AIStoreHub Package Vault: App Store Compliance
Package Slug: app-store-compliance
Archetype: agent
Upstream Repository: https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance
Workspace Files & Specifications (68 files)
- agent-os/commands/app-store-audit.md (4230 bytes)
--- description: Run an enterprise pre submission compliance audit on an iOS or Android app against Apple App Store and Google Play rejection rules. Pass a project path or run from the project root. --- # App Store Audit Run a full pre submission compliance audit on a mobile app project so it passes review on the first try. Use before any submission, or after a rejection to build the fix and appeal plan. ## What to do 1. Resolve the target. Use the path the user passed as an argument, otherwise the current working directory. 2. Run the automated guard against the project root and capture the ranked findings. ``` bash ~/.claude/hooks/app-store-compliance-guard.sh <project-path> ``` 2b. Load the structured references for full context. From `~/.claude/skills/app-store-compliance/references/` load the by app type file that matches the app and the relevant rule category files, so the audit reasons from the full guideline set, not only the guard output. Offer the user `templates/REVIEW-NOTES-TEMPLATE.md` for a new submission. 2c. Run the metadata layer. If the user pulled the listing into a metadata directory, run `python3 ~/.claude/skills/app-store-compliance/scripts/metadata-audit.py <metadata-dir>` to audit the real store listing, and `--propose` to write suggested fixes. The pull step is `scripts/pull-metadata.sh apple`. A large share of rejections live in the listing text. 2d. Run the Apple Developer requirements monitor. Run `python3 ~/.claude/skills/app-store-compliance/scripts/monitor.py --project <project-path>` to monitor updates to 25 critical tracks against Apple Developer announcements, identify affected files, generate migration tasks, estimate release impact, and draft pull requests. 3. Run the human checks the scanner cannot see, from `~/.claude/skills/app-store-compliance/docs/PRE-SUBMISSION-CHECKLIST.md`. - The production backend is live and stays up during review. - A working demo account exists, with no 2FA the reviewer cannot pass, not expired, pre populated with data. - The Apple privacy nutrition labels and the privacy manifest, and the Google Data Safety form, match the real runtime behavior including every SDK. - Screenshots show the app in use, the listing claims only what the app does. - For a new Google personal account, the closed test of 12 testers over 14 days is complete. - The 2026 Apple age rating questionnaire is answered. - For any app reaching EU, US, or other-global users, load and check the legal layer. `docs/EU-REGULATORY-2026.md` (the EU AI Act, the DMA and the Core Technology Fee, DSA trader status, the European Accessibility Act) and `docs/GLOBAL-REGULATORY-2026.md` (COPPA, the US state App Store Accountability Acts, the external-link rules, the UK, Australia, Brazil, Canada, South Korea, India, and more, plus Apple's cross-region age-assurance spine). Store review does not check these, and several are release blockers with real fines. - Load and check the platform-mechanics gates for the app's type. `docs/PLATFORM-MECHANICS-2026.md` (macOS notarization, Guideline 4.2 and 4.3, reader apps, France ANSSI encryption, visionOS and watchOS and tvOS specifics, Android developer verification, Foreground Service types, Play Integrity, Play Billing v8, target API, Health Connect, and the cross-cutting CSAM, UGC, accessibility, deletion-URL, sanctions, and PCI items). These are current, common, blocking causes the base maps did not carry. 4. Produce a ranked findings table. The pattern id, the platform, the cited guideline, the severity, the concrete fix, and the file or setting to change. Order by severity. Mark every critical as a release blocker. 5. If the app was already rejected, find the matching pattern in `~/.claude/skills/app-store-compliance/data/rejection-patterns.json`, apply the fix, then follow the appeal playbook in the docs. Never resubmit an unchanged build. 6. Give a clear verdict. Clear to submit, or blocked with a numbered fix list. Never report clear while a critical finding stands. ## Reference - Skill. `~/.claude/skills/app-store-compliance/` - Guard. `~/.claude/hooks/app-store-compliance-guard.sh` - Public playbook. https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance
- agent-os/hooks/app-store-compliance-guard-test.sh (246488 bytes)
#!/usr/bin/env bash # Test gauntlet for app-store-compliance-guard.sh # Covers positive, negative, override, fail-open, hook-mode silence, and stress cases. # @register: no set -uo pipefail HERE="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)" GUARD="$HERE/app-store-compliance-guard.sh" [ -x "$GUARD" ] || GUARD="bash $HERE/app-store-compliance-guard.sh" PASS=0; FAIL=0 ok() { PASS=$((PASS+1)); printf 'PASS %s\n' "$1"; } bad() { FAIL=$((FAIL+1)); printf 'FAIL %s\n' "$1"; } # A privacy manifest is a plist. The validator rejects anything it cannot parse, so fixtures carry a real one. PLIST_EMPTY='<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><plist version="1.0"><dict/></plist>' mk_ios_bad() { local d; d="$(mktemp -d)"; mkdir -p "$d/App" printf '<plist><dict></dict></plist>' > "$d/App/Info.plist" printf 'import CoreLocation\nclass A { func signIn(){} func createAccount(){} }\nlet m=CLLocationManager()\nlet u="https://staging.example.com"\nimport Stripe\n' > "$d/App/X.swift" echo "$d" } mk_ios_clean() { local d; d="$(mktemp -d)"; mkdir -p "$d/App" printf '<plist><dict><key>NSCameraUsageDescription</key><string>Scan receipts to log expenses</string><key>NSLocationWhenInUseUsageDescription</key><string>Show nearby stores on the map</string><key>ITSAppUsesNonExemptEncryption</key><false/></dict></plist>' > "$d/App/Info.plist" printf '%s' "$PLIST_EMPTY" > "$d/App/PrivacyInfo.xcprivacy" printf 'import StoreKit\nimport CoreLocation\nimport AVFoundation\nclass A { func signIn(){} func createAccount(){} func deleteAccount(){} func restorePurchases(){} }\nlet dev=AVCaptureDevice.default(for:.video)\nlet m=CLLocationManager()\nlet p="https://api.realbackend.io"\nlet policy="https://realbackend.io/privacy-policy"\nlet prod:SKProduct?=nil\n' > "$d/App/X.swift" echo "$d" } mk_android_bad() { local d; d="$(mktemp -d)"; mkdir -p "$d/app/src/main" printf '<manifest><uses-permission android:name="android.permission.ACCESS_BACKGROUND_LOCATION"/></manifest>' > "$d/app/src/main/AndroidManifest.xml" printf 'android { defaultConfig { targetSdkVersion 30 } }\n' > "$d/app/build.gradle" echo "$d" } # The four known FALSE-POSITIVE scenarios, which must all stay SILENT: a localhost only inside # #if DEBUG (never shipped), a location usage description in the modern INFOPLIST_KEY build-setting # form, example.com used as test input inside a Tests dir (never shipped), and the bare word "Adjust". mk_ios_precision_safe() { local d; d="$(mktemp -d)"; mkdir -p "$d/App.xcodeproj" "$d/App" "$d/AppTests" printf 'INFOPLIST_KEY_NSLocationWhenInUseUsageDescription = "for prayer times";\nITSAppUsesNonExemptEncryption = NO;\n' > "$d/App.xcodeproj/project.pbxproj" printf '%s' "$PLIST_EMPTY" > "$d/App/PrivacyInfo.xcprivacy" printf 'import CoreLocation\nimport SwiftUI\nlet m = CLLocationManager()\nlet policy = "https://app.com/privacy-policy"\nvar base: String {\n#if DEBUG\nreturn "http://localhost:8787"\n#else\nreturn "https://prod.app.com"\n#endif\n}\nstruct V: View { var body: some View { TextField("Search", text: .constant("")) } }\nlet label = "Adjust times"\n' > "$d/App/Main.swift" printf 'let testURL = "https://example.com/x"\n' > "$d/AppTests/T.swift" echo "$d" } # The SAME four categories as REAL shipped violations, which must all FIRE (no blind spot): a # release-reachable localhost string, CLLocationManager with no usage description, a real tracking # SDK (AdjustConfig), and lorem ipsum in shipped (non-test) source. mk_ios_precision_real() { local d; d="$(mktemp -d)"; mkdir -p "$d/App.xcodeproj" "$d/App" printf 'X=1;\n' > "$d/App.xcodeproj/project.pbxproj" printf 'import CoreLocation\nimport AdjustSdk\nlet m = CLLocationManager()\nlet staging = "http://localhost:9000"\nlet cfg = AdjustConfig(appToken:"x")\nlet copy = "lorem ipsum dolor sit"\n' > "$d/App/Main.swift" echo "$d" } mk_ios_bad_nutrition() { local d; d="$(mktemp -d)"; mkdir -p "$d/App" printf '<plist><dict></dict></plist>' > "$d/App/Info.plist" printf 'import Foundation\nlet email = "[email protected]"\n' > "$d/App/X.swift" echo "$d" } mk_android_bad_privacy() { local d; d="$(mktemp -d)"; mkdir -p "$d/app/src/main" printf '<manifest xmlns:android="http://schemas.android.com/apk/res/android"><uses-permission android:name="com.google.android.gms.permission.AD_ID"/><uses-permission android:name="android.permission.READ_STEPS"/><uses-permission android:name="android.permission.READ_CONTACTS"/></manifest>' > "$d/app/src/main/AndroidManifest.xml" printf 'android { defaultConfig { targetSdkVersion 34 } }\n' > "$d/app/build.gradle" printf 'class MyActivity { void test() { requestPermissions(new String[]{"camera"}, 1); HealthConnectClient client = null; contacts = "john"; } }\n' > "$d/app/src/main/MyActivity.java" echo "$d" } mk_web_bad() { local d; d="$(mktemp -d)"; mkdir -p "$d" printf '{"name": "test-web"}' > "$d/package.json" printf '<html><body><script>localStorage.setItem("token", "secret"); sessionStorage.setItem("session", "xyz"); indexedDB.open("db"); gtag("event", "test"); document.cookie = "user=john"; processData("sensitivedata");</script></body></html>' > "$d/index.html" echo "$d" } mk_web_clean() { local d; d="$(mktemp -d)"; mkdir -p "$d" printf '{"name": "test-web"}' > "$d/package.json" printf '<html><body><script>encryptedStorage("token"); clearSessionStorage(); encryptDatabase(); consentTracking(); cookieBanner(); GDPR();</script></body></html>' > "$d/index.html" echo "$d" } # Flutter with a required-reason plugin and no PrivacyInfo.xcprivacy anywhere. mk_flutter_bad() { local d; d="$(mktemp -d)"; mkdir -p "$d/ios/Runner" "$d/lib" printf 'name: t\ndependencies:\n permission_handler: ^11.0.0\n' > "$d/pubspec.yaml" printf "import 'package:permission_handler/permission_handler.dart';\nvoid main(){Permission.camera.request();}\n" > "$d/lib/main.dart" printf '<plist><dict></dict></plist>' > "$d/ios/Runner/Info.plist" echo "$d" } # React Native + an undisclosed OTA updater (CodePush). mk_rn_bad() { local d; d="$(mktemp -d)"; mkdir -p "$d/ios/App" printf '{"dependencies":{"react-native":"0.74.0","react-native-code-push":"^8.0.0"}}' > "$d/package.json" printf 'import codePush from "react-native-code-push";\ncodePush.sync();\n' > "$d/App.tsx" printf '<plist><dict></dict></plist>' > "$d/ios/App/Info.plist" echo "$d" } # Ionic/Capacitor thin wrapper. WebView present, fewer than 2 native-feel plugins. mk_ionic_thin_wrapper() { local d; d="$(mktemp -d)"; mkdir -p "$d/ios/App" "$d/src" printf '{"dependencies":{"@capacitor/core":"^6.0.0","@ionic/angular":"^8.0.0"}}' > "$d/package.json" printf 'export default {};' > "$d/capacitor.config.ts" printf "import { Capacitor } from '@capacitor/core';\nconst wv = new WKWebView();\n" > "$d/src/app.ts" printf '<plist><dict></dict></plist>' > "$d/ios/App/Info.plist" echo "$d" } # Same shape but with 3 distinct native-feel plugins. Thin-wrapper must NOT fire. mk_ionic_native_shell() { local d; d="$(mktemp -d)"; mkdir -p "$d/ios/App" "$d/src" printf '{"dependencies":{"@capacitor/core":"^6.0.0","@ionic/angular":"^8.0.0"}}' > "$d/package.json" printf 'export default {};' > "$d/capacitor.config.ts" printf "import { Capacitor } from '@capacitor/core';\nimport '@capacitor/status-bar';\nimport '@capacitor/splash-screen';\nimport '@capacitor/push-notifications';\nconst wv = new WKWebView();\n" > "$d/src/app.ts" printf '<plist><dict></dict></plist>' > "$d/ios/App/Info.plist" echo "$d" } # Flutter, Android-only (no ios/ folder at all). The iOS-only privacy-manifest check must # NOT fire, since flutter build appbundle/apk never touches Info.plist or PrivacyInfo.xcprivacy. mk_flutter_android_only() { local d; d="$(mktemp -d)"; mkdir -p "$d/android/app/src/main" "$d/lib" printf 'name: t\ndependencies:\n permission_handler: ^11.0.0\n' > "$d/pubspec.yaml" printf "import 'package:permission_handler/permission_handler.dart';\nvoid main(){Permission.camera.request();}\n" > "$d/lib/main.dart" printf '<manifest xmlns:android="http://schemas.android.com/apk/res/android"></manifest>' > "$d/android/app/src/main/AndroidManifest.xml" echo "$d" } # Monorepo layout: root package.json is tooling-only, the real RN app lives at apps/mobile/. mk_rn_monorepo() { local d; d="$(mktemp -d)"; mkdir -p "$d/apps/mobile/ios/App" printf '{"name":"tooling-root","private":true}' > "$d/package.json" printf '{"dependencies":{"react-native":"0.74.0"}}' > "$d/apps/mobile/package.json" printf '<plist><dict></dict></plist>' > "$d/apps/mobile/ios/App/Info.plist" echo "$d" } # A config.xml that is NOT Cordova (no <widget>/xmlns:cdv marker). Must not flip IS_IONIC. mk_unrelated_config_xml() { local d; d="$(mktemp -d)"; mkdir -p "$d/ios/App" printf '<configuration><appSettings></appSettings></configuration>' > "$d/config.xml" printf '<plist><dict></dict></plist>' > "$d/ios/App/Info.plist" echo "$d" } # The real-world Codex-found scenario: a full cross-platform Flutter repo with BOTH ios/ and # android/ folders committed (the normal case), building only for Android. mk_flutter_both_platforms() { local d; d="$(mktemp -d)"; mkdir -p "$d/ios/Runner" "$d/android/app/src/main" "$d/lib" printf 'name: t\ndependencies:\n permission_handler: ^11.0.0\n' > "$d/pubspec.yaml" printf "import 'package:permission_handler/permission_handler.dart';\nvoid main(){Permission.camera.request();}\n" > "$d/lib/main.dart" printf '<plist><dict></dict></plist>' > "$d/ios/Runner/Info.plist" printf '<manifest xmlns:android="http://schemas.android.com/apk/res/android"></manifest>' > "$d/android/app/src/main/AndroidManifest.xml" echo "$d" } # 1 positive. iOS with violations blocks D="$(mk_ios_bad)"; OUT="$(bash "$GUARD" "$D" 2>&1)"; RC=$? echo "$OUT" | grep -q 'CRITICAL' && [ "$RC" -eq 2 ] && ok "iOS violations block (exit 2, has CRITICAL)" || bad "iOS violations block" rm -rf "$D" # 2 positive. Android background location blocks D="$(mk_android_bad)"; OUT="$(bash "$GUARD" "$D" 2>&1)"; RC=$? echo "$OUT" | grep -q 'GOOGLE-PERM-BACKGROUND-LOCATION' && [ "$RC" -eq 2 ] && ok "Android bg location blocks" || bad "Android bg location blocks" rm -rf "$D" # 3 negative. Clean iOS passes D="$(mk_ios_clean)"; OUT="$(bash "$GUARD" "$D" 2>&1)"; RC=$? if [ "$RC" -eq 0 ]; then ok "Clean iOS passes (exit 0)"; else bad "Clean iOS passes (got $RC) :: $(echo "$OUT" | grep CRITICAL)"; fi rm -rf "$D" # 4 override. APP_STORE_GUARD_OK=1 allows despite critical D="$(mk_ios_bad)"; OUT="$(APP_STORE_GUARD_OK=1 bash "$GUARD" "$D" 2>&1)"; RC=$? [ "$RC" -eq 0 ] && ok "Override allows critical (exit 0)" || bad "Override allows critical (got $RC)" rm -rf "$D" # 5 hook mode. Non-submission command stays silent OUT="$(printf '{"tool_input":{"command":"ls -la"}}' | bash "$GUARD" 2>&1)"; RC=$? [ -z "$OUT" ] && [ "$RC" -eq 0 ] && ok "Hook mode silent on non-submission command" || bad "Hook mode silent (rc=$RC out=$OUT)" # 6 hook mode. Submission command runs the scan D="$(mk_ios_bad)"; OUT="$(printf '{"tool_input":{"command":"fastlane deliver --submit"}}' | CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR="$D" bash "$GUARD" 2>&1)"; RC=$? echo "$OUT" | grep -q 'App Store Compliance Guard' && [ "$RC" -eq 2 ] && ok "Hook mode runs scan on submission command" || bad "Hook mode runs scan (rc=$RC)" rm -rf "$D" # 7 a non-existent dir does not crash and never reads as a clean pass OUT="$(bash "$GUARD" /no/such/dir/here 2>&1)"; RC=$? [ "$RC" -eq 1 ] && ok "Missing dir is reported (exit 1)" || bad "Missing dir is reported (got $RC)" # 8 stress. Malformed JSON stdin does not crash OUT="$(printf '%s' '{not valid json [[[ command : oops }}}' | bash "$GUARD" 2>&1)"; RC=$? [ "$RC" -eq 0 ] && ok "Malformed JSON stdin fail-open" || bad "Malformed JSON stdin (got $RC)" # 9 stress. Empty stdin does not hang or crash. /tmp may hold no app at all, which is exit 1 (not checked). OUT="$(printf '' | bash "$GUARD" /tmp 2>&1)"; RC=$? [ "$RC" -eq 0 ] || [ "$RC" -eq 1 ] || [ "$RC" -eq 2 ] && ok "Empty stdin handled" || bad "Empty stdin handled (got $RC)" # 9b fail-open. Hook mode with an empty payload must not fall back to scanning the working directory D="$(mk_ios_bad)"; OUT="$(cd "$D" && printf '' | bash "$GUARD" 2>&1)"; RC=$? [ "$RC" -eq 0 ] && [ -z "$OUT" ] && ok "Empty hook payload exits 0 without scanning cwd" || bad "Empty hook payload scanned cwd (rc=$RC)" rm -rf "$D" # 10 precision. The four known false-positive scenarios must NOT fire (no false alarms). D="$(mk_ios_precision_safe)"; OUT="$(bash "$GUARD" "$D" 2>&1)"; RC=$? if echo "$OUT" | grep -Eq 'STAGING-BACKEND|MISSING-USAGE-DESCRIPTION|BOTH-PLACEHOLDER|MISSING-ATT' || [ "$RC" -ne 0 ]; then bad "Precision: false positives silent (rc=$RC, leaked: $(echo "$OUT" | grep -Eo 'STAGING-BACKEND|MISSING-USAGE-DESCRIPTION|BOTH-PLACEHOLDER|MISSING-ATT' | paste -sd, -))" else ok "Precision: #if-DEBUG localhost, INFOPLIST_KEY location, example.com-in-Tests, word Adjust all stay silent"; fi rm -rf "$D" # 11 no blind spot. The SAME four categories as real shipped violations must STILL fire. D="$(mk_ios_precision_real)"; OUT="$(bash "$GUARD" "$D" 2>&1)" MISS="" for pat in STAGING-BACKEND MISSING-USAGE-DESCRIPTION BOTH-PLACEHOLDER MISSING-ATT; do echo "$OUT" | grep -q "$pat" || MISS="$MISS $pat" done [ -z "$MISS" ] && ok "No blind spot: release localhost, no-usage location, AdjustConfig, lorem ipsum all still fire" || bad "No blind spot: missed$MISS" rm -rf "$D" # 12 Apple Privacy Nutrition Labels violation blocks D="$(mk_ios_bad_nutrition)"; OUT="$(bash "$GUARD" "$D" 2>&1)"; RC=$? echo "$OUT" | grep -q 'APPLE-PRIVACY-NUTRITION-LABELS' && ok "Apple missing nutrition labels blocks" || bad "Apple missing nutrition labels blocks" rm -rf "$D" # 13 Android user disclosures, AD_ID, runtime permission checks, health permissions block D="$(mk_android_bad_privacy)"; OUT="$(bash "$GUARD" "$D" 2>&1)"; RC=$? MISS_AND="" for pat in ANDROID-USER-DATA-DISCLOSURE ANDROID-ADVERTISING-ID ANDROID-RUNTIME-PERMISSIONS ANDROID-HEALTH-PERMISSIONS; do echo "$OUT" | grep -q "$pat" || MISS_AND="$MISS_AND $pat" done [ -z "$MISS_AND" ] && ok "Android bad privacy checks all fire" || bad "Android bad privacy checks missed:$MISS_AND" rm -rf "$D" # 14 Web bad privacy checks (GDPR, cookie, localStorage, sessionStorage, IndexedDB, tracking) D="$(mk_web_bad)"; OUT="$(bash "$GUARD" "$D" 2>&1)"; RC=$? MISS_WEB="" for pat in WEB-GDPR-COMPLIANCE WEB-COOKIE-CONSENT WEB-LOCAL-STORAGE WEB-SESSION-STORAGE WEB-INDEXEDDB WEB-TRACKING-TECHNOLOGIES; do echo "$OUT" | grep -q "$pat" || MISS_WEB="$MISS_WEB $pat" done [ -z "$MISS_WEB" ] && [ "$RC" -eq 2 ] && ok "Web bad privacy checks all fire (exit 2)" || bad "Web bad privacy checks missed:$MISS_WEB or wrong exit code ($RC)" rm -rf "$D" # 15 Web clean privacy checks pass D="$(mk_web_clean)"; OUT="$(bash "$GUARD" "$D" 2>&1)"; RC=$? if [ "$RC" -eq 0 ] && ! echo "$OUT" | grep -q 'WEB-'; then ok "Web clean privacy passes (exit 0)" else bad "Web clean privacy passes (got $RC) :: $(echo "$OUT" | grep -E 'WEB- - agent-os/hooks/app-store-compliance-guard.sh (128590 bytes)
#!/usr/bin/env bash # App Store Compliance Guard. Native and cross-platform (Flutter, RN/Expo, Ionic/Capacitor). # Standalone or PreToolUse Bash hook on a submit command. See docs/CROSS-PLATFORM-FRAMEWORKS.md. # @event: PreToolUse # @matcher: Bash set -uo pipefail HOOK_LOG="${HOME:-}/.claude/hooks/hook-log.sh" # shellcheck disable=SC1090 [ -f "$HOOK_LOG" ] && source "$HOOK_LOG" 2>/dev/null || true log_err() { if type hlog_error >/dev/null 2>&1; then hlog_error "app-store-compliance-guard" "$@"; else echo "app-store-compliance-guard: $*" >&2; fi; } CRIT=0; HIGH=0; MED=0; ANY_IOS=0; ANY_AND=0; ANY_NATIVE=0; ANY_RN=0; ANY_WEB=0; ANY_NEEDS_NATIVE=0; NATIVE_HINT=""; UNCHECKED=""; EXPO_READ=0 FILELIST="" REPORT=""; REPORT_DEGRADED=0 cleanup() { [ -n "$FILELIST" ] && rm -f "$FILELIST" "$FILELIST.blob" "$FILELIST.manifest" "$FILELIST.code" "$FILELIST.impl" 2>/dev/null; [ -n "$REPORT" ] && rm -f "$REPORT" 2>/dev/null; true; } trap cleanup EXIT # ----- resolve mode and project dir ----- DIR="" STDIN_JSON="" CMD="" if [ "$#" -ge 1 ] && [ -d "$1" ]; then DIR="$1" # standalone with explicit path elif [ "$#" -ge 1 ] && [ ! -d "$1" ]; then # An explicit path that is not a directory is a typo. Say so and exit 1, a path that was not read is never a pass. echo "app-store-compliance-guard: $1 is not a directory. Nothing was scanned." >&2; exit 1 elif [ ! -t 0 ]; then STDIN_JSON="$(cat 2>/dev/null || true)" # hook mode, payload on stdin # An empty hook payload has no command to judge; falling back to scanning the working directory can take minutes. [ -z "$STDIN_JSON" ] && exit 0 fi # Cursor beforeShellExecution reads a permission object on stdout, prose there is a schema error (cursor.com/docs/hooks). IS_CURSOR=0; CURSOR_SENT=0; CURSOR_FD=0; CURSOR_IDS="" printf '%s' "$STDIN_JSON" | tr -d '\n\r' | grep -qE '"hook_event_name"[[:space:]]*:[[:space:]]*"beforeShellExecution"' && IS_CURSOR=1 cursor_reply() { # $1 exit code about to be returned. Prints the permission JSON once, on the real stdout [ "$IS_CURSOR" -eq 1 ] && [ "$CURSOR_SENT" -eq 0 ] || return 0 CURSOR_SENT=1 if [ "$1" -eq 2 ]; then local why="with ${CRIT:-0} critical rejection risk(s)" [ "${CRIT:-0}" -eq 0 ] && why="because the scan did not finish" printf '{"permission":"deny","user_message":"App Store Compliance Guard blocked this submit %s.","agent_message":"Blocked by app-store-compliance-guard %s. Critical findings. %s Fix each one using the report on stderr, or set APP_STORE_GUARD_OK=1 to override."}\n' "$why" "$why" "${CURSOR_IDS:-none listed.}" else printf '{"permission":"allow"}\n' fi } # Read .tool_input.command as JSON (issue #610). The best installed parser decides. jq, else python3, # else a backslash-aware regex. A payload the chosen parser rejects yields no command, so the guard stays silent. tool_ok() { command -v "$1" >/dev/null 2>&1 && "$@" >/dev/null 2>&1; } # present AND able to run payload_command() { local out if tool_ok jq -n true; then out="$(printf '%s' "$STDIN_JSON" | jq -rs 'if length != 1 then empty else .[0] | if type != "object" then empty else (.tool_name? // .toolName? // (if (.tool_info.command_line? | type) == "string" then "shell" else "Bash" end)) as $t | if (($t | type) != "string") or ((["Bash","PowerShell","bash","powershell","run_shell_command","shell","Execute","launch-process","execute_bash","execute_cmd","runInTerminal","run_in_terminal","run_terminal_command","run_terminal_cmd","monitor","execute_pwsh"] | any(. == $t)) | not) then empty else ((.tool_input.command? | strings) // (.toolInput.command? | strings) // (.toolArgs? | if type == "string" then (try fromjson catch null) else . end | if type == "object" then (.command? | strings) else empty end) // (.tool_info.command_line? | strings) // (.command? | strings) // empty) end end end' 2>/dev/null)" && { printf '%s' "$out"; return 0; } fi if tool_ok python3 -c pass; then out="$(printf '%s' "$STDIN_JSON" | python3 -c ' import json, sys try: d = json.loads(sys.stdin.buffer.read().decode("utf-8-sig")) except Exception: sys.exit(4) c = None SHELLS = ("Bash", "PowerShell", "bash", "powershell", "run_shell_command", "shell", "Execute", "launch-process", "execute_bash", "execute_cmd", "runInTerminal", "run_in_terminal", "run_terminal_command", "run_terminal_cmd", "monitor", "execute_pwsh") info = d.get("tool_info") if isinstance(d, dict) else None default = "shell" if isinstance(info, dict) and isinstance(info.get("command_line"), str) else "Bash" t = d.get("tool_name", d.get("toolName", default)) if isinstance(d, dict) else None if isinstance(d, dict) and isinstance(t, str) and t in SHELLS: ti = d.get("tool_input") if not isinstance(ti, dict) and isinstance(d.get("toolInput"), dict): ti = d["toolInput"] if not isinstance(ti, dict) and isinstance(info, dict) and isinstance(info.get("command_line"), str): ti = {"command": info["command_line"]} ta = d.get("toolArgs") if isinstance(ta, str): try: ta = json.loads(ta) except Exception: ta = None if isinstance(ti, dict) and isinstance(ti.get("command"), str): c = ti["command"] elif isinstance(ta, dict) and isinstance(ta.get("command"), str): c = ta["command"] elif isinstance(d.get("command"), str): c = d["command"] sys.stdout.buffer.write((c or "").encode("utf-8"))' 2>/dev/null)"; rc=$? [ "$rc" -eq 0 ] && { printf '%s' "$out"; return 0; } [ "$rc" -eq 4 ] && return 0 fi # No working tool. Prefer the command inside tool_input, then a Copilot toolArgs JSON string, then the first command key. local body ta tn # A named tool that is not a shell stays quiet here too, the same list jq and python3 use. tn="$(printf '%s' "$STDIN_JSON" | tr -d '\n\r' | grep -oE '"(tool_name|toolName)"[[:space:]]*:[[:space:]]*"[^"]*"' | head -1 | sed -E 's/.*:[[:space:]]*"//; s/"$//')" if [ -n "$tn" ] && [ "$(printf '%s' "$STDIN_JSON" | grep -oE '"(tool_name|toolName)"[[:space:]]*:' | wc -l | tr -d ' ')" -eq 1 ]; then case "$tn" in Bash|PowerShell|bash|powershell|run_shell_command|shell|Execute|launch-process|execute_bash|execute_cmd|runInTerminal|run_in_terminal|run_terminal_command|run_terminal_cmd|monitor|execute_pwsh) ;; *) return 0 ;; esac fi body="$(printf '%s' "$STDIN_JSON" | tr -d '\n\r' | grep -oE '"tool_input"[[:space:]]*:[[:space:]]*\{([^{}]|\{[^{}]*\})*"command"[[:space:]]*:[[:space:]]*"([^"\\]|\\.)*"' | head -1)" if [ -z "$body" ]; then ta="$(printf '%s' "$STDIN_JSON" | tr -d '\n\r' | grep -oE '"toolArgs"[[:space:]]*:[[:space:]]*"([^"\\]|\\.)*"' | head -1 | sed -E 's/^"toolArgs"[[:space:]]*:[[:space:]]*"//; s/"$//')" [ -n "$ta" ] && body="$(printf '%s' "$ta" | json_unescape | tr -d '\n\r' | grep -oE '"command"[[:space:]]*:[[:space:]]*"([^"\\]|\\.)*"' | head -1)" fi [ -z "$body" ] && body="$(printf '%s' "$STDIN_JSON" | tr -d '\n\r' | grep -oE '"command"[[:space:]]*:[[:space:]]*"([^"\\]|\\.)*"' | head -1)" [ -z "$body" ] && body="$(printf '%s' "$STDIN_JSON" | tr -d '\n\r' | grep -oE '"command_line"[[:space:]]*:[[:space:]]*"([^"\\]|\\.)*"' | head -1 | sed 's/"command_line"/"command"/')" [ -z "$body" ] && return 0 printf '%s' "$body" | sed -E 's/.*"command"[[:space:]]*:[[:space:]]*"//; s/"$//' | json_unescape } # Decodes JSON string escapes on stdin (newline, tab, quote, ASCII \u), for the no-tools tier. json_unescape() { awk 'BEGIN { hx="0123456789abcdef" } { n=split($0, part, /\\/); o=part[1]; lit=0 for (i=2; i<=n; i++) { p=part[i] if (lit) { o=o p; lit=0; continue } if (p=="") { o=o "\\"; lit=1; continue } d=substr(p,1,1); rest=substr(p,2) if (d=="n") o=o "\n" rest; else if (d=="t") o=o "\t" rest; else if (d=="r") o=o "\r" rest else if (d=="\"") o=o "\"" rest; else if (d=="/") o=o "/" rest else if (d=="f") o=o sprintf("%c", 12) rest; else if (d=="b") o=o sprintf("%c", 8) rest else if (d=="u" && length(p)>=5) { h=tolower(substr(p,2,4)); v=0; ok=1 for (j=1;j<=4;j++) { q=index(hx,substr(h,j,1)); if (q==0) {ok=0; break}; v=v*16+q-1 } if (ok && v>0 && v<128) o=o sprintf("%c", v) substr(p,6); else o=o "\\" p } else o=o "\\" p } printf "%s", o }' } # The working folder another harness reports in the payload (Codex, Gemini CLI, Cursor, Copilot CLI send cwd). payload_cwd() { if tool_ok jq -n true; then printf '%s' "$STDIN_JSON" | jq -rs 'if length == 1 and (.[0] | type) == "object" then .[0] | ((.cwd? | strings) // (.tool_info.cwd? | strings) // (.working_dir? | strings) // (.tool_input.cwd? | strings) // (.workspace_roots[0]? | strings) // empty) else empty end' 2>/dev/null return 0 fi if tool_ok python3 -c pass; then printf '%s' "$STDIN_JSON" | python3 -c ' import json, sys try: d = json.loads(sys.stdin.buffer.read().decode("utf-8-sig")) except Exception: sys.exit(0) c = None if isinstance(d, dict): ti, info, roots = d.get("tool_input"), d.get("tool_info"), d.get("workspace_roots") for v in (d.get("cwd"), info.get("cwd") if isinstance(info, dict) else None, d.get("working_dir"), ti.get("cwd") if isinstance(ti, dict) else None, roots[0] if isinstance(roots, list) and roots else None): if isinstance(v, str) and v: c = v break sys.stdout.write(c or "")' 2>/dev/null fi } if [ -n "$STDIN_JSON" ]; then # Only a shell tool call (Bash, run_shell_command, Grok run_terminal_command, and kin) carries a shell command. The jq and python3 tiers check the top-level tool_name. # The no-tools tier cannot tell a top-level key from a nested one, so it scans rather than skips. CMD="$(payload_command 2>/dev/null | tr -d '\000')" # Fold a backslash-newline continuation (odd trailing backslashes) into one space. Bare newlines stay, # and grep matches per line, so a trigger split across two commands is never invented. CMD="$(printf '%s' "$CMD" | tr -d '\r' | awk ' { l=$0; if (cont) { sub(/^[ \t]*/, "", l); cont=0 } n=length(l); k=0; while (k<n && substr(l,n-k,1)=="\\") k++ if (k%2==1) { acc=acc substr(l,1,n-1) " "; cont=1 } else { printf "%s%s\n", acc, l; acc="" } } END { if (cont) printf "%s\n", acc }' 2>/dev/null)" [ -z "$CMD" ] && exit 0 # A commit, tag, note, or gh PR or issue message is text. Its quoted -m, --body, or --title value is blanked, # Only inside that git or gh segment, never a later command's, and never when the segment holds any substitution. IFS= read -r -d '' INERT_AWK <<'INERT' BEGIN { sq=sprintf("%c", 39); dq="\""; bt=sprintf("%c", 96) } function msgflag(w) { return w ~ /^(-[A-Za-z]*m|--message|-b|--body|-t|--title)$/ } function blank(s, o, i, n, c, w, prev, j, body) { o=""; w=""; prev=""; i=1; n=length(s) while (i <= n) { c=substr(s, i, 1) if (c == " " || c == "\t") { if (w != "") { prev=w; w="" }; o=o c; i++; continue } if (c == "\\") { o=o substr(s, i, 2); w=w substr(s, i, 2); i+=2; continue } if (c == sq || c == dq) { j=i+1; while (j <= n && substr(s, j, 1) != c) { if (c == dq && substr(s, j, 1) == "\\") j++; j++ } body=substr(s, i+1, j-i-1) if (j <= n && ((w == "" && msgflag(prev)) || (w ~ /=$/ && msgflag(substr(w, 1, length(w)-1)))) && (c == sq || (index(body, "$") == 0 && index(body, bt) == 0))) { o=o c c; w=w c c; i=j+1; continue } o=o substr(s, i, j-i+1); w=w substr(s, i, j-i+1); i=j+1; continue } o=o c; w=w c; i++ } return o } function seg(s, t) { if (index(s, "$(") || index(s, bt) || index(s, "<(") || index(s, ">(") || index(s, "=(")) return s t=s; sub(/^[ \t({!]+/, "", t) while (t ~ /^[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*=[^ \t]*[ \t]+/) sub(/^[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*=[^ \t]*[ \t]+/, "", t) if (t ~ /^git([ \t]+-C[ \t]+[^ \t]+)?[ \t]+(commit|tag|notes)([ \t]|$)/ || t ~ /^gh[ \t]+(pr|issue)[ \t]+(create|comment|edit)([ \t]|$)/) return blank(s) return s } { l=$0; n=length(l); cur=""; out=""; q=""; i=1 while (i <= n) { c=substr(l, i, 1) if (q != "") { if (c == "\\" && q == dq) { cur=cur substr(l, i, 2); i+=2; continue }; if (c == q) q=""; cur=cur c; i++; continue } if (c == "\\") { cur=cur substr(l, i, 2); i+=2; continue } if (c == sq || c == dq) { q=c; cur=cur c; i++; continue } if (c == ";" || c == "|" || c == "&") { out=out seg(cur) c; cur=""; i++; continue } cur=cur c; i++ } raw[NR]=l; msk[NR]=out seg(cur); if (q != "") open=1 } END { for (k=1; k<=NR; k++) print (open ? raw[k] : msk[k]) } INERT # Match raw with quotes and letter escapes stripped. Only a single simple line led by an inert text command # (echo, grep, cat) has quoted spans blanked, and a heredoc body is blanked unless an interpreter consumes it. CMD_MATCH="$( { printf '%s\n' "$CMD" | awk "$INERT_AWK" 2>/dev/null || printf '%s' "$CMD"; } | awk 'BEGIN { sq=sprintf("%c", 39); dq="\""; bt=sprintf("%c", 96); hd=0 } { l=$0 if (hd) { t=l; sub(/^\t+/, "", t); if (t == hd_end) { hd=0 } else if (!hd_keep) { l="" } ; print l; next } if (match(l, /<<-?[ \t]*[\047"]?[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*[\047"]?/) && substr(l, RSTART+2, 1) != "<") { tag=substr(l, RSTART, RLENGTH); sub(/^<<-?[ \t]*/, "", tag); gsub(/[\047"]/, "", tag); hd=1; hd_end=tag hd_keep = (l ~ /(^|[^A-Za-z0-9_\/-])((ba|z|da|k)?sh|eval|ssh|sudo|su|xargs|python[0-9.]*|node|ruby|perl|docker|kubectl|source)([^A-Za-z0-9_-]|$)/) } f=l; sub(/^[ \t]*/, "", f) while (f ~ /^[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*=[^ \t]*[ \t]+/) sub(/^[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*=[^ \t]*[ \t]+/, "", f) split(f, w, /[ \t]+/); c=w[1] simple = (index(l, "$(") == 0 && index(l, bt) == 0 && l !~ /[|;&<>]/) if (simple && c ~ /^(echo|printf|grep|egrep|fgrep|cat|head|tail|wc|sort|uniq|tee)$/) { gsub(sq "[^" sq "]*" sq, sq sq, l); gsub(dq "[^" dq "]*" dq, dq dq, l); sub(/(^|[ \t])#.*$/, "", l) } else { gsub(sq, "", l); gsub(dq, "", l) } print l }' 2>/dev/null | sed -E 's/\\([A-Za-z0-9])/\1/g')" # Only act on submission style commands. Otherwise stay silent. # Installing a package named like a submit tool (npm install bundletool) is not a submit. CMD_MATCH="$(printf '%s' "$CMD_MATCH" | sed -E 's/(npm|pnpm|yarn|bun|brew|pip3?|gem|cargo)[[:space:]]+(install|add|i|uninstall|remove)([[:space:]][^;&|$`]*)?//g')" # A Debug publish is a local build, never a store upload. CMD_MATCH="$(printf '%s' "$CMD_MATCH" | sed -E 's/dotnet[[:space:]]+publish[^;&|]*(-c|--configuration)[[:space:]=]+[Dd]ebug[^;&|]*//g')" # fastlane global options sit before the action or lane (fastlane --env production deliver). Drop them. fl_norm() { printf '%s' "$1" | sed -E ':a s/(fastlane)[[:space:]]+--env([[:space:]]+|=)[^-[:space:];&|][^[:space:];&|]*/\1/ ta s/(fastlane)[[:space:]]+--?[A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9_-]*/\1/ ta'; } CMD_MATCH="$(fl_norm "$CMD_MATCH")" SUBMIT_RE='fastlane[[:space:]]+(run[[:space:]]+)?(deliver|pilot|supply|submit|appstore|testflight|uploa - agent-os/skill/SKILL.md (9639 bytes)
--- name: app-store-compliance license: LicenseRef-OpenRoots-ORA-2.3 description: Run an enterprise pre submission compliance audit on a mobile app project before uploading to the Apple App Store or Google Play. Use when the user is about to submit, ship, or release an iOS or Android app, when an app was rejected and needs a fix plan, when reviewing App Store Review Guidelines or Google Play policy compliance, or when the user mentions App Store rejection, Play Console rejection, Resolution Center, Data Safety form, privacy nutrition labels, account deletion requirement, in app purchase rules, or app review. --- # App Store Compliance Audit This skill runs a full pre submission compliance audit against the Apple App Store Review Guidelines and the Google Play Developer Program Policies, then produces a fix plan ranked by severity. It exists because roughly one in four App Store submissions is rejected and Google blocked over 1.75 million Play submissions in 2025, almost always for the same handful of preventable causes. ## When to run it - Before any upload to App Store Connect or the Play Console. - After a rejection, to build the exact fix and appeal plan. - During a release review, as a release blocker gate. ## How to run it ### Step 1. Locate the project and the reference The compliance reference lives in the `app-store-compliance` repo. The key files are. - `data/rejection-patterns.json` the machine readable taxonomy. - `docs/APPLE.md` and `docs/GOOGLE-PLAY.md` the full rejection maps. - `docs/PRE-SUBMISSION-CHECKLIST.md` the verifiable checklist. - `docs/MISTAKE-PATTERNS.md` root causes, the appeal playbook, and real rejection case studies. - `docs/BY-APP-TYPE.md` the rejection map routed by app type. Load the section that matches the app. - `docs/ADVANCED-2026.md` the modern upload time and legal layer. - `docs/EU-REGULATORY-2026.md` the EU legal hard rules with dated sources. the EU AI Act, the DMA and the Core Technology Fee, DSA trader status, and the European Accessibility Act. Load it for any app reaching EU users. - `docs/GLOBAL-REGULATORY-2026.md` the USA and other-global legal hard rules with dated sources. COPPA, the US state App Store Accountability Acts, the external-link rules, the UK, Australia, Brazil, Canada, South Korea, India, and more, plus Apple's cross-region age-assurance spine. Load it for any app reaching those users. - `docs/PLATFORM-MECHANICS-2026.md` the platform-mechanics and newer-policy hard rules with dated sources. macOS notarization, Guideline 4.2 and 4.3 with the June 2026 saturation tightening, reader apps, France ANSSI encryption, visionOS and watchOS and tvOS specifics, Android developer verification, Foreground Service types, Play Integrity, Play Billing v8, target API, Health Connect, and the cross-cutting CSAM, UGC, accessibility, sanctions, and PCI items. Load it for any app whose type touches these. - `references/` the structured, AI loadable tree. Load `references/guidelines/by-app-type/<type>.md` for the app at hand and the relevant `references/rules/<category>.md` files for full context before judging. - `templates/REVIEW-NOTES-TEMPLATE.md` the review notes template to hand the user for a new submission. - `app-store-compliance-guard.sh` the automated scanner. The install puts it in your tool's hooks folder, listed in Step 2. For the strongest audit, also run the metadata layer. A large share of rejections live in the listing text, not the source. ``` bash scripts/pull-metadata.sh apple # pulls the live listing into ./metadata via the asc CLI python3 scripts/metadata-audit.py ./metadata # audits name, subtitle, keywords, description, URLs python3 scripts/metadata-audit.py ./metadata --propose # writes suggested fixes, source copy untouched python3 scripts/metadata-audit.py ./metadata/android --platform google # Google Play limits and rules python3 scripts/release-audit.py /path/to/app --metadata ./metadata # full gate, exit 0 clear, 2 blocked, 3 incomplete ``` The metadata audit checks character limits, other platform mentions, future functionality, negative Apple sentiment, profanity, ranking and price claims, keyword formatting, missing privacy policy and subscription terms, China storefront AI references, and malformed URLs (pass `--check-urls` to also test that each URL loads). It audits every locale folder on its own, filled from a fastlane `default/` folder and parent folders like fastlane does, and names the locale in each finding. It flags a URL that is not a real http or https address, an Apple listing with no support URL, a Google listing with no contact email, and a subscription with no real Terms or EULA link. Run it, then re run it after applying fixes. That is the detect, propose, re validate loop. The release audit blocks on any critical or high finding with exit 2. It exits 3 when a scan failed or the listing was not audited, so pass `--metadata` with your pulled listing. For monitoring evolving developer requirements, also run the Apple Developer requirements monitor. This tracks 25 key categories against active developer news/announcements and maps updates directly to repository impact: ``` python3 scripts/monitor.py --project /path/to/app/project ``` Or simulate a simulated track update (e.g., "Privacy Manifests") to preview impact: ``` python3 scripts/monitor.py --project /path/to/app/project --simulate "Privacy Manifests" ``` The monitor determines repository impact, identifies affected files, generates migration tasks, estimates release impact, and drafts a complete pull request description. ### Step 2. Run the automated scan Run the guard against the project root. Use the copy the install put in your tool's hooks folder. | Tool | Guard | |---|---| | Claude Code | `~/.claude/hooks/app-store-compliance-guard.sh` | | Codex CLI | `~/.codex/hooks/app-store-compliance-guard.sh` | | Gemini CLI | `~/.gemini/hooks/app-store-compliance-guard.sh` | | OpenCode | `~/.config/opencode/hooks/app-store-compliance-guard.sh` | | Cursor | `~/.cursor/hooks/app-store-compliance-guard.sh` | | Copilot CLI | `~/.copilot/hooks/app-store-compliance-guard.sh`, or under `$COPILOT_HOME` when set | | Grok | `~/.grok/hooks/app-store-compliance-guard.sh` | | Qwen Code | `~/.qwen/hooks/app-store-compliance-guard.sh`, or under `$QWEN_HOME` when set | | Kimi Code | `~/.kimi-code/hooks/app-store-compliance-guard.sh`, or under `$KIMI_CODE_HOME` when set | | Factory Droid | `~/.factory/hooks/app-store-compliance-guard.sh` | | Auggie | `~/.augment/hooks/app-store-compliance-guard.sh` | | Windsurf | `~/.codeium/windsurf/hooks/app-store-compliance-guard.sh` | | From a checkout | `~/repositories/app-store-compliance/agent-os/hooks/app-store-compliance-guard.sh` | ``` bash <guard path from the table> "/path/to/app/project" ``` The `scripts/` paths in this skill are relative to this skill's own folder. It detects iOS and Android, scans for the rejection patterns, and prints findings ranked critical, high, medium. It exits 2 when a critical risk is present. ### Step 3. Run the human checks the scanner cannot see Some rejection causes are not visible in code. Walk these by hand against the project. - Is the production backend live and will it stay up during the entire review window. - Is a working demo account provided in the Notes for Review or the Play test instructions. - Do the privacy nutrition labels (Apple) and the Data Safety form (Google) match the real runtime behavior including every third party SDK. This is the single biggest cause on both stores. - Do the screenshots show the app in use, not a splash or login screen. - Does the listing claim only what the app actually does. - For a new Google personal account, is the closed test of 12 testers over 14 days complete. - Are the 2026 Apple age rating questions answered. - For any app reaching EU, US, or other-global users, is the legal layer satisfied. the EU AI Act AI-disclosure and the European Accessibility Act, US COPPA and the state age-assurance laws, the DSA trader status, and the per-region 18-plus age gating. Store review does not check these. See `docs/EU-REGULATORY-2026.md` and `docs/GLOBAL-REGULATORY-2026.md`. - Are the platform-mechanics gates satisfied for the app's type. macOS notarization, Guideline 4.2 and 4.3, reader-app rules, Android developer verification, Foreground Service types, Play Integrity, Play Billing v8, target API, Health Connect, and the cross-cutting CSAM, UGC, accessibility, deletion-URL, sanctions, and PCI items. See `docs/PLATFORM-MECHANICS-2026.md`. ### Step 4. Produce the fix plan For every finding, output a table row. The pattern id, the platform, the cited guideline, the severity, the concrete fix, and the file or setting to change. Order by severity. Mark each critical as a release blocker. ### Step 5. If the app was already rejected Read the exact guideline number the store cited, find the matching pattern in `data/rejection-patterns.json`, apply the fix, then follow the appeal playbook in `docs/MISTAKE-PATTERNS.md`. Never resubmit an unchanged build. On Google, a careless resubmit moves the account toward suspension. ## The two checks that matter most If time is short, verify these two first, because they cause the majority of rejections across both stores. 1. A working demo account with a live backend. 2. A privacy declaration that matches actual runtime behavior, including every SDK. ## Output contract The audit ends with a ranked findings table and a clear verdict. Clear to submit, or blocked with a numbered fix list. Never report clear while a critical finding stands.
- AGENTS.md (11130 bytes)
# Release Review Guidelines for AI Agents Any software release (whether code, configuration, or documentation in this repository or any app utilizing this playbook) must be thoroughly audited against App Store and Google Play rejection rules. You MUST perform this review as if the release were about to be submitted directly to the App Store and Google Play. ## Mandatory Verification Checklist Before certifying a release as clear to submit/ship, verify every item below. Map each to its corresponding playbook file, checklist, or script to perform the check. ### 1. Permissions * **Verify.** Ensure no sensitive permissions (e.g., location, storage, camera) are declared without a core user-facing feature or a specific, non-generic purpose string. * **Playbook Mapping:** * Checklist: `docs/PRE-SUBMISSION-CHECKLIST.md` -> "Privacy and data" & "Google Play specific" * Guard: `agent-os/hooks/app-store-compliance-guard.sh` (scans for standard purpose strings and sensitive permissions) * Rules Reference: `references/rules/privacy.md` & `references/rules/android.md` ### 2. Privacy Disclosures * **Verify.** Ensure the app displays appropriate consent modals and nutrition/safety declarations for data collection or SDK tracking. * **Playbook Mapping:** * Checklist: `docs/PRE-SUBMISSION-CHECKLIST.md` -> "Privacy and data" * Patterns: `data/rejection-patterns.json` -> `APPLE-5.1.2-MISSING-ATT` & `GOOGLE-DATASAFETY-MISMATCH` * Rules Reference: `references/rules/privacy.md` ### 3. Screenshots * **Verify.** Check that screenshots in the store metadata show the app in actual use (not splash or login screens) and are accurate representation of the current features. * **Verify.** Creative assets (product page header and search result art) show the app or its brand, suit all audiences, and carry no prices, discounts, unverifiable claims, or references to other apps (Apple 2.3.14). No feature is hidden from review or turned on after approval (Apple 2.5.19). * **Playbook Mapping:** * Checklist: `docs/PRE-SUBMISSION-CHECKLIST.md` -> "Metadata and listing" * Rules Reference: `references/rules/metadata.md` ### 4. Metadata * **Verify.** Check character limits, emojis, ALL CAPS, curse words, other platform references, ranking claims, and future feature promises. * **Playbook Mapping:** * Script: `scripts/metadata-audit.py` (checks name, subtitle, description, keywords) * Patterns: `data/rejection-patterns.json` -> `BOTH-METADATA-DECORATION` & `APPLE-2.3-CROSS-PLATFORM-REFERENCE` * Rules Reference: `references/rules/metadata.md` ### 5. Age Rating * **Verify.** Ensure that the 2026 Apple age rating questions (13+, 16+, 18+) are fully answered and that any child-directed or mature content triggers appropriate gating. * **Playbook Mapping:** * Checklist: `docs/PRE-SUBMISSION-CHECKLIST.md` -> "Apple specific" (APPLE-2.3-AGE-RATING-2026) * Patterns: `data/rejection-patterns.json` -> `APPLE-2.3-AGE-RATING-2026` * Global Rules: `docs/GLOBAL-REGULATORY-2026.md` ### 6. AI Disclosures * **Verify.** Verify that any generative AI integration has a content moderation safeguard, appropriate age rating, and, for EU users, displays an in-app notice that the user is interacting with an AI (EU AI Act Article 50(1)). Confirm third-party AI consent modals are present. * **Playbook Mapping:** * Checklist: `docs/PRE-SUBMISSION-CHECKLIST.md` -> "EU specific" & "Global specific" * Patterns: `data/rejection-patterns.json` -> `APPLE-5.1.2-AI-NO-CONSENT-MODAL` & `BOTH-AI-GENERATED-CONTENT` * EU Rules: `docs/EU-REGULATORY-2026.md` ### 7. Subscription Disclosures * **Verify.** Subscription terms, auto-renewals, billing periods, pricing hierarchy, and Terms of Use (ToS/EULA) links must be clearly laid out inside the app and in the metadata description. * **Playbook Mapping:** * Checklist: `docs/PRE-SUBMISSION-CHECKLIST.md` -> "Monetization" & "Apple specific" * Script: `scripts/metadata-audit.py` (verifies terms/EULA links when subscriptions are mentioned) * Patterns: `data/rejection-patterns.json` -> `APPLE-3.1.2-MISLEADING-PRICING` ### 8. Payment Compliance * **Verify.** Confirm that Play Billing or StoreKit is utilized for in-app digital goods (with StoreKit Restore Purchases functionality present). Ensure third-party gateways (e.g. Stripe, PayPal) are restricted to physical goods or exempt categories. * **Playbook Mapping:** * Checklist: `docs/PRE-SUBMISSION-CHECKLIST.md` -> "Monetization" & "Platform mechanics gate" * Patterns: `data/rejection-patterns.json` -> `APPLE-3.1.1-EXTERNAL-PAYMENT`, `GOOGLE-PLAY-BILLING`, & `APPLE-RESTORE-PURCHASES-MISSING` * Rules Reference: `references/rules/payments.md` ### 9. Accessibility * **Verify.** Verify accessibility support such as VoiceOver labels, Dynamic Type, contrast, and ensure compliance with accessibility standards like EN 301 549 / WCAG 2.1 AA. * **Playbook Mapping:** * Checklist: `docs/PRE-SUBMISSION-CHECKLIST.md` -> "EU specific" & "Platform mechanics gate" * Patterns: `data/rejection-patterns.json` -> `GOOGLE-PERM-ACCESSIBILITY-MISUSE` * Platform Mechanics: `docs/PLATFORM-MECHANICS-2026.md` ### 10. Legal Documents * **Verify.** Verify that required legal declarations are in place (e.g., DSA trader status, child privacy/COPPA requirements, and EU AI Act Article 4/50 compliance). * **Playbook Mapping:** * EU Rules: `docs/EU-REGULATORY-2026.md` * Global Rules: `docs/GLOBAL-REGULATORY-2026.md` * Checklist: `docs/PRE-SUBMISSION-CHECKLIST.md` -> "EU specific" & "Global specific" ### 11. Support URL * **Verify.** Confirm that a valid, reachable, and active support/contact URL is set in the metadata. * **Playbook Mapping:** * Checklist: `docs/PRE-SUBMISSION-CHECKLIST.md` -> "Shared (both stores)" * Script: `scripts/metadata-audit.py` (verifies URL availability when `--check-urls` is passed) * Patterns: `data/rejection-patterns.json` -> `BOTH-UNREACHABLE-METADATA-URL` ### 12. Privacy Policy * **Verify.** A clear and accurate Privacy Policy URL must be published, reachable in-app, and declared in the store listing. * **Playbook Mapping:** * Checklist: `docs/PRE-SUBMISSION-CHECKLIST.md` -> "Privacy and data" * Patterns: `data/rejection-patterns.json` -> `APPLE-5.1.1-MISSING-PRIVACY-POLICY` & `GOOGLE-MISSING-PRIVACY-POLICY` * Script: `scripts/metadata-audit.py` (ensures privacy url is not missing) ### 13. Terms of Service * **Verify.** Terms of Service or End User License Agreement (EULA) must be present and linked, especially for subscriptions and UGC apps. * **Playbook Mapping:** * Checklist: `docs/PRE-SUBMISSION-CHECKLIST.md` -> "Monetization" & "Platform mechanics gate" * Patterns: `data/rejection-patterns.json` -> `APPLE-1.2-UGC-24H-ACTION` & `APPLE-3.1.2-MISLEADING-PRICING` * Script: `scripts/metadata-audit.py` (checks for terms in subscription listings) ### 14. Export Compliance & Encryption Declarations * **Verify.** Check that encryption declarations (`ITSAppUsesNonExemptEncryption`) are present in `Info.plist` and appropriate French ANSSI declaration is completed if distributing to France. * **Playbook Mapping:** * Checklist: `docs/PRE-SUBMISSION-CHECKLIST.md` -> "Apple specific" * Patterns: `data/rejection-patterns.json` -> `APPLE-EXPORT-COMPLIANCE-MISSING` * Rules Reference: `references/rules/export.md` * Platform Mechanics: `docs/PLATFORM-MECHANICS-2026.md` ### 15. Cross-Platform Framework Coverage * **Verify.** If the project is Flutter (`pubspec.yaml`), React Native/Expo (`package.json` deps), or Ionic/Capacitor/Cordova (`capacitor.config.*`, `config.xml`, or matching deps), confirm the framework-specific findings are addressed. Watch for privacy manifest aggregation gaps for plugin-wrapped native SDKs, undisclosed OTA JS-bundle updaters, the Guideline 4.2 thin-WebView-wrapper rejection, and deprecated UIWebView linkage. * **Playbook Mapping** - Doc. `docs/CROSS-PLATFORM-FRAMEWORKS.md` - Guard. `agent-os/hooks/app-store-compliance-guard.sh` (Flutter/React Native/Ionic detection and checks) - Patterns. `data/rejection-patterns.json` -> `FLUTTER-PRIVACY-MANIFEST-MISSING`, `RN-OTA-UNDECLARED`, `RN-PRIVACY-MANIFEST-MISSING`, `IONIC-4.2-THIN-WRAPPER`, `IONIC-UIWEBVIEW-DEPRECATED`, `IONIC-PRIVACY-MANIFEST-MISSING` ## Release-Time Action Flow For any software release, in this order: 1. **Run the Automated Guard.** Execute `bash agent-os/hooks/app-store-compliance-guard.sh /path/to/project`. 2. **Run Metadata Audit.** Run `python3 scripts/metadata-audit.py <metadata-dir>` if metadata is pulled. 3. **Run Manual Verifications.** Walk through `docs/PRE-SUBMISSION-CHECKLIST.md` line-by-line for any item the automated scanners cannot detect. 4. **Compile findings.** Report every issue found under a clear, severity-ranked findings table. No release is approved while a `critical` or `high` issue stands. # Agent Guidelines for Source Trust and Verification When acting as an AI agent on this repository, you must strictly adhere to the following source trust hierarchy and verification rules when reviewing guidelines, updating policies, or proposing/creating compliance changes and pull requests. ## Source Trust Hierarchy Priority 1, Official Regulatory and Standardization Bodies: - European Commission - EUR-Lex - Official Journal of the European Union - ENISA (European Union Agency for Cybersecurity) - EDPB (European Data Protection Board) - FTC (Federal Trade Commission) - NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology) - CISA (Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency) - ICO (Information Commissioner's Office) - Government publications Priority 2, Reputable News Agencies: - Reuters - AP (Associated Press) - Bloomberg Priority 3, Academic Publications: - Academic papers and peer-reviewed journals Priority 4, Industry Material: - Industry blogs and vendor publications Priority 5, Social Media and AI Summaries: - LinkedIn - Reddit - Twitter - AI generated summaries ## Compliance Pull Request Rules - Never trust secondary sources before official sources. - Never create compliance pull requests using Priority 4 or Priority 5 sources unless verified by a Priority 1 source. Any citation or claim sourced from Priority 4 or 5 must be traceably corroborated by an official publication from Priority 1. - A deadline that is postponed, withdrawn, or narrowed is updated in place in `data/regulatory-deadlines.json`, never deleted. Keep the old date and the reason in a `history` note on the entry. A deadline that has passed gets `absorbed_into` naming the doc section that now carries the rule, and `scripts/validate.py` fails a passed entry without one after 7 days. - Every deadline carries `source_url` (the source its claim was read from) and `verified_on` (the day that page was last fetched and confirmed to name the instrument). Where the read went through a mirror, an archive, a secondary summary, or a machine record such as the Publications Office CELLAR, say so in `source_note`, never pass it off as primary. `scripts/validate.py` fails an entry missing either field and warns when `verified_on` is older than 180 days.
- aistorehub.json (663 bytes)
{ "name": "App Store Compliance", "slug": "app-store-compliance", "version": "1.0.0", "type": "agent", "description": "Avoid common App Store and Google Play rejections. Open playbook and pre-submission guard with 117 documented rejection patterns and fixes, privacy manifest and Data safety checks, 95 tracked deadlines (EU AI Act, DSA, COPPA, age laws), and a skill for AI coding agents.", "owner": "community", "repository": "catalog", "github_repo_url": "https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance", "tags": [ "trending", "shell", "mjmirza", "github", "open-source" ], "imported_at": "2026-11-21T23:56:35.312Z" } - CHANGELOG.md (80980 bytes)
# Changelog All notable changes to this playbook are recorded here. The format follows Keep a Changelog, adapted to plain punctuation. ## 2.4.0 (2026-11-15) This release closes gaps found by a second survey of comparable open source repositories, a line by line read of the App Store Connect release notes, and an internal audit of the guard. Eight adversarial review rounds attacked the changes before release, and every reproduced bug became a test. The new findings are high or medium except the debuggable Android build, which Play refuses at upload, so nothing that passed 2.3.0 is blocked unless it carries a debuggable release manifest. It is a minor version. ### Added - The guard now scans uploads made through `helm-asc` (builds upload and `--submit`), the `asc` CLI, and the Codemagic `app-store-connect publish` command. Before, these reached App Store Connect without a scan. - `APPLE-MIN-DEPLOYMENT-TARGET-IOS13`. App Store Connect refuses uploads that target below iOS 13. The guard reads the project, xcconfig files (including `[sdk=...]` qualifiers) and the Podfile. Reported as high, because a dependency or test target below 13 does not block an upload on its own. - `APPLE-2.5.5-IPV4-ONLY-NETWORKING`. App Review runs on an IPv6 only network, so `inet_addr`, `inet_aton` and `gethostbyname` are flagged, including in the app's own C, C++ and Objective-C++ files. Vendored native code is skipped. - `APPLE-5.1.3-HEALTH-DATA-ICLOUD`. HealthKit plus CloudKit or iCloud key-value storage is reported for a human to confirm that no health data reaches iCloud. - `ANDROID-DEBUGGABLE-RELEASE` (critical). A release manifest with `android:debuggable` set to true. Debug-only manifests are ignored. - `ANDROID-FGS-SPECIAL-USE-UNDECLARED`. A `specialUse` foreground service without its own subtype property, counted per manifest. - `ANDROID-64BIT-ABI-MISSING`. An `abiFilters` line that ships `armeabi-v7a` without `arm64-v8a`, or `x86` without `x86_64`. - `APPLE-ODR-UPLOAD-BLOCK-2027`. From early 2027 App Store Connect will no longer accept On-Demand Resources uploads from new apps or apps that have never used the feature. Tracked from the earliest possible date as a reminder, not as Apple's enforcement date. - `docs/COMPETITIVE-GAP-ANALYSIS.md` records the second survey, what was adopted, what was rejected and why, and the larger work left for later releases (built artifact inspection, runtime flow proof, a Data safety CSV generator). ## 2.3.0 (2026-11-15) This release adds source provenance to every regulatory deadline, ten new deadlines (six from the November sweep, three from its Asia-Pacific follow-up, and Korea's privacy certification from the September re-read), and a GitHub Pages site. A deadline entry now needs `source_url` and `verified_on` to validate, which changes the data schema but blocks nothing in the guard, so it is a minor version. ### Fixed - Unverified dates from the September sweep re-read against primary sources. Korea's mandatory privacy certification (1 July 2027, PIPA Article 32-2(1) proviso) is a new deadline. The Japan APPI amendment now carries its law number and the penal-provision start. The UK subscription regime cites its draft commencement regulations. Android developer verification cites developer.android.com, where Google keeps the rollout current. Items that still have no published day keep their first-of-month placeholder. - The India DPDP rule 4 Consent Manager deadline (13 November 2026) is absorbed, and section 3.6 cites the Gazette copy MeitY hosts instead of a mirror. - Landing page accuracy. It said every third-party SDK needs a signed privacy manifest, that Stripe can never sell digital goods, that both stores need deletion fully inside the app, and that every AI feature triggers the EU AI Act. Each now states the actual rule and its scope. ### Added - Asia-Pacific follow-up to the November sweep. Three deadlines, each read on its primary source on 15 November 2026. Korea's AI development reuse rule under PIPA Act No. 21910 (9 March 2027), Indonesia's PP TUNAS self-assessment for every product, service, and feature (31 December 2026), and China's CAC filing window for platforms with a large minor audience (around 16 November 2026, already carried by the doc). `docs/GLOBAL-REGULATORY-2026.md` gains section 3.11 Indonesia. - November 2026 gap sweep, `docs/GAP-ANALYSIS-2026-11.md`. Six new deadlines, each read on its primary source. Apple's new age rating descriptors (12 January 2027) and the Developer ID Sub-CA expiry (1 February 2027). Google Play's Japan payments authorization (1 December 2026), eligibility-based subscription discounts (27 January 2027), the AppFunctions policy (14 April 2027), and the Local Network and Manage Contacts declarations (25 August 2027). The Apple, Google, EU, and US docs carry the matching lines, and anything that could not be read on a primary source is listed as unverified. - Every regulatory deadline now names its source and the day it was last read. Before, a reader followed two hops from the entry to a doc section to find the source, and nothing could tell a fresh entry from a stale one. Now each of the 95 entries carries `source_url` and `verified_on`, plus `source_note` on the 27 read through a mirror, an archive, a secondary summary, or the Publications Office CELLAR record. 92 sources were fetched and confirmed on 14 November 2026. The two Ofcom pages refuse scripted reads and keep the date they were last read in a browser. `scripts/validate.py` fails an entry missing either field and warns after 180 days, and `scripts/verify-citations.py` already sweeps the new URLs. - A GitHub Pages site for the docs. Before, the playbook could only be read on github.com. Now each doc is its own page on mjmirza.github.io/app-store-compliance, with a sitemap, search metadata, structured data and an llms.txt file, so search engines and AI assistants can find and cite it. ## 2.2.0 (2026-11-05) This release adds Fleet Sweep, the Waiver Ledger, the Ruling Register and an eval scorecard. Nothing that passed 2.1.0 in the single-app guard is blocked now, so it is a minor version. ### Added - Fleet Sweep, `scripts/fleet-sweep.py`. Before, the guard checked one app per run and you added the results up by hand. Now one run covers every app in a fleet file and returns one verdict, worst app wins, with exit codes 0 ready, 3 ready with open actions, 1 not checked, 2 blocked. A partial scan, a declared platform the guard did not find, a timeout, or a report whose counts or exit code contradict its findings is `NOT_CHECKED`, never ready. Account and console steps you track show as owner actions, and an app with no readiness list reports that too. - The Waiver Ledger. A reviewed false positive can step aside for one occurrence (app, finding, severity, file) with a reason, evidence, a reviewer, and an expiry at most 180 days out. Expired, incomplete, duplicated, and stale waivers are named and the finding comes back. - The guard prints a `Coverage.` line before every exit (complete or incomplete, which platforms it found, and why), so a blocked run still says whether every app root was scanned. - A GitHub code-scanning export (`--scanning-export`, SARIF 2.1.0) that keeps each app's path, marks waived findings as suppressed with their evidence, and marks the run unsuccessful when an app was not checked. Plus a full JSON result (`--json`). - The Ruling Register, `data/ruling-register.json` and `scripts/ruling-register.py`. Release requirements a code scan cannot see, each with its legal standing (in force, in force later, store policy, proposed, guidance), how it is proven (automated, owner attested, mixed), and a verbatim quoted source with the date it was read. A rule blocks only when quoted sources cover both its obligation and its start date, so a quote on one premise never verifies another. `due` lists what applies to an app, `export` writes a commit-stamped copy. 14 first entries from an adversarial gap review, covering India, the EU, the US, China, Indonesia, Vietnam and Australia. Fleet Sweep requires every app to declare its platforms, regions and features, and an applicable in-force rule without a compliant attestation, covering every proof item and country at the rule's current revision, makes the app `BLOCKED`. - `scripts/eval-scorecard.py` and `evals/gold-cases.json`. 32 gold scenarios across Fleet Sweep, the Waiver Ledger and the Ruling Register. Each checks the verdict, the exit code, that the fleet and app agree, and which rule ids must and must not appear. Any miss fails CI. - `scripts/ruling-register-test.sh`, 74 cases. A second adversarial Codex review of the register and the evals reproduced eight defects, all fixed and kept as regression cases. - `scripts/fleet-sweep-test.sh`, 42 cases including every defect an adversarial Codex review reproduced, wired into CI. Guide in `docs/FLEET-SWEEP.md`, templates in `templates/`. ## 2.1.0 (2026-10-17) Apple revised the App Review Guidelines on 16 October 2026. This release follows that revision. It adds three patterns and no new guard rule, so it is a minor version. ### Changed - Apple revised the App Review Guidelines on 16 October 2026, and the playbook follows the live text, checked on 17 October 2026 against [the revision note](https://developer.apple.com/news/?id=92th7e5i) and [Apple's safety post](https://developer.apple.com/news/?id=vvzx6cul). - 1.2 now names social media, user-generated content platforms, and AI content creation apps, lists nonconsensual intimate imagery, and warns of a Developer Code of Conduct violation for missing safeguards or violations left unfixed after notice. `APPLE-1.2-UGC-24H-ACTION` and `BOTH-AI-GENERATED-CONTENT` carry the new wording, and the UGC fix no longer promises a 24 hour window the guideline does not set. - Hidden, dormant, and undocumented features moved from 2.3.1 to the new 2.5.19. The 2.3.1 row in `docs/APPLE.md` and the `future_functionality` mapping now say so, and `RN-OTA-UNDECLARED` names the bait-and-switch risk. - 3.1.1(a) folds the Music Streaming Services Entitlement into the StoreKit External Purchase Link bullet and requires a permitted destination. `APPLE-3.1.1-EXTERNAL-LINK-REGION-GATING` and its row say so. ### Added - Three patterns, each checked by hand because the evidence lives outside the project. `APPLE-2.3.14-CREATIVE-ASSET-CONTENT` (medium), `APPLE-2.5.19-HIDDEN-OR-DORMANT-FEATURE` (critical), and `APPLE-5-TRAFFICKING-CHILD-EXPLOITATION` (critical), with matching rows in `docs/APPLE.md` and two new lines in the pre-submission checklist. ## 2.0.0 (2026-10-16) This release changes the licence and the release audit's exit codes, so it is a major version. Everything below landed since 1.0.0. ### Thanks - Omar Albeik ([@omaralbeik](https://github.com/omaralbeik)) found that the sanctions section still listed Syria as an embargoed territory after the OFAC program ended, and opened [#967](https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance/pull/967) with the correction. His fix landed in [#1001](https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance/pull/1001), where he is a co-author. Developers shipping to Syria now get the rules that actually apply instead of a block that no longer exists. ### Changed - Shell tools are matched against an exact name list, which adds `runInTerminal` and `run_in_terminal`. An MCP tool whose name merely contains terminal or shell is no longer scanned. - The default branch is now `main`. The CI trigger, the README badge and SECURITY.md follow it, and the bot branch ruleset excludes whichever branch is the default. - The bot PR gate. The workflow from #442 closed every PR whose branch looked bot-generated, which caught the owner's own Jules scheduled tasks. It is replaced by a gate that closes only pull requests from bot accounts not on the allowlist (Jules, Copilot, Dependabot, GitHub Actions), without deleting the branch. Owner-run bot PRs stay open, land on the project board as Backlog through the auto-add workflow, and are reviewed by hand. The eleven Jules PRs closed on 14 September 2026 had their branches deleted by the old workflow and cannot be reopened. ### Added - A bare Xcode or Android app under a root framework app (Expo, React Native, Flutter, Capacitor), with its own Info.plist or AndroidManifest.xml and no root build file that names it, is scanned as its own app. It counts as an app only with an `.xcodeproj` that builds an application (or names no product type) or an Android application module, so a library or a local native module stays with the app that uses it, and it splits off only when the root has its own project for that platform, so a managed Expo root keeps its checks. A native host that embeds React Native, Expo, Flutter or Capacitor (Swift, Objective-C, Kotlin or Java code, a Podfile or a Gradle file naming it, Cordova plugins included, in Objective-C or Swift, an `RCTAppDelegate`, an Expo app delegate, `import React` with a React surface view, or an Android `ReactActivity` or `ReactNativeHost`) is brownfield and stays in the root scan, so its over-the-air updater and other framework findings still count. A native app that does split off, and the root it left, both keep every framework check the pooled tree showed (a Capacitor root's UIWebView check, or a Cordova `config.xml` inside the split app, for example), exactly as when they were scanned as one. The root and its split native apps are also scanned together as in 1.0.0, and any finding the separate scans did not list at the same severity is added once, so a critical finding is never dropped beside a high one with the same id, so evidence that spans both (a shared source file and the split app) still counts. A project in a folder named exactly demo, example, sample or playground (or the plural) stays in the root scan, so its findings still count (#656). - Install for every major AI coding tool. `install.sh --tool codex|gemini|opencode|cursor|copilot|grok|qwen|kimi|droid|auggie|windsurf` installs the guard, the skill and, where the tool supports it, the `/app-store-audit` command, and registers the hook in that tool's own config, merged with every other setting and backed up. `--tool all` installs into every tool it finds. Each install ends with `Install verified.` only after it feeds a submit command to the hook in that tool's own payload format and sees it blocked. OpenCode gets a plugin, because it has no hook config, written to both `plugins/` (current OpenCode) and `plugin/` (OpenCode before 1.0, which reads only that folder). Checked live on this machine. The real Codex CLI and the real Qwen Code 0.25.1 each stopped a submit command with the guard's findings. The real Gemini CLI 0.22.5 and OpenCode 0.14.1 loaded the hook and the plugin, and their model call could not run here (no Gemini licence on the account, no free OpenCode model available), so their blocking is proven by feeding each tool's own payload to the installed
- data/detection-recipes.json (22722 bytes)
{ "description": "Concrete detection commands per rejection pattern id, for the automatable rules. Consumed by scripts/generate-references.py to emit a How to detect block per rule. Metadata rules point at metadata-audit.py.", "recipes": { "APPLE-2.1-STAGING-BACKEND": "grep -rn 'localhost\\|127.0.0.1\\|staging\\.\\|ngrok\\|http://' --include='*.swift' --include='*.plist' . | grep -v https", "APPLE-2.1-PLACEHOLDER-CONTENT": "grep -rni 'lorem ipsum\\|placeholder\\|TODO\\|FIXME\\|example.com' --include='*.swift' --include='*.strings' .", "APPLE-5.1.1-MISSING-USAGE-DESCRIPTION": "for k in NSCameraUsageDescription NSLocationWhenInUseUsageDescription NSPhotoLibraryUsageDescription NSContactsUsageDescription NSMicrophoneUsageDescription; do echo \"$k\"; plutil -extract \"$k\" raw */Info.plist 2>/dev/null || echo ' MISSING or empty'; done", "APPLE-5.1.1-NO-ACCOUNT-DELETION": "grep -rn 'createAccount\\|signUp\\|register' --include='*.swift' . && ! grep -rn 'deleteAccount\\|delete_account\\|account deletion' --include='*.swift' .", "APPLE-5.1.2-MISSING-ATT": "grep -rn 'AppsFlyer\\|Adjust\\|FBSDK\\|advertisingIdentifier\\|ASIdentifierManager' --include='*.swift' . && ! grep -rn 'ATTrackingManager\\|NSUserTrackingUsageDescription' .", "APPLE-3.1.1-EXTERNAL-PAYMENT": "grep -rn 'Stripe\\|PayPalCheckout\\|braintree\\|razorpay' --include='*.swift' --include='pubspec.yaml' --include='package.json' . && ! grep -rnE 'StoreKit|SKProduct|Product.purchase|in_app_purchase|purchases_flutter|flutter_inapp_purchase|react-native-iap|react-native-purchases|expo-iap|cordova-plugin-purchase|@revenuecat/purchases-capacitor' --include='*.swift' --include='pubspec.yaml' --include='package.json' .", "APPLE-4.8-SOCIAL-LOGIN-ONLY": "grep -rn 'FacebookLogin\\|GoogleSignIn\\|GIDSignIn' --include='*.swift' . && ! grep -rn 'SignInWithApple\\|ASAuthorizationAppleIDProvider' --include='*.swift' .", "APPLE-PRIVACY-MANIFEST-MISSING": "find . -name 'PrivacyInfo.xcprivacy' | grep -q . || echo 'MISSING PrivacyInfo.xcprivacy'; find . -path '*/*.framework/*' -name 'PrivacyInfo.xcprivacy' # each bundled SDK should ship one", "APPLE-EXPORT-COMPLIANCE-MISSING": "grep -rn 'ITSAppUsesNonExemptEncryption' */Info.plist || echo 'MISSING ITSAppUsesNonExemptEncryption, build will stall in Missing Compliance'", "APPLE-RESTORE-PURCHASES-MISSING": "grep -rn 'SKProduct\\|Product.purchase\\|StoreKit' --include='*.swift' . && ! grep -rn 'restorePurchases\\|restoreCompletedTransactions\\|AppStore.sync' --include='*.swift' .", "APPLE-2.4.5-UNUSED-ENTITLEMENTS": "for e in $(find . -name '*.entitlements'); do echo \"== $e\"; plutil -p \"$e\"; done # then grep the codebase to confirm each capability is actually used", "APPLE-4.0-SIWA-UX": "grep -rn 'ASAuthorizationAppleIDProvider' --include='*.swift' . && grep -rn 'completeProfile\\|askForName\\|nameTextField\\|emailTextField' --include='*.swift' . # asking for name or email after SIWA is a violation", "APPLE-5.1.1-UNNECESSARY-DATA": "grep -rni 'phone\\|gender\\|marital\\|date.of.birth\\|birthdate\\|address' --include='*.swift' . | grep -i 'required\\|validator\\|isRequired'", "APPLE-2.1-DEBUG-FEATURES": "grep -rni 'debug menu\\|debugMenu\\|skip login\\|bypass auth\\|DEBUG_BYPASS' --include='*.swift' .", "APPLE-2.1-CLOUD-NOT-IN-PRODUCTION": "grep -rn 'CKContainer\\|CloudKit\\|NSUbiquitousKeyValueStore' --include='*.swift' . # then confirm the CloudKit schema is deployed to production in the CloudKit console", "APPLE-2.5.1-PRIVATE-API": "grep -rn 'UIWebView\\|performSelector\\|valueForKey' --include='*.swift' --include='*.m' . # review any reflection or deprecated framework use", "GOOGLE-DATASAFETY-MISMATCH": "grep -rn 'firebase-analytics\\|com.google.android.gms.ads\\|appsflyer\\|adjust\\|com.facebook' --include='*.gradle' --include='*.kts' . # every SDK that collects or shares data must be declared in Data Safety", "GOOGLE-PERM-BACKGROUND-LOCATION": "grep -rn 'ACCESS_BACKGROUND_LOCATION' --include='AndroidManifest.xml' .", "GOOGLE-PERM-ALL-FILES": "grep -rn 'MANAGE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE' --include='AndroidManifest.xml' .", "GOOGLE-PERM-SMS-CALLLOG": "grep -rnE 'permission.(READ_SMS|SEND_SMS|RECEIVE_SMS|READ_CALL_LOG|WRITE_CALL_LOG)' --include='AndroidManifest.xml' .", "GOOGLE-PERM-ACCESSIBILITY-MISUSE": "grep -rn 'BIND_ACCESSIBILITY_SERVICE\\|AccessibilityService' --include='AndroidManifest.xml' --include='*.kt' --include='*.java' .", "GOOGLE-TARGET-API": "grep -rnE 'targetSdk(Version)?[ =]+[0-9]+' --include='*.gradle' --include='*.kts' . # must be 36 or higher from 31 Aug 2026", "GOOGLE-PLAY-BILLING": "grep -rn 'Stripe\\|PayPal\\|razorpay' --include='*.kt' --include='*.java' --include='pubspec.yaml' --include='package.json' . && ! grep -rnE 'BillingClient|com.android.billingclient|in_app_purchase|purchases_flutter|flutter_inapp_purchase|react-native-iap|react-native-purchases|expo-iap|cordova-plugin-purchase|@revenuecat/purchases-capacitor' .", "ANDROID-DYNAMIC-CODE-LOADING": "grep -rn 'DexClassLoader\\|PathClassLoader\\|loadDex\\|createPackageContext' --include='*.kt' --include='*.java' .", "ANDROID-QUERY-ALL-PACKAGES": "grep -rn 'QUERY_ALL_PACKAGES' --include='AndroidManifest.xml' .", "ANDROID-OVERLAY-TAPJACKING": "grep -rn 'SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW\\|TYPE_APPLICATION_OVERLAY' --include='AndroidManifest.xml' --include='*.kt' --include='*.java' .", "BOTH-AI-GENERATED-CONTENT": "grep -rni 'api.openai.com\\|anthropic\\|generativelanguage\\|stable diffusion\\|text-to-image' . && ! grep -rni 'moderation\\|report\\|block user\\|content filter' .", "BOTH-LOOTBOX-ODDS": "grep -rni 'lootbox\\|loot box\\|gacha\\|mystery box\\|random reward' .", "BOTH-FINGERPRINTING": "grep -rni 'fingerprint\\|deviceFingerprint\\|canvas fingerprint' .", "BOTH-METADATA-DECORATION": "python3 scripts/metadata-audit.py ./metadata", "APPLE-2.3-CROSS-PLATFORM-REFERENCE": "python3 scripts/metadata-audit.py ./metadata", "APPLE-2.3-FUTURE-FUNCTIONALITY": "python3 scripts/metadata-audit.py ./metadata", "APPLE-2.3-NEGATIVE-APPLE-SENTIMENT": "python3 scripts/metadata-audit.py ./metadata", "BOTH-UNREACHABLE-METADATA-URL": "python3 scripts/metadata-audit.py ./metadata --check-urls", "APPLE-3.1.2-MISLEADING-PRICING": "python3 scripts/metadata-audit.py ./metadata", "APPLE-2.1-REVIEW-NOTES-INCOMPLETE": "use templates/REVIEW-NOTES-TEMPLATE.md and fill all six sections", "APPLE-2.1-MISSING-DEMO-ACCOUNT": "grep -rn 'signIn\\|LoginView\\|OAuth\\|FirebaseAuth' --include='*.swift' . # then confirm a demo account is in the review notes", "APPLE-5.1.1-MISSING-PRIVACY-POLICY": "grep -rn 'privacyPolicy\\|privacy-policy\\|PrivacyPolicy' --include='*.swift' . || echo 'no privacy policy reference found'", "APPLE-5.1.1-VAGUE-PURPOSE-STRING": "for k in NSCameraUsageDescription NSLocationWhenInUseUsageDescription NSPhotoLibraryUsageDescription NSContactsUsageDescription; do v=$(plutil -extract \"$k\" raw */Info.plist 2>/dev/null); echo \"$k = $v\"; done # flag empty or generic values like 'required'", "APPLE-4.2-WEB-WRAPPER": "grep -rn 'WKWebView\\|loadRequest\\|Capacitor\\|Cordova' --include='*.swift' . | wc -l # a high count with little native code is a thin wrapper", "APPLE-5.1.2-AI-NO-CONSENT-MODAL": "grep -rni 'api.openai.com\\|anthropic\\|generativelanguage\\|chat/completions' . && ! grep -rni 'consent' .", "GOOGLE-MISSING-PRIVACY-POLICY": "grep -rn 'privacyPolicy\\|privacy-policy' . || echo 'set a privacy policy URL in the Play listing'", "APPLE-ACCOUNT-DELETION-WEAK": "grep -rn 'deleteAccount\\|delete account' --include='*.swift' . && grep -rn 'mailto:\\|deactivate' --include='*.swift' . # deletion must truly delete, not mailto or deactivate", "ANDROID-ACCOUNT-DELETION-URL": "grep -rn 'createAccount\\|signUp\\|register' --include='*.kt' --include='*.java' . && ! grep -rn 'deleteAccount\\|delete_account' . # also set a data deletion URL in the Play listing", "APPLE-1.2-UGC-24H-ACTION": "grep -rni 'post\\|comment\\|upload\\|feed\\|community' --include='*.swift' . && ! grep -rni 'report\\|block user\\|EULA\\|moderation' --include='*.swift' .", "GOOGLE-FAMILIES-AD-SDK": "grep -rn 'com.google.android.gms.ads\\|applovin\\|unity.*ads\\|ironsource' --include='*.gradle' . && grep -rni 'children\\|families\\|kids' --include='AndroidManifest.xml' .", "APPLE-GAMBLING-BRAZIL-LICENSE": "grep -rni 'gambling\\|fixed-odds\\|betting' --include='*.swift' . # then verify the SPA license is provided in App Review Information for Brazil storefront", "GOOGLE-PLAY-AGE-SIGNALS-MISUSE": "grep -rn 'com.google.android.play:age-signals\\|AgeSignalsManager\\|AgeSignalsRequest' --include='*.gradle' --include='*.kts' --include='*.kt' --include='*.java' . # if present, confirm age signals are never passed to ad, marketing, profiling, or analytics SDKs", "APPLE-PRIVACY-NUTRITION-LABELS": "grep -rn 'email\\|phoneNumber\\|userName\\|location\\|coordinates' --include='*.swift' . && ! grep -rn 'NSPrivacyCollectedDataTypes\\|privacyNutritionLabels\\|privacy-nutrition-labels' .", "ANDROID-USER-DATA-DISCLOSURE": "grep -rnE 'android\\.permission\\.(READ_CONTACTS|WRITE_CONTACTS|READ_SMS|SEND_SMS|RECEIVE_SMS|READ_CALL_LOG|WRITE_CALL_LOG|GET_ACCOUNTS|MANAGE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE)' --include='AndroidManifest.xml' . && ! grep -rnE 'prominent disclosure|user consent|privacy consent|accept policy|[Pp]rominentDisclosure|[Dd]isclosureDialog|[Cc]onsentDialog|showDisclosure|requestConsent' .", "ANDROID-ADVERTISING-ID": "grep -rn 'com.google.android.gms.permission.AD_ID\\|AD_ID\\|getAdvertisingIdInfo' --include='AndroidManifest.xml' --include='*.kt' --include='*.java' . && ! grep -rn 'opt-out\\|reset AD_ID\\|advertisingIdConsent\\|delete AD_ID' .", "ANDROID-RUNTIME-PERMISSIONS": "grep -rn 'requestPermissions\\|checkSelfPermission\\|shouldShowRequestPermissionRationale' --include='*.kt' --include='*.java' . && ! grep -rn 'permission explanation\\|showPermissionRationale\\|explainPermission' .", "ANDROID-HEALTH-PERMISSIONS": "grep -rn 'HealthConnectClient\\|com.google.android.gms.permission.HealthConnect\\|READ_STEPS\\|READ_HEART_RATE' --include='*.kt' --include='*.java' --include='AndroidManifest.xml' . && ! grep -rn 'healthConnectConsent\\|healthPrivacyPolicy\\|Health Connect' .", "WEB-GDPR-COMPLIANCE": "grep -rn 'processData\\|personalData\\|submitForm\\|registerWeb\\|webForm' --include='*.js' --include='*.ts' --include='*.html' . && ! grep -rn 'GDPR\\|opt-in\\|privacyConsent\\|deletePersonalData\\|exportData' .", "WEB-COOKIE-CONSENT": "grep -rn 'document.cookie\\|setCookie\\|cookieStore\\|js-cookie\\|cookieConsent' --include='*.js' --include='*.ts' --include='*.html' . && ! grep -rn 'cookieBanner\\|cookieConsentBanner\\|acceptCookies\\|cookiePreferences' .", "WEB-LOCAL-STORAGE": "grep -rn 'localStorage.setItem\\|localStorage' --include='*.js' --include='*.ts' --include='*.html' . && ! grep -rn 'encryptedStorage\\|encryptToken\\|consentLocalStorage\\|clearLocalStorage' .", "WEB-SESSION-STORAGE": "grep -rn 'sessionStorage.setItem\\|sessionStorage' --include='*.js' --include='*.ts' --include='*.html' . && ! grep -rn 'encryptedSession\\|clearSessionStorage' .", "WEB-INDEXEDDB": "grep -rn 'indexedDB.open\\|indexedDB\\|createObjectStore' --include='*.js' --include='*.ts' --include='*.html' . && ! grep -rn 'encryptDatabase\\|deleteDatabase\\|consentIndexedDB' .", "WEB-TRACKING-TECHNOLOGIES": "grep -rn 'gtag\\|fbq\\|google-analytics\\|trackingPixel\\|analytics.js\\|hotjar' --include='*.js' --include='*.ts' --include='*.html' . && ! grep -rn 'consentTracking\\|disableTracking\\|optOutTracking\\|trackingPreferences' .", "BOTH-SECURE-STORAGE": "grep -rn 'UserDefaults.standard.set\\|getSharedPreferences' . | grep -i 'token\\|password\\|credential\\|secret\\|jwt' && ! grep -rn 'Keychain\\|SecItemAdd\\|SecItemUpdate\\|EncryptedSharedPreferences\\|KeyStore\\|SQLCipher' . # matches guard.sh: fires only when a sensitive keyword is present AND a secure-storage API is absent", "ANDROID-INSECURE-BACKUP": "grep -rn 'allowBackup=\"true\"' . && ! grep -rn 'dataExtractionRules\\|fullBackupContent\\|allowBackup=\"false\"' .", "BOTH-UNSAFE-DEEPLINK": "grep -rn 'CFBundleURLSchemes\\|android:scheme' . && ! grep -rn 'apple-app-site-association\\|assetlinks.json' .", "APPLE-ACCESSIBILITY-VOICEOVER": "python3 scripts/accessibility-audit.py . --rule APPLE-ACCESSIBILITY-VOICEOVER", "APPLE-ACCESSIBILITY-DYNAMICTYPE": "python3 scripts/accessibility-audit.py . --rule APPLE-ACCESSIBILITY-DYNAMICTYPE", "APPLE-ACCESSIBILITY-REDUCEMOTION": "python3 scripts/accessibility-audit.py . --rule APPLE-ACCESSIBILITY-REDUCEMOTION", "APPLE-ACCESSIBILITY-COLORCONTRAST": "python3 scripts/accessibility-audit.py . --rule APPLE-ACCESSIBILITY-COLORCONTRAST", "APPLE-ACCESSIBILITY-HAPTICS": "python3 scripts/accessibility-audit.py . --rule APPLE-ACCESSIBILITY-HAPTICS", "APPLE-ACCESSIBILITY-KEYBOARD": "python3 scripts/accessibility-audit.py . --rule APPLE-ACCESSIBILITY-KEYBOARD", "ANDROID-ACCESSIBILITY-TALKBACK": "python3 scripts/accessibility-audit.py . --rule ANDROID-ACCESSIBILITY-TALKBACK", "ANDROID-ACCESSIBILITY-FONTSCALING": "python3 scripts/accessibility-audit.py . --rule ANDROID-ACCESSIBILITY-FONTSCALING", "ANDROID-ACCESSIBILITY-HIGHCONTRAST": "python3 scripts/accessibility-audit.py . --rule ANDROID-ACCESSIBILITY-HIGHCONTRAST", "ANDROID-ACCESSIBILITY-SCANNER": "python3 scripts/accessibility-audit.py . --rule ANDROID-ACCESSIBILITY-SCANNER", "BOTH-SUBSCRIPTION-HARD-CANCEL": "grep -rniE 'subscri(be|ption)|auto.renew|membership' --include='*.swift' --include='*.kt' --include='*.java' --include='*.html' --include='*.md' . 2>/dev/null | grep -iE '(^|[^a-z])call[^a-z].{0,24}cancel|cancel.{0,25}[^a-z]call([^a-z]|$)|mail.{0,25}cancel|(^|[^a-z])write[^a-z].{0,24}cancel|cancel.{0,15}(in.person|by.phone|by.mail)'", "BOTH-E-EVIDENCE-COMPLIANCE-MISSING": "grep -rniE 'e-evidence|european production order|european preservation order|emergency data production' . 2>/dev/null", "BOTH-WITHDRAWAL-BUTTON-MISSING": "grep -rniE 'withdrawal button|withdrawal function|withdraw from contract|distance contract' . 2>/dev/null", "BOTH-GPSR-COMPLIANCE-MISSING": "grep -rniE 'gpsr|general product safety|product safety|manufacturerInfo|safetyWarning' . 2>/dev/null", "FLUTTER-PRIVACY-MANIFEST-MISSING": "grep -q 'permission_handler\\|image_picker\\|geolocator\\|firebase_' pubspec.yaml 2>/dev/null && ! find . -name 'PrivacyInfo.xcprivacy' | grep -q .", "RN-OTA-UNDECLARED": "grep -rn 'react-native-code-push\\|CodePush\\.\\|expo-updates' --include='*.ts' --include='*.tsx' --include='*.js' . 2>/dev/null", "RN-PRIVACY-MANIFEST-MISSING": "grep -qE '\"react-native\"|\"expo\"' package.json 2>/dev/null && grep -rn 'Firebase\\|AsyncStorage\\|expo-file-system' --include='*.ts' --include='*.tsx' . 2 - data/regulatory-deadlines.json (106613 bytes)
{ "version": "2.4.0", "updated": "2026-11-15", "description": "Database of global regional, national, and platform regulatory deadlines compiled from App Store Compliance Playbook records.", "deadlines": [ { "id": "EU-AI-ACT-ART-4", "jurisdiction": "European Union (EU)", "law": "EU AI Act, Regulation (EU) 2024/1689", "requirement": "Article 4 AI Literacy. Providers and deployers must take measures to ensure a sufficient level of AI literacy, proportionate to context. A written policy, induction, and log are pragmatic evidence, not a stated legal mandate.", "effective_date": "2024-08-01", "grace_period": "6 months", "mandatory_date": "2025-02-02", "enforcement_date": "2025-02-02", "affected_repository_sections": "docs/EU-REGULATORY-2026.md section 1.3, references/guidelines/by-app-type/ai-and-generative-apps.md", "priority": "high", "absorbed_into": "docs/EU-REGULATORY-2026.md section 1.3, references/guidelines/by-app-type/ai-and-generative-apps.md", "source_url": "https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1689/oj/eng", "verified_on": "2026-11-14", "source_note": "EUR-Lex serves scripted clients an empty page, so the text was read through the Publications Office CELLAR record for CELEX 32024R1689." }, { "id": "EU-AI-ACT-ART-5", "jurisdiction": "European Union (EU)", "law": "EU AI Act, Regulation (EU) 2024/1689", "requirement": "Article 5 Prohibited Practices (ban on subliminal manipulation, child exploitation, social scoring, biometric trait categorization, etc.).", "effective_date": "2024-08-01", "grace_period": "6 months", "mandatory_date": "2025-02-02", "enforcement_date": "2025-02-02", "affected_repository_sections": "docs/EU-REGULATORY-2026.md section 1.4, references/guidelines/by-app-type/ai-and-generative-apps.md", "priority": "critical", "absorbed_into": "docs/EU-REGULATORY-2026.md section 1.4, references/guidelines/by-app-type/ai-and-generative-apps.md", "source_url": "https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1689/oj/eng", "verified_on": "2026-11-14", "source_note": "EUR-Lex serves scripted clients an empty page, so the text was read through the Publications Office CELLAR record for CELEX 32024R1689." }, { "id": "EU-AI-ACT-ART-50", "jurisdiction": "European Union (EU)", "law": "EU AI Act, Regulation (EU) 2024/1689", "requirement": "Article 50 Transparency Obligations (AI-interaction disclosure, synthetic content marking, and deepfake disclosure).", "effective_date": "2024-08-01", "grace_period": "24 months", "mandatory_date": "2026-08-02", "enforcement_date": "2026-08-02", "affected_repository_sections": "docs/EU-REGULATORY-2026.md section 1.2, references/guidelines/by-app-type/ai-and-generative-apps.md", "priority": "critical", "absorbed_into": "docs/EU-REGULATORY-2026.md section 1.2, references/guidelines/by-app-type/ai-and-generative-apps.md", "source_url": "https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1689/oj/eng", "verified_on": "2026-11-14", "source_note": "EUR-Lex serves scripted clients an empty page, so the text was read through the Publications Office CELLAR record for CELEX 32024R1689." }, { "id": "EU-AI-ACT-GPAI", "jurisdiction": "European Union (EU)", "law": "EU AI Act, Regulation (EU) 2024/1689", "requirement": "GPAI-model obligations, governance, and penalties (Articles 99 and 100).", "effective_date": "2024-08-01", "grace_period": "12 months", "mandatory_date": "2025-08-02", "enforcement_date": "2025-08-02", "affected_repository_sections": "docs/EU-REGULATORY-2026.md section 1.1, section 1.6", "priority": "high", "absorbed_into": "docs/EU-REGULATORY-2026.md section 1.1, section 1.6", "source_url": "https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1689/oj/eng", "verified_on": "2026-11-14", "source_note": "EUR-Lex serves scripted clients an empty page, so the text was read through the Publications Office CELLAR record for CELEX 32024R1689." }, { "id": "EU-AI-ACT-HIGH-RISK-ANNEX-III", "jurisdiction": "European Union (EU)", "law": "EU AI Act, Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 (as amended by AI Omnibus, in force 27 July 2026)", "requirement": "High-risk AI systems (Annex III) obligations, compliance checks, and governance requirements deferred by the AI Omnibus (in force 27 July 2026). Date set by Regulation (EU) 2026/1744 of 8 July 2026, in force, not a proposal.", "effective_date": "2024-08-01", "grace_period": "40 months", "mandatory_date": "2027-12-02", "enforcement_date": "2027-12-02", "affected_repository_sections": "docs/EU-REGULATORY-2026.md section 1.5, references/guidelines/by-app-type/ai-and-generative-apps.md", "priority": "high", "source_url": "https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/ai-omnibus-enters-force", "verified_on": "2026-11-14", "source_note": "Commission notice of the AI omnibus amendment. The consolidated amended text was not read." }, { "id": "EU-AI-ACT-HIGH-RISK-ANNEX-I", "jurisdiction": "European Union (EU)", "law": "EU AI Act, Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 (as amended by AI Omnibus, in force 27 July 2026)", "requirement": "High-risk AI systems embedded in physical products (Annex I machinery, toys, lifts, etc.) compliance deferred by the AI Omnibus (in force 27 July 2026). Date set by Regulation (EU) 2026/1744 of 8 July 2026, in force, not a proposal.", "effective_date": "2024-08-01", "grace_period": "48 months", "mandatory_date": "2028-08-02", "enforcement_date": "2028-08-02", "affected_repository_sections": "docs/EU-REGULATORY-2026.md section 1.5, references/guidelines/by-app-type/ai-and-generative-apps.md", "priority": "high", "source_url": "https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/ai-omnibus-enters-force", "verified_on": "2026-11-14", "source_note": "Commission notice of the AI omnibus amendment. The consolidated amended text was not read." }, { "id": "EU-DMA-EXTERNAL-PURCHASE", "jurisdiction": "European Union (EU)", "law": "EU Digital Markets Act (DMA)", "requirement": "Alternative payments and out-of-app offers (StoreKit External Purchases or Offers Entitlement, ExternalPurchaseCustomLink disclosure sheet, In-App Purchase at equal prominence when offered, parental gates for minors, options kept 12 months, monthly transaction reporting).", "effective_date": "2024-03-07", "grace_period": "none", "mandatory_date": "2024-03-07", "enforcement_date": "2024-03-07", "affected_repository_sections": "docs/EU-REGULATORY-2026.md section 2", "priority": "high", "absorbed_into": "docs/EU-REGULATORY-2026.md section 2", "source_url": "https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/commission-finds-apple-and-meta-breach-digital-markets-act", "verified_on": "2026-11-14" }, { "id": "EU-DSA-TRADER-STATUS", "jurisdiction": "European Union (EU)", "law": "EU Digital Services Act (DSA)", "requirement": "Trader status declaration and verification (D-U-N-S, phone, email publish, 2FA verified) or app removal from EU storefront.", "effective_date": "2024-02-17", "grace_period": "12 months", "mandatory_date": "2025-02-17", "enforcement_date": "2025-02-17", "affected_repository_sections": "docs/EU-REGULATORY-2026.md section 3, references/rules/metadata.md", "priority": "critical", "absorbed_into": "docs/EU-REGULATORY-2026.md section 3, references/rules/metadata.md", "source_url": "https://developer.apple.com/help/app-store-connect/manage-compliance-information/manage-european-union-digital-services-act-trader-requirements/", "verified_on": "2026-11-14" }, { "id": "EU-EAA-ACCESSIBILITY", "jurisdiction": "European Union (EU)", "law": "European Accessibility Act (EAA), Directive (EU) 2019/882", "requirement": "Harmonised standard EN 301 549 Chapter 11 / WCAG 2.1 AA mobile accessibility compliance and Annex V accessibility information published in the terms and conditions or an equivalent document (Article 13(2)).", "effective_date": "2022-06-28", "grace_period": "36 months", "mandatory_date": "2025-06-28", "enforcement_date": "2025-06-28", "affected_repository_sections": "docs/EU-REGULATORY-2026.md section 4, references/rules/design.md", "priority": "high", "absorbed_into": "docs/EU-REGULATORY-2026.md section 4, references/rules/design.md", "source_url": "https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2019/882/oj", "verified_on": "2026-11-14", "source_note": "EUR-Lex serves scripted clients an empty page, so the text was read through the Publications Office CELLAR record for CELEX 32019L0882." }, { "id": "EU-DATA-ACT-CORE", "jurisdiction": "European Union (EU)", "law": "EU Data Act, Regulation (EU) 2023/2854", "requirement": "Core data access-by-design obligations when apps interact with connected products and wearables.", "effective_date": "2024-01-11", "grace_period": "20 months", "mandatory_date": "2025-09-12", "enforcement_date": "2025-09-12", "affected_repository_sections": "docs/EU-REGULATORY-2026.md section 5", "priority": "medium", "absorbed_into": "docs/EU-REGULATORY-2026.md section 5", "source_url": "https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=OJ:L_202302854", "verified_on": "2026-11-14", "source_note": "EUR-Lex serves scripted clients an empty page, so the text was read through the Publications Office CELLAR record for CELEX 32023R2854." }, { "id": "EU-DATA-ACT-DESIGN", "jurisdiction": "European Union (EU)", "law": "EU Data Act, Regulation (EU) 2023/2854", "requirement": "Access-by-design technical implementation for connected wearables and devices. This is the Article 3(1) access-by-design duty for connected products, not cloud switching. Switching charges fall to zero on 12 January 2027 under Article 29(1).", "effective_date": "2024-01-11", "grace_period": "32 months", "mandatory_date": "2026-09-12", "enforcement_date": "2026-09-12", "affected_repository_sections": "docs/EU-REGULATORY-2026.md section 5", "priority": "medium", "absorbed_into": "docs/EU-REGULATORY-2026.md section 5", "source_url": "https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=OJ:L_202302854", "verified_on": "2026-11-14", "source_note": "EUR-Lex serves scripted clients an empty page, so the text was read through the Publications Office CELLAR record for CELEX 32023R2854." }, { "id": "EU-CRA-REPORTING", "jurisdiction": "European Union (EU)", "law": "Cyber Resilience Act, Regulation (EU) 2024/2847", "requirement": "Active vulnerability reporting and security incident notification obligations.", "effective_date": "2024-12-11", "grace_period": "21 months", "mandatory_date": "2026-09-11", "enforcement_date": "2026-09-11", "affected_repository_sections": "docs/EU-REGULATORY-2026.md section 5", "priority": "medium", "absorbed_into": "docs/EU-REGULATORY-2026.md section 5", "source_url": "https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/cyber-resilience-act", "verified_on": "2026-11-14" }, { "id": "EU-CRA-MAIN", "jurisdiction": "European Union (EU)", "law": "Cyber Resilience Act, Regulation (EU) 2024/2847", "requirement": "Main security-by-design and vulnerability handling obligations.", "effective_date": "2024-12-11", "grace_period": "36 months", "mandatory_date": "2027-12-11", "enforcement_date": "2027-12-11", "affected_repository_sections": "docs/EU-REGULATORY-2026.md section 5", "priority": "medium", "source_url": "https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/cyber-resilience-act", "verified_on": "2026-11-14" }, { "id": "US-COPPA-AMENDED", "jurisdiction": "United States (Federal)", "law": "Children's Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA), 16 CFR Part 312", "requirement": "Amended COPPA Rule compliance (biometric identifiers added to PII, separate opt-in consent for third-party disclosure/targeted-ads, written retention policy, written info-security program). The section 312.11 carve-outs are earlier dates (90 days and six months after the 22 April 2025 publication) and bind FTC-approved COPPA Safe Harbor programs only, not app developers.", "effective_date": "2025-06-23", "grace_period": "10 months", "mandatory_date": "2026-04-22", "enforcement_date": "2026-04-22", "affected_repository_sections": "docs/GLOBAL-REGULATORY-2026.md section 2.1, references/guidelines/by-app-type/kids-category-and-families.md", "priority": "critical", "absorbed_into": "docs/GLOBAL-REGULATORY-2026.md section 2.1, references/guidelines/by-app-type/kids-category-and-families.md", "source_url": "https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2025/01/ftc-finalizes-changes-childrens-privacy-rule-limiting-companies-ability-monetize-kids-data", "verified_on": "2026-11-14" }, { "id": "US-FTC-HEALTH-BREACH", "jurisdiction": "United States (Federal)", "law": "FTC Health Breach Notification Rule, 16 CFR Part 318", "requirement": "2024 Final Rule compliance (unauthorized sharing of health/sensitive data with advertisers treated as breach, mandatory 60-day notice).", "effective_date": "2024-06-25", "grace_period": "none", "mandatory_date": "2024-06-25", "enforcement_date": "2024-06-25", "affected_repository_sections": "docs/GLOBAL-REGULATORY-2026.md section 2.6, references/guidelines/by-app-type/health-fitness-and-medical.md", "priority": "high", "absorbed_into": "docs/GLOBAL-REGULATORY-2026.md section 2.6, references/guidelines/by-app-type/health-fitness-and-medical.md", "source_url": "https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2024/04/ftc-finalizes-changes-health-breach-notification-rule", "verified_on": "2026-11-14" }, { "id": "US-TX-ASAA", "jurisdiction": "Texas (USA State)", "law": "Texas SB 2420 (App Store Accountability Act)", "requirement": "Age assurance and verifiable parental consent for minors on downloads, purchases, and major updates, delete age data, request age category. Statutory effective date 1 January 2026. Preliminary injunctions of 23 December 2025 were stayed by the Fifth Circuit on 4 June 2026 and the Supreme Court declined to vacate the stay on 6 July 2026, so the law is in force while t - data/rejection-patterns.json (99384 bytes)
{ "version": "2.4.0", "updated": "2026-11-15", "description": "Machine readable taxonomy of App Store and Google Play rejection patterns. Drives the pre submission guard. Each pattern carries a platform, the cited guideline or policy, a severity, an automatable detection signal, and the fix.", "sources": [ "https://developer.apple.com/app-store/review/guidelines/", "https://developer.apple.com/app-store/review/", "https://play.google/developer-content-policy/", "https://support.google.com/googleplay/android-developer/answer/9899234" ], "patterns": [ { "id": "ANDROID-ACCESSIBILITY-FONTSCALING", "platform": "google", "guideline": "User Experience - Accessibility", "title": "Font scaling disabled due to dp text sizing", "severity": "medium", "detection": "Hardcoded text sizes specified in dp instead of sp in Android XML layouts or Jetpack Compose files.", "signals": [ "textSize", "dp" ], "fix": "Always define text sizes in sp (scale-independent pixels) rather than dp to allow the system font scaling to work correctly." }, { "id": "ANDROID-ACCESSIBILITY-HIGHCONTRAST", "platform": "google", "guideline": "User Experience - Accessibility", "title": "Hardcoded colors ignoring high contrast settings", "severity": "medium", "detection": "Hardcoded hex color strings in layout files or hardcoded Color objects in Compose without using theme attributes.", "signals": [ "color", "textColor", "Color(0xFF" ], "fix": "Reference semantic colors or color resources so the app automatically respects high contrast themes." }, { "id": "ANDROID-ACCESSIBILITY-SCANNER", "platform": "google", "guideline": "User Experience - Accessibility", "title": "Touch target sizes below 48dp", "severity": "medium", "detection": "Clickable items or buttons defined with layout_width, layout_height, or padding that results in touch targets smaller than 48dp.", "signals": [ "clickable", "onClick", "48dp", "48.dp" ], "fix": "Ensure all interactive elements have a minimum touch target area of 48dp x 48dp by using padding, minWidth, and minHeight." }, { "id": "ANDROID-ACCESSIBILITY-TALKBACK", "platform": "google", "guideline": "User Experience - Accessibility", "title": "TalkBack support missing or disabled", "severity": "medium", "detection": "Views or graphic components missing contentDescription or setting importantForAccessibility inappropriately.", "signals": [ "contentDescription", "importantForAccessibility" ], "fix": "Provide meaningful contentDescription values for all informative images and interactive views, and ensure importantForAccessibility is set correctly." }, { "id": "ANDROID-ACCOUNT-DELETION-URL", "platform": "google", "guideline": "User Data", "title": "Account creation without in app deletion and a data deletion URL", "severity": "high", "detection": "Account creation present but no in app delete path and no web data deletion URL.", "signals": [ "signUp", "createAccount", "register" ], "counterSignals": [ "deleteAccount", "delete_account", "account deletion" ], "fix": "Provide in app account deletion and set a public data deletion URL in the Play Console listing." }, { "id": "ANDROID-ADVERTISING-ID", "platform": "google", "guideline": "User Data", "title": "Google Play Advertising ID usage without disclosure or opt-out", "severity": "high", "detection": "Using com.google.android.gms.permission.AD_ID permission or querying GAID but lacking opt-out support or user deletion pathways in code/privacy policy.", "signals": [ "com.google.android.gms.permission.AD_ID", "AD_ID", "getAdvertisingIdInfo" ], "counterSignals": [ "opt-out", "reset AD_ID", "advertisingIdConsent", "delete AD_ID" ], "fix": "Declare the AD_ID permission in AndroidManifest.xml and handle user opt-out or deletion requests in full compliance with Google Play policy." }, { "id": "ANDROID-DYNAMIC-CODE-LOADING", "platform": "google", "guideline": "Device and Network Abuse", "title": "Dynamic code loading at runtime", "severity": "high", "detection": "DexClassLoader, PathClassLoader from a downloaded file, or downloading and executing code at runtime. For apps targeting API 37, every native library loaded with System.load() must be read-only or the system throws UnsatisfiedLinkError.", "signals": [ "DexClassLoader", "PathClassLoader", "loadDex", "createPackageContext" ], "fix": "Ship all code in the package. Server side changes must be data, not executable code." }, { "id": "ANDROID-HEALTH-PERMISSIONS", "platform": "google", "guideline": "Permissions and APIs", "title": "Health or fitness data access without Health Connect declaration", "severity": "critical", "detection": "Accessing Health Connect client or querying health permissions (e.g. steps, heart rate) without proper declaration or dedicated health privacy policy.", "signals": [ "HealthConnectClient", "com.google.android.gms.permission.HealthConnect", "READ_STEPS", "READ_HEART_RATE" ], "counterSignals": [ "healthConnectConsent", "healthPrivacyPolicy", "Health Connect" ], "fix": "Declare Health Connect permissions, complete the console Health Connect form, and maintain a dedicated health privacy policy." }, { "id": "ANDROID-INSECURE-BACKUP", "platform": "google", "guideline": "Device and Network Abuse", "title": "Android backup is enabled without filtering sensitive data", "severity": "high", "detection": "android:allowBackup is set to true in AndroidManifest.xml without setting data extraction rules to exclude credentials/databases.", "signals": [ "allowBackup=\"true\"" ], "counterSignals": [ "dataExtractionRules", "fullBackupContent", "allowBackup=\"false\"" ], "fix": "Disable backups with allowBackup=\"false\", or configure dataExtractionRules / fullBackupContent to exclude sensitive credentials and SQLite databases." }, { "id": "ANDROID-OVERLAY-TAPJACKING", "platform": "google", "guideline": "Permissions and APIs", "title": "System overlay permission, a tapjacking and malware signal", "severity": "high", "detection": "SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW or application overlay declared, especially combined with AccessibilityService.", "signals": [ "SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW", "TYPE_APPLICATION_OVERLAY" ], "fix": "Remove overlay abuse. The overlay plus accessibility combination is a strong malware signal Google enforces against." }, { "id": "ANDROID-QUERY-ALL-PACKAGES", "platform": "google", "guideline": "Package visibility", "title": "QUERY_ALL_PACKAGES without a permitted use case", "severity": "high", "detection": "QUERY_ALL_PACKAGES declared in AndroidManifest.", "signals": [ "QUERY_ALL_PACKAGES" ], "fix": "Declare specific packages with a queries element, or qualify for a permitted use case." }, { "id": "ANDROID-RUNTIME-PERMISSIONS", "platform": "google", "guideline": "Permissions and APIs", "title": "Sensitive runtime permissions requested without validation", "severity": "high", "detection": "Requesting critical permissions (camera, contacts, storage) without dynamic checks or explicit explanation/rationale to the user.", "signals": [ "requestPermissions", "checkSelfPermission", "shouldShowRequestPermissionRationale" ], "counterSignals": [ "permission explanation", "showPermissionRationale", "explainPermission" ], "fix": "Check permissions dynamically at runtime, show a clear rationale if denied, and handle denials gracefully." }, { "id": "GOOGLE-PHOTO-VIDEO-PERMISSIONS-DECLARATION", "platform": "google", "guideline": "Photo and Video Permissions", "title": "READ_MEDIA_IMAGES or READ_MEDIA_VIDEO declared without the Android photo picker", "severity": "high", "detection": "Apps targeting API 33 or higher may only request READ_MEDIA_IMAGES and READ_MEDIA_VIDEO when the system photo picker is not sufficient for core functionality, and every app that keeps them must complete the Photo and Video Permissions declaration in Play Console. A manifest that declares them with no photo picker usage in source is the usual rejection shape.", "signals": [ "READ_MEDIA_IMAGES", "READ_MEDIA_VIDEO" ], "counterSignals": [ "PickVisualMedia", "ACTION_PICK_IMAGES", "PhotoPicker", "photo_picker" ], "fix": "Use the Android photo picker for one-off selection. Keep broad access only for a core gallery-style feature and complete the Photo and Video Permissions declaration in Play Console. Reference https://support.google.com/googleplay/android-developer/answer/14115180" }, { "id": "ANDROID-USER-DATA-DISCLOSURE", "platform": "google", "guideline": "User Data", "title": "Missing prominent disclosure for sensitive user data", "severity": "critical", "detection": "A declared permission that reads contacts, SMS, call logs, device accounts, or all files (the surface Play enforces prominent disclosure on) with no disclosure or consent flow in the app.", "signals": [ "READ_CONTACTS", "WRITE_CONTACTS", "READ_SMS", "SEND_SMS", "RECEIVE_SMS", "READ_CALL_LOG", "WRITE_CALL_LOG", "GET_ACCOUNTS", "MANAGE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE" ], "counterSignals": [ "prominent disclosure", "user consent", "privacy consent", "accept policy", "prominentDisclosure", "disclosureDialog", "consentDialog", "showDisclosure", "requestConsent" ], "fix": "Provide a prominent in-app disclosure before collecting sensitive personal data, and obtain explicit user consent." }, { "id": "APPLE-1.2-UGC-24H-ACTION", "platform": "apple", "guideline": "1.2", "title": "User generated content without the required moderation mechanisms", "severity": "critical", "detection": "UGC present without content filtering, a mechanism to report offensive content with timely responses to concerns, the ability to block abusive users, and published contact information. Verified against the live guideline 2026-08-30, which requires timely responses rather than a fixed 24 hour deadline. Since 8 June 2026 guideline 1.2 states that egregious or repeated behavior is grounds for immediate removal from the App Store and from the Apple Developer Program, and 1.2.1(a) requires creator apps to gate over-rating content on verified or declared age. Since 16 October 2026 guideline 1.2 names the app types it covers, social media, user-generated content platforms, and AI content creation apps, lists nonconsensual intimate imagery among the harms, and states that failing to implement appropriate safeguards or to remediate violations after notice may be a Developer Code of Conduct violation.", "signals": [ "post", "comment", "upload", "chat", "feed", "community" ], "counterSignals": [ "report", "block user", "EULA", "moderation" ], "fix": "Add a zero tolerance EULA, content filtering, in app reporting, user blocking, published contact information, and a process that acts on reports and Apple notices in a timely way. Remediate every violation Apple identifies, because failing to remediate after notice may breach the Developer Code of Conduct. Source. real Apple Safety 1.2 rejection email, and https://developer.apple.com/news/?id=92th7e5i." }, { "id": "APPLE-2.1-CLOUD-NOT-IN-PRODUCTION", "platform": "apple", "guideline": "2.1", "title": "iCloud or CloudKit schema not deployed to production", "severity": "critical", "detection": "The app uses CloudKit or iCloud but the schema and containers are only in the development environment, so the feature fails for the reviewer on the production build.", "signals": [ "CKContainer", "CloudKit", "NSUbiquitousKeyValueStore", "iCloud" ], "fix": "Deploy the CloudKit schema and containers to production before submitting. Source. lukylab checklist." }, { "id": "APPLE-2.1-DEBUG-FEATURES", "platform": "apple", "guideline": "2.1", "title": "Debug or test features shipped in the production build", "severity": "high", "detection": "Debug menus, test logins, or developer backdoors left visible in the release build rather than gated behind a debug only flag.", "signals": [ "debug menu", "debugMenu", "test login", "skip login", "bypass auth", "DEBUG_BYPASS" ], "fix": "Hide debug and test features behind a debug only compile flag so they never ship in production. Source. lukylab checklist." }, { "id": "APPLE-2.1-MISSING-DEMO-ACCOUNT", "platform": "apple", "guideline": "2.1", "title": "Account based app without demo credentials", "severity": "critical", "detection": "Login or auth code present (SignInWithApple, OAuth, Auth, login view) but no demo account note found in review metadata or fastlane review_information.", "signals": [ "LoginView", "signIn", "AuthService", "OAuth", "Firebase Auth" ], "fix": "Add a working demo account and a live test path to the Notes for Review field before submission." }, { "id": "APPLE-2.1-PLACEHOLDER-CONTENT", "platform": "apple", "guideline": "2.1", "title": "Placeholder content in the build", "severity": "high", "detection": "Strings such as lorem ipsum, TODO, FIXME, placeholder, dummy, test data, example.com found in shipped resources.", "signals": [ "lorem ipsum", "placeholder", "TODO", "FIXME", "dummy", "example.com" ], "fix": "Replace all placeholder text and assets with real content before submission." }, { - data/ruling-register.json (21137 bytes)
{ "register_version": "1.1.0", "about": "Release requirements with their legal standing and how each one is proven. See docs/RULING-REGISTER.md.", "requirements": [ { "id": "RR-PLAY-LENDING-IN", "revision": 1, "title": "Personal-loan apps in India must hold an RBI licence and appear on the RBI list of digital lending apps", "jurisdiction": "IN", "store": "google", "instrument": "Google Play Financial Services policy, India personal loan requirements", "authority": "Google Play, Reserve Bank of India", "standing": "store_policy", "takes_effect": null, "features": [ "lending" ], "proof": "mixed", "proof_items": [ { "what": "The app does not request the contacts or photos permissions in the merged release manifest", "how": "automated", "id": "auto-1" }, { "what": "The app is listed in the RBI DLAs deployed by Regulated Entities list and the licence is shown in the Play declaration", "how": "owner_attested", "id": "owner-2" } ], "check": "Inspect the merged release manifest for contacts and photos access, then confirm the app appears on the RBI DLA list before enabling India.", "sources": [ { "url": "https://support.google.com/googleplay/android-developer/answer/16604194?hl=en", "checked_on": "2026-11-05", "quote": "hold and present a valid financial services license from the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) to offer personal loans", "supports": [ "obligation" ] }, { "url": "https://support.google.com/googleplay/android-developer/answer/9876821?hl=en", "checked_on": "2026-11-05", "quote": "lending apps are prohibited from accessing sensitive user data such as contacts or photos", "supports": [ "obligation" ] } ] }, { "id": "RR-PLAY-CRYPTO-EU", "revision": 1, "title": "Crypto exchange and wallet apps in the EU need MiCA CASP authorisation or a documented local exemption", "jurisdiction": "EU", "store": "google", "instrument": "Google Play cryptocurrency exchange and software wallet requirements, MiCA", "authority": "Google Play, national competent authorities", "standing": "store_policy", "takes_effect": null, "features": [ "crypto" ], "proof": "owner_attested", "proof_items": [ { "what": "For each enabled EU country, the CASP authorisation or the accepted exemption and the completed Play Console declaration", "how": "owner_attested", "id": "owner-1" } ], "check": "For every enabled EU country record the service type, the legal entity, the CASP authorisation or exemption, and the Console declaration. A non-custodial wallet is assessed on its own terms, never by inheriting an exchange's answer.", "sources": [ { "url": "https://support.google.com/googleplay/android-developer/answer/16329703?hl=en", "checked_on": "2026-11-05", "quote": "the developer must be authorized as a crypto-asset service provider (CASP) under the markets in crypto-assets (MiCA) regulation", "supports": [ "obligation" ] } ], "open_questions": [ "Whether a given exemption is accepted depends on the country and needs local advice." ] }, { "id": "RR-US-FDA-DEVICE-SOFTWARE", "revision": 1, "title": "Health software that diagnoses or treats may be a regulated medical device in the US", "jurisdiction": "US", "store": null, "instrument": "FDA device software functions including mobile medical applications", "authority": "US Food and Drug Administration", "standing": "in_force", "takes_effect": null, "features": [ "medical" ], "proof": "owner_attested", "proof_items": [ { "what": "A written classification for each medical function and advertised indication, with the authorisation, exemption or enforcement-discretion basis", "how": "owner_attested", "id": "owner-1" } ], "check": "List every medical function and claim, record its classification and the pathway that covers it, and keep the US listing off until each one is resolved.", "sources": [ { "url": "https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/digital-health-center-excellence/device-software-functions-including-mobile-medical-applications", "checked_on": "2026-11-05", "quote": "Software functions span a wide range of health functions, and some require FDA review.", "supports": [ "obligation" ] } ] }, { "id": "RR-CN-GENAI-FILING", "revision": 1, "title": "Generative AI services with public-opinion reach in China need a security assessment and algorithm filing", "jurisdiction": "CN", "store": null, "instrument": "Interim Measures for the Management of Generative AI Services, Article 17", "authority": "Cyberspace Administration of China", "standing": "in_force", "takes_effect": null, "features": [ "generative_ai" ], "proof": "owner_attested", "proof_items": [ { "what": "The filing applicability decision for each model and service role, with the filing or assessment record", "how": "owner_attested", "id": "owner-1" } ], "check": "Decide whether the service has public-opinion or social-mobilisation reach, and if so keep the security assessment and the algorithm filing on record.", "sources": [ { "url": "https://www.cac.gov.cn/2023-07/13/c_1690898327029107.htm", "checked_on": "2026-11-05", "quote": "提供具有舆论属性或者社会动员能力的生成式人工智能服务的,应当按照国家有关规定开展安全评估", "supports": [ "obligation" ] } ], "open_questions": [ "Whether an app that only wraps a third-party model API needs its own filing needs local confirmation." ] }, { "id": "RR-CN-AI-LABELING", "revision": 1, "title": "App stores in China verify the AI-content labelling materials of apps offering generated content", "jurisdiction": "CN", "store": null, "instrument": "Measures for Labeling AI-Generated Synthetic Content, Article 7", "authority": "Cyberspace Administration of China", "standing": "in_force", "takes_effect": null, "features": [ "generative_ai" ], "proof": "mixed", "proof_items": [ { "what": "Generated output carries a visible label and the metadata label survives download and sharing", "how": "automated", "id": "auto-1" }, { "what": "The labelling materials the distribution platform asks for at listing", "how": "owner_attested", "id": "owner-2" } ], "check": "Test visible labels and embedded metadata through generate, download and share, and keep the labelling materials ready for the store review.", "sources": [ { "url": "https://www.cac.gov.cn/2025-03/14/c_1743654684782215.htm", "checked_on": "2026-11-05", "quote": "互联网应用程序服务提供者提供人工智能生成合成服务的,互联网应用程序分发平台应当核验其生成合成内容标识相关材料", "supports": [ "obligation" ] } ] }, { "id": "RR-US-DOJ-DATA-SECURITY", "revision": 1, "title": "Transfers of bulk US sensitive personal data to countries of concern are prohibited or restricted", "jurisdiction": "US", "store": null, "instrument": "DOJ Data Security Program, 28 CFR Part 202, Executive Order 14117", "authority": "US Department of Justice, National Security Division", "standing": "in_force", "takes_effect": "2025-04-08", "features": [ "personal_data" ], "proof": "owner_attested", "proof_items": [ { "what": "A map of every SDK, analytics, cloud and support-access recipient to its ownership, the data categories and volumes, and the transaction type", "how": "owner_attested", "id": "owner-1" } ], "check": "Map each data recipient to ownership and control, data category and volume, then block prohibited transactions and document the security controls for restricted ones. OFAC screening does not answer this question.", "sources": [ { "url": "https://www.justice.gov/nsd/data-security", "checked_on": "2026-11-05", "quote": "The Data Security Program went into effect on April 8, 2025.", "supports": [ "obligation", "date" ] } ] }, { "id": "RR-ID-PSE-REGISTRATION", "revision": 1, "title": "Private electronic system operators serving Indonesia must register or face blocking", "jurisdiction": "ID", "store": null, "instrument": "Ministerial Regulation 5 of 2020 on Private Electronic System Operators", "authority": "Komdigi", "standing": "in_force", "takes_effect": null, "features": [], "proof": "owner_attested", "proof_items": [ { "what": "The PSE applicability decision and, where it applies, the current registration record", "how": "owner_attested", "id": "owner-1" } ], "check": "Before enabling Indonesia, decide whether PSE registration applies and keep the registration current. Passing store review does not satisfy it.", "sources": [ { "url": "https://portal.komdigi.go.id/kanal-publik/berita-kini/9446", "checked_on": "2026-11-05", "quote": "Komdigi Putus Akses Tiga PSE Lingkup Privat yang Tidak Memenuhi Kewajiban Pendaftaran", "supports": [ "obligation" ] } ] }, { "id": "RR-EU-WITHDRAWAL-FUNCTION", "revision": 1, "title": "Online distance contracts in the EU need a withdrawal function", "jurisdiction": "EU", "store": null, "instrument": "Directive (EU) 2023/2673, Article 11a inserted into Directive 2011/83/EU", "authority": "EU member state consumer authorities", "standing": "in_force_later", "takes_effect": "2026-06-19", "features": [ "subscriptions" ], "proof": "mixed", "proof_items": [ { "what": "A labelled withdrawal function is reachable in the app for the whole withdrawal period", "how": "automated", "id": "auto-1" }, { "what": "The national implementation, the contracting trader and the exceptions for each country you sell in", "how": "owner_attested", "id": "owner-2" } ], "pattern_ids": [ "BOTH-WITHDRAWAL-BUTTON-MISSING" ], "check": "Walk the withdrawal flow to its durable confirmation, and keep it separate from cancelling a renewal.", "sources": [ { "url": "https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2023/2673/oj/eng", "checked_on": "2026-11-05", "unverified": "EUR-Lex refused automated fetches on 2026-11-05, so the Article 11a text and the 19 June 2026 date were not re-read today. Confirm on EUR-Lex before relying on it.", "supports": [ "obligation", "date" ] } ] }, { "id": "RR-EU-DSA-NOTICE-ACTION", "revision": 1, "title": "Apps that host user content in the EU must run a notice and action mechanism", "jurisdiction": "EU", "store": null, "instrument": "Digital Services Act, notice and action", "authority": "European Commission, Digital Services Coordinators", "standing": "in_force", "takes_effect": null, "features": [ "social", "marketplace" ], "proof": "mixed", "proof_items": [ { "what": "A report-illegal-content entry point exists in the app", "how": "automated", "id": "auto-1" }, { "what": "A notice is acknowledged, decided and answered with reasons, and the size-based exemptions you rely on are written down", "how": "owner_attested", "id": "owner-2" } ], "check": "Send a test illegal-content notice through acknowledgement, decision and the reasons sent to the user.", "sources": [ { "url": "https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/dsa-notice-and-action-mechanism", "checked_on": "2026-11-05", "quote": "The notice and action mechanism under the Digital Services Act (DSA) is a tool provided by platforms to report illegal content", "supports": [ "obligation" ] } ] }, { "id": "RR-VN-SOCIAL-AUTH", "revision": 1, "title": "Social platforms in Vietnam must authenticate accounts before posting, and under-16 accounts are registered by a parent", "jurisdiction": "VN", "store": null, "instrument": "Decree 147/2024/ND-CP", "authority": "Government of Vietnam", "standing": "in_force", "takes_effect": null, "features": [ "social" ], "proof": "mixed", "proof_items": [ { "what": "An unauthenticated account cannot post or share", "how": "automated", "id": "auto-1" }, { "what": "The phone or identity route and the guardian sign-up for under-16s, and whether your social features are in scope", "how": "owner_attested", "id": "owner-2" } ], "check": "Prove an unauthenticated account cannot publish, and walk the guardian sign-up for an under-16 user.", "sources": [ { "url": "https://en.baochinhphu.vn/social-media-platforms-have-to-authenticate-users-via-phone-numbers-decree-111241112173317774.htm", "checked_on": "2026-11-05", "quote": "For children aged below 16 using social media platforms, their parents or supervisors shall use their personal information to register for accounts", "supports": [ "obligation" ] } ] }, { "id": "RR-EU-CRA-REPORTING", "revision": 1, "title": "Manufacturers must report actively exploited vulnerabilities within 24 and 72 hours", "jurisdiction": "EU", "store": null, "instrument": "Cyber Resilience Act, reporting obligations", "authority": "ENISA, national CSIRTs", "stan - docs/_config.yml (949 bytes)
title: App Store Compliance Playbook description: >- Avoid common App Store and Google Play rejections. An open playbook and pre-submission guard with 117 rejection patterns and fixes, privacy manifest and Data safety checks, and 95 tracked deadlines across 28 jurisdictions and platform scopes. url: https://mjmirza.github.io baseurl: /app-store-compliance lang: en theme: jekyll-theme-primer author: Mirza Iqbal github_username: mjmirza twitter: username: MirzaJhanzaib social: name: Mirza Iqbal links: - https://github.com/mjmirza - https://twitter.com/MirzaJhanzaib - https://next8n.com plugins: - jekyll-seo-tag - jekyll-sitemap - jekyll-relative-links - jekyll-optional-front-matter - jekyll-titles-from-headings relative_links: enabled: true collections: false titles_from_headings: strip_title: true include: - llms.txt webmaster_verifications: google: dHbguG3JdSMV02JY_ltLOKoI--3cG4dQEEkT2K_AnmA - docs/ACCESSIBILITY.md (32233 bytes)
# Accessibility for App Store and Google Play apps Neither store rejects an app today for missing VoiceOver or TalkBack support, so accessibility is mostly a legal and quality duty rather than a review gate. The binding pressure comes from the law (the European Accessibility Act in the EU, the DOJ ADA Title II rule for US public entities, the Equality Act in the UK) and from what each store asks you to declare or shows you in its own test reports. This document covers the store-side declarations and checks, the per-platform implementation bar, the legal layer outside the EU, how to run the repo's static accessibility scan, and, in section 12, the accessibility of this repository itself. Every item below was checked against a primary source on 7 November 2026. Anything that could not be confirmed is listed in section 11 and was left out of the body. ## 1. The EU layer in one table The European Accessibility Act (Directive (EU) 2019/882) is covered in full in [section 4 of the EU regulatory document](EU-REGULATORY-2026.md#4-european-accessibility-act-eaa-directive-eu-2019882-hard-new-gap). The duties in short. | Duty | What it means for an app | Where it is set | |---|---|---| | Applicability | In force for in-scope consumer services since 28 June 2025, including e-commerce, banking, e-books, transport booking, telecom, and audiovisual media access, delivered through websites and mobile apps | EU doc section 4.1 | | Microenterprise exemption | Fewer than 10 employees and turnover or balance sheet not over 2,000,000 euro, services only (Article 4(5)) | EU doc section 4.2 | | Technical bar | Harmonised standard EN 301 549 (V3.2.1 builds on WCAG 2.1 AA and adds Chapter 11 for non-web software). A WCAG-only audit does not cover Chapter 11 | EU doc section 4.3 | | Accessibility information | Annex V information on how the service meets the Annex I requirements, published in the terms and conditions or an equivalent document (Article 13(2)) | EU doc section 4.3 | | Penalties | Set per Member State. Germany up to 100,000 euro plus corrective measures or withdrawal | EU doc section 4.4 | ## 2. Apple Accessibility Nutrition Labels Accessibility Nutrition Labels are a per-app declaration in App Store Connect that appears on the product page. Apple describes them this way. "The Accessibility Nutrition Labels help users learn if an app will be accessible to them before they download, and give developers the opportunity to better inform and educate their users on features that their app supports." ### 2.1 The nine features you can declare | Feature | Platform note from Apple | |---|---| | VoiceOver | | | Voice Control | Not supported on Apple TV and Apple Watch | | Larger Text | Not supported on Mac | | Dark Interface | | | Differentiate Without Color Alone | | | Sufficient Contrast | | | Reduced Motion | | | Captions | | | Audio Descriptions | | The labels appear on devices running iOS 26, iPadOS 26, macOS 26, tvOS 26, visionOS 26, and watchOS 26 or later. You answer per device your app supports. ### 2.2 Optional now, required later, no date Apple states. "providing these labels will be voluntary to start." and "You'll be given ample time and evaluation resources before this is mandatory, but over time, you'll be required to share accessibility support details to submit new apps and app updates to the App Store." Apple publishes no date for the switch. Do not quote one. ### 2.3 The bar for claiming a feature A feature may only be declared when it works across the whole app. Apple's text. "To indicate support for an accessibility feature in the Accessibility Nutrition Labels, users must be able to complete all of the common tasks of your app using that feature." Apple defines common tasks as the primary functionality users are expected to perform in the app, plus the functionality fundamental to using any app, namely the first launch experience, login, purchase, and settings. If known bugs would change the answer under these criteria, Apple says not to indicate support. Treat an over-claim as a metadata accuracy problem. A declared feature that fails on the login or purchase screen is a false statement on your product page. ### 2.4 How to publish - Role. Account Holder, Admin, Finance, App Manager, or Marketing. - Path. Apps, select the app, App Accessibility in the sidebar, Get Started, add support per device, select the features, save as draft, then Publish. - You can only publish support for devices that have a live version on the App Store. - Published responses go live immediately and can take up to 24 hours to be visible to all users. Apple's help page does not say that publishing passes through App Review. - An optional accessibility URL on the product page can carry more detail, such as in-app accessibility settings, caption languages, or areas of the app that do not support a feature. Sources. [Overview of Accessibility Nutrition Labels](https://developer.apple.com/help/app-store-connect/manage-app-accessibility/overview-of-accessibility-nutrition-labels/), [Manage Accessibility Nutrition Labels](https://developer.apple.com/help/app-store-connect/manage-app-accessibility/manage-accessibility-nutrition-labels/). ## 3. Apple App Review Guidelines and accessibility The current App Review Guidelines contain no guideline that requires an app to support VoiceOver, Dynamic Type, or any other assistive feature. The full text was searched for accessibility, accessible, VoiceOver, assistive, and disability. The only use of the word in the sense of disability is in Guideline 3.2.1(ii), which lists accessibility as an approved need for an app that collects third-party apps. "Displaying or recommending a collection of third-party apps that are designed for a specific approved need (such as health management, aviation, accessibility)." The other hits use "accessible" to mean reachable, not usable by people with disabilities. Guideline 2.3.1(a) requires new features to be "accessible for review", and Guideline 5.1.1(i) requires the privacy policy link "within the app in an easily accessible manner". So accessibility does not reach App Review as a feature requirement. It reaches the store through the Nutrition Labels in section 2 and through the law in sections 6 and 7. Source. [App Review Guidelines](https://developer.apple.com/app-store/review/guidelines/). ## 4. iOS and iPadOS implementation checklist Figures and wording in this section come from the Apple Human Interface Guidelines accessibility page. API names were checked against Apple's documentation index. | Area | What to do | APIs and figures | |---|---|---| | VoiceOver labels | Give every interactive element and every informative image a label that names its purpose. Mark decorative images so VoiceOver skips them | `accessibilityLabel`, `accessibilityHint`, `accessibilityTraits` (UIKit), `.accessibilityLabel(_:)`, `.accessibilityHint(_:)`, `.accessibilityAddTraits(_:)`, `.accessibilityHidden(_:)`, `Image(decorative:)` (SwiftUI) | | Voice Control | Label elements so a spoken command can target them. Provide alternative names where the visible label is long or ambiguous | `accessibilityUserInputLabels` (UIKit), `.accessibilityInputLabels(_:)` (SwiftUI) | | Larger Text | HIG asks you to let people enlarge text "by at least 200 percent (or 140 percent in watchOS apps)". Default and minimum system sizes on iOS and iPadOS are 17 pt and 11 pt | `UIFont.preferredFont(forTextStyle:)` with `adjustsFontForContentSizeCategory`, SwiftUI text styles such as `.body` | | Contrast | HIG minimum ratios. text up to 17 pt at 4.5 to 1, text 18 pt and up at 3 to 1, bold text at 3 to 1. If the default scheme falls short, provide a higher contrast scheme when Increase Contrast is on, and check both light and dark appearances | `UIAccessibility.isDarkerSystemColorsEnabled`, system and asset catalog colors | | Color alone | Do not carry meaning by color only | `accessibilityDifferentiateWithoutColor` (SwiftUI environment) | | Reduce Motion | When the setting is on, reduce "automatic and repetitive animations, including zooming, scaling, and peripheral motion". HIG suggests fades in place of x, y, and z transitions | `UIAccessibility.isReduceMotionEnabled`, `accessibilityReduceMotion` (SwiftUI environment) | | Hit targets | HIG table for iOS and iPadOS. default control size 44x44 pt, minimum 28x28 pt. Add about 12 points of padding around bezeled elements and about 24 points around elements without a bezel | Layout constraints, `contentShape` | | Captions and audio descriptions | Do not deliver dialogue or important information through audio alone. Offer captions, subtitles, and audio descriptions | AVFoundation media selection, `AVMediaCharacteristic.describesVideoForAccessibility` | The 44x44 pt figure is the HIG default control size, and 28x28 pt is the HIG minimum. Plan for 44x44 pt on touch targets. WCAG 2.2 Success Criterion 2.5.8 Target Size (Minimum) sets 24 by 24 CSS pixels at Level AA, and WCAG 2.1 Success Criterion 2.5.5 Target Size sets 44 by 44 CSS pixels at Level AAA. Test each declared feature end to end with the real assistive technology (VoiceOver, Voice Control, Larger Text at the largest sizes) through the first launch, login, purchase, and settings flows, since those are the common tasks Apple's label criteria name. Sources. [Apple HIG Accessibility](https://developer.apple.com/design/human-interface-guidelines/accessibility), [WCAG 2.2 Understanding SC 2.5.8](https://www.w3.org/WAI/WCAG22/Understanding/target-size-minimum.html), [WCAG 2.1 Understanding SC 2.5.5](https://www.w3.org/WAI/WCAG21/Understanding/target-size.html). ## 5. Android and Google Play ### 5.1 Implementation | Area | What Android's documentation says | |---|---| | Content labels | Describe each UI element's purpose, usually in `contentDescription`. Do not add a description to `Text` composables or `TextView`, since TalkBack reads the text. Do not include the element type ("Submit", not "Submit button"). Each description should be unique, including items in a list | | Decorative elements | Compose. pass `null` as `contentDescription` for a purely decorative element, or use `hideFromAccessibility`. Views. set `android:importantForAccessibility="no"` (minSdkVersion 16 or higher) | | Touch targets | At least 48dp x 48dp. In Views, `paddingLeft` plus `minWidth` plus `paddingRight` must reach 48dp, and the same for height, so the visible size can be smaller than the touch target. Many built-in Compose components such as `Button`, `IconButton`, and `ListItem` already enforce the minimum | | Text size | The `sp` unit "is also scaled by the user's font size preference. It is recommend you use this unit when specifying font sizes" | | Contrast | At least 4.5 to 1 for text smaller than 18sp, or bold text smaller than 14sp. At least 3 to 1 for all other text | ### 5.2 Testing tools - TalkBack, the built-in screen reader. Swipe through each element and check that every element is reachable, that announcements convey purpose, and that the main workflows complete. - Switch Access and Voice Access, for motor and voice input. - Compose UI Check mode in Android Studio, which flags issues such as low color contrast in the problems panel. - Accessibility Scanner, which uses the Accessibility Test Framework and checks content labels, clickable items, contrast, and more. Android notes that the framework in Android Studio cannot detect issues that only occur on a device. - Compose testing APIs, which read the same semantics tree that accessibility services use. ### 5.3 Play pre-launch report When you upload to a release track, Google Play runs accessibility tests with the Accessibility Test Framework and lists the results on the Accessibility tab of the pre-launch report. The categories are Touch target size, Low contrast, Content labeling, and Implementation (for example a traversal order that does not match the logical layout). The report also gives a launch recommendation. Neither page fetched states that accessibility findings block publishing, so treat them as findings to fix, not as a gate. ### 5.4 AccessibilityService policy This is the one accessibility area where Google Play enforces policy. The rules, from the Play policy page "Use of the AccessibilityService API". - Only services designed to help people with disabilities access their device may declare `isAccessibilityTool`. Supporting people with disabilities must be the primary purpose. Examples include screen readers, switch-based and voice-based input systems, and braille-based access systems. - Apps that are not accessibility tools, such as antivirus software, automation tools, assistants, monitoring apps, cleaners, password managers, and launchers, may still use the API but must meet the prominent disclosure and consent requirements. - The disclosure must be inside the app, not only in the store description, on a website, or in a privacy policy or terms of service. It must be a separate disclosure explaining why the app needs the API, and consent needs an affirmative user action such as a tap to accept or a ticked check box. - Any use of the Accessibility API that enables an app to "autonomously initiate, plan, and execute actions or decisions is strictly prohibited". Deterministic, rule-based automation that follows a static, human-defined script is not prohibited. Verified accessibility tools are exempt when the function serves the core accessibility purpose. The page gives no effective date for this clause. - Since 3 November 2021, apps targeting API level 31 that include an AccessibilityService must complete a declaration in Play Console. Accessibility tools describe a core feature, the disability types served, and the target users. Other apps explain why they need the API and whether they collect or share personal or sensitive data. Both provide a video showing the disclosure flow, the consent and non-consent paths, and a core feature. The `AccessibilityService_description` text does not replace the in-app disclosure. - Changes to how the app uses the API require resubmitting the declaration. Deceptive or undeclared use can lead to suspension or account termination. Sources. [Make apps more accessible](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/ui/accessibility/apps), [Make apps more accessible (Views)](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/ui/accessibility/views/apps-views), [Dimension resources](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/resources/more-resources), [Test your app's accessibility](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/ui/accessibility/testing), [Pre-launch report](https://support.google.com/googleplay/android-developer/answer/9842757), [Use of the AccessibilityService API](https://support.google.com/googleplay/android-developer/answer/10964491). ## 6. United States ### 6.1 ADA Title II, state and local government apps (rule in force, dates extended) The DOJ rule at 28 CFR Part 35 Subpart H re - docs/ADVANCED-2026.md (16914 bytes)
# Advanced and 2026 Enforcement Layer This document closes the gaps that the base rejection maps do not cover. It was built from a ten persona adversarial review of the base playbook (indie developer, enterprise lead, an Apple reviewer lens, privacy officer, fintech, kids, games, AI, ASO, security). The base maps cover the classic guideline numbers. This layer covers the modern upload time enforcement, the pre review account preconditions, the legal obligations that sit underneath store policy, and the per domain depth that causes real rejections in 2025 and 2026. A framing that the whole layer rests on. Store compliance is not the same as legal compliance. Passing review does not make an app GDPR, COPPA, or EU AI Act compliant. The store enforces a subset, and a regulator enforces the rest. Both must be satisfied. ## 1. Apple upload time enforcement (the modern first wall) These are checked when you upload the binary, before a human reviewer ever opens the app. Getting them wrong means the build is rejected or stuck and never reaches review. | Item | What it is | What triggers the block | Fix | |---|---|---|---| | Privacy Manifest, PrivacyInfo.xcprivacy | A bundled file declaring the data the app and its SDKs collect, the tracking domains, and the reasons for using certain APIs | An app that uses required reason APIs without declaring an approved reason, or bundles a commonly used third party SDK that lacks a signed privacy manifest | Add a PrivacyInfo.xcprivacy to the app and confirm every listed third party SDK ships its own signed manifest. Keep the SDK versions current so the signed manifest is present | | Required Reason APIs | A defined set of APIs (file timestamps, system boot time, disk space, user defaults, active keyboards) that need a declared approved reason code | Using one of these APIs with no NSPrivacyAccessedAPITypes entry or with a reason code that does not match the use | Declare each required reason API with an approved reason code in the privacy manifest | | Tracking domains | NSPrivacyTrackingDomains in the manifest | A domain that performs tracking is contacted but not listed, while ATT consent is not granted | List every tracking domain and gate it behind ATT consent | | Export compliance, ITSAppUsesNonExemptEncryption | The encryption declaration every iOS build must answer | Leaving it unanswered parks the build in Missing Compliance, so it never reaches review | Set ITSAppUsesNonExemptEncryption in Info.plist. For a standard app that only uses HTTPS, the exempt answer applies, which removes the per submission prompt | | Build with the current SDK | Apple requires new submissions to be built with a recent SDK and Xcode by an annual deadline | An old SDK build after the deadline is rejected at upload | Build with the current required Xcode and SDK before the annual cutoff | The privacy manifest is the single highest impact addition to any pre 2024 checklist. It is the most common modern upload rejection and it scales badly across an enterprise with many vendor SDKs, because each SDK must carry its own signed manifest. ## 2. Pre review account preconditions (you cannot even submit) These block the submit button itself or leave the app in a Developer Action Needed state. They have nothing to do with the build. | Precondition | Why it blocks | |---|---| | Apple Developer Program enrollment and identity verification | Enrollment verification can take days. Individual versus organization, and a D U N S number for an organization, must be resolved first | | Paid Applications Agreement, plus tax and banking | In app purchases and paid apps cannot be reviewed until the agreement is accepted and tax and banking forms are complete | | EU trader status under the Digital Services Act | Both stores require verified trader or developer identity information for distribution in the EU. Missing trader info blocks EU availability | | Required store assets | The largest iPhone screenshot size and, for an iPad app, the iPad size, a 1024 pixel app icon with no alpha or transparency, and a preview video that meets spec. Missing a required size blocks submission | | Metadata field limits | Apple name 30 characters, subtitle 30, keyword field 100, promotional text 170, description 4000. Google title 30, short description 80, full description 4000. Overflow or banned decoration blocks the listing | | Metadata decoration rules | No emoji or emoticons in the title, no all caps except a brand, no ranking or price claims such as number one, best, top, or free in the title or icon, no fake notification badges on the icon | ## 3. In app purchase and payments depth | Item | What developers miss | Fix | |---|---|---| | IAP created, attached, and submitted together | The IAP exists in App Store Connect but is not attached to the app version, so the reviewer cannot find it and rejects under 2.3.2 or 2.1 | Attach every IAP to the app version and submit it for review with the binary on the first review | | Restore Purchases | A non consumable or non renewing purchase with no restore path | Provide a visible Restore Purchases control. Required for non consumables | | Physical goods must not use IAP | Apple 3.1.5(a). Real world goods and services must use a payment method other than IAP. Using IAP for physical goods is itself a rejection | Use an external payment method for physical goods, and IAP only for digital goods | | External purchase, anti steering, and the DMA | The base map treats external links as a narrow regional entitlement. The real picture in 2025 and 2026 includes the EU Digital Markets Act alternative payment and marketplace rules, the US external link state after the Epic versus Apple injunction, the StoreKit External Purchase API, mandatory disclosure sheets, and Google User Choice Billing and alternative billing programs | Treat external payments as a region specific program with an application, disclosure sheet rules, and reporting. Confirm the current state per region before relying on it | | Commission tiers | Apple Small Business Program at the reduced rate, and reduced external or alternative billing fee tiers | Enroll in the Small Business Program if eligible and model the correct fee per region and program | | Merchant of record and tax | External payments move tax, refunds, chargebacks, PCI DSS, and strong customer authentication onto the developer | If you take external payments, you own PCI DSS scope, SCA and PSD2 3 D Secure, refunds, and tax | | Subscription depth | Price increase consent, grace periods, billing retry, account hold, free trial and intro offer disclosure | Implement the full subscription lifecycle, not only the purchase | ## 4. The demo account and reviewer reachability The base map says provide a demo account. The real failures are about reachability. - The demo account must not sit behind 2FA or SMS the reviewer cannot pass. Disable or bypass it for the review account. - The credentials must not expire during the review window. - The account must be pre populated with sample data so features are visible. - The backend must be reachable from Apple's review network. A geo IP block, a VPN requirement, an allowlist, or a WAF rule that blocks the reviewer reads as a broken app. - For a hard to reach feature, attach a demo video in App Review Notes. ## 5. Design quality, HIG, and device class Apple 4.0 Design covers the practical your app looks broken bucket the base map does not. - Broken layouts, truncated text, content clipped by the notch, Dynamic Island, or safe areas. - Unsupported orientations and a poor iPad experience when the app is universal rather than marked iPhone only. - A universal app that passes on iPhone but crashes or renders broken on iPad. Test every supported device class. - Non native or unfinished UI that does not follow basic Human Interface Guidelines. ## 6. The legal layer (store compliance is not legal compliance) | Obligation | What it requires beyond store policy | |---|---| | GDPR lawful basis, Article 6 | A documented lawful basis for every processing activity. Consent is one of six, not the default | | GDPR notice content, Articles 13 and 14 | A privacy notice that states identity, purposes, lawful basis, recipients, transfers, retention, and rights. A linked policy that merely exists is not enough | | International transfers, Chapter V | US analytics and third party AI are cross border transfers that need a transfer mechanism, not only disclosure | | ePrivacy and German TTDSG or TDDDG | Consent quality, a real consent banner, and SDK consent gating before any non essential SDK loads | | Data processing agreements, Article 28 | A DPA with every processor, and a controller versus processor classification of each SDK | | DPIA, Article 35 | A data protection impact assessment for high risk processing | | Special category data, Article 9 | Explicit consent or another Article 9 condition for health and similar data, beyond the store framework rules | | Children's digital consent age, Article 8 | The EU age of digital consent varies from 13 to 16. Germany is 16. COPPA's under 13 is a US rule, not a global one | | Data subject rights, Articles 15 to 22 | Access, rectification, erasure, portability, and objection, not only an account delete button | | EU AI Act | Transparency duties, risk classification, and disclosure for AI features shipping in the EU, phasing in across 2025 and 2026 | | DSA trader status | Verified trader or developer identity for EU distribution | The EU obligations above are shallow pointers. The full EU legal layer, with dated hard rules and sources for the EU AI Act (including the Article 50 transparency deadline of 2 August 2026), the Digital Markets Act and the Core Technology Fee, DSA trader status, and the European Accessibility Act (in force 28 June 2025), lives in [EU-REGULATORY-2026.md](EU-REGULATORY-2026.md). The USA and other-global legal layer lives in [GLOBAL-REGULATORY-2026.md](GLOBAL-REGULATORY-2026.md). The platform-mechanics and newer-policy hard rules (macOS notarization, Guideline 4.2 and 4.3, reader apps, the France ANSSI encryption declaration, visionOS and watchOS and tvOS specifics, Android developer verification, Foreground Service types, Play Integrity, Play Billing v8, target API, Health Connect, and the cross-cutting CSAM, UGC, accessibility, sanctions, and PCI items) live in [PLATFORM-MECHANICS-2026.md](PLATFORM-MECHANICS-2026.md). ## 7. Children and families depth - COPPA operative facts. The threshold is under 13. Persistent identifiers such as a device ID, advertising ID, IDFA, or cookies are themselves personal information for a child. The amended COPPA Rule from 2025 tightens consent and retention. - Verifiable Parental Consent. A parental gate is not consent for data collection. Real VPC is a separate, stronger step. - A valid parental gate uses an adult action a young child cannot perform, and gates external links and purchases. - Neutral age screen versus parental gate. A mixed audience app uses a neutral age screen that does not nudge a younger answer, then branches. - Apple Kids Category 1.3 bans behavioral advertising and requires ads to be age appropriate and human reviewed, rather than a flat ban on all ads. Verify the current wording. - Google Families. The audience and content declaration in the Play Console is the trigger. Use the self certified ads SDK program and set AdMob child directed flags. - Other regimes. US FERPA and state student data laws for ed tech, the UK Children's Code, and the California Age Appropriate Design Code. ## 8. Gambling depth - Simulated gambling and social casino is a distinct category from real money gambling, with its own age rating and regional rules. - Sweepstakes and dual currency sweeps coins models, cash prize skill tournaments, and daily fantasy are frequently treated as gambling and need the matching licensing and geo restriction. - Real money gambling program mechanics. An entitlement or application, a country allowlist, and a free to download requirement. - A national loot box and gambling law matrix governs odds disclosure and legality per country. - Google Play requires an in game purchases including random items disclosure, with specific odds disclosure placement. ## 9. AI content policy (2026) - Google Play has a distinct AI Generated Content policy. It is absent from the base map and must be satisfied for any generative app. - Apple UGC rules 1.2 apply to AI generated OUTPUT, not only user to user content. The model is a content source that needs filtering, reporting, and blocking. - Image and avatar generation abuse. NSFW, deepfake, face swap, and undress generation are high risk and cause removal. - AI app age rating reality. A companion or character AI that can produce sensitive content needs the matching age rating and self harm and crisis safeguards. - The thin AI wrapper. A bare front end over a third party model with no added value risks 4.2 and 4.3, distinct from the web wrapper case. - Reviewer demo accounts for AI apps need a high or unlimited quota so the reviewer can exercise the feature. ## 10. Android specifics the base map underweights | Item | Trigger | Fix | |---|---|---| | Dynamic code loading | DexClassLoader or downloading executable code at runtime | Ship all code in the package. Server changes are data, not code | | Package visibility | QUERY_ALL_PACKAGES without a permitted use case | Declare specific packages, or use a permitted use case | | Overlay and tapjacking | SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW or application overlay abuse, especially combined with AccessibilityService | Remove overlay abuse. The overlay plus accessibility combination is a strong malware signal | | Granular media permissions | Requesting broad storage on Android 13 and later instead of the granular photo and video permissions, or misusing the Photo and Video Permissions policy | Use the granular media permissions and the photo picker | | SDK Index | A banned or flagged SDK from the Google Play SDK Index | Check the SDK Index and remove flagged SDKs | | In app account and data deletion | Google requires both in app account deletion and a web data deletion URL | Provide in app deletion and a public data deletion URL in the listing | | Fingerprinting | Persistent identifier or fingerprinting to track users | Banned on both stores. Apple 5.1.2 bans fingerprinting regardless of ATT consent | ## 11. Ratings, reviews, and metadata integrity - Apple requires the native SKStoreReviewController for rating prompts, and bans rating gating and incentivized reviews. - Google bans incentivized and fake reviews and artificial installs. - Competitor brand names or trademarks in the Apple keyword field or the Google description are a distinct, named rejection. - Icon and screenshot integrity. No promotional or price or ranking badges on the icon, no fake notification dots, no emoji, no misleading overlays, captions, claims not in the app, or fake testim
- docs/AI-POLICY-MIGRATION.md (2154 bytes)
<!-- AI_POLICY_MONITOR_START --> > **Simulated output, not live announcements.** This file was generated from sample > announcements (the built-in set, the default, or a file passed with `--mock`). The titles, > publish dates, and descriptions below are examples that show the shape of a migration > report, not real publications. Only the linked official documentation URLs are real. > Re-run the monitor with `--live` against the real feeds before treating anything here > as an actual requirement. # AI Policy Monitoring & Compliance Report This report is continuously generated and updated by `scripts/monitor-ai-policy.py` to keep track of platform policy changes. ## Latest Monitored Policy Changes ### Sample. Apple App Review Guidelines, generative AI section (illustrative) (Apple) - **Published**: Wed, 01 Apr 2026 10:00:00 PDT - **Official Link**: [https://developer.apple.com/app-store/review/guidelines/](https://developer.apple.com/app-store/review/guidelines/) - **Key Topics**: AI-generated content requirements, App Review AI guidance, Safety expectations, User disclosure requirements - **Details**: Illustrative example only. Apps with generative AI features are expected to implement input/output moderation and user-reporting, disclose data shared with third-party LLM providers, and reflect AI-generated content in the age rating questionnaire. Verify the current wording at the linked guidelines page before citing it as fact. ### Sample. Google Play generative AI content policy (illustrative) (Google Play) - **Published**: Thu, 02 Apr 2026 09:00:00 PDT - **Official Link**: [https://play.google/developer-content-policy/](https://play.google/developer-content-policy/) - **Key Topics**: Google Play AI policies, AI-generated content disclosures, User safety requirements - **Details**: Illustrative example only. Apps featuring generative AI are expected to disclose AI-generated content, let users flag or report harmful output, and prevent deepfakes, face-swaps, and non-consensual sexual content. Verify the current wording at the linked developer policy center before citing it as fact. <!-- AI_POLICY_MONITOR_END -->
- docs/ANDROID-POLICY-MIGRATION.md (26108 bytes)
<!-- ANDROID_POLICY_MONITOR_START --> > **Simulated output, not live announcements.** This file was generated from sample > announcements (the built-in set, the default, or a file passed with `--mock`). The titles, > publish dates, and descriptions below are examples that show the shape of a migration > report, not real publications. Only the linked official documentation URLs are real. > Re-run the monitor with `--live` against the real feeds before treating anything here > as an actual requirement. # Android and Google Play Policy Migration & Requirements Report This report is continuously generated and updated by `scripts/monitor-android.py` to track compliance areas. ## Monitored Requirements Update Log ### 1. [Google Play Developer Policies] Google Play Enforcement Process - **Published Date**: Wed, 10 Jun 2026 10:00:00 PDT - **Official Resource**: [https://support.google.com/googleplay/android-developer/answer/9899234](https://support.google.com/googleplay/android-developer/answer/9899234) - **Description**: Google Play's enforcement process for policy violations covers rejection, removal, suspension, limited visibility, and account termination, based on app metadata, in-app experience, and account information. ### 2. [Play Console announcements] New Play Console Mandatory Identity Verification for Personal Accounts - **Published Date**: Mon, 15 Jun 2026 09:00:00 PDT - **Official Resource**: [https://support.google.com/googleplay/android-developer/answer/10788890](https://support.google.com/googleplay/android-developer/answer/10788890) - **Description**: To foster user trust, Google Play requires all personal developer accounts created before recent policy updates to complete mandatory identity verification by September 30, 2026. Failure to verify will result in update blockages and eventual listing removals. ### 3. [Target SDK requirements] Google Play Target SDK Policy: Support Android 16 (API 36) by August 31, 2026 - **Published Date**: Sun, 01 Mar 2026 08:00:00 PDT - **Official Resource**: [https://developer.android.com/google/play/requirements/target-sdk](https://developer.android.com/google/play/requirements/target-sdk) - **Description**: Google Play is updating its Target SDK requirements. Starting August 31, 2026, all new apps and updates to existing apps must target Android 16 (API 36) or higher. Submissions failing to meet this threshold will be blocked by the publishing gate. ### 4. [Minimum SDK requirements] Minimum SDK Requirement Policy Change for Android 5.0 Deprecation - **Published Date**: Thu, 12 Mar 2026 11:00:00 PDT - **Official Resource**: [https://developer.android.com/about/versions](https://developer.android.com/about/versions) - **Description**: To maintain high security and performance across the Google Play ecosystem, apps must set a minSdkVersion of 23 (Android 6.0) or higher to receive updates, formally deprecating support for legacy Android 5.0 and 5.1 (API 21/22). ### 5. [Android API deprecations] Minimum SDK Requirement Policy Change for Android 5.0 Deprecation - **Published Date**: Thu, 12 Mar 2026 11:00:00 PDT - **Official Resource**: [https://developer.android.com/about/versions](https://developer.android.com/about/versions) - **Description**: To maintain high security and performance across the Google Play ecosystem, apps must set a minSdkVersion of 23 (Android 6.0) or higher to receive updates, formally deprecating support for legacy Android 5.0 and 5.1 (API 21/22). ### 6. [Play Console announcements] Legacy SafetyNet Attestation APIs Deprecation & Shutdown Schedule - **Published Date**: Fri, 20 Mar 2026 12:00:00 PDT - **Official Resource**: [https://developer.android.com/google/play/integrity/overview](https://developer.android.com/google/play/integrity/overview) - **Description**: As announced previously, the Legacy SafetyNet Attestation APIs are fully deprecated and shut down. All anti-abuse, security check, and integrity verification flows must migrate to the modern Play Integrity API. ### 7. [Android API deprecations] Legacy SafetyNet Attestation APIs Deprecation & Shutdown Schedule - **Published Date**: Fri, 20 Mar 2026 12:00:00 PDT - **Official Resource**: [https://developer.android.com/google/play/integrity/overview](https://developer.android.com/google/play/integrity/overview) - **Description**: As announced previously, the Legacy SafetyNet Attestation APIs are fully deprecated and shut down. All anti-abuse, security check, and integrity verification flows must migrate to the modern Play Integrity API. ### 8. [Play Integrity API] Legacy SafetyNet Attestation APIs Deprecation & Shutdown Schedule - **Published Date**: Fri, 20 Mar 2026 12:00:00 PDT - **Official Resource**: [https://developer.android.com/google/play/integrity/overview](https://developer.android.com/google/play/integrity/overview) - **Description**: As announced previously, the Legacy SafetyNet Attestation APIs are fully deprecated and shut down. All anti-abuse, security check, and integrity verification flows must migrate to the modern Play Integrity API. ### 9. [Play Console announcements] Android Permission Model Update: Scoped Media and Storage Consent - **Published Date**: Mon, 23 Mar 2026 14:00:00 PDT - **Official Resource**: [https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) - **Description**: Under the updated User Data and Android Permission Model, apps requesting READ_MEDIA_IMAGES and READ_MEDIA_VIDEO face stricter verification. Broad photo access is restricted, and developers are urged to migrate to the native Android Photo Picker. ### 10. [Android permission model] Android Permission Model Update: Scoped Media and Storage Consent - **Published Date**: Mon, 23 Mar 2026 14:00:00 PDT - **Official Resource**: [https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) - **Description**: Under the updated User Data and Android Permission Model, apps requesting READ_MEDIA_IMAGES and READ_MEDIA_VIDEO face stricter verification. Broad photo access is restricted, and developers are urged to migrate to the native Android Photo Picker. ### 11. [User Data policy] Android Permission Model Update: Scoped Media and Storage Consent - **Published Date**: Mon, 23 Mar 2026 14:00:00 PDT - **Official Resource**: [https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) - **Description**: Under the updated User Data and Android Permission Model, apps requesting READ_MEDIA_IMAGES and READ_MEDIA_VIDEO face stricter verification. Broad photo access is restricted, and developers are urged to migrate to the native Android Photo Picker. ### 12. [Background execution restrictions] Strict Restrictions on Android Background execution and Exact Alarms - **Published Date**: Fri, 27 Mar 2026 15:00:00 PDT - **Official Resource**: [https://developer.android.com/about/versions/14/changes/schedule-exact-alarms](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/14/changes/schedule-exact-alarms) - **Description**: To conserve system battery life and improve device performance, Android is introducing tighter runtime checks. Tighter limitations on exact alarms (SCHEDULE_EXACT_ALARM) and background wake locks will trigger automatic job throttling. ### 13. [Play Console announcements] New Foreground Service Type Declaration Mandate on Play Console - **Published Date**: Tue, 31 Mar 2026 16:00:00 PDT - **Official Resource**: [https://developer.android.com/guide/components/foreground-services](https://developer.android.com/guide/components/foreground-services) - **Description**: All applications targeting API 34+ that run foreground services must declare valid foregroundServiceType attributes in their manifest, hold matching FOREGROUND_SERVICE permissions, and submit a detailed Play Console foreground service declaration and video. ### 14. [Foreground service policies] New Foreground Service Type Declaration Mandate on Play Console - **Published Date**: Tue, 31 Mar 2026 16:00:00 PDT - **Official Resource**: [https://developer.android.com/guide/components/foreground-services](https://developer.android.com/guide/components/foreground-services) - **Description**: All applications targeting API 34+ that run foreground services must declare valid foregroundServiceType attributes in their manifest, hold matching FOREGROUND_SERVICE permissions, and submit a detailed Play Console foreground service declaration and video. ### 15. [Privacy Sandbox] Privacy Sandbox Technologies Scheduled for Phase-Out on Android - **Published Date**: Wed, 01 Apr 2026 10:00:00 PDT - **Official Resource**: [https://privacysandbox.google.com/blog/update-on-plans-for-privacy-sandbox-technologies](https://privacysandbox.google.com/blog/update-on-plans-for-privacy-sandbox-technologies) - **Description**: Google has scheduled Privacy Sandbox technologies for phase-out, including the Topics and Attribution Reporting APIs on Android. Apps and SDKs should not build on these APIs and should review any code that still calls them. ### 16. [Google Play Developer Policies] Play Integrity API Update: Nonce Verification and Integrity Token Enforcement - **Published Date**: Mon, 06 Apr 2026 11:00:00 PDT - **Official Resource**: [https://developer.android.com/google/play/integrity](https://developer.android.com/google/play/integrity) - **Description**: To mitigate man-in-the-middle replay attacks, Google Play Integrity API now enforces server-side cryptographic nonce verification and strict integrity token checks before dispensing secure payloads. ### 17. [Play Console announcements] Play Integrity API Update: Nonce Verification and Integrity Token Enforcement - **Published Date**: Mon, 06 Apr 2026 11:00:00 PDT - **Official Resource**: [https://developer.android.com/google/play/integrity](https://developer.android.com/google/play/integrity) - **Description**: To mitigate man-in-the-middle replay attacks, Google Play Integrity API now enforces server-side cryptographic nonce verification and strict integrity token checks before dispensing secure payloads. ### 18. [Play Integrity API] Play Integrity API Update: Nonce Verification and Integrity Token Enforcement - **Published Date**: Mon, 06 Apr 2026 11:00:00 PDT - **Official Resource**: [https://developer.android.com/google/play/integrity](https://developer.android.com/google/play/integrity) - **Description**: To mitigate man-in-the-middle replay attacks, Google Play Integrity API now enforces server-side cryptographic nonce verification and strict integrity token checks before dispensing secure payloads. ### 19. [Play Billing] Play Billing Library v8.0 Mandatory Migration Deadline - **Published Date**: Wed, 08 Apr 2026 12:00:00 PDT - **Official Resource**: [https://developer.android.com/google/play/billing/deprecation-faq](https://developer.android.com/google/play/billing/deprecation-faq) - **Description**: By August 31, 2026, all new apps and updates to existing apps must migrate to the Play Billing Library version 8.0 or higher. Apps attempting to publish using earlier Billing Library versions (including v7.x or below) will be automatically blocked. ### 20. [User Data policy] Google Play User Data Deletion and Web URL Mandate Update - **Published Date**: Fri, 10 Apr 2026 13:00:00 PDT - **Official Resource**: [https://support.google.com/googleplay/android-developer/answer/13327111](https://support.google.com/googleplay/android-developer/answer/13327111) - **Description**: All apps permitting in-app account creation must provide users with both an in-app account deletion flow and a public web-based data deletion URL. Unreachable or broken deletion URLs will trigger automated store rejections. ### 21. [Google Play Developer Policies] Data Safety Mismatch Enforcement: Automatic Static SDK Scanning - **Published Date**: Mon, 13 Apr 2026 14:00:00 PDT - **Official Resource**: [https://support.google.com/googleplay/android-developer/answer/10787469](https://support.google.com/googleplay/android-developer/answer/10787469) - **Description**: Google Play is introducing enhanced static scanning for compiled binaries. The system will auto-scan for analytics (Firebase, Facebook, AppsFlyer) and advertising SDKs, rejecting any submission whose Data Safety declarations fail to match active tracking behavior. ### 22. [User Data policy] Data Safety Mismatch Enforcement: Automatic Static SDK Scanning - **Published Date**: Mon, 13 Apr 2026 14:00:00 PDT - **Official Resource**: [https://support.google.com/googleplay/android-developer/answer/10787469](https://support.google.com/googleplay/android-developer/answer/10787469) - **Description**: Google Play is introducing enhanced static scanning for compiled binaries. The system will auto-scan for analytics (Firebase, Facebook, AppsFlyer) and advertising SDKs, rejecting any submission whose Data Safety declarations fail to match active tracking behavior. ### 23. [Data Safety section] Data Safety Mismatch Enforcement: Automatic Static SDK Scanning - **Published Date**: Mon, 13 Apr 2026 14:00:00 PDT - **Official Resource**: [https://support.google.com/googleplay/android-developer/answer/10787469](https://support.google.com/googleplay/android-developer/answer/10787469) - **Description**: Google Play is introducing enhanced static scanning for compiled binaries. The system will auto-scan for analytics (Firebase, Facebook, AppsFlyer) and advertising SDKs, rejecting any submission whose Data Safety declarations fail to match active tracking behavior. ### 24. [Firebase policy updates] Data Safety Mismatch Enforcement: Automatic Static SDK Scanning - **Published Date**: Mon, 13 Apr 2026 14:00:00 PDT - **Official Resource**: [https://support.google.com/googleplay/android-developer/answer/10787469](https://support.google.com/googleplay/android-developer/answer/10787469) - **Description**: Google Play is introducing enhanced static scanning for compiled binaries. The system will auto-scan for analytics (Firebase, Facebook, AppsFlyer) and advertising SDKs, rejecting any submission whose Data Safety declarations fail to match active tracking behavior. ### 25. [AI-generated content policies] Google Play Generative AI Safeguards and In-App Reporting Requirements - **Published Date**: Thu, 16 Apr 2026 15:00:00 PDT - **Official Resource**: [https://support.google.com/googleplay/android-developer/answer/14747720](https://support.google.com/googleplay/android-developer/answer/14747720) - **Description**: Applications integrating generative AI or conversational LLMs must provide robust user-safety controls, including prominent disclosures, an in-app content reporting/flagging mechanism, user blocking, and safeguards preventing deepfake/NSFW outputs. ### 26. [Accessibility requirements] Google Play Accessibility Service Misuse and Touch Target Audit - **Published Date**: Tue, 21
- docs/APPLE.md (32675 bytes)
# Apple App Store Review Guidelines. Rejection Map Source. Apple App Store Review Guidelines (developer.apple.com/app-store/review/guidelines). Empirical ranking from Apple's 2024 App Store Transparency Report and 2025 enforcement reporting. Apple groups every rule into five sections. Safety, Performance, Business, Design, Legal. The tables below list every rejection causing guideline, what it requires, the exact behavior that triggers a rejection, and how to avoid it. Severity reflects how often the rule causes a real rejection and how hard it is to recover from. ## Ranked reality (where rejections actually come from) | Rank | Area | Guideline | Why it tops the list | |---|---|---|---| | 1 | Privacy noncompliance | 5.1.1, 5.1.2 | Single biggest cause of update and new app rejection. Missing privacy policy, vague purpose strings, no account deletion, undisclosed data sharing | | 2 | App completeness | 2.1 | Crashes, broken links, placeholder content, missing demo account, backend not live during review. Over 1.2 million performance rejections in 2024 | | 3 | Inaccurate metadata | 2.3 | Hidden features, misleading screenshots, undocumented functionality, keyword stuffing | | 4 | In app purchase | 3.1.1 | Trying to sell digital goods outside Apple's in app purchase, missing restore, undisclosed odds | | 5 | Minimum functionality and spam | 4.2, 4.3 | Repackaged websites, thin apps, duplicate bundle IDs, template apps, saturated category clones | | 6 | Design and login | 4.8 | Third party login present without an equal privacy preserving alternative | About one in four submissions is rejected. A large share fail on privacy and stability as Apple tightens enforcement and, per industry reporting, increasingly automates parts of review. Treat the figures here as directional, from store transparency reporting, and confirm current numbers against the source before quoting them. ## Section 1. Safety | Guideline | Requires | Triggers rejection | Avoid by | |---|---|---|---| | 1.2 Scope and Code of Conduct (16 October 2026) | The four UGC controls for every app where users create, generate, upload, or share content, named as social media, user-generated content platforms, and AI content creation apps | Nonconsensual intimate imagery, including AI-generated imagery, left unprevented or unremoved. Failing to implement appropriate safeguards, or failing to remediate violations after Apple's notice, may be a Developer Code of Conduct violation on top of the app removal | Treat an AI image or video generator as a UGC app, block intimate and undress generation, act on every Apple notice and keep a record of the fix. Sources. [Apple, 16 October 2026](https://developer.apple.com/news/?id=92th7e5i), [Apple, 16 October 2026](https://developer.apple.com/news/?id=vvzx6cul) | | 1.2 UGC escalation (8 June 2026) | The four UGC controls plus an escalation clause | Egregious or repeated UGC failures are now grounds for immediate removal from the App Store and from the Apple Developer Program. 1.2.1(a) creator apps must gate over-rating content on verified or declared age | Treat the first UGC rejection as the last warning, add age-based gating for creator content. Source. [App Review Guidelines](https://developer.apple.com/app-store/review/guidelines/) | | 1.1 Objectionable content | No defamatory, discriminatory, violent, sexual, or inflammatory content | Mean spirited content, realistic depictions of harm, pornography, hookup or prostitution promotion, fake or trick functionality. An entertainment disclaimer does not excuse it | Ship genuine, non objectionable functionality and remove joke or fake utility features | | 1.2 User generated content | Filtering, reporting, blocking, and published contact info for any app with UGC | No content filter, no report mechanism, no way to block abusive users, anonymous or objectionable chat | Build moderation, in app reporting, user blocking, and a contact method before submission | | 1.2.1 Creator content | Age restriction so minors cannot reach age inappropriate creator content | Creator app with no age gating mechanism | Add an age restriction based on verified or declared age | | 1.3 Kids category | No external links, no purchases, no IDFA, no third party ads or analytics collecting child data, all behind a parental gate | Links out, purchase opportunities, third party analytics or ads, children privacy law noncompliance | Gate every exit and purchase, strip third party SDKs that collect child data | | 1.4 Physical harm | Accurate medical data, validated health claims, no encouragement of harm | Unvalidated health measurement claims, drug dosage calculators without approval, DUI checkpoint data not from law enforcement, dangerous challenges | Validate claims, cite approvals, remove harm encouraging features | | 1.5 Developer information | An easy contact method in app or a support URL | Missing or outdated contact info | Add a working support URL and in app contact | | 1.6 Data security | Appropriate security for user information | Unauthorized access, disclosure, or weak protection | Encrypt in transit and at rest, scope third party access | | 1.7 Reporting criminal activity | Local law enforcement involvement where active | Reporting crime features without law enforcement involvement | Restrict to regions with active law enforcement partnership | ## Section 2. Performance | Guideline | Requires | Triggers rejection | Avoid by | |---|---|---|---| | 2.3.6 Social media declaration (September 2026) | Answer whether the app includes social media capabilities | Since September 2026 you cannot submit a new version, an update, or notarize for alternative marketplaces without answering the question. Declaring social media places the app in the Time Allowance category with a minimum 13+ rating, and under-13 users require the Declared Age Range API | Answer it in App Store Connect (or through the API socialMedia and socialMediaAgeRestricted attributes), accept 13+, adopt Declared Age Range if needed. Sources. [Apple, 8 June 2026](https://developer.apple.com/news/?id=0d2gpmml), [Apple, 9 July 2026](https://developer.apple.com/news/?id=tlur8uvi) | | 2.1 App completeness | A finished, stable, fully reviewable build | Crashes, bugs, broken links, placeholder or temporary content, untested code, missing demo account or demo mode for account features, backend not live during review, in app purchases incomplete or invisible, undocumented non obvious features | Test on device, ship a live backend, provide demo credentials, explain every non obvious feature and every in app purchase in App Review Notes | | 2.2 Beta testing | No demos, betas, or trials on the App Store | Submitting a trial or beta directly instead of using TestFlight | Use TestFlight for any pre release build | | 2.3.1 Accurate metadata | Every new feature described with specificity in Notes for Review, no misleading marketing. Hidden and dormant features moved to 2.5.19 on 16 October 2026 | False claims, a false price, generic Notes for Review, unvalidated claims such as an iOS virus scanner | Write specific Notes for Review, make claims you can prove | | 2.3.2 IAP in metadata | In app purchases clearly indicated, correct purchase handling | IAP not indicated in description or screenshots, broken purchase completion | Show IAP in metadata, implement transaction completion correctly | | 2.3.3 Screenshots | Screenshots show the app in use | Screenshots of only title art, a login page, or a splash screen | Capture real in app screens | | 2.3.6 Age rating | Accurate age rating and content warnings | Inaccurate rating, missing warnings for films, music, games | Answer the age rating questionnaire honestly | | 2.3.7 Names and keywords | App name 30 characters or fewer, clean keywords | Name too long, metadata packed with trademarks, app names, prices, or unrelated keywords | Keep the name short, keywords relevant and owned | | 2.3.10 No other platforms | No references to other platforms or marketplaces | Naming Android, Google Play, or alternative marketplaces in app or metadata | Remove cross platform references | | 2.3.14 Creative assets (16 October 2026) | Creative assets on the product page header and in search results show the app's content, functionality, or brand, follow the metadata rules, and suit all audiences | Specific or discounted prices, unverifiable product claims, references to other apps meant to mislead, inappropriate content | Keep the art about the app, drop prices and claims you cannot prove. Sources. [Apple, 16 October 2026](https://developer.apple.com/news/?id=92th7e5i), [Apple asset guidelines](https://developer.apple.com/app-store/asset-best-practices/#asset-guidelines) | | 2.4.2 Resource use | No excessive battery, heat, or background abuse | Rapid drain, excessive heat, unrelated background work such as crypto mining | Profile resource use, remove unrelated background tasks | | 2.5.1 Software requirements | Public APIs only, current OS, no deprecated tech | Private API use, deprecated frameworks, APIs used for unintended purposes | Use only documented public APIs | | 2.5.2 No executable code download | No downloading code that changes app features | Downloading or installing code that alters functionality | Ship all functionality in the binary, gate changes server side as data not code | | 2.5.4 Background modes | Background services used only for declared purposes | Misusing VoIP, audio, or location background modes | Declare only the background modes you actually use | | 2.5.18 Ad behavior | Age appropriate, non deceptive ads with a visible close control | Deceptive interstitials, ads on sensitive data, ads without a close button, ads in kids apps | Use compliant ad placements, never on health, school, or kids data | | 2.5.19 Hidden, dormant, or undocumented features (16 October 2026) | Every feature clear to users and to App Review. Formerly part of 2.3.1 | A server flag that turns on a different app after approval (bait-and-switch), a secret menu or gesture, code obfuscated to hide a feature. Grounds for removal and termination of the developer account | Show every feature to review, describe it in Notes for Review, use remote configuration only to tune or roll out reviewed features. Sources. [Apple, 16 October 2026](https://developer.apple.com/news/?id=92th7e5i), [Apple, 16 October 2026](https://developer.apple.com/news/?id=vvzx6cul) | ## Section 3. Business | Guideline | Requires | Triggers rejection | Avoid by | |---|---|---|---| | 3.1.1 External purchase link, storefront scope | The no-entitlement link is a US storefront carve-out only | The same link UI shipped to every region is still a 3.1.1 violation in Japan, Canada, Australia, the UK, and most other storefronts. Review evaluates per region. Developers report two rejection rounds before shipping in 2026 | Gate the link on Storefront.current or countryCode, keep the entitlement path elsewhere. Sources. [Apple guideline update, 1 May 2025](https://developer.apple.com/news/?id=9txfddzf), [implementation report, May 2026](https://stora.sh/blog/2026-05-16-apple-app-store-external-purchase-links-implementation-guide) | | 3.1.1 In app purchase | Apple's in app purchase for all digital goods, services, and paid content access | Selling digital access with license keys, QR codes, crypto, or any non IAP method, loot boxes without disclosed odds, digital gift cards outside IAP, external buttons or links to purchase NFTs (the ban is global, not US only) | Route every digital purchase through StoreKit in app purchase, disclose loot box odds before purchase | | 3.1.1(a) External link entitlements | StoreKit External Purchase Link Entitlements (which since 16 October 2026 also cover the Music Streaming Services Entitlement) used only in approved regions, linking to a permitted destination | Using external purchase links outside approved storefronts, a link to a destination that is not permitted for the region, misleading entitlement marketing | Apply for the correct entitlement, restrict to approved regions and destinations. Source. [Apple, 16 October 2026](https://developer.apple.com/news/?id=92th7e5i) | | 3.1.2 Subscriptions | Ongoing value, periods of 7 days or more, clear terms, available across devices | Subscriptions with no ongoing value, hidden terms, removing paid functionality to force a subscription, subscription scams | Provide continuous value, disclose terms, never remove what existing users already bought | | 3.1.3 Other purchase methods | External payment only for the specific exempt categories such as reader, multiplatform, enterprise, and person to person services | A non exempt app using external payment for in app consumed goods | Use IAP unless the app is a documented exempt category | | 3.2.2 Unacceptable business practices | No store like interface for third party apps, no artificial ad inflation, no manipulating other services, no usurious lending | Building an app store inside the app, fake ad impressions, personal loans over 36 percent APR or under 60 day terms, forcing rate or download actions | Remove these mechanics entirely | ## Section 4. Design | Guideline | Requires | Triggers rejection | Avoid by | |---|---|---|---| | 4.0 Sign in with Apple relay domain | Accept Hide My Email addresses on private.icloud.com and privaterelay.appleid.com | Email validation or an allowlist that accepts only privaterelay.appleid.com breaks sign-up for the new relay domain, a broken Sign in with Apple flow | Accept both domains server and client side. Source. [Apple, 15 June 2026, corrected 24 August 2026](https://developer.apple.com/news/?id=1ptvdtcm) | | 4.5.3 Live Activities (8 June 2026) | No spam, phishing, or unsolicited messages over Apple services | The guideline now names Live Activities alongside Game Center and Push Notifications. A promotional or unrelated Live Activity is rejected | Tie every Live Activity to a real, user-initiated, time-bound activity. Source. [App Review Guidelines](https://developer.apple.com/app-store/review/guidelines/) | | On-Demand Resources (WWDC26) | Migrate to Background Assets | On-Demand Resources are deprecated starting in iOS 27, iPadOS 27, tvOS 27, and visionOS 27 | Move tagged resources to the Background Assets framework. Source. [WWDC26 App Store guide](https://developer.apple.com/wwdc26/guides/app-store/) | | 4.1 Copycats | Original app, no impersonation, no third party brand in icon or name | Copying a popular app with minor changes, impersonating a service, using another brand's icon or name without permission | Build an original experience and own your brand assets | | 4.2 Minimum functionality | Real features, content, and UI beyond a repackaged website | Repackaged website, thin web clip, marketing only app, content aggregator or link collection with no utility | Add native value, lasting utility, or entertainment | | 4.2.3 Standalone and disclosed downloads | Works on its own, discloses on launch do
- docs/BY-APP-TYPE.md (6517 bytes)
# Rejection Map by App Type A games app and a finance app fail review for very different reasons. This doc routes each app type to the guidelines that actually hit it, so you check the right things instead of all things. Adopted from the structure of the most popular open source preflight skill. Run the universal set for every app, then the set that matches your app type. ## Universal. Every app - Stability. No crashes, broken links, or placeholder content. Apple 2.1, Google spam and minimum functionality. - Demo account and live backend. A working demo account, no 2FA the reviewer cannot pass, a backend that stays up. Apple 2.1. - Review notes. A screen recording or path for every non obvious feature, the app purpose, test credentials, external services, regional notes, and any regulatory document. Apple 2.1. - Privacy policy. Published, reachable in the app, accurate. Apple 5.1.1, Google User Data. - Permissions. Each sensitive permission traces to a visible core feature with a specific reason string. Apple 5.1.1, Google permissions policy. - Privacy manifest. iOS PrivacyInfo.xcprivacy with approved reason codes, and every SDK ships its signed manifest. Apple upload enforcement. - Data declaration. Apple privacy labels and Google Data Safety match real runtime behavior including SDKs. - Metadata. Accurate name, screenshots of the app in use, no other platform mentions, no Apple device images in the icon, no device frames in the preview video. Apple 2.3, 5.2.5. - Account deletion. Genuine in app deletion for any account creating app, not a deactivate or a web form. Apple 5.1.1(v), Google account deletion. - Export compliance. ITSAppUsesNonExemptEncryption set so the build does not stall. ## Subscriptions and in app purchase - All digital goods through Apple in app purchase and Google Play Billing. Apple 3.1.1. - Subscriptions show real ongoing value, clear terms, and the actual billed amount at least as prominent as the per month figure. Apple 3.1.2. - Terms of Use or EULA and Privacy Policy links present in the app and the metadata. Apple 3.1.2. - Restore Purchases control for non consumables. Apple 3.1.1. - Loot boxes and random rewards disclose odds before purchase. Apple 3.1.1, Google random items disclosure. - Physical goods use external payment, not in app purchase. Apple 3.1.5(a). ## Social and user generated content - A EULA with zero tolerance for objectionable content, that users must agree to. - Content filtering, a report mechanism, and the ability to block abusive users. - The developer acts on an objectionable content report within 24 hours by removing the content and ejecting the user. Apple 1.2. - Published contact information. - For AI generated output, the same moderation applies. The model is a content source. Apple 1.2 and Google AI Generated Content. ## Kids category and families - COPPA, GDPR, and local child law. Under 13 is the COPPA threshold. Persistent identifiers are personal information for a child. - No third party analytics or behavioral ads. Use only a self certified ads SDK in the families program. - A valid parental gate for links and purchases, and a neutral age screen for a mixed audience. - Verifiable Parental Consent where data is collected, which is more than a parental gate. Apple 5.1.4, Google Families. ## Health, fitness, and medical - Validated health claims only. No unproven measurement from device sensors. Apple 1.4.1. - Health data never used for advertising, marketing, or data mining. Apple 5.1.2(vi), 5.1.3. - Informed consent and an ethics review for research apps. - Special category data under GDPR Article 9 needs explicit consent. - A medical or regulated entity submits, not an individual. Apple 5.1.1(ix). ## Games - In app purchase for all digital goods and currency. No external funding of real money play. Apple 3.1. - Loot boxes and gacha disclose odds before purchase. Google requires a random items disclosure. - Real money gaming is licensed, geo restricted, free to download, with official rules. Apple 5.3. - Simulated gambling and social casino is a separate category with its own rating. - Accurate age rating for the content and any chance mechanics. - For the per country loot box and gambling rules, see docs/GAMBLING-MATRIX.md. ## macOS and the Mac App Store - Proper sandboxing and the macOS file system rules. Apple 2.4.5(i). - Packaged with Xcode, self contained, no third party installer. Apple 2.4.5(ii). - No auto launch, no Dock icon added without consent, no desktop shortcut left behind. Apple 2.4.5(iii). - No downloading standalone apps, kexts, or code that adds features. Apple 2.4.5(iv). - No root escalation or setuid. No custom license key or copy protection screen. No non App Store update mechanism. Apple 2.4.5(v) through (vii). - Runs on the current shipping OS. Apple 2.4.5(viii). ## AI and generative apps - AI generated content counts toward the age rating, and a model that can produce sensitive content needs an age restriction. Apple 2026 rules. - A consent modal naming the AI provider and the data types before any personal data is sent to a third party AI. Apple 5.1.2, enforced since late 2025. - Moderation, reporting, and blocking on AI output, the same as user content. No NSFW, deepfake, face swap, or undress generation. - Self harm and crisis safeguards for a companion or character AI. - Not a thin wrapper over a third party model with no added value. Apple 4.2 and 4.3. - In a China storefront, references to external AI services such as ChatGPT or Gemini can trigger a regional rejection. - A reviewer demo account needs a high or unlimited quota so the feature can be exercised. ## Crypto, finance, and trading - A finance app is submitted by the company legal entity, not an individual account. Apple 5.1.1(ix) and PLA 1.2. - Licensing where required, and geo restriction to licensed regions. - No personal loans over 36 percent APR or under 60 day terms. Apple 3.2.2(ix). - No binary options, and CFD or FOREX needs proper licensing. Apple 3.2.2(viii). - NFT purchases through in app purchase, no external buttons or links to buy NFTs. - Crypto exchange apps come from a licensed exchange in the regions offered. ## VPN and networking - The NEVPNManager API, and the developer enrolled as an organization. Apple 5.4. - Declared data use, and no selling or sharing of any data. - License information in the review notes where a territory requires it. - Android, no misuse of the VPN service for tracking or ad injection.
- docs/COMPETITIVE-GAP-ANALYSIS.md (10870 bytes)
# Competitive Gap Analysis. What Other Repositories Publish and What We Adopted This document is the result of surveying the open source repositories that already publish App Store and Google Play compliance knowledge, studying why each one exists and what it captures, finding the gaps against this playbook, and folding the missing patterns back in. It is maintained so this playbook stays the most complete open reference, not a snapshot. Method. Each repository was read in full through the GitHub API, its structure and unique content extracted, then compared field by field against this playbook. The gaps it surfaced are listed, and the ones we adopted are marked. ## The repositories surveyed | Repository | Stars | What it publishes | Why it exists | |---|---|---|---| | truongduy2611/app-store-preflight-skills | about 1,224 | An AI agent skill that scans an iOS or macOS project, pulls App Store Connect metadata through the asc CLI, and checks it against a full index of 100 plus guidelines organized into 10 app type checklists | The most popular comparable. Built so an agent catches rejections before submission, the same goal as this playbook | | lukylab/appstore-submission-checklist | about 17 | Two practical checklists, one for new app submissions and one for app updates, from an indie developer with 10 plus live apps | New apps and updates fail review for different reasons, so it splits the two | | andrewmcwattersandco/app-store-rejections | about 14 | A community collection of real, named App Store rejection stories with links | To warn developers of marketplace risk and encourage self publishing | | jaywcjlove/app-rejection-fixes | small | Rejection reasons paired with the fix that cleared each | A working developer logging the rejections they hit and resolved | | hnxyzhw/AppStoreReviewsAndRejected | small | The actual Apple rejection email texts, by guideline, with the Chinese translation and the fix | Captures the exact reviewer wording, which is the most concrete signal of what triggers a rejection | | aashishtamsya/Appstore-Review-Guidelines | about 90 | An older curated guideline list by category | An early community attempt at a pre submission reference | ## Gaps these repositories surfaced, and what we adopted ### 1. App type specific checklists. ADOPTED The most popular repository organizes its checks into ten app types, because a games app and a finance app fail for very different reasons. Our playbook was flat. We adopted this as a new doc, `BY-APP-TYPE.md`, mapping each app type to the critical guidelines that hit it. This is the single biggest structural improvement from the survey. ### 2. macOS as a first class target. ADOPTED The leader covers macOS and the Mac App Store as a distinct checklist. Our playbook covered iOS and Android. macOS has its own rules, sandboxing, notarization, no non App Store update mechanism, and the 2.4.5 Mac specific set. We added a macOS section to the by app type doc. ### 3. Pulling real App Store Connect metadata. ADOPTED as guidance The leader integrates the asc CLI to pull the live listing metadata and inspect it, rather than only scanning source. Our guard scans source. We added guidance to the skill that the strongest audit pulls the real App Store Connect metadata, with the asc CLI or the App Store Connect API, and checks the words in the live listing, because a large share of rejections are metadata, not code. ### 4. Specific metadata rejection rules. ADOPTED into the taxonomy The leader and the Chinese rejection email collection name precise triggers we did not have as patterns. - Apple device images or the Apple trademark in the app icon or screenshots, guideline 5.2.5. - Device frames around the app in preview videos, guideline 2.3.4. - Subscription pricing that shows the monthly price more prominently than the actual billed amount, guideline 3.1.2. - Missing Terms of Use or EULA and Privacy Policy links for a subscription, guideline 3.1.2. - In a China storefront, references to external AI services such as ChatGPT or Gemini can trigger a regional rejection. - Review notes for a new submission that omit a screen recording, the app purpose, test credentials, external service details, regional information, or regulatory documents, guideline 2.1. ### 5. The user generated content 24 hour rule. ADOPTED The real Safety 1.2 rejection email in the Chinese collection states the exact requirement. The developer must act on an objectionable content report within 24 hours by removing the content and ejecting the user. Our 1.2 coverage named filtering, reporting, and blocking, but not the 24 hour action window and the EULA with zero tolerance. Both are now captured. ### 6. Financial apps require a company developer account. ADOPTED The PLA 1.2 rejection email shows that a financial app submitted under an individual account is rejected. This reinforces our 5.1.1(ix) regulated fields rule, now stated plainly for finance. ### 7. New app versus update split. ADOPTED into the checklist An update fails for different reasons than a first submission. Our checklist is now framed so the first submission items, demo account, review notes, and metadata, are clearly the heavy ones, and the update items focus on what changed. ### 8. Real rejection case studies. ADOPTED into the mistake patterns The community collections hold named, real rejections that teach more than an abstract rule. The Halide camera app rejected for not explaining why it uses the camera, the iDOS emulator takedown, and the pattern of a long lived app pulled for not being updated. These are now examples in the mistake patterns doc. ### 9. A guideline history reference. ADOPTED as a reference The checklist repository points at the App Store Review Guidelines History site, which tracks how the guidelines changed over time. Useful when a rejection cites a rule that was recently reworded. ## What we already had that they did not This survey also confirmed where this playbook is ahead. - Google Play depth. Most comparable repositories are iOS only. This playbook carries the full Google Play policy map, the four level enforcement ladder, the 12 tester rule, and Data Safety. - The legal layer. None of the surveyed repositories cover GDPR lawful basis, the EU AI Act, the DSA, or COPPA depth. This playbook does, with the explicit framing that store compliance is not legal compliance. - Cross store coverage. Huawei, the Chinese stores, Samsung, Amazon, Microsoft, and RuStore, in `OTHER-STORES.md`. - A working automated guard with a test suite, not only a written checklist. ## The two edges the leader had, now closed The first pass of this analysis honestly noted two places the most popular repository was ahead. Both are now closed. 1. Live metadata pull and an autofix loop. We built `scripts/metadata-audit.py`, which audits the real store listing, name, subtitle, keywords, description, promotional text, review notes, and URLs, against the metadata rejection rules, with a propose and re validate loop, plus `scripts/pull-metadata.sh` to pull the live Apple listing through the asc CLI. The metadata layer is tested. 2. Per rule detection commands. Every rule in the `references/rules/` tree now carries a concrete detection command, generated from `data/detection-recipes.json`. An agent or a developer can run the exact grep, plist, or manifest check for each rule. What remains is not a capability gap, it is adoption. The most popular repository has the stars. That is earned over time through the launch, shares, and contributions, and the on ramp for that is in place. ## Second survey, 15 November 2026 The survey was repeated a month later. Of the six repositories above, only `truongduy2611/app-store-preflight-skills` changed (a sync with the 16 October 2026 guidelines, which this playbook already carries). New repositories read through the GitHub API on 15 November 2026. | Repository | Stars | Last push | What it publishes | |---|---|---|---| | RevylAI/greenlight | 2474 | 2026-08-05 | Go scanner over source, privacy manifests, built IPA and AAB files, App Store Connect metadata, with SARIF output and runtime flow checks | | safaiyeh/app-store-review-skill | 454 | 2026-10-17 | Agent skill with rules split by guideline section | | devsemih/appstore-review-skill | 106 | 2026-11-11 | iOS and Play audit with build inspection, fixes, and rejection reply drafting | | dabodamjan/app-store-rejection-checker | 88 | 2026-11-05 | Skill with a rejection taxonomy and a recent changes file | | berkayturk/appstore-precheck | 12 | 2026-10-22 | Bash gate with a weekly guideline drift workflow | | wajahatkarim3/play-data-safety-skill | 11 | 2026-11-13 | Generates the Play Data safety CSV from a per SDK evidence map | | RobertoJoseph/appstore-rejections-mcp | 16 | 2026-02-15 | MCP server over real rejection cases | ### Adopted in 2.4.0 - Upload paths the guard missed. `helm-asc` uploads and `--submit`, the `asc` CLI, and the Codemagic `app-store-connect publish` command now trigger the scan. - IPv6 only review network (2.5.5). `inet_addr`, `inet_aton` and `gethostbyname` are flagged, and C and C++ sources are now scanned so native code is no longer invisible. - Debuggable Android builds, `specialUse` foreground services without their subtype property, and `abiFilters` that ship `armeabi-v7a` without `arm64-v8a`. - HealthKit and iCloud storage in the same app (5.1.3(ii)), reported for a human to confirm, because co-occurrence alone does not prove health data reaches iCloud. ### Considered and not adopted, with the reason - A 200 MB cellular download limit as a rejection rule. It is not an upload rejection threshold, so encoding it would block valid apps. - A launch storyboard requirement. `UILaunchScreen` in Info.plist is an accepted alternative, so a storyboard check would misfire. - Keyword blocking of trial toggles, countdowns and permission priming screens. These are not violations on their own, and `APPLE-3.1.2-MISLEADING-PRICING` already covers deceptive pricing. ### Open, larger work tracked for later releases - Inspecting the built IPA, APK and AAB, including the merged Android manifest, 16 KB ELF and ZIP alignment, and embedded framework privacy manifests and signatures. - Runtime proof that account deletion, restore purchases and Sign in with Apple work, with free XCUITest or Maestro flows. - A Data safety CSV generator, rejection message to reply drafting, an MCP server over the pattern data, and a weekly guideline page diff. ## The standing process This analysis is repeatable. When a new comparable repository appears, read it through the API, extract its structure and unique rules, diff against this playbook, and fold in the net new patterns. Contributions that bring a pattern from another open source list are welcome, with a link to the source.
- docs/CREDITS.md (3845 bytes)
# Credits and Sources This playbook stands on the shoulders of the open source community. The patterns below were learned from the repositories listed here, and we credit every one. Where a project uses a license that requires attribution, this page is that attribution. Where a project is permissively licensed, we credit anyway because it is the right thing to do. If you maintain one of these and want the wording changed or a link corrected, open an issue. ## People who contributed | Person | Contribution | |---|---| | Omar Albeik ([@omaralbeik](https://github.com/omaralbeik)) | Corrected the Syria entry in the sanctions section ([#967](https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance/pull/967), landed in [#1001](https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance/pull/1001)) | | Akash Sharma ([@akash5852](https://github.com/akash5852)) | Fixed vendor folder platform detection in the guard and added privacy manifest validation ([#596](https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance/pull/596)) | ## Repositories we learned from | Project | Author | License | What we adopted | |---|---|---|---| | [app-store-preflight-skills](https://github.com/truongduy2611/app-store-preflight-skills) | truongduy2611 | MIT | The app type checklist structure, the macOS coverage, the review notes template and its six section completeness, the unused entitlements check, the Sign in with Apple UX rules, the unnecessary personal data rule, the subscription disclosure detail, and the idea of pulling live App Store Connect metadata with the asc CLI | | [appstore-submission-checklist](https://github.com/lukylab/appstore-submission-checklist) | lukylab | CC BY 4.0 | The split between a new app checklist and an update checklist, and concrete items such as hiding debug features, the StoreKit configuration in the scheme, deploying the CloudKit schema to production, keyword field formatting, and phased release | | [app-store-rejections](https://github.com/andrewmcwattersandco/app-store-rejections) | andrewmcwattersandco | see repo | The real named rejection case studies in the mistake patterns doc | | [app-rejection-fixes](https://github.com/jaywcjlove/app-rejection-fixes) | jaywcjlove | MIT | Confirmation of rejection reasons paired with their fixes | | [AppStoreReviewsAndRejected](https://github.com/hnxyzhw/AppStoreReviewsAndRejected) | hnxyzhw | see repo | The real Apple rejection email wording, the user generated content 24 hour action rule, and the finance app company account rule | | [Appstore-Review-Guidelines](https://github.com/aashishtamsya/Appstore-Review-Guidelines) | aashishtamsya | see repo | An early curated guideline structure | ## Tools and references we point at | Source | What it gives | |---|---| | [fastlane precheck](https://docs.fastlane.tools/actions/precheck/) | The open source App Store metadata rule set, adopted as our metadata checks | | [Play Policy Insights](https://developer.android.com/studio/publish/insights) | Google's own policy lint in Android Studio | | [google/android-security-lints](https://github.com/google/android-security-lints) | Google's open source security lint checks | | [App Store Review Guidelines History](https://www.appstorereviewguidelineshistory.com/) | A tracker of how the guidelines changed over time | | [lukylab/ios-permissions-descriptions](https://github.com/lukylab/ios-permissions-descriptions) | Sample permission purpose strings | ## Primary canonical sources Every factual claim in this playbook traces to one of these. - [Apple App Store Review Guidelines](https://developer.apple.com/app-store/review/guidelines/) - [Apple developer news](https://developer.apple.com/news/) - [Google Play Developer Program Policy](https://play.google/developer-content-policy/) - [Google Play Console help](https://support.google.com/googleplay/android-developer)
- docs/CROSS-PLATFORM-FRAMEWORKS.md (14992 bytes)
# Cross-Platform Framework Coverage The guard scans the app's built artifact surface (Info.plist, AndroidManifest.xml, entitlements, gradle, PrivacyInfo.xcprivacy) which store review inspects regardless of what generated it. This page documents the checks specific to the framework that generated the app, on top of the native checks. ## Detection | Framework | Detected by | |---|---| | Flutter | `pubspec.yaml` present within 12 levels of the project root | | React Native / Expo | `package.json` within 12 levels with a dependency on `react-native` or `expo` | | Ionic / Capacitor / Cordova | `package.json` within 12 levels with a dependency on `@capacitor/*`, `@ionic/*`, or `cordova-*`, OR a `capacitor.config.*` / `config.xml` file within 12 levels | These depths come from the `find_app` calls in `agent-os/hooks/app-store-compliance-guard.sh`. Unity, .NET MAUI, Tauri mobile, and Kotlin Multiplatform are searched within 6 levels. A project can match more than one framework flag (a Capacitor app that also imports `expo` polyfills, for example); every matching check runs. Detection scans EVERY `package.json`/`config.xml` within depth, not only the first, so a monorepo whose root `package.json` is tooling-only still finds the real app deeper in the tree. A `config.xml` only counts as Cordova evidence when it carries a `<widget>` or `xmlns:cdv` marker, since that filename collides with unrelated tooling configs. Every framework-specific finding below is gated on `IOS_TARGET_ACTIVE`, not raw file-tree presence. A committed `ios/` folder is common in a real cross-platform repo even when the current build is Android-only, so file presence alone cannot tell `flutter build apk` apart from an iOS build. When the invoking command is known (hook mode) and clearly targets Android only (`build apk/appbundle`, `assembleRelease`, `bundleRelease`, `run-android`, `run:android`, `--platform android`, `capacitor android`, with no `ios`/`ipa`/`xcodebuild` token present), the command overrides the file-tree signal and these Apple-only checks stay silent. 2.0.0 also requires every other command in the line to be a known harmless one, so it never silences more than 1.0.0 did. Standalone mode (no command context) falls back to plain file-tree detection. ## Submission commands the guard recognizes `fastlane deliver/pilot/supply/submit`, `eas submit`, `eas build`, `xcrun altool`, `xcrun notarytool`, `transporter`, `gradlew bundleRelease/assembleRelease`, `bundletool`, `xcodebuild archive`, `flutter build ipa/appbundle/apk`, `cap sync/build/run` (with or without `npx`), `ionic capacitor build/run`, `cordova build` (with or without `--release`), `Unity ... -buildTarget iOS/Android`, `dotnet publish -f net8.0-ios/android`, `tauri ios/android build`. ## Flutter checks - `FLUTTER-PRIVACY-MANIFEST-MISSING` (critical). A required-reason-API plugin (permission_handler, image_picker, geolocator, device_info_plus, package_info_plus, shared_preferences, sqflite, firebase_*) is a dependency and no `PrivacyInfo.xcprivacy` exists anywhere in the project. Since Flutter 3.19 most first-party plugins ship their own manifest, but the aggregation only works when the app also ships one. - `FLUTTER-NO-IOS-RUNNER-FOUND` (medium, advisory). No `Info.plist` was found, so every iOS-specific check in this guard was skipped. Run `flutter create .` or confirm the `ios/` platform folder exists before an iOS submission. Known limitation. The guard cannot see whether a purpose-string value that exists only in a localized `InfoPlist.strings` file was also copied into the real `Info.plist` shipped in the archive (ITMS-90683). Check this by hand before submitting. ## React Native / Expo checks - `RN-OTA-UNDECLARED` (high). An over-the-air JS bundle updater (`react-native-code-push`, `expo-updates`, `react-native-ota-hot-update`, Stallion) is present with no App Review disclosure. Apple 3.3.2/2.5.2 allow bug-fix-only OTA updates when disclosed by name in the review notes; an undeclared swappable bundle reads as dormant functionality. - `RN-PRIVACY-MANIFEST-MISSING` (critical). A native module touching required-reason APIs (Firebase, AsyncStorage, expo-file-system) is present transitively via a JS dependency and no `PrivacyInfo.xcprivacy` exists. This is the hardest of the three frameworks to audit by eye because the native SDK hides behind a JS package name. ## Ionic / Capacitor / Cordova checks - `IONIC-4.2-THIN-WRAPPER` (high, advisory). The single most common Ionic rejection reason in the wild, but this check is a HEURISTIC PROXY, not the actual Apple 4.2 test, which is about features, content, and UI beyond a repackaged website, not a plugin count. A real app using unmatched plugins (`@capacitor/preferences`, private native plugins) can false-positive; a thin wrapper that imports two matched plugins for cosmetic reasons can false-negative. Review manually before treating this as a hard blocker. Counts distinct plugin identifiers, not files, so multiple plugin imports in one bootstrap file are counted correctly. - `IONIC-UIWEBVIEW-DEPRECATED` (critical). The literal `UIWebView` symbol, usually pulled in by a stale plugin even when app code never references it directly. Apple auto-rejects (ITMS-90809) any binary that statically links it. - `IONIC-PRIVACY-MANIFEST-MISSING` (high). Capacitor/Cordova plugin manifest support is less standardized than Flutter's. Verify each plugin wrapping a native SDK ships its own `PrivacyInfo.xcprivacy`. ## Unity, .NET MAUI, Tauri mobile, and Kotlin Multiplatform Added for issue 837. Each one is detected, named on the `Frameworks.` line, and has a bad and a clean project in the test suite. | Framework | Detected by | Source now read | Submit command that runs the scan | |---|---|---|---| | Unity | `ProjectSettings/ProjectVersion.txt` | `.cs` | `Unity -batchmode ... -buildTarget iOS` or `Android` | | .NET MAUI | a `.csproj` with `UseMaui` or a `net8.0-ios` style target | `.cs`, `.xaml`, `.csproj` | `dotnet publish -f net8.0-ios` or `net8.0-android` | | Tauri mobile | `tauri.conf.json`, `tauri.conf.json5` or `Tauri.toml` | `.rs`, `.toml` | `tauri ios build`, `tauri android build`, with or without `cargo` or `npx` | | Kotlin Multiplatform | the multiplatform plugin in a Gradle file | `commonMain` Kotlin, as before | the Gradle and `xcodebuild archive` commands already covered | Four behaviours to know. - A Unity project is scanned for both stores when it is run by hand. As a hook the `-buildTarget` value picks the store. - A Unity project holds no Xcode or Gradle project until it is exported, so the export compliance check and the R8 check stay silent and the report says so. Scan the exported project too. - A Kotlin Multiplatform project is scanned as one app, so shared code in `commonMain` counts for both the iOS and the Android checks. - A bare Xcode or Android project under a root Expo, React Native, Flutter, or Capacitor app is scanned as its own app when it has its own `Info.plist` or `AndroidManifest.xml` and no root build file names its path (`settings.gradle`, a `Podfile`, or an `.xcworkspace`). It counts as an app only with an `.xcodeproj` that builds an application (or names no product type) or an Android application module, so a library, a framework or a local native module stays with the app that uses it. A native host that embeds the root framework (React Native, Expo, Flutter, Capacitor or Cordova code in its sources, such as an `RCTAppDelegate`, or its Podfile or Gradle files) is a brownfield host and stays in the root scan, so the root's framework checks still cover it. A native app that does split off, and the root it left, both keep every framework check the pooled tree showed, so every check that ran when they were scanned as one still runs, a framework marker found only inside the split app included. The root and its split native apps are also scanned together as in 1.0.0, and any finding the separate scans missed is added once, so evidence spread across a shared file and the split app still counts. A project in a folder named exactly `demo`, `example`, `sample`, or `playground` (or the plural) is treated as a repo demo and stays part of the root scan. A nested project splits off only when the root has its own project for that platform, so a managed Expo root with no native project keeps scanning the nested project and keeps its iOS checks. A native root app never splits off a nested project (issue #656). ## What stays out of reach These are limits, not bugs waiting for a fix. Plan around them. - **Anything that runs on a CI server.** `gh workflow run`, a release started from a CI dashboard, and a fastlane lane run by a runner are never seen by a hook on your machine. - **Uploads from an app window.** Xcode Organizer, the Transporter app, the Unity Editor build window and Android Studio's Generate Signed Bundle do not run a shell command. - **A Unity build whose target is chosen in code.** `-executeMethod` with no `-buildTarget iOS` or `Android` on the command line is not treated as a submit. - **Unity and .NET MAUI build settings.** Info.plist keys and Gradle settings that the tool generates at build time are not read. For .NET MAUI the linker and target API settings in the `.csproj` are not checked, and `dotnet build -t:Publish` is not matched. A Mac Catalyst publish is not treated as a submit. - **Tauri before init.** With no `src-tauri/gen/apple` or `src-tauri/gen/android` folder there is nothing native to scan. The report names the command to run. - **A Tauri app beside a native app.** In a monorepo a Tauri folder with no `gen/apple` or `gen/android` is treated as a desktop app, so it does not stop a `CLEAR` for the native app next to it. - **Rust naming.** The sign-in and account-deletion patterns look for camelCase names such as `signIn`. A Rust function named `sign_in` does not trigger them. - **Frameworks not detected.** NativeScript and legacy Xamarin.Forms projects. - **More than one Xcode target.** Targets are read as one body of source, so an app extension can satisfy, or trigger, a finding for the main app. A watchOS-only or visionOS-only workspace is treated as iOS. - **Pooled or split layouts that remain coarse (inherited from 1.0).** A single nested managed Expo app is read through the root's config only, shared packages and a brownfield host's source outside the scanned root are not followed, every native target in one root is pooled, and two .NET MAUI or Unity apps in one repo are scanned as one. - **Workspace runners.** A package script is followed one level deep, so a root script that runs `turbo run build`, which in turn runs a mobile package's submit, is not seen. A pnpm graph selector (`web...`, `...web`, `{apps/web}`) is reduced to its package name, without following that package's dependencies or dependents, and a change-set selector such as `"[origin/main]"` cannot be resolved, so it reads every package, which can block a web-only build in a repo that also holds a mobile app. Run the web build without the wrapper, or set `APP_STORE_GUARD_OK=1` once. - **Cross-platform purchase plugins.** 1.0.0 checked the restore flow only for native StoreKit apps. 2.0.0 also checks a react-native-iap, RevenueCat or Flutter purchase plugin app, where a purchase list query (`getAvailablePurchases`, `queryPastPurchases`) or the plugin's restore call counts as the restore flow. Check by hand that a visible Restore Purchases control calls it. - **Monitor source verification.** The regulatory and privacy monitors mark a claim as corroborated when an official source shares its keywords, not when that source states the same claim. Read the official source before acting on a monitor item. - **Store console state.** The guard cannot see App Store Connect or Play Console, so the age rating, social media declaration, and closed testing items are reminders, not proof of a problem. ## Known gaps (found by Codex and Qwen adversarial review, not yet fixed) - **Newline-containing file paths.** The `package.json`/`config.xml` scan loops are safe against spaces and shell metacharacters (quoted `IFS= read -r`), but not against a literal newline inside a path, which `find`'s newline-delimited output cannot represent. Extremely unlikely in practice, and not proven safe. - **`config.xml` widget-marker check is spoofable by a comment.** A commented-out `<!-- <widget ...> -->` or a look-alike tag like `<widgetConfig>` still counts as Cordova evidence. Low severity, no realistic false negative on a real Cordova project, though not a hard proof either. - **Android-side framework checks are thin.** Apart from the Android permissions array a managed Expo app config declares, every check in this doc is Apple-side. Flutter/RN/Ionic apps also ship to Google Play, where Data Safety disclosure for bundled SDKs, WebView-controlled data collection, cleartext traffic, and mixed-content/debug flags are real, framework-relevant risks this guard does not yet check. - **The PrivacyInfo.xcprivacy check reads the app's own manifest only.** A manifest under `Pods`, `Carthage`, `node_modules`, SwiftPM `.build` or checkouts, `SourcePackages` or Flutter `.symlinks` does not count. A managed Expo app passes with `expo.ios.privacyManifests` in its app config, since EAS generates the native project at build time. - **Expo Continuous Native Generation (CNG) is modeled for config only.** A managed Expo project with no committed `ios/` or `android/` folder has its `app.json` or `app.config` read for camera and location purpose strings, `ios.privacyManifests` and the sensitive `android.permissions` entries. Its native code is still NOT CHECKED until `npx expo prebuild` runs. - **Two frameworks have no coverage.** NativeScript and legacy Xamarin.Forms are not detected. Unity, .NET MAUI, Tauri mobile, and Kotlin Multiplatform are, see the section above for what each one still cannot see. - **The submission regex errs toward firing.** `SUBMIT_RE` in `agent-os/hooks/app-store-compliance-guard.sh` matches `eas build` with or without a `--platform` flag, also when global flags come before the subcommand. It also matches every `cap run` and `cap open`, so a local dev run with no release intent still triggers the guard. These are logged, not hidden. Track them before treating this guard as complete coverage for a cross-platform team; the checks that exist are a real improvement over native-only, not a finished answer. ## The honest limit The guard reads Swift, Kotlin, XML, Gradle, Plist, Dart, JS, TS, C#, and Rust source text. It does not execute the app, does not parse the Dart or JS AST, and cannot see runtime behavior (whether an OTA update actually changes the UI, for example). Treat every finding as a lead to verify, not a guaranteed defect, and treat a clean run as "nothing detectable from source text", not a guarantee of approval. - docs/ed58fe78607df9d92fc534bf9ac7b976.txt (33 bytes)
ed58fe78607df9d92fc534bf9ac7b976
- docs/EU-REGULATORY-2026.md (42116 bytes)
# EU Regulatory Hard Rules (2026) This document is the EU legal layer for App Store and Google Play compliance. It sits on top of the base rejection maps and the Advanced 2026 layer. The framing holds. Store compliance is not the same as legal compliance. Passing App Review does not make an app compliant with the EU AI Act, the Digital Markets Act, the Digital Services Act, or the European Accessibility Act. The store enforces a subset, a regulator enforces the rest, and for an app that reaches users in the EU both must be satisfied. Every item in this document is a HARD rule for any app distributed to, or reaching, users in the EU or EEA. Each carries the date it takes effect and a source. Regulatory dates and fee numbers move, so re-verify against the cited source before quoting a figure externally. Items that could not be confirmed against a primary source are labelled unverified in section 9. ## 1. EU AI Act, Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 Scope. Any app whose AI feature reaches EU users is in scope, wherever the developer is based. A typical consumer app with an AI chatbot, assistant, or generation feature sits in the limited-risk transparency tier, not high-risk and not prohibited. **MUST for every EU-facing AI app.** Sections 1.1 to 1.7 are a requirement, not a recommendation. An app with an AI feature that reaches EU users is not compliant, and must not be shipped to those users, until every HARD item in this section is satisfied. Treat this as a release blocker, the same weight as a working demo account or a matching privacy declaration. ### 1.1 Timeline (HARD dates) | Date | What applies | Status mid-2026 | |---|---|---| | 1 Aug 2024 | Entry into force, no obligations yet | past | | 2 Feb 2025 | Article 5 prohibited practices, Article 4 AI literacy | live now | | 2 Aug 2025 | GPAI-model obligations, governance, penalties (Articles 99 and 100) | live now | | 2 Aug 2026 | Article 50 transparency, and most remaining provisions | in force from this date | | 2 Dec 2026 | Article 111(4) retrofit of Article 50(2) AI-content marking onto generative systems already on the market before 2 August 2026, and the new Article 5 prohibition on AI systems producing non-consensual intimate imagery or CSAM (both via Regulation (EU) 2026/1744) | future | | 2 Dec 2027 | Article 6(1) / Annex III High-risk AI systems (as deferred by the AI Omnibus, in force 27 July 2026) | future | | 2 Aug 2028 | Annex I High-risk AI embedded in physical products (as deferred by the AI Omnibus, in force 27 July 2026) | future | The Digital Omnibus simplification package (the AI Omnibus) was finalised in mid-2026 (Parliament 16 June 2026, Council final green light 29 June 2026, and entered into force on 27 July 2026). It postpones high-risk compliance deadlines (Annex III high-risk moved to 2 December 2027, Annex I physical high-risk moved to 2 August 2028), but **Article 50 transparency HOLDS at 2 August 2026**. Do not assume the transparency date moved. Sources. [artificialintelligenceact.eu timeline](https://artificialintelligenceact.eu/implementation-timeline/), [EUR-Lex 2024/1689](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1689/oj/eng), [Council 29 June 2026](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2026/06/29/artificial-intelligence-council-gives-final-green-light-to-simplify-and-streamline-rules/), [EU Commission AI Omnibus Enters into Force 27 July 2026](https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/ai-omnibus-enters-force). ### 1.2 Article 50 transparency (HARD, from 2 Aug 2026) An app with an AI feature reaching EU users MUST do all of the following. - AI-interaction disclosure, Article 50(1). If the app has a chatbot or assistant that interacts directly with a person, the person is told they are interacting with an AI system, unless it is obvious to a reasonably informed person. A plain in-app line such as "You are chatting with an AI assistant" satisfies this. - Synthetic-content marking, Article 50(2). If the app generates synthetic audio, image, video, or text, the output is marked in a machine-readable format and detectable as artificially generated or manipulated, using state-of-the-art techniques. C2PA content provenance is a common implementation choice, but the Act does not name C2PA. It requires machine-readable and state-of-the-art, not a specific vendor. - Deepfake disclosure, Article 50(4). If the app produces a deepfake, the deployer discloses that the content has been artificially generated or manipulated, even without intent to deceive. - Timing and accessibility, Article 50(5). The information is given in a clear and distinguishable manner at the latest at the time of the first interaction or exposure, and it conforms to accessibility requirements (which ties this rule to the European Accessibility Act in section 4). The Commission published draft Article 50 implementation guidelines on 8 May 2026, intended to apply from 2 Aug 2026. Sources. [Article 50 text](https://artificialintelligenceact.eu/article/50/), [Commission draft Article 50 guidelines](https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/draft-guidelines-implementation-transparency-obligations-certain-ai-systems-under-article-50-ai-act). ### 1.3 Article 4 AI literacy (HARD, live since 2 Feb 2025) Every provider and deployer makes sure the people who build or operate the AI feature have a sufficient level of AI literacy. There is no headcount carve-out, so a solo team is bound too. only the scale of "sufficient" scales down. For a small team the pragmatic evidence is a short written policy, an induction, a refresh schedule, and a completion log. Source. [Article 4](https://artificialintelligenceact.eu/article/4/). ### 1.4 Article 5 prohibited practices (HARD, live since 2 Feb 2025) Never ship an AI feature that does any of the following. subliminal, manipulative, or deceptive techniques causing serious harm. exploiting vulnerabilities of children, disabled, or socio-economically disadvantaged people. social scoring. purely profiling-based crime prediction. untargeted facial-image scraping. emotion inference in the workplace or education (outside medical or safety). biometric categorisation inferring sensitive traits such as race, religion, or sexual orientation. real-time remote biometric identification in public for law enforcement. Source. [Article 5](https://artificialintelligenceact.eu/article/5/). ### 1.5 Provider versus deployer (scope the obligation correctly) A developer building an AI feature on a third-party model (OpenAI, Anthropic, Google) through an API is a DEPLOYER by default. The heavy GPAI-model obligations (training-data summaries, model documentation, copyright, systemic risk) fall on the model vendor, not the app. The app becomes a PROVIDER under Article 25 only if it puts its own name or trademark on the system, makes a substantial modification, or puts it into service for a new intended purpose. Because a consumer app is usually the provider of its own assistant UI and the deployer of the model, it carries the visible disclosure duties of Article 50 regardless. Do not over-scope the developer into the model-vendor obligations. Source. [Commission GPAI guidance](https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/guidelines-gpai-providers). ### 1.6 Penalties, Article 99 | Violation | Maximum fine, whichever is higher | |---|---| | Prohibited practices (Article 5) | 35,000,000 euro or 7 percent of total worldwide annual turnover | | Other obligations including transparency (Article 50) | 15,000,000 euro or 3 percent of worldwide annual turnover | | Supplying incorrect or misleading information to authorities | 7,500,000 euro or 1 percent of worldwide annual turnover | For SMEs and start-ups each fine is capped at the LOWER of the euro amount or the percentage, the reverse of the default. So the penalty anchor for a transparency miss by a small developer is the lower of 15,000,000 euro or 3 percent. Source. [Article 99](https://artificialintelligenceact.eu/article/99/). ### 1.7 The Apple and Google rules that overlap the AI Act - Apple Guideline 5.1.2(i), effective 13 November 2025. If an app shares personal data with a third-party AI (OpenAI, Anthropic, Gemini, ElevenLabs, and the like), it must clearly disclose the third party, name the AI provider and the data types, and obtain explicit opt-in consent before any transmission. On-device AI (the Apple Foundation Models framework, Core ML) does not trigger this, because data never leaves the device. Sources. [TechCrunch 13 Nov 2025](https://techcrunch.com/2025/11/13/apples-new-app-review-guidelines-clamp-down-on-apps-sharing-personal-data-with-third-party-ai/), [Apple guideline update](https://developer.apple.com/news/?id=ey6d8onl). - Google Play AI-generated content policy (2025). Developers must clearly inform users when content is AI-generated, and must prevent the generation of offensive or harmful content up front, not only react to reports. Source. [Google Play policy analysis](https://chatboq.com/blogs/google-play-ai-content-policy). Neither Apple nor Google states "you must comply with the AI Act". Both shipped AI-disclosure and consent policies that a compliant Article 50 implementation largely satisfies, and the reverse. Do not assert that Apple or Google requires AI Act compliance. they do not say that. ## 2. EU Digital Markets Act (DMA) Applies to apps distributed to users in the EU (NFC rules apply in the EEA). Apps outside the EU keep the standard worldwide App Store terms. On 8 July 2026 the EU General Court upheld Apple's DMA gatekeeper designation for the App Store and iOS. ### 2.1 Distribution channels and notarization (HARD) There are three EU distribution channels, all still involving Apple. the App Store, Web Distribution (the developer hosts signed binaries on its own registered domain, iOS 17.5 or later), and Alternative App Marketplaces (via the Alternative App Marketplace Entitlement and the MarketplaceKit framework). Notarization is mandatory for every iOS and iPadOS app regardless of channel. Apple runs automated and human notarization checks for accuracy, functionality, safety, security, and privacy, and can revoke an app if malware is found after install. Sources. [Apple DMA and apps in the EU](https://developer.apple.com/support/dma-and-apps-in-the-eu/), [Apple alternative marketplace](https://developer.apple.com/support/alternative-app-marketplace-in-the-eu/). ### 2.2 External purchase links and alternative payments (HARD) - From 1 October 2026 the terms sit in Attachment 14 of the Apple Developer Program License Agreement. The Alternative Terms Addendum for Apps in the EU and the StoreKit External Purchase Link Entitlement (EU) Addendum are phased out. - Combining is allowed. An app on EU storefronts may sell through Apple In-App Purchase, alternative payment processing within the app, out-of-app offers, or any combination of them. - Once a payment option or combination is chosen, it MUST be kept across all EU storefronts for 12 months. - When alternatives are offered alongside In-App Purchase, In-App Purchase MUST be presented at the same time and at least as prominently, with Apple-provided artwork on a black or white background, payment flows may not discourage or disrupt it, and the App Store product page may not describe alternative payment options. - An app that offers only alternative payment options MUST give users a genuine choice of alternative payment processing within the app, viewable and selectable on the same screen as any out-of-app offers. An app subject to Guideline 3.1.3(b) Multiplatform Services must offer In-App Purchase or alternative processing within the app. - Child safety. An app in the Kids category places alternative payment flows behind a parental gate and cannot offer an out-of-app purchase on a website. For users under 13, alternative payments sit behind a parental gate and out-of-app offers are not permitted. For users 13 to 17, both alternative processing and out-of-app offers sit behind a parental gate. Where an EU storefront sets a higher age for parental consent, the same protections apply at that age instead of 13, for example under 16 and 16 to 17. - The entitlement is the StoreKit External Purchases or Offers Entitlement, key `com.apple.developer.storekit.custom-purchase-link.allowed-regions`, an array of the ISO country codes where the app offers alternatives. It works on EU storefronts on iOS and iPadOS 26.2 or later and macOS, tvOS, visionOS and watchOS 26.6 or later. Supporting earlier versions needs Apple's agreement. - Alternative payment processing in the app, and any out-of-app offer behind a link the user can tap, click, or scan, MUST use the `ExternalPurchaseCustomLink` API to show the system disclosure sheet stating the user will transact with the developer and not Apple. - Reporting. every alternative payment transaction, including refunds, renewals and transactions that did not result in a purchase, is reported monthly within 15 days after the end of the calendar month, through the External Purchase Server API for apps on OS 26.4 or later. - Transactions outside In-App Purchase do not appear in Report a Problem, Family Sharing, App Store purchase history, or subscription management, and Apple cannot help with their refunds. Source, read 15 October 2026. [Apple payment options on the App Store in the EU](https://developer.apple.com/support/payment-options-on-the-app-store-in-the-eu/), [Apple communication and promotion of offers in the EU](https://developer.apple.com/support/communication-and-promotion-of-offers-on-the-app-store-in-the-eu/), [Apple apps in the EU, child safety protections](https://developer.apple.com/support/apps-in-the-eu/#child-safety-protections-for-alternative-payments-on-the-app-store). ### 2.3 The EU fee model (unified terms from 1 October 2026, verified 5 September 2026) On 18 August 2026 Apple announced updated business terms for apps in the EU, effective 1 October 2026, and added Attachment 14 to the Apple Developer Program License Agreement to carry them. Verbatim from Apple. "The Core Technology Fee, a per-install fee for developers who achieve extraordinary scale, will be replaced by the Core Technology Commission, a simple 5% commission on digital transactions in apps distributed outside the App Store." and "The new terms also eliminate the Initial Acquisition Fee and Store Services Fee." - Core Technology Commission (CTC). 5 percent on digital transactions in apps distributed outside the App Store, covering sales within alternative app marketplaces, apps distributed via alternative marketplaces, and apps distributed via Web Distribution. From 1 October 2026 it is the general replacement for the CTF, not only the promoted-external-offer case it covered from 26 June 2025. - Core Technology Fee (CTF). Replaced on 1 October 2026. The earlier 0.50 euro per first annual install above 1,000,000 installs applies only to releases under the pre-Oct
- docs/FLEET-SWEEP.md (3834 bytes)
# Fleet Sweep and the Waiver Ledger You ship more than one app. Fleet Sweep runs the guard over every one of them and gives you one release verdict, so a blocker in the app you forgot about cannot slip through. The Waiver Ledger lets a reviewed false positive step aside, with evidence, until a date you choose, after which it comes back on its own. ## What you get - One verdict for the whole fleet. `READY`, `READY_WITH_ACTIONS`, `NOT_CHECKED`, or `BLOCKED`, worst app wins. Exit codes 0, 3, 1 and 2, so only a truly ready fleet exits 0. - No silent passes. The guard prints a `Coverage.` line before every exit naming what it scanned. A partial scan, a platform you declared but the guard did not find, a timeout, a missing or doubled summary, counts that do not match the findings, or an exit code that contradicts them is `NOT_CHECKED`, never `READY`. A waiver can never turn a partial scan into a pass. - Owner actions in the same report. Account and console steps the scan cannot see (agreements, privacy answers, Data Safety, a test on a real device) sit beside the code findings. A step set to `false`, or no readiness list at all, stays open. - Waivers that expire and cover one occurrence. A waiver names the app, the finding ID, its severity and its file, so it never hides the same rule firing somewhere new or at a higher severity. It needs a reason, evidence, a reviewer, and an expiry no more than 180 days out. Two waivers for the same occurrence cancel each other. An expired, incomplete, duplicated, or stale waiver is named in the report and the finding returns. - The release rules a scan cannot see. Each app declares its `regions` and `features`, and every verified, in-force [Ruling Register](RULING-REGISTER.md) requirement that applies blocks the app until you attest to it. - A GitHub code-scanning file. `--scanning-export` writes findings in the SARIF 2.1.0 format GitHub requires, so they show in the Security tab and on pull requests. ## From install to first verdict 1. Copy the fleet template and list your apps. ```bash cp templates/fleet.example.json fleet.json ``` Each `name` must be unique. `path` may use `~` and environment variables. `platforms` lists what you ship (`ios`, `android`, `web`), and the sweep checks the guard actually found each one. `readiness` maps each account step to `true` or `false`. Leave it out and the app reports it as an open owner action. 2. Run the sweep. ```bash python3 scripts/fleet-sweep.py fleet.json ``` 3. Read the verdict line at the bottom. Exit code 0 is ready, 3 is ready with open actions, 2 is blocked, 1 is not checked or bad input. ## Waive a reviewed false positive ```bash cp templates/waivers.example.json waivers.json python3 scripts/fleet-sweep.py fleet.json --waivers waivers.json ``` Each waiver copies the `app` name from the fleet file and the `finding_id`, `severity` and `file` exactly as the guard prints them. Leave `file` out only for a finding the guard prints without one. A waiver never applies to a different app, and one that matches nothing is reported so you can retire it. ## Outputs for CI ```bash python3 scripts/fleet-sweep.py fleet.json --json fleet-result.json --scanning-export fleet.sarif ``` Upload `fleet.sarif` with `github/codeql-action/upload-sarif` to see findings in code scanning. Paths carry the app name, waived findings stay in the file marked as suppressed with their evidence, and an app that was not checked marks the run unsuccessful. The JSON holds every app, its findings, the waived items with their evidence, waiver problems, and owner actions. ## What it does not do It does not change a single guard rule. The guard decides what is a finding. Fleet Sweep only gathers, applies waivers you signed, and refuses to call anything ready that it did not see checked.
- docs/GAMBLING-MATRIX.md (4276 bytes)
# Loot Box and Gambling Matrix by Country Random reward mechanics and real money gaming are regulated very differently per country, and a game that ships worldwide has to satisfy the strictest market it is sold in. This matrix captures the well documented positions per jurisdiction. Regulation in this area moves fast, so confirm the current law for any market before you rely on a row. Two rules sit above the whole matrix. - Apple 3.1.1 and Google both require odds disclosure for any random reward, in every market. That is the baseline regardless of country. - Real money gambling must be licensed, geo restricted to licensed regions, and free to download. ## Loot box and paid random reward positions | Country or region | Position on paid loot boxes | What you must do | |---|---|---| | Belgium | Paid random items have been treated as gambling and effectively prohibited since the 2018 Gaming Commission ruling | Remove paid loot boxes for Belgium, or geo restrict | | Netherlands | Enforcement action since 2018, with later court rulings, tradeable random items the most exposed | Avoid tradeable paid random items, follow the current Kansspelautoriteit position | | China | Probability disclosure is mandatory under the MIIT rules, plus minor spending limits and real name and play time controls | Disclose exact drop rates in app, enforce minor protections | | South Korea | A probability disclosure law amending the Game Industry Promotion Act requires odds disclosure, with enforcement from 2025 | Disclose probabilities clearly, keep them accurate | | Japan | Complete gacha, kompu gacha, has been banned since 2012, and odds disclosure is handled through industry self regulation | No complete gacha mechanics, disclose odds per the industry codes | | United Kingdom | Loot boxes are not classified as gambling at present but are under active scrutiny, with industry self regulation and age controls | Follow the current industry guidance, do not sell paid random items to children | | Australia | Reforms require a mandatory minimum age rating for games with paid random items, and classification changes apply | Apply the required age rating, disclose odds | | Germany | The Interstate Treaty on Gambling and youth protection rules apply, with age rating through the USK | Age rate appropriately, follow youth protection | | United States | No single federal loot box law, but the FTC has scrutinized the practice and store odds disclosure rules apply | Disclose odds per the store rules, watch state level proposals | ## Real money gambling and adjacent categories | Category | Treatment | What you must do | |---|---|---| | Real money casino and betting | Licensed and geo restricted per country, free to download | Hold the license per region, restrict to licensed regions, free download | | Brazil fixed-odds betting (sports & virtual) | Regulated by the Secretariat of Prizes and Bets (SPA); license required for distribution in Brazil (enforced since May 8, 2026) | Provide a valid SPA license in the App Review Information section, submit a new app version for verification, and set the age rating to A18. | | Social casino and simulated gambling | A distinct category from real money, with its own age rating, allowed more widely but still rated | Rate it correctly, no real money payout | | Sweepstakes and dual currency sweeps coins | Frequently treated as gambling depending on the prize and consideration | Get legal review per market, geo restrict where it counts as gambling | | Cash prize skill tournaments and daily fantasy | Often regulated as gambling or as a regulated contest per state or country | License or restrict per jurisdiction | ## How to use this 1. List the markets the game ships in. 2. For each market, apply the strictest row that matches the mechanic. 3. Disclose odds everywhere, because that is the store baseline in every market. 4. Geo restrict any market where the mechanic is prohibited or unlicensed. 5. Get a legal review for real money, sweepstakes, and cash prize formats. This matrix is a starting map, not legal advice. Sources. National gaming regulators and the store gambling policies. Confirm the current position with the regulator for any market before you ship, because this area changes often.
- docs/GAP-ANALYSIS-2026-09.md (18380 bytes)
# Gap analysis, September 2026 <!-- freshness: 60d --> What was checked, what changed on the platforms and in law since the previous sweep, what developers are reporting in public, and what this playbook added or corrected in response. Verified against primary sources on 5 September 2026. Anything that could not be read from a primary source is listed under Unverified, not folded into a rule. ## 1. Method - Apple. every App Store Connect, App Review, and Developer Program announcement since 1 June 2026 was fetched and read, with the June 8 guideline text diffed against the previous revision. 88 percent of items were read on developer.apple.com itself, the rest on Apple support pages. - Google. every Play Console Help policy announcement and Android Developers Blog post since 1 June 2026, plus the Android 17 (API 37) behaviour-change pages. - Regulation. five regional passes (EU, UK, US federal, APAC, and Canada, Australia, Brazil), each returning only dated items with a quoted sentence from the instrument. federalregister.gov, ecfr.gov, congress.gov, ofcom.org.uk, ico.org.uk, and meity.gov.in blocked scripted fetches. those items were read through govinfo bulk data, a headed browser session, or a mirror, and are marked as such. - Community. a 30-day sweep across Reddit, Hacker News, GitHub, and YouTube on App Store and Play rejections, plus a targeted sweep of r/appledevelopers on developer verification. Reddit rate-limited the sweep after 15 items and blocked every direct fetch, so Reddit coverage is partial and stated as partial. - Repo. every finding was diffed against `data/rejection-patterns.json`, `data/regulatory-deadlines.json`, the guard, and the docs before anything was written. ## 2. What developers are saying (the pains behind the gaps) Each item below produced a pattern, a deadline, or a doc change. Quotes are verbatim from the saved raw files under `~/Documents/Last30Days/`. - Play chargebacks now land on the developer. r/androiddev, "Google Play's chargeback/dispute changes cost you $28.50 on a $5 sale". Verified on Play Console Help answer 17068375. orders after 3 August 2026 shift the disputed purchase amount to the developer, and the Review Refund API is the only way to contest one. Added GOOGLE-PLAY-CHARGEBACK-LIABILITY plus a guard check for Play Billing without refund-review handling. - Donation links are a Payments rejection. AnkiDroid issue 21656 (921 points on Hacker News). Google's own line, quoted in the issue, "501(c)(6) status does not suffice because user donations are not tax-exempt." Added GOOGLE-PAYMENTS-DONATION-LINK and a guard check for Open Collective, Ko-fi, Patreon, and similar links in an Android build. - External purchase links are a US-only carve-out. Multiple implementation reports say the same link UI shipped worldwide is rejected under 3.1.1 outside the United States and to "budget two rejection rounds". Added APPLE-3.1.1-EXTERNAL-LINK-REGION-GATING with a storefront-gating counter-signal. - Android developer verification confuses per-bundle-id setups. r/expo, "my app was automatically verified by Android for the new policy ... However, I do have separate bundle identifiers." Added GOOGLE-PLAY-APP-REGISTRATION-MISSING (register every distributed package name by 30 September 2026) and the account-readiness checklist. - Vibe-coded apps discover review late. "I thought being able to build was enough to launch an app. I was wrong." The pre-submission checklist gained an account and program readiness section so the blockers that sit before review are visible before the first build. - React Native and Expo builds flagged "App optimization: Low". Two separate r/reactnative threads. Traced to the February 2027 technical-quality requirement (R8 at 25 percent minimum coverage). Added ANDROID-R8-OPTIMIZATION-MISSING with a Gradle check. ## 3. The r/appledevelopers verification question, validated The ask was how many people on r/appledevelopers report actually getting verified, and whether the playbook covers those steps. - Subreddit evidence. the last30days sweep of r/appledevelopers returned four threads in the window (a Team Name change on an Individual account, a Guideline 5.6 removal for features hidden during review, a timer app launch, and a Private Cloud Compute entitlement question). None is a verification thread. Reddit returned HTTP 429 partway through and blocked every direct fetch, including a headless browser session, so this is partial coverage and not proof the topic is absent. - Forum evidence, which is where the pain actually shows. Apple Developer Forums thread 817247 has five replies on Developer Program enrollment stuck in identity verification. four still pending, one approved after about a month, one refunded. Thread 816626 reports the identity-upload link failing with "Sorry, you don't have access. Your account isn't authorized to upload files" for more than 45 days. Threads 816864, 817185, 813667, 821680, 814930, and 767809 report the same shape, and one individual-to-organization migration has been open for 61 days. Sources. [thread 817247](https://developer.apple.com/forums/thread/817247), [thread 816626](https://developer.apple.com/forums/thread/816626). - Was the playbook tackling it. No. Enrollment and account readiness appeared only as a VPN organization-enrollment row and a Health organization-migration line. Nothing said that the account can block a launch for weeks before review starts, and Guideline 5.6 existed only as a table row. - What changed. APPLE-ENROLLMENT-VERIFICATION-PENDING (manual pattern, six-week enrollment lead time, ADPLA attachment acceptance, migration a quarter ahead), the account and program readiness section in `docs/PRE-SUBMISSION-CHECKLIST.md`, and the account-readiness line in the Apple 2026 changes list. The honest count from the evidence read. of six enrollment reports with a stated outcome, one verified, one refunded, four still pending. ## 4. Apple, verified deltas | Change | Source | Repo action | |---|---|---| | Social media capability declaration is a submission gate since September 2026, minimum 13+, Declared Age Range for under-13 | [0d2gpmml](https://developer.apple.com/news/?id=0d2gpmml), [tlur8uvi](https://developer.apple.com/news/?id=tlur8uvi) | APPLE-2.3.6-SOCIAL-MEDIA-DECLARATION, deadline, APPLE.md row | | Sign in with Apple relay addresses also arrive from private.icloud.com | [1ptvdtcm](https://developer.apple.com/news/?id=1ptvdtcm) | APPLE-4.0-SIWA-RELAY-DOMAIN, guard check | | Age assurance requires the iOS 26.2 SDK and handling RESCIND_CONSENT | [Age assurance support](https://developer.apple.com/support/age-assurance) | APPLE-5.1.1-RESCIND-CONSENT-UNHANDLED, guard check | | Guideline 1.2 UGC escalation and 4.5.3 Live Activities named (8 June 2026) | [Guidelines](https://developer.apple.com/app-store/review/guidelines/) | Pattern updates, APPLE-4.5.3-LIVE-ACTIVITY-SPAM | | On-Demand Resources deprecated from the 27 OS family | [WWDC26 App Store guide](https://developer.apple.com/wwdc26/guides/app-store/) | APPLE-ODR-DEPRECATED-27, guard check | | App Store Connect API 4.3 and 4.4 removed the old age-rating endpoints | [API 4.4 notes](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/appstoreconnectapi/app-store-connect-api-4-4-release-notes) | APPLE-ASCAPI-AGERATING-ENDPOINT-REMOVED, guard check | | Rosetta sunset, macOS 27 per the 1 September notice, macOS 26 per the 9 September notice | [w5ngl9k2](https://developer.apple.com/news/?id=w5ngl9k2), [k1mtkt1k](https://developer.apple.com/news/?id=k1mtkt1k) | APPLE-MACOS-ROSETTA-SUNSET | | April 2027 SDK 27 floor for uploads (iOS, iPadOS, tvOS, visionOS, watchOS) | [k1mtkt1k](https://developer.apple.com/news/?id=k1mtkt1k) | APPLE-SDK-27-REQ deadline, PLATFORM-MECHANICS section 1.6 | | App Review contact phone in international format, first in-app purchase of each type needs a new app version (19 August 2026) | [App Store Connect release notes](https://developer.apple.com/help/app-store-connect/release-notes/) | Pre-submission checklist, APPLE.md Notes for Review | | Screenshot specifications for iPhone Duo, iPhone 18 Pro and Pro Max, Apple Watch Ultra 4 and Series 12 (9 September 2026) | [Screenshot specifications](https://developer.apple.com/help/app-store-connect/reference/app-information/screenshot-specifications) | PLATFORM-MECHANICS section 1.6, checklist | | EU unified terms from 1 October 2026, CTC replaces CTF, Attachment 14 | [gmws0jgp](https://developer.apple.com/news/?id=gmws0jgp), [0cgo95n6](https://developer.apple.com/news/?id=0cgo95n6) | EU-DMA-UNIFIED-TERMS-2026, EU-REGULATORY section 2.3 rewritten | | Brazil alternative distribution from iOS 26.5, Attachment 12 by 6 July 2026 | [dhwadr2x](https://developer.apple.com/news/?id=dhwadr2x), [umq9wxmm](https://developer.apple.com/news/?id=umq9wxmm) | Deadline, GLOBAL-REGULATORY section 3.3 | | Australia 15+ removed, Vietnam Decree 147 rating, Korea descriptor move | [yrrb45pw](https://developer.apple.com/news/?id=yrrb45pw), [oj3r9pvw](https://developer.apple.com/news/?id=oj3r9pvw) | Deadline, GLOBAL-REGULATORY sections 3.2, 3.5, 3.10 | | Brazil betting licence check needs a new binary | [x4eyetnp](https://developer.apple.com/news/?id=x4eyetnp) | APPLE-GAMBLING-BRAZIL-LICENSE fix text | Stale entries corrected. `docs/PLATFORM-MECHANICS-2026.md` cited the wrong announcement id for the June 2026 Guideline 4.3 tightening (now a233fmpw) and still said API 35 (now API 36 with the 1 November 2026 extension). `docs/EU-REGULATORY-2026.md` section 2.3 said the unified fee model was not implemented. it is, from 1 October 2026. ## 5. Google Play and Android, verified deltas | Change | Source | Repo action | |---|---|---| | Chargeback cost shift, 3 August 2026 | [Play Console Help 17068375](https://support.google.com/googleplay/android-developer/answer/17068375) | GOOGLE-PLAY-CHARGEBACK-LIABILITY, guard check, deadline, GOOGLE-PLAY.md row | | Donation links under the Payments policy | [Payments policy](https://support.google.com/googleplay/android-developer/answer/9992660) | GOOGLE-PAYMENTS-DONATION-LINK, guard check | | Organization account for regulated categories, 30 September 2026 | [Play Console requirements](https://support.google.com/googleplay/android-developer/answer/10788890) | GOOGLE-ORG-REGISTRATION-REQUIRED, guard check, deadline | | Register every package name for developer verification, 30 September 2026 | [15 July 2026 announcement](https://support.google.com/googleplay/android-developer/answer/17134731) | GOOGLE-PLAY-APP-REGISTRATION-MISSING, deadline | | READ_CALL_LOG no longer permitted for call verification, 26 August 2026 | same | GOOGLE-PERM-SMS-CALLLOG detection updated | | Anonymous and random chat apps in scope of Child Safety Standards | [17036597](https://support.google.com/googleplay/android-developer/answer/17036597) | GOOGLE-ANON-CHAT-MINOR-BLOCK, guard check | | Generative AI NCII controls, 25 August 2026 | [Android Developers Blog](https://android-developers.googleblog.com/2026/08/ensuring-safety-genai-preventing-non-consensual-intimate-content.html) | GOOGLE-GENAI-NCII-CONTROLS, guard check | | Unrated apps not allowed, third-party AI in the User Data policy | [17134731](https://support.google.com/googleplay/android-developer/answer/17134731) | GOOGLE-UNRATED-APP-BANNED | | API 37 targets. Contact Picker, location button, geofencing out of foreground services (27 January 2027) | [16909972](https://support.google.com/googleplay/android-developer/answer/16909972), [16965181](https://support.google.com/googleplay/android-developer/answer/16965181) | Three patterns, TSDK-gated guard block, deadline | | Technical quality, February 2027 (R8, memory) and Restore Credentials, April 2027 | [17492799](https://support.google.com/googleplay/android-developer/answer/17492799) | ANDROID-R8-OPTIMIZATION-MISSING, ANDROID-RESTORE-CREDENTIALS-REQUIRED, deadlines | | Android 17 ACCESS_LOCAL_NETWORK, read-only native libraries, per-app memory limits | [Behavior changes 17](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/17/behavior-changes-17) | ANDROID-LOCAL-NETWORK-PERMISSION, ANDROID-DYNAMIC-CODE-LOADING updated | | Target API 36 with 1 November 2026 extension, Billing v8 ladder to 2028 | [Target SDK](https://developer.android.com/google/play/requirements/target-sdk) | Deadline text updated, GOOGLE-TARGET-API updated | | US alternative billing reporting from 1 October 2026, Play Catalog Access default from 22 July 2026 | [16497028](https://support.google.com/googleplay/android-developer/answer/16497028), [17117200](https://support.google.com/googleplay/android-developer/answer/17117200) | Deadlines, GOOGLE-PLAY.md section | ## 6. Regulation, verified deltas Thirty-eight deadlines were added and eight corrected. The full dated list is in `data/regulatory-deadlines.json` and the compiled view in `docs/REGULATORY-TIMELINE.md`. - United States. DOJ ADA Title II and HHS Section 504 mobile-app accessibility dates were extended by 2026 interim final rules to 26 April 2027 and 11 May 2027 (large entities) and 26 April 2028 and 10 May 2028 (small). The FTC COPPA age-verification policy statement (25 February 2026) is a live safe harbour. COPPA 2.0 passed the Senate and the KIDS Act passed the House, neither is law. The COPPA section 312.11 carve-outs bind Safe Harbor programs, not developers, a correction to the earlier text. - United Kingdom. DUAA commenced 5 February 2026 with the complaints process on 19 June 2026. ICO storage and access guidance published 29 April 2026. DMCCA subscription regime moves to January 2027 (earlier estimate was spring 2027). Under-16 social media ban regulations laid by end of 2026 for spring 2027, with an 18+ floor for AI romantic companions. Ofcom app stores report due by January 2027. - European Union. Regulation (EU) 2026/1744 is in force, so the Annex III and Annex I high-risk dates (2 December 2027, 2 August 2028) are law, and 2 December 2026 brings the marking retrofit and the NCII and CSAM prohibition. Data Act 12 September 2026 is access-by-design, not switching (switching charges hit zero 12 January 2027). Product Liability Directive applies from 9 December 2026. eIDAS wallet acceptance by 24 December 2027. CSAM ePrivacy derogation expires 3 April 2028. There is no general EAA 2027 date. - Asia-Pacific. Korea PIPA amendment effective 11 September 2026. China AI anthropomorphic services measures effective 15 July 2026 (no companion services to minors). Singapore OSRAA partially commenced 29 June 2026. India Consent Managers tranche 13 November 2026. Japan APPI amendment effective by 16 July 2028 with an under-16 threshold. - Canada, Australia, Brazil. Australia's App Distribution Services Code age-assurance duty bites 9 September 2026 (read from an archived copy, re-confirm live), Privacy Act automated-decision disclosure and the Children's Online Privacy Code land 10 December 2026. Brazil's Decreto 12.880 (18 March 2026) puts age signals on stores and
- docs/GAP-ANALYSIS-2026-11.md (8261 bytes)
# Gap analysis, November 2026 <!-- freshness: 60d --> What changed on the platforms and in law between 5 September and 14 November 2026, what this playbook added in response, and what could not be read from a primary source. It repeats the method of [GAP-ANALYSIS-2026-09.md](GAP-ANALYSIS-2026-09.md). Every item encoded below was read on its primary source on 14 November 2026. Anything that could not be read there is listed under Unverified, not folded into a rule. The next sweep is due by 13 January 2027. ## 1. Method - Apple. every Apple Developer news post from 5 September to 14 November 2026 (21 posts, none between 5 and 8 September) and the Upcoming Requirements page. - Google. the Play policy announcements in the window (one batch, 29 October 2026), the Play Policy Deadlines table, the Android Developers Blog, and the target API, Billing deprecation, and developer verification pages. - Regulation. four regional passes (EU and UK, United States, Asia-Pacific, and Canada, Australia, Brazil), each returning only dated items with a quoted sentence from the instrument. gov.ca.gov, ofcom.org.uk, and esafety.gov.au refused or timed out on scripted fetches, so their items are listed as unverified rather than encoded. - Repo. every finding was searched for across `docs/`, `data/`, and `references/` before anything was written, so items the October review had already added (the 16 October guideline revision, the EU ATT prompt, the DSA trader status) were not added twice. - Every finding a research pass returned was re-read on its primary page before it changed the data. Two claims that contradicted existing entries (the social media 13+ rule, the iPhone Duo SDK scope) were checked this way and turned out to be wrong, so the entries stand. ## 2. Apple, verified deltas | Change | Source | Repo action | |---|---|---| | New age rating descriptors, Shared Location and Dating and Relationships, in the questionnaire from 16 November 2026, every app answered by 12 January 2027, Dating sets an 18+ minimum | [yxkh08us](https://developer.apple.com/news/?id=yxkh08us) | APPLE-AGE-RATING-LOCATION-DATING-2027, APPLE.md | | Original Developer ID Sub-CA expires 1 February 2027, re-sign installer packages from the G2 authority | [w4atic4c](https://developer.apple.com/news/?id=w4atic4c) | APPLE-DEVELOPER-ID-SUBCA-EXPIRY-2027, PLATFORM-MECHANICS section 1.1 | | Developer Program License Agreement updated 13 October 2026, acceptance needed | [17mwd36z](https://developer.apple.com/news/?id=17mwd36z) | APPLE.md | | Taiwan standard commission 30 to 26 percent from 31 October 2026 | [w9mxlhek](https://developer.apple.com/news/?id=w9mxlhek) | APPLE.md | | App Review Guidelines revised 16 October 2026 (2.3.14, 2.5.19, 1.2 NCII) and EU ATT alternative prompt from iOS 27.2 | [92th7e5i](https://developer.apple.com/news/?id=92th7e5i), [idsft9ai](https://developer.apple.com/news/?id=idsft9ai) | Already in the repo from the October review, no change | Checked and month-only, placeholders kept. the social media declaration (September 2026), the minimum SDK for uploads and the iPhone Duo screenshot rule (both April 2027). ## 3. Google Play and Android, verified deltas All from the policy announcement of 29 October 2026 and the Play Policy Deadlines table. | Deadline | Change | Repo action | |---|---|---| | 1 December 2026 | Japan payments authorization, or payments held globally | GOOGLE-JAPAN-PAYMENTS-AUTHORIZATION-2026 | | 27 January 2027 | Eligibility-based subscription discounts disclose criteria, verification, and post-eligibility pricing | GOOGLE-SUBSCRIPTION-ELIGIBILITY-DISCOUNTS-2027 | | 14 April 2027 | AppFunctions API policy | GOOGLE-APPFUNCTIONS-POLICY-2027 | | 25 August 2027 | Local Network and Manage Contacts permission declarations | GOOGLE-LOCAL-NETWORK-MANAGE-CONTACTS-2027 | The same announcement says trader status must be declared in Play Console starting November 2026, which the repo already covers. Android developer verification still names 2027 for the global step with no day. The target API and Billing pages are unchanged. ## 4. Regulation, verified deltas - European Union. Cyber Resilience Act vulnerability and incident reporting applies from 11 September 2026, already encoded. The Commission proposed the Digital Fairness Act on 11 November 2026 (COM(2026) 1100), which would apply 12 months after entry into force, so it creates no obligation yet. The EDPB finalised its DSA and GDPR interplay guidelines and consulted on fines guidelines until 13 November 2026. - United Kingdom. The draft Consumer Subscription Contracts (Cancellation and Information) Regulations 2026 name 1 January 2027 and had not been made on 14 November 2026. - United States. New York S.9051B/A.10379C (signed 28 October 2026) bars unsafe AI chatbot features for minors and requires age verification with a non-ID option, with no effective date published. The FTC opened an advance notice of proposed rulemaking on impersonation scams on 1 October 2026 (comments to 30 November 2026). Louisiana Act 502 takes effect 1 January 2027. The DOJ ADA Title II rule is still the interim final rule and the FTC AI accuracy statement is still proposed. ## 5. Asia-Pacific, Canada, Australia, Brazil, verified deltas The regional pass for Asia-Pacific, Canada, Australia, and Brazil was still running when this sweep merged. Its findings landed in a follow-up change on 15 November 2026 after each item was read on its primary source. Korea's AI development reuse rule (Act No. 21910, from 9 March 2027), Indonesia's PP TUNAS self-assessment deadline (31 December 2026), and China's CAC filing window for platforms with a large minor audience (closing around 16 November 2026). Items already confirmed in [#659](https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance/issues/659) on 14 November 2026. Korea's mandatory privacy certification from 1 July 2027, Japan's APPI amendment as Act No. 56 of 2026, and the India DPDP rule 4 Consent Manager date. ## 6. Unverified, deliberately not encoded - California bills signed in September 2026 (AB 1709 social media for under-16s, SB 1119 companion chatbots, AB 1856 age signals, AB 2246 replacing the Age-Appropriate Design Code, SB 1000 and AB 2713 AI transparency). A research pass read the Governor's releases, but gov.ca.gov refused every fetch from this check, and none of the releases states an effective date. Read the chaptered text on leginfo before encoding. - Ofcom's amended Illegal Content Codes of Practice (issued 12 October 2026, in force 2 November 2026) and its categorised-services risk assessment dates. ofcom.org.uk answers scripted reads with a browser challenge, so the wording was seen only through a search index. - The UK under-16 social media regulations, reported to be laid in December 2026 for spring 2027. Secondary only. - The Alabama App Store Accountability Act challenge (CCIA, reported 28 October 2026). No docket found. - Korea MyData expansion dates and the Australia App Distribution Services Code on the live eSafety register, carried over from [#659](https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance/issues/659). ## 7. Follow-up, 15 November 2026 A second pass read the App Store Connect release notes and the Upcoming Requirements page line by line, which the first pass had only skimmed. | Change | Source | Repo action | |---|---|---| | From early 2027 App Store Connect will no longer accept uploads containing On-Demand Resources from new apps or apps that have never used the feature (release notes, 12 November 2026) | [release notes](https://developer.apple.com/help/app-store-connect/release-notes/) | APPLE-ODR-UPLOAD-BLOCK-2027, APPLE-ODR-DEPRECATED-27 expanded | | iOS and iPadOS apps uploaded to App Store Connect must target iOS 13 or later | [Upcoming Requirements](https://developer.apple.com/news/upcoming-requirements/) | APPLE-MIN-DEPLOYMENT-TARGET-IOS13, new guard check | Checked and not encoded. The INSTALLS analytics report deprecation in App Store Connect API 4.6 affects reporting, not review. The Republic of Korea consent schedule for converting subscription offers to standard paid subscriptions (30 September 2026) is tracked for the next sweep, because its detail page failed to load on the first read.
- docs/GLOBAL-REGULATORY-2026.md (55324 bytes)
# Global Regulatory Hard Rules (2026). USA and Worldwide This document is the non-EU legal layer for App Store and Google Play compliance. It is the companion to [EU-REGULATORY-2026.md](EU-REGULATORY-2026.md). The same framing holds. Store compliance is not the same as legal compliance. Passing App Review does not make an app compliant with US federal or state law, or with the laws of the UK, Australia, Brazil, Canada, South Korea, India, Singapore, Japan, or China. The store enforces a subset, a regulator enforces the rest, and for an app that reaches users in a market both must be satisfied. Every item is a HARD rule for any app that reaches users in the named market. Each carries a date and a source. Apple-backed items cite developer.apple.com so the reference stays Apple-anchored. Many US and global dates are under active litigation or legislative delay, so treat each effective date as the statutory date subject to injunction or amendment, and re-verify against the cited source before relying on it. Items that could not be confirmed against a primary source are labelled unverified in the last section. ## 1. Storefront-backed age-assurance spines (Apple and Google-backed) Several national and US-state laws are operated through storefront-specific age-assurance machinery, so an audit checks this layer first. ### 1.1 Apple's cross-region age-assurance spine - Declared Age Range API. It returns a user's age band, not a birthdate, plus a signal for how age was confirmed (`governmentIDChecked`, `paymentChecked`, `selfDeclared`, `guardianDeclared`). The entitlement is `com.apple.developer.declared-age-range`. Version map. iOS and iPadOS 26 add the base self-declared and guardian-declared range. 26.2 adds verification methods and PermissionKit. 26.4 adds regulatory-requirement signals and a parental-acknowledgement sheet for a major app update. Full features build against the iOS 26.2 SDK with Xcode 26.2 or later. The API is available worldwide. Sources. [Apple age assurance](https://developer.apple.com/support/age-assurance/), [Apple Declared Age Range](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/declaredagerange/). - Apple names no specific law on the age-assurance page. it says "in certain regions, where legally required" and "consult your legal counsel". The country and state list lives in Apple's dated news posts, not the evergreen page. An audit must not read the region list off the support page. - The developer owns the restriction and the consent handling. Until a parent consents, the child is prevented from accessing the gated update or feature. Consent withdrawal arrives through App Store Server Notifications as the `RESCIND_CONSENT` value, and a major app change re-requests consent through PermissionKit (`SignificantAppUpdateTopic`). Source. [Apple age assurance](https://developer.apple.com/support/age-assurance/). - 18-plus download block. from 24 February 2026 Apple blocks users in Brazil, Australia, and Singapore from downloading apps rated 18-plus unless they are confirmed to be adults through reasonable methods. Apple states developers may have separate obligations to independently confirm adulthood. Source. [Apple region age requirements](https://developer.apple.com/news/?id=f5zj08ey). Per-region storefront dates Apple has published. | Region | Apple date | Mechanic | Law Apple names | |---|---|---|---| | Texas | 4 June 2026 (after an injunction was stayed) | Age assurance plus parent consent for under-18 on downloads, purchases, and major changes. bands under 13, 13 to 15, 16 to 17, over 18 | SB 2420 | | Utah | 6 May 2026 (new Apple Accounts) | Age category via Declared Age Range API, consent and revocation | not named | | Louisiana | 1 July 2026 (new Apple Accounts) | Same tool set as Utah | not named | | Brazil | 24 February 2026 | 18-plus download block. loot-box apps auto-rated 18-plus | not named | | Australia | 24 February 2026 | 18-plus download block | not named | | Singapore | 24 February 2026 | 18-plus download block | not named | Sources. [Apple region age requirements](https://developer.apple.com/news/?id=f5zj08ey), [Apple Texas SB 2420](https://developer.apple.com/news/?id=btkirlj8). ### 1.2 Google Play Age Signals API (v3 / beta) To help developers meet compliance obligations under age verification laws in jurisdictions such as Texas, Utah, Louisiana, and Brazil, Google Play provides a runtime client-side age signal interface. - **Purpose and Scope**: The Play Age Signals API retrieves age-related signals for users, notifies Google Play of significant app changes requiring parental approval, and receives notifications about revoked approvals. It only returns data for users based in regions where Play is required by law to provide age category data. - **Terms of Service (ToS)**: Usage is heavily restricted. Developers may only use information from the Play Age Signals API to provide age-appropriate content and experiences in compliance with laws. You **MUST NOT** use the API for any other purpose including, but not limited to, advertising, marketing, user profiling, or analytics. Misuse will result in the termination of API access and immediate app suspension or takedown. - **Integration & Dependency**: Integrate using `com.google.android.play:age-signals:0.0.3` (or subsequent versions). Supported on Android 6.0 (API level 23) and higher. - **Bands**: Default returned categories are 0-12, 13-15, 16-17, and 18+ (custom age ranges can also be received). Cached age signals are updated by Play within 2 to 8 weeks after the user's birthday. - **Data Safety**: No user data is collected, stored, or shared by the client-side library itself. Google Play's background services handle data governed by the Google Play ToS. - **Rollout Timeline**: - **Brazil**: Started rolling out on March 17, 2026, to meet requirements under Brazil's Digital ECA. - **Texas**: Started returning signals on May 28, 2026, for users who created accounts after that date to comply with Texas SB2420. - Ongoing updates are provided for other US states (Utah, Louisiana). Sources. [Google Play Age Signals overview](https://developer.android.com/google/play/age-signals/v3/overview), [Use Play Age Signals API (beta)](https://developer.android.com/google/play/age-signals/v3/use-age-signals-api), [Google Play Developer Help](https://support.google.com/googleplay/android-developer/answer/16569691). ## 2. United States ### 2.1 COPPA and the amended COPPA Rule (FTC) - COPPA covers operators of services directed to children under 13, and general-audience services with actual knowledge they collect data from an under-13 child. Asking date of birth and receiving an under-13 answer is actual knowledge. Anchor is 16 CFR Part 312. Source. [FTC COPPA FAQ](https://www.ftc.gov/business-guidance/resources/complying-coppa-frequently-asked-questions). - The amended Rule. Federal Register 22 April 2025, citation 90 FR 16918, effective 23 June 2025, general compliance date 22 April 2026. Source. [Federal Register 2025-05904](https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/04/22/2025-05904/childrens-online-privacy-protection-rule). - What changed, each a testable duty. - Personal information now adds biometric identifiers (fingerprint, retina or iris, genetic or DNA, voiceprint, gait, facial template) and government identifiers beyond the SSN. - Separate opt-in consent for third-party disclosure and targeted advertising, and access cannot be conditioned on it. - Data-retention limits with a written retention policy, no indefinite retention (312.10). - A written information-security program with a coordinator and an annual risk assessment (312.8). - New verifiable parental consent methods including knowledge-based authentication and a face-match to a government photo ID. - Penalty up to 53,088 dollars per violation (2025 inflation-adjusted). Sources. [FTC final COPPA changes](https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2025/01/ftc-finalizes-changes-childrens-privacy-rule-limiting-companies-ability-monetize-kids-data), [Gibson Dunn COPPA analysis](https://www.gibsondunn.com/ftc-updates-to-coppa-rule-impose-new-compliance-obligations-for-online-services-that-collect-data-from-children/). - Apple hook. Guideline 5.1.4 names COPPA, and Guideline 1.3 gates Kids-Category apps behind a parental gate with no third-party PII sharing. Source. [Apple App Review Guidelines](https://developer.apple.com/app-store/review/guidelines/). - FTC Enforcement Policy Statement on age-verification technology, 25 February 2026, in force until final COPPA amendments are published. A general or mixed-audience app that collects age data for age verification is outside COPPA enforcement only if it uses the data solely for age determination, minimises retention, vets third parties, gives notice, and secures the data. Correction to earlier drafts of this doc. the section 312.11 carve-outs are earlier dates and bind FTC-approved Safe Harbor programs, not developers. Bill status on 5 September 2026 (govinfo BILLSTATUS). COPPA 2.0 (S.836) passed the Senate on 5 March 2026 and sits at the House desk, the KIDS Act (H.R.7757) passed the House on 29 June 2026 and sits in Senate Commerce, KOSA (S.1748) was ordered reported on 5 August 2026, and the App Store Accountability Act (H.R.3149) is at full committee. None is law. Sources. [FTC policy statement](https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2026/02/ftc-issues-coppa-policy-statement-incentivize-use-age-verification-technologies-protect-children), [COPPA final rule, 90 FR 16918](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-04-22/html/2025-05904.htm), [BILLSTATUS bulk data](https://www.govinfo.gov/bulkdata/BILLSTATUS/119). ### 2.2 US state App Store Accountability Acts (ASAA) These put duties on both the store and the developer, separate from broader social-media minor laws. Four states as of mid-2026, all under active litigation or delay. | State | Bill | Signed | Effective (subject to litigation) | |---|---|---|---| | Utah | SB 142 | 26 March 2025 | store and developer duties from 6 May 2026, some operational parts delayed to 6 May 2027, private right of action from 31 December 2026 | | Texas | SB 2420 | 2025 | statutory 1 January 2026, enjoined 23 December 2025, injunction stayed 28 May 2026 so now in effect while litigation continues | | Louisiana | HB 977 (Act 185 of 2026), replacing HB 570 | 2026 | 1 July 2027. HB 570 (Act 481 of 2025) never takes effect | | Alabama | HB 161 | 9 March 2026 | 2027, exact date unverified | Common developer duties. request and receive an age category from the store. confirm whether verifiable parental consent exists for a minor account before use. assign an accurate age and suitability rating. re-request consent on a major change. limit use of age and consent data to compliance and delete it after verification (Texas is explicit on deletion). For Android apps, Google Play supports this via the Play Age Signals API, which began returning signals for eligible Texas accounts created after May 28, 2026. Sources. [Utah SB 142](https://le.utah.gov/~2025/bills/static/SB0142.html), [FPF comparison of the ASAAs](https://fpf.org/blog/comparing-enacted-app-store-accountability-acts/), [Wiley ASAA developments](https://www.wiley.law/alert-Key-Developments-With-State-App-Store-Accountability-Acts-as-Texas-Act-Takes-Effect). Apple discrepancy to flag. Apple's storefront date for Louisiana is 1 July 2026, while the statute was delayed to 1 July 2027. An audit flags the gap rather than assuming either date. Sources. [Apple region age requirements](https://developer.apple.com/news/?id=f5zj08ey), [Alston on the Louisiana delay](https://www.alstonprivacy.com/louisiana-delays-app-store-accountability-effective-date-to-july-2027/). Note. Texas HB 18 (the SCOPE Act, effective 1 September 2024) is a separate Texas law that regulates digital service providers directly, distinct from the ASAA. - Status on 5 September 2026, verified on the enrolled texts and court dockets. Texas SB 2420 is in force since 1 January 2026. the Fifth Circuit stayed the preliminary injunctions on 4 June 2026 and the Supreme Court declined to vacate the stay on 6 July 2026, merits appeal pending. Utah SB 142 was amended by HB 498 (2026). every substantive duty now begins 6 May 2027, pre-installed apps are in scope, and enforcement is a private right of action only, so the CCIA challenge was dismissed on 21 April 2026. Louisiana HB 570 (Act 481 of 2025) never takes effect. HB 977 (Act 185 of 2026) re-enacts the regime effective 1 July 2027. Alabama HB 161 is confirmed effective 1 January 2027 with legacy accounts age-verified by 1 October 2027. Sources. [Fifth Circuit stay order, Nos. 25-51073 and 26-50001](https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/), [Utah HB 498 enrolled](https://le.utah.gov/Session/2026/bills/enrolled/HB0498.pdf), [Louisiana HB 977](https://legis.la.gov/), [Alabama HB 161](https://alison.legislature.state.al.us/). ### 2.3 US external purchase links and anti-steering (Epic v. Apple) - 30 April 2025. the court found Apple in civil contempt and enjoined it from charging a commission on out-of-app purchases or restricting the design of external links. 11 December 2025. the Ninth Circuit upheld the contempt finding but narrowed the remedy. Apple may charge only costs genuinely necessary to coordinate the hand-off, not a flat percentage. The Supreme Court granted cert in mid-2026 with argument scheduled October 2026, so the exact US commission is unsettled. Sources. [Ninth Circuit opinion](https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2025/12/11/25-2935.pdf), [SCOTUS cert reporting](https://9to5mac.com/2026/06/30/supreme-court-agrees-to-hear-apple-appeal-over-epic-games-ruling/). - Apple-backed rule. from 1 May 2025 Apple updated Guidelines 3.1.1, 3.1.1(a), 3.1.3, and 3.1.3(a) for the US decision. On the US storefront an app may include external-purchase links or buttons to the developer's own website, with no entitlement and no mandatory disclosure sheet. It does not permit alternative in-app payment. the transaction happens on the web. Outside the US the prohibition still applies and the external-purchase-link entitlement is still required. Sources. [Apple guideline update 1 May 2025](https://developer.apple.com/news/?id=9txfddzf), [Apple App Review Guidelines](https://developer.apple.com/app-store/review/guidelines/). - An audit treats the US commission question as unresolved, not as a fixed zero. ### 2.4 California (CCPA and CPRA, CPPA 2026 regulations, AADC) - CCPA and CPRA apply to a for-profit business doing business in California over a revenue or volume threshold. Duties. a privacy policy and a notice at collection, rights to know, delete, and correct, an opt-out of sale and sharing through a "Do Not Sell or Share" mechanism that honors Global Privacy Control, a "Limit the Use of My Sensitive Personal Information" control, and non-discrimination. Source. [California AG CCPA]
- docs/GOOGLE-PLAY.md (19673 bytes)
# Google Play Developer Program Policies. Rejection Map Source. Google Play Developer Program Policy (play.google/developer-content-policy) and Play Console enforcement documentation (support.google.com/googleplay/android-developer). Empirical figures from Google's 2025 platform safety reporting. Google blocked more than 1.75 million Play submissions in 2025 for policy violations and stopped over 255,000 apps from gaining excessive access to sensitive user data. The single most common rejection cause is a Data Safety declaration that does not match the app's real runtime behavior. A critical difference from Apple. Google enforcement escalates against the developer account, not only the app. A rejection is mild, but repeated rejections, removals, or one egregious violation can suspend the account and then terminate it. After termination, registering a new account triggers immediate re termination. ## The four level enforcement ladder | Level | What happens | Account impact | Common cause | |---|---|---|---| | Rejection | A new app or update is not published | None on account standing | Data Safety mismatch, crashes, broken privacy link, missing permission justification | | Removal | The app and prior versions are taken offline | None immediately, but multiple removals lead to suspension | Repeat policy violation, false advertising in the listing | | Suspension | The app is pulled, purchases stop, the code can no longer be used | Counts as a strike against the account | Egregious or multiple violations, repeated rejections or removals | | Account termination | Every app removed, no new publishing, new accounts re terminated | Permanent | Malware, fraud, harm to users or devices, severe repeat violations | ## Policy categories and what triggers enforcement ### Restricted content | Policy | Triggers enforcement | Avoid by | |---|---|---| | Child endangerment | Any content that sexualizes or endangers minors | Zero tolerance design, proactive detection, reporting | | Sexual content and nudity | Pornographic or sexually explicit content | Remove explicit content, gate mature content correctly | | Hate speech | Content targeting protected groups | Moderate and remove hateful content | | Violence and graphic content | Gore, realistic violence, glorification of harm | Remove or heavily restrict graphic content | | Illegal activities | Promoting illegal acts, drugs, weapons sales | Remove content that promotes illegal acts | | Real money gambling | Unlicensed gambling, outside permitted regions | License, geo restrict, follow the gambling program | | Financial services | Unlicensed lending, deceptive financial products, personal loan disclosure gaps | Disclose APR and terms, hold licenses, follow the financial services policy | | Health and medical | Unqualified or misleading medical claims | Substantiate claims, avoid unproven treatments | | Blockchain and NFT | Deceptive crypto content, undisclosed risks | Disclose risk, follow gambling rules for tokenized chance | | Unmoderated UGC | User content that contains prohibited content with no moderation | Add reporting, filtering, and blocking before launch | ### Impersonation and intellectual property | Policy | Triggers enforcement | Avoid by | |---|---|---| | Impersonation | Misrepresenting the developer, copying another app, false authorship | Use your own identity and original branding | | Intellectual property | Copyright or trademark infringement, counterfeiting, plagiarism | Own or license every asset and brand reference | ### Privacy, deception, and device abuse | Policy | Triggers enforcement | Avoid by | |---|---|---| | User data | Collecting personal data without clear disclosure, using data beyond stated purposes, sharing without consent, weak security | Disclose every collection and use, secure data, honor the stated purpose | | Permissions and APIs | Requesting permissions beyond functional need, deceptive access to location, SMS, call log, contacts | Request the minimum, justify each sensitive permission | | AccessibilityService misuse | Using accessibility APIs for data harvesting rather than accessibility | Use accessibility APIs only for genuine accessibility, declare the use | | Background location | Background location without a clear core feature and disclosure | Use foreground location where possible, justify background use with a prominent disclosure | | SMS and Call Log | Requesting SMS or Call Log without an approved core use case | Use the permissions declaration, drop the permission if not core | | All files access | MANAGE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE without a qualifying use case | Use scoped storage, request all files access only when truly required | | Health Connect | Accessing Health Connect without an appropriate use case and disclosure | Limit to declared health use, disclose in Data Safety | | Data Safety section | A Data Safety form that does not match the app's real data behavior. This is the number one rejection cause | Audit runtime data flows and SDKs, declare every collection, sharing, and security practice accurately | | Device and network abuse | Malware, botnets, resource hijacking, unauthorized system modification | Ship clean, well behaved code | | Deceptive behavior and misrepresentation | False functionality claims, misleading descriptions or screenshots, fake system UI | Make the listing match the app exactly | ### SDK and target API requirements | Policy | Triggers enforcement | Avoid by | |---|---|---| | Third party SDKs | An SDK that violates policy through tracking, permissions, or malicious code. The developer is responsible for SDK behavior | Vet every SDK, keep them current, remove non compliant ones | | Target API level | Failing to target the current required Android API level | Build against the current required target API before submission | ### Monetization and ads | Policy | Triggers enforcement | Avoid by | |---|---|---| | Payments | Deceptive billing, hidden charges, unauthorized transactions, ignoring refund rules. Play Billing required for in app digital goods, with regional alternatives where permitted | Use Play Billing for digital goods, disclose all charges | | Subscriptions | Unclear terms, difficult cancellation, misleading trials, undisclosed auto renewal | Show full terms, easy cancellation, honest trials | | Payments, donations | An in-app link to Open Collective, Ko-fi, Patreon, Buy Me a Coffee, GitHub Sponsors, or a PayPal donate page. Google reads the Payments policy exception literally, only donations to a tax-exempt charity (501(c)(3)-class) may bypass Play billing, a 501(c)(6) or an unincorporated project does not qualify. Open-source apps are the usual casualty ([AnkiDroid, August 2026](https://github.com/ankidroid/Anki-Android/issues/21656)) | Remove the donation entry point from the Play build, sell it as a one-time Play billing product, or document the charity's tax-exempt status in the review notes. Source. [Payments policy](https://support.google.com/googleplay/android-developer/answer/9992660) | | Payments, chargebacks | Not a rejection, a cost shift. For orders placed after 3 August 2026 the developer bears the purchase price less the service fee plus the card-network chargeback fee, Google Play covers only its service fee. An app that never handles the refund-review notification loses every fraudulent dispute by default | Handle `PendingRefundReviewNotification` and call the Review Refund API within 24 hours with the refund preference and usage evidence. Source. [Play Console Help](https://support.google.com/googleplay/android-developer/answer/17068375), [Review Refund API](https://developer.android.com/google/play/billing/provide-refund-and-chargeback-suggestions) | | Ads | Ads that mimic system UI, mislead, serve malware, or are intrusive and disruptive | Use compliant ad formats and placements | | Families ads | Non compliant SDKs or behavioral advertising in apps for children | Use only Families certified ad SDKs, no behavioral ads to minors | ### Store listing and promotion | Policy | Triggers enforcement | Avoid by | |---|---|---| | Metadata | Spammy listings, misleading titles or descriptions, keyword stuffing, near identical repeat submissions | Write an accurate, clean listing, one app per concept | | Ratings, reviews, installs | Fake reviews, artificial installs, incentivized reviews, rating manipulation | Never buy or incentivize ratings or installs | | Content ratings | A missing or inaccurate content rating questionnaire | Complete the IARC content rating questionnaire honestly | ### Spam and minimum functionality | Policy | Triggers enforcement | Avoid by | |---|---|---| | Spam and minimum functionality | Minimal function, frequent crashes, unresponsive UI, broken features, duplicate or low effort submissions | Ship a stable app with real, working functionality | ### Malware and mobile unwanted software | Policy | Triggers enforcement | Avoid by | |---|---|---| | Malware | Spyware, ransomware, rootkits, credential theft, unauthorized system access | Ship clean code, scan dependencies | | Ad fraud | Click injection, impression fraud, hidden ad networks | Use legitimate ad mediation only | | Social engineering | Phishing, credential harvesting, deceptive permission prompts | Be honest in every prompt and flow | | Hostile downloaders | Bundling or installing malicious software | Do not bundle or sideload other software | | Unauthorized system imitation | Fake system alerts, spoofed dialogs, unauthorized dialer or SMS replacement | Never imitate system UI | ### Families and Designed for Families | Policy | Triggers enforcement | Avoid by | |---|---|---| | Families program | Inappropriate content in child targeted apps, behavioral ads to minors, unclear parental controls, unsafe child data practices, COPPA noncompliance | Follow the Families policy, use compliant SDKs, comply with COPPA and local child law | ## The 12 tester rule for new personal accounts New personal developer accounts created after the policy change must run a closed test with at least 12 testers for 14 consecutive days before they can apply for production access. Skipping or under populating this test blocks production. Plan the closed test window into the release schedule from day one. Organization accounts are treated differently, so the account type chosen at signup matters. ## The recurring Google failure mode Most Google rejections are not about a forbidden feature. They are about a mismatch between what the app does and what the developer declared. The Data Safety form says no data is collected while an analytics SDK ships location. The listing promises a feature the app does not have. A permission is requested with no matching core feature. Close every one of these gaps by auditing actual runtime behavior, including every third party SDK, against every declaration before you submit. ## 2026 policy rounds you must act on (verified 5 September 2026, updated 14 November 2026) Google restructured the Developer Program Policy on 26 August 2026 into one consolidated document with a standalone AI-generated content and blockchain section. Re-anchor policy links to the new pages. Every item below was read on Google's own page. | Deadline | Change | What to do | Source | |---|---|---|---| | 1 December 2026 | Developers selling into or out of Japan must complete the payments authorization form in Play Console, or payments are held globally (announced 29 October 2026) | Complete the authorization form | [Policy announcement, 29 October 2026](https://support.google.com/googleplay/android-developer/answer/18100766) | | 27 January 2027 | Subscriptions with ongoing eligibility-based discounts, such as student plans, disclose eligibility criteria, the verification process, and post-eligibility pricing | Add the three disclosures to the offer | [Play Policy Deadlines](https://support.google.com/googleplay/android-developer/table/12921780) | | 14 April 2027 | New AppFunctions API policy. AppFunctions must not deceive or manipulate AI agents, bypass security controls, or interfere with other apps | Review every exposed AppFunction | [Play Policy Deadlines](https://support.google.com/googleplay/android-developer/table/12921780) | | 25 August 2027 | Local Network and Manage Contacts permissions restricted to core functionality, each with a Play Console declaration (Local Network for apps targeting API 37+) | File the declarations or move to pickers and scoped intents | [Play Policy Deadlines](https://support.google.com/googleplay/android-developer/table/12921780) | | 30 September 2026 | Organization account required for financial products, health apps, VpnService apps, and government apps, with a D-U-N-S number matching the Dun and Bradstreet profile | Migrate the app to an organization account through the official Transfer ownership workflow (7-day cool-down) | [Play Console requirements](https://support.google.com/googleplay/android-developer/answer/10788890?hl=en), [preview](https://support.google.com/googleplay/android-developer/answer/17125096?hl=en) | | 30 September 2026 | Register every Play app package name in Play Console for Android developer verification. Global, separate from the Brazil, Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand sideloading leg. Non-registration risks global removal | Complete developer verification and register each distributed applicationId | [Policy announcement, 15 July 2026](https://support.google.com/googleplay/android-developer/answer/17134731) | | 1 October 2026 | US alternative billing and external links. transaction and download reporting plus the Play service fee begin | Wire reporting before the date if enrolled | [US alternative billing](https://support.google.com/googleplay/android-developer/answer/16497028?hl=en) | | 22 July 2026 (live) | Play Catalog Access. registered third-party US stores list your app by default | Opt out in Play Console, Settings, Catalog Settings, if you do not want third-party distribution | [Play Catalog Access Program](https://support.google.com/googleplay/android-developer/answer/17117200?hl=en) | | 30 June 2026 (live) | Service fee restructure in the US, UK, and EEA. 10 percent service plus 5 percent billing fee, split by new versus existing install | Re-model revenue per region | [Lower service fees](https://support.google.com/googleplay/android-developer/answer/16954621?hl=en), [blog](https://android-developers.googleblog.com/2026/06/play-expanded-billing.html) | | 26 August 2026 (live) | Random and anonymous chat apps must block minors, may not target children, and are in scope of the Child Safety Standards | Enable minor blocking, publish CSAE standards, add reporting and a child-safety contact | [Age-Restricted Content](https://support.google.com/googleplay/android-developer/answer/17036597), [Families](https://support.google.com/googleplay/android-developer/answer/17122218), [Child Safety Standards](https://support.google.com/googlepla
- docs/index.md (5301 bytes)
--- title: App Store and Google Play rejection playbook description: How to avoid common App Store and Google Play rejections. Rejection maps, a pre-submission checklist, privacy manifest and Data safety checks, app regulation deadlines, and a guard that runs before you submit. --- # App Store and Google Play rejection playbook **The short answer.** Many rejections trace back to a few documented causes. A demo account that does not work, a privacy declaration that does not match what the app and its SDKs really collect, missing in-app account deletion, digital goods sold outside in-app purchase, and an incomplete or placeholder build. This playbook maps documented rejection patterns to the rule behind each one and the fix, and ships a guard that flags selected risks in your project before you submit. - **117 rejection patterns** with the guideline, how to detect it in your code, and the fix. - **95 tracked deadlines** across 28 jurisdictions and platform scopes, including the EU AI Act, the Digital Services Act, COPPA and US state age laws. - **A pre-submission guard** that runs locally or inside AI coding tools like Claude Code, Codex and Cursor. - Free to read. Source on [GitHub](https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance). ## Start here | You are | Read this | |---|---| | About to submit | [Pre-submission checklist](PRE-SUBMISSION-CHECKLIST.md) | | Rejected on the App Store | [Apple rejection map](APPLE.md) | | Rejected on Google Play | [Google Play rejection map](GOOGLE-PLAY.md) | | Want to appeal | [Root causes and the appeal playbook](MISTAKE-PATTERNS.md) | | Building a specific kind of app | [Rejection map by app type](BY-APP-TYPE.md) | | Using Expo, React Native or Flutter | [Cross-platform frameworks](CROSS-PLATFORM-FRAMEWORKS.md) | ## Laws and deadlines - [Accessibility for App Store and Google Play apps](ACCESSIBILITY.md). Nutrition Labels, TalkBack and VoiceOver, ADA Title II, the static scan. - [EU rules for apps in 2026](EU-REGULATORY-2026.md). EU AI Act, Digital Services Act trader status, European Accessibility Act, DMA. - [USA and worldwide rules](GLOBAL-REGULATORY-2026.md). COPPA, state app store accountability acts, UK, Australia, Brazil and more. - [Regulatory timeline](REGULATORY-TIMELINE.md) and [ruling register](RULING-REGISTER.md). - [Platform mechanics](PLATFORM-MECHANICS-2026.md). Notarization, Android developer verification, target API level, Play Billing. ## Privacy, security and payments - [Mobile privacy guide](MOBILE-PRIVACY-MONITOR-2026.md). Privacy manifests, App Tracking Transparency, Google Data safety. - [Mobile security requirements](MOBILE-SECURITY-2026.md). - [Loot boxes and gambling by country](GAMBLING-MATRIX.md). - [Other app stores](OTHER-STORES.md). ## Frequently asked questions **Why was my app rejected under Apple guideline 2.1?** The reviewer could not fully use the app. Usually a broken demo account, a backend that was down, placeholder content or an in-app purchase that did not load. **Do I need a privacy manifest?** Yes, for iOS apps that call required-reason APIs. SDKs on Apple's list of commonly used SDKs must ship their own manifest, and signatures when used as binary dependencies. A missing API declaration triggers ITMS-91053 on upload. **Do I need in-app account deletion?** Yes. Apple requires deletion to start inside the app. Google requires an in-app path plus a web page where users can request deletion. **Can I use Stripe instead of in-app purchase?** For physical goods and real-world services, yes. For digital goods it depends on the storefront. In-app purchase is the default, the EU allows alternative payment processing, and US link-out rules loosened in 2025. **How many testers does a new Google Play account need?** Personal accounts created after 13 November 2023 need a closed test with at least 12 testers opted in for 14 days in a row before they can apply for production access. **Does the EU AI Act affect my app?** Possibly. Article 50 transparency duties apply from 2 August 2026, and which ones bind you depends on whether you are a provider or a deployer. More answers in the [full question index](questions.md) and the [Q&A discussions](https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance/discussions/categories/q-a). ## Run the guard ```bash git clone https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance ~/repositories/app-store-compliance bash ~/repositories/app-store-compliance/scripts/install.sh install ``` Maintained by [Mirza Iqbal](https://github.com/mjmirza). Not affiliated with Apple or Google. App Store is a trademark of Apple Inc. Google Play is a trademark of Google LLC. <script type="application/ld+json"> {"@context":"https://schema.org","@type":"SoftwareSourceCode","name":"App Store Compliance Playbook","description":"Open playbook and pre-submission guard to stop App Store and Google Play rejections.","codeRepository":"https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance","programmingLanguage":["Shell","Python"],"author":{"@type":"Person","name":"Mirza Iqbal","url":"https://github.com/mjmirza","sameAs":["https://twitter.com/MirzaJhanzaib","https://next8n.com"]},"keywords":"App Store rejection, Google Play rejection, app review guidelines, privacy manifest, Data safety, account deletion, EU AI Act, COPPA"} </script> - docs/llms.txt (1368 bytes)
# App Store Compliance Playbook > Open playbook and pre-submission guard that stops App Store and Google Play rejections. Maps each common rejection to its guideline and fix, tracks app regulation deadlines, and runs inside AI coding tools. ## Core - [Pre-submission checklist](https://mjmirza.github.io/app-store-compliance/PRE-SUBMISSION-CHECKLIST.html): every check before you submit - [Apple rejection map](https://mjmirza.github.io/app-store-compliance/APPLE.html): guideline, trigger and fix - [Google Play rejection map](https://mjmirza.github.io/app-store-compliance/GOOGLE-PLAY.html): policy, trigger and fix - [Root causes and appeal playbook](https://mjmirza.github.io/app-store-compliance/MISTAKE-PATTERNS.html) - [Rejection map by app type](https://mjmirza.github.io/app-store-compliance/BY-APP-TYPE.html) ## Law - [EU rules 2026](https://mjmirza.github.io/app-store-compliance/EU-REGULATORY-2026.html) - [USA and worldwide rules](https://mjmirza.github.io/app-store-compliance/GLOBAL-REGULATORY-2026.html) - [Platform mechanics](https://mjmirza.github.io/app-store-compliance/PLATFORM-MECHANICS-2026.html) ## Data - [Rejection patterns JSON](https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance/blob/main/data/rejection-patterns.json) - [Regulatory deadlines JSON](https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance/blob/main/data/regulatory-deadlines.json)
- docs/MISTAKE-PATTERNS.md (8960 bytes)
# Why Apps Get Rejected. Root Cause Taxonomy and Appeal Playbook Rejection is rarely caused by a lack of knowledge about the rules. It is caused by process gaps that let a known rule slip through. This document names the recurring mistake patterns, the human root cause behind each, and the discipline that prevents it. Then it gives the appeal playbook for when a rejection still lands. ## The meta lesson The store reviewer is an adversarial integration test that runs once, on a real device, with no access to your intentions and no patience for setup. Every developer who is surprised by a rejection made the same error. They optimized for building the app and treated submission as a final formality, when submission is itself a test with its own preconditions. The fix is to move the review criteria to the front of the process and treat each one as a release blocker, not a last mile checklist. ## The eight root cause patterns ### 1. The invisible feature Root cause. The reviewer could not reach a feature, so they rejected what they could not see. A login wall with no demo account, a backend that was paused to save cost during review, a feature behind a paywall the reviewer did not buy, a region locked flow. The discipline. Provide a working demo account and a live backend at submission. Walk the Notes for Review field through every non obvious path. If the reviewer cannot reach it, it does not exist. ### 2. The declaration mismatch Root cause. What the app does at runtime does not match what was declared. Apple privacy labels or Google Data Safety say one thing while an SDK does another. A purpose string is generic. The listing promises a feature the build lacks. The discipline. Audit actual runtime data flows, including every third party SDK, against every declaration. The declaration is a contract. Make the app honor it exactly. ### 3. The payment shortcut Root cause. Trying to avoid the store commission on digital goods by routing payment outside the official billing. License keys, external checkout, crypto, or a web link for in app digital content. The discipline. Use Apple in app purchase and Google Play Billing for all digital goods unless the app is a documented exempt category. Treat the commission as a cost of distribution, not a bug to route around. ### 4. The thin wrapper Root cause. Shipping a website in a native shell with no added value. The app is a web view, a marketing page, or a link collection. Apple 4.2 and Google minimum functionality both reject this. The discipline. Add genuine native capability, offline value, device integration, or content the web version does not have. If the app does nothing beyond the website, it is not ready. ### 5. The spam signature Root cause. Submitting many near identical apps, duplicate bundle IDs for variations, template or generated apps from a reseller, or a low effort clone in a saturated category. Apple 4.3 and Google spam policy both catch this, and both escalate to account level action. The discipline. One app per concept, with variations handled as in app content. If a content owner has many properties, the owner submits or uses a single picker app. ### 6. The permission grab Root cause. Requesting sensitive permissions with no matching core feature. Background location, all files access, SMS or call log, AccessibilityService used for data collection. Google rejects the permission without a qualifying use case, Apple rejects the vague purpose string. The discipline. Request the minimum. Every sensitive permission must trace to a visible core feature, carry a specific reason string, and use the platform declaration form where required. ### 7. The missing exit Root cause. The app collects data or creates accounts but gives users no way out. No account deletion inside an app that supports account creation, no consent withdrawal, no privacy policy, social tokens stored off device. The discipline. Every account creating app needs in app account deletion. Every data collection needs consent and a withdrawal path. The privacy policy must be present, accessible, and accurate. ### 8. The compounding resubmit Root cause. Treating a rejection as a coin flip and resubmitting the same build hoping for a different reviewer. On Google this is the fastest path from rejection to suspension to account termination. The discipline. Never resubmit without addressing the cited guideline. Read the exact rule, fix the cause, and reply in the Resolution Center or the Play appeal with what changed. ## Top mistakes to never make 1. Submitting without a working demo account for an account based app. 2. Letting the backend go down or stay in staging during review. 3. A privacy nutrition label or Data Safety form that does not match the SDKs. 4. Generic permission purpose strings that do not name a real reason. 5. No in app account deletion in an app that creates accounts. 6. Selling digital goods outside in app purchase or Play Billing. 7. Loot boxes or random rewards without disclosed odds. 8. Screenshots of a splash or login screen instead of the app in use. 9. Keyword stuffing the name, subtitle, or description. 10. Third party social login with no privacy preserving alternative on Apple. 11. Background location or all files access with no qualifying core feature. 12. Shipping a web wrapper with no added value. 13. Duplicate bundle IDs or many near identical template apps. 14. Skipping the Google closed test of 12 testers over 14 days on a new personal account. 15. Not targeting the current required Android API level. 16. AI features that produce sensitive content without an age restriction. 17. Sharing personal data with a third party AI without a consent modal naming the provider. 18. Not answering Apple's new age rating questionnaire before a 2026 update. 19. References to other platforms or marketplaces inside the app or metadata. 20. Resubmitting an unchanged build after a rejection. ## The appeal playbook A rejection is recoverable. A bad appeal turns one rejection into a strike. ### Apple. Resolution Center 1. Read the exact guideline number Apple cited. The rejection names it. 2. If it is a misunderstanding, reply in the Resolution Center with a precise explanation, a screenshot or screen recording, and the demo path. Be factual and specific. 3. If it is a real issue, fix it, then in the reply state exactly what changed and where. 4. If you believe the reviewer is wrong on the rules, you can escalate to the App Review Board. Use this sparingly and only with evidence. 5. Never argue the spirit of the rule. Address the cited guideline directly. ### Google. Play Console appeal 1. The enforcement email names the policy and includes appeal instructions. Use that link. 2. State precisely what the app does, why it complies, and what you changed if anything. 3. Fix the declaration mismatch first. Most Google reversals come from correcting the Data Safety form or removing the offending SDK or permission, not from arguing. 4. Do not resubmit the same rejected build in parallel. That compounds strikes. 5. For an account level action, the appeal is the only channel. Be complete and honest, because a second wrong move can be terminal. ### The universal rule of appeals Address the cited rule, show evidence, change the build if needed, and reply once with everything. Speed comes from precision, not from volume. ## Real rejection case studies Named, real rejections teach more than an abstract rule. These come from open source community collections. - Halide, an Apple Design Award winning camera app, was rejected because it did not explain why the app uses the camera. Even a polished, award winning app fails the permission purpose check. This is the missing exit and the vague purpose string patterns in real life. - iDOS, a DOS emulator, received an App Store takedown. Emulators sit in a contested category and have been pulled even after a period of availability. Category risk is real, and it can arrive after approval. - A game that had not been updated in seven years was removed for being out of date. Approval is not permanent. An app that goes stale against current requirements can be pulled. - A developer submitted a macOS build under an iOS app and was rejected. Platform and target rules are strict. A Mac build is a separate target with its own rules. The lesson across all four. Approval is a moment, not a state. The rules apply at submission and keep applying after, so the privacy strings, the category fit, and the current SDK all have to stay correct over the life of the app. ## How to operationalize this Put the pre submission checklist into the definition of done for every release. Run the automated guard before every upload. Keep this taxonomy in code review so a reviewer can name the pattern a change risks. The goal is that no rejection reason in this document can reach submission without a human or a hook catching it first.
- docs/MOBILE-PRIVACY-MONITOR-2026.md (10719 bytes)
# Mobile and Web Privacy Compliance Guide (2026) This playbook establishes the reference and automated validation framework to ensure compliance with modern privacy requirements across iOS, Android, and Web platforms. Use this guide to identify missing disclosures and implementation gaps before submitting your applications to their respective app stores or deploying to production. --- ## 1. Apple Privacy Compliance Apple enforces highly strict, programmatic checks at build upload and review times. Failure to comply with any of these rules results in an automatic binary rejection or review block. ### 1.1 Privacy Manifest (PrivacyInfo.xcprivacy) - **Rule:** Every app and third-party SDK must bundle a `PrivacyInfo.xcprivacy` manifest file detailing the types of data collected, tracking practices, and any usage of Required Reason APIs. - **Implementation Gap:** Missing the manifest entirely or failing to include declarations for embedded third-party SDKs that collect data or perform tracking. Each bundled framework or library must ship with its own signed privacy manifest. - **Verification:** Search for `PrivacyInfo.xcprivacy` files in the app bundle and verify that all collected data types are mapped correctly. ### 1.2 Required Reason APIs - **Rule:** Apple designates specific APIs as Required Reason APIs, including system uptime, file timestamps, active keyboards, user defaults, and disk space. If your code or an embedded SDK calls these, you must declare the approved reason code in your privacy manifest. - **Implementation Gap:** Declaring an API without specifying an approved reason code, or using an unapproved API category, which triggers automatic App Store Connect build rejection. - **Verification:** Scan the codebase for symbols like `NSFileManager`, `UserDefaults`, `systemUptime`, or `ProcessInfo` and cross-reference with the `NSPrivacyAccessedAPITypes` array in your privacy manifest. ### 1.3 App Tracking Transparency (ATT) - **Rule:** Before accessing the advertising identifier (IDFA) or tracking users across other apps/websites, you must show the App Tracking Transparency prompt and request permission. - **Implementation Gap:** Presenting third-party tracking or advertising SDKs (such as Facebook, AppsFlyer, Adjust, or Branch) without calling the ATT prompt or omitting `NSUserTrackingUsageDescription` from `Info.plist`. - **Verification:** Run static analysis to detect tracking SDK references and verify that `ATTrackingManager.requestTrackingAuthorization` is called before initialization. ### 1.4 Privacy Nutrition Labels - **Rule:** Developers must complete the self-reported Privacy Nutrition Labels questionnaire in App Store Connect. The declared labels must align with actual data collection and tracking observed at runtime. - **Implementation Gap:** Failing to declare data collection types such as email address, phone number, location, or purchase history in the App Store Connect portal while the codebase actively transmits this information. - **Verification:** Audit all outgoing API request payloads and ensure that any personally identifiable information (PII) corresponds directly with the submitted nutrition labels. --- ## 2. Android Privacy Compliance Google Play enforces a multi-tiered compliance policy, backed by automated static scanning and human verification, focusing heavily on user consent and runtime capability access. ### 2.1 Data Safety - **Rule:** The Google Play Data Safety form requires developers to provide clear, granular declarations regarding what user data is collected, shared, and how it is secured (e.g., encryption in transit). - **Implementation Gap:** A discrepancy between the declared Data Safety form and actual runtime behavior, specifically around bundled analytics, advertising, or attribution SDKs that collect data silently. - **Verification:** Scan dependencies for known tracking or marketing libraries and verify that their collection practices match the Google Play Console declarations. ### 2.2 User Data Policy - **Rule:** Personal and sensitive user data must be handled securely and require a prominent, explicit in-app disclosure followed by user consent before collection. - **Implementation Gap:** Accessing or transferring contacts, SMS, device accounts, or file systems without a prominent disclosure or before the user explicitly clicks an consent button. - **Verification:** Audit onboarding and authentication flows to confirm that privacy policies and disclosures are displayed prior to data collection. ### 2.3 Advertising ID - **Rule:** Apps targeting Android 12 (API level 31) or higher that use the Google Play Services Advertising ID must declare the `com.google.android.gms.permission.AD_ID` permission in the manifest. - **Implementation Gap:** Declaring the advertising ID permission without providing a mechanism inside the app or the privacy policy to opt out of interest-based ads or request advertising ID reset/deletion. - **Verification:** Search for the `AD_ID` permission in `AndroidManifest.xml` and confirm that opt-out preferences are fully supported. ### 2.4 Runtime Permissions - **Rule:** Sensitive permissions must be requested dynamically at runtime rather than assuming access is granted. The app should check, request, and gracefully handle permission denial. - **Implementation Gap:** Invoking system features (e.g., camera or contacts) without checking for permission, or failing to present an in-app rationale prior to the system dialog when requested a second time. - **Verification:** Trace calls to permission-checking methods and verify that rationales are shown when `shouldShowRequestPermissionRationale` returns true. ### 2.5 Background Location - **Rule:** Google Play strictly restricts the use of `ACCESS_BACKGROUND_LOCATION`. It is permitted only if background location is essential to the core functionality of the application. - **Implementation Gap:** Requesting background location for features that could be accomplished with foreground access, or failing to present a highly visible, persistent prominent disclosure. - **Verification:** Ensure `ACCESS_BACKGROUND_LOCATION` is absent unless fully justified by a core use case, and verify the prominent disclosure UX. ### 2.6 Health Permissions - **Rule:** Access to health, fitness, or wellness data (including APIs like Health Connect) requires extensive developer declarations, a prominent disclosure, and explicit user consent. - **Implementation Gap:** Integrating Health Connect SDKs or querying health permissions (such as steps or heart rate) without completing the Health Connect integration questionnaire in Google Play Console. - **Verification:** Locate health-related permissions in the manifest and ensure a specialized health privacy policy is accessible inside the app. --- ## 3. Web Privacy Compliance Web applications must adhere to international regulations like the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and ePrivacy Directive. Static analysis of local storage, session storage, databases, cookies, and tracking tags is necessary to prevent compliance failures. ### 3.1 GDPR - **Rule:** Under GDPR, processing personal data of EU residents requires a legal basis, most commonly explicit, freely-given opt-in consent. Users must also be provided with the "Right to be Forgotten" (data deletion) and data portability. - **Implementation Gap:** Processing or storing IP addresses, names, emails, or device identifiers without obtaining prior opt-in consent or lacking a functional data deletion request mechanism. - **Verification:** Confirm that GDPR consent gates are active for all data ingestion pipelines and that an explicit deletion request option is available to users. ### 3.2 Cookie Consent - **Rule:** Non-essential cookies (such as analytics, tracking, or marketing cookies) must not be written or accessed before the user has given explicit consent via a Cookie Consent banner. - **Implementation Gap:** Injecting tracking cookies on initial page load before the user interacts with the consent banner, or failing to provide a preference manager. - **Verification:** Check that all analytical or marketing script tags are delayed or conditionally executed only after consent is recorded. ### 3.3 Local Storage - **Rule:** Sensitive personal data, session tokens, or authentication credentials should not be stored in unencrypted plain text within `localStorage`, as it is vulnerable to Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) attacks. - **Implementation Gap:** Writing JWT tokens, passwords, or user profile information directly to `localStorage` without encryption or proper lifecycle management. - **Verification:** Scan for `localStorage.setItem` calls and verify that sensitive keys are encrypted or moved to secure cookies (HttpOnly, Secure, SameSite). ### 3.4 IndexedDB - **Rule:** Structured offline client-side data stored in `indexedDB` must respect user consent preferences, apply secure encryption for sensitive files, and provide absolute cleanup mechanisms. - **Implementation Gap:** Creating object stores containing personal health, financial, or tracking data without validation of consent, or leaving databases orphaned after user logout. - **Verification:** Review `indexedDB.open` calls and verify that database instances are wiped during account deletion or logout. ### 3.5 Session Storage - **Rule:** Temporary sensitive details stored in `sessionStorage` must be limited, protected against unauthorized script access, and cleared immediately when the tab or window is closed. - **Implementation Gap:** Leaving exposed active session data in `sessionStorage` without security controls or validation, leading to potential session hijacking. - **Verification:** Scan for `sessionStorage.setItem` and ensure no highly sensitive data is left plain. ### 3.6 Tracking Technologies - **Rule:** Third-party tracking scripts, tracking pixels, and analytics tags (e.g., Google Analytics, Facebook Pixel, Hotjar) must be explicitly managed, declared in the privacy policy, and disabled by default until consent is obtained. - **Implementation Gap:** Loading tracking scripts dynamically or statically via script tags on page load without checking the user's consent status. - **Verification:** Verify that analytics and pixel scripts are loaded conditionally based on cookie preferences. --- ## 4. Identifying Gaps and Verifying Compliance To integrate these requirements into your release workflows, the App Store Compliance Guard automatically scans source code for known privacy violation patterns. Every check maps to the strict guidelines established above, preventing costly rejections before your build leaves the developer machine.
- docs/MOBILE-SECURITY-2026.md (22540 bytes)
# Mobile Security Requirements and Best Practices (2026) This playbook establishes a rigorous, comprehensive security reference for mobile application development. It addresses the 17 core mobile security domains required to protect user data, prevent unauthorized access, and ensure compliance with platform policies and industry standards (e.g., OWASP MASVS). Each section provides a high-level review of the security domain, platform-specific mechanics (iOS and Android), concrete secure implementation recommendations, and rejection/compliance risks. --- ## 1. Secure Storage ### 1.1 Overview Sensitive information (session tokens, passwords, personal data, API keys, private cryptographic keys) must never be stored in plaintext. Standard application sandbox structures—such as `UserDefaults` on iOS or standard `SharedPreferences` on Android—write content directly to XML or plist files in unencrypted formats, allowing easy retrieval on jailbroken/rooted devices, or via backup analysis. ### 1.2 Platform Implementation & Best Practices #### iOS: Secure Storage - **Unsecure Options:** `UserDefaults`, CoreData (without custom encryption), plain SQLite, or standard application documents/cache directories. - **Secure Option:** Use the **Keychain Services API** for small pieces of data (tokens, credentials, keys). For larger databases, use SQLCipher to encrypt the local SQLite/CoreData database. - **Data Protection Class:** When writing sensitive files directly to disk, use iOS Data Protection. Pass `Data.WritingOptions.completeFileProtection` to encrypt the file on disk, which remains encrypted when the device is locked. #### Android: Secure Storage - **Unsecure Options:** Plain `SharedPreferences`, standard internal/external storage files, or standard SQLite databases. - **Secure Option:** Use **EncryptedSharedPreferences** and **EncryptedFile** (from the Jetpack Security library), which automatically handle key management and encryption of storage components using AES-256 (for files) and AES-256-SIV (for keys/values). - **Database Encryption:** If using SQLite or Room, encrypt the database with **SQLCipher for Android**, using a hardware-backed master key generated in the Android Keystore. --- ## 2. Keychain (iOS Specific) ### 2.1 Overview The iOS Keychain provides a secure, hardware-accelerated enclave to store small, highly sensitive configuration and credential items. The items are encrypted and managed directly by the operating system, isolated from other applications. ### 2.2 Secure Implementation Recommendations - **Accessibility Attributes:** Always specify the strict accessibility attribute (`kSecAttrAccessible`) when creating or updating Keychain items: - `kSecAttrAccessibleAfterFirstUnlockThisDeviceOnly`: **Highly Recommended** for background tasks or push notification handlers. The data is available after the user unlocks the device once, and is not restored to another physical device via backups. - `kSecAttrAccessibleWhenUnlockedThisDeviceOnly`: Use for foreground-only apps. The data is accessible only when the device is unlocked and is not backed up. - **Avoid:** `kSecAttrAccessibleAlways` (deprecated) and non-`ThisDeviceOnly` classes if you want to prevent migration of the credentials to other physical devices during backups. - **Access Group Sharing:** Limit Keychain sharing (`kSecAttrAccessGroup`) strictly to verified app suites from the same team using Keychain Sharing entitlements. - **Keychain Backups:** Ensure the `kSecAttrSynchronizable` attribute is set to `false` (default) unless explicit iCloud Keychain synchronization is required. --- ## 3. Android Keystore (Android Specific) ### 3.1 Overview The Android Keystore system lets developers store cryptographic keys in a hardware-backed container (such as the Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) or StrongBox Security Chip), making them extremely difficult to extract from the device even if the operating system is compromised or rooted. ### 3.2 Secure Implementation Recommendations - **Hardware Backing:** Force the use of hardware-backed keys by checking `KeyInfo.isInsideSecureHardware()` after key generation. On devices supporting Android 9 (API 28) or higher, use `setIsStrongBoxBacked(true)` to enforce hardware protection using a dedicated HSM chip. - **Key Attestation:** For high-security environments, use Key Attestation to mathematically prove to a backend server that the cryptographic key was created in hardware and has not been tampered with. - **Purpose and Encryption Modes:** Strictly limit key capabilities during creation (e.g., allow ONLY decryption/encryption with specific padding schemes): ```kotlin val keyGenerator = KeyGenerator.getInstance(KeyProperties.KEY_ALGORITHM_AES, "AndroidKeyStore") keyGenerator.init( KeyGenParameterSpec.Builder("MySecureKeyAlias", KeyProperties.PURPOSE_ENCRYPT or KeyProperties.PURPOSE_DECRYPT) .setBlockModes(KeyProperties.BLOCK_MODE_GCM) .setEncryptionPaddings(KeyProperties.ENCRYPTION_PADDING_NONE) .setUserAuthenticationRequired(true) // require passcode/biometrics to use the key .build() ) ``` --- ## 4. Biometric Authentication ### 4.1 Overview Biometric authentication (FaceID, TouchID, Android BiometricPrompt) must verify user identity safely. A critical mistake is treating biometrics as an offline UI lock that merely flips a boolean flag (e.g., `isLoggedIn = true`) upon success. Attackers can bypass boolean returns using runtime instrumentation (e.g., Frida hooks on `LAContext` or `BiometricPrompt`). ### 4.2 Secure Implementation Recommendations - **Crypto-Backed Biometrics:** Rather than relying on simple success callbacks, require biometric authentication to unlock or authorize a cryptographic key stored in the Keychain or Keystore. - **iOS Implementation:** - Create Keychain item with `SecAccessControl` using `.biometryAny` or `.biometryCurrentSet`. - When accessing the item, the OS automatically prompts the user for FaceID/TouchID and releases the decrypted token ONLY if biometrics pass. - **Avoid** simple offline `LAContext.evaluatePolicy` checks for session authorization unless paired with severe security constraints. - **Android Implementation:** - Pass an initialized `BiometricPrompt.CryptoObject` (wrapping a Cipher, Signature, or Mac associated with a Keystore key) to `biometricPrompt.authenticate()`. - The Keystore key must be configured with `.setUserAuthenticationRequired(true)` and `.setUserAuthenticationParameters(0, KeyProperties.AUTH_BIOMETRIC_STRONG)`. - The key can only decrypt/sign if the user successfully passes strong biometric authentication. --- ## 5. Certificate Pinning ### 5.1 Overview Certificate Pinning (or public-key pinning) mitigates Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attacks by ensuring the client connects strictly to a server presenting a pre-defined cryptographic public key. This prevents traffic interception even if an attacker installs a malicious root certificate on the user's device (e.g., via corporate proxies, malware, or user-approved configuration profiles). ### 5.2 Secure Implementation Recommendations - **Pin SPKI Hashes:** Do not pin the leaf certificate itself (which changes frequently during standard certificate rotations, causing app outages). Instead, pin the **Subject Public Key Info (SPKI)** hash of the intermediate or leaf public key. - **Backup Pins:** Always include at least one backup pin (representing a standby Certificate Authority or intermediate key) to prevent bricking the app if the primary certificate needs emergency replacement. - **Native Implementation:** - **iOS:** Use declarative Network Session Pinning in `Info.plist` using the `NSPinnedDomains` key (supported natively since iOS 14). This operates safely inside the networking stack without manual delegation code. - **Android:** Declare a Network Security Configuration file (`res/xml/network_security_config.xml`) and specify the pins within `<pin-set>` elements. The system automatically enforces pinning for any `HttpURLConnection` or OkHttp client: ```xml <network-security-config> <domain-config> <domain includeSubdomains="true">api.myproduction.com</domain> <pin-set expiration="2026-12-31"> <pin digest="SHA-256">Base64EncodedSPKIHashHere=</pin> <pin digest="SHA-256">Base64EncodedBackupSPKIHashHere=</pin> </pin-set> </domain-config> </network-security-config> ``` --- ## 6. Jailbreak Detection (iOS) ### 6.1 Overview A jailbroken iOS device bypasses critical platform sandboxing protections, allowing attackers to access private application data directories, hook runtime methods, and intercept secure communications. ### 6.2 Secure Implementation Recommendations - **Multi-layered defense:** Use multiple independent indicators to assess device compromise. Avoid single simple functions. - **Standard Checks:** 1. **File Existence:** Check for known jailbreak-related directories and binaries (e.g., `/Applications/Cydia.app`, `/Applications/Sileo.app`, `/Library/MobileSubstrate/MobileSubstrate.dylib`, `/bin/bash`, `/usr/sbin/sshd`, `/private/var/lib/apt`). 2. **Directory Permissions:** Attempt to write a dummy file outside the app sandbox (e.g., to `/private/jailbreak.txt`). Standard apps will fail; jailbroken apps with root access may succeed. 3. **Symlink Analysis:** Check if common directories like `/Library/Ringtones` or `/Applications` are symlinks, which jailbreak tools create to preserve disk space. 4. **Dynamic Linker (dyld) Inspection:** Iterate over loaded dynamic libraries to detect hooks or injection libraries (e.g., `MobileSubstrate`, `Frida`). - **Response:** If jailbreaking is detected, wipe cached tokens and local databases, notify the backend, and safely terminate or gracefully degrade features. --- ## 7. Root Detection (Android) ### 7.1 Overview An Android device with root access grants administrative control, which bypasses critical security policies, memory isolation, and filesystem sandbox controls. ### 7.2 Secure Implementation Recommendations - **Local Heuristics:** 1. **Binary Search:** Look for administrative binaries like `su`, `busybox`, or root-management tools across standard paths (`/system/bin/su`, `/system/xbin/su`, `/sbin/su`, `/system/sd/xbin/su`). 2. **Build Tags:** Check `android.os.Build.TAGS` for `"test-keys"`, indicating a custom or rooted ROM build instead of a release-signed image. 3. **Superuser Apps:** Inspect the package list for root management packages (e.g., `com.noshufou.android.su`, `eu.chainfire.supersu`, `com.topjohnwu.magisk`). - **Hardware-Backed Attestation (Highly Recommended):** - Standard local heuristics are easily bypassed using Magisk Hide or zygisk modules. - Rely on the **Google Play Integrity API**. Call the API from the device, forward the cryptographically signed verdict token to your backend server, and decrypt/verify it on the backend. This provides a hardware-backed verdict of device integrity and whether it runs on a certified Android build. --- ## 8. SSL Configuration ### 8.1 Overview Misconfigured Transport Layer Security (TLS) leaves mobile applications vulnerable to credential sniffing and traffic modification. Cleartext traffic (HTTP) must be completely disabled in production. ### 8.2 Secure Implementation Recommendations - **Enforce TLS 1.3 or 1.2 minimum:** Disable backward compatibility with deprecated SSL v3, TLS 1.0, and TLS 1.1. - **iOS Implementation:** - Keep App Transport Security (ATS) enabled. - **Avoid** setting `NSAllowsArbitraryLoads` to `true` in production `Info.plist`. If certain domains require HTTP exceptions, specify them explicitly under `NSExceptionDomains` with strict justifications. - **Android Implementation:** - Define cleartext policies in `AndroidManifest.xml` via `android:usesCleartextTraffic="false"`. - Alternatively, enforce it globally in the Network Security Configuration: ```xml <network-security-config> <base-config cleartextTrafficPermitted="false"> <trust-anchors> <certificates src="system" /> </trust-anchors> </base-config> </network-security-config> ``` --- ## 9. Backup Rules ### 9.1 Overview By default, mobile operating systems include application sandboxed files in automated backups (iCloud backups on iOS, ADB / Google Drive backups on Android). This means sensitive data stored insecurely is automatically transferred to cloud drives or accessible via physical extraction. ### 9.2 Secure Implementation Recommendations - **iOS Backup Exclusion:** - Exclude any sensitive database or local config file from automatic iCloud and iTunes backups by adding the `.isExcludedFromBackup` resource attribute to the file's URL: ```swift var url = URL(fileURLWithPath: path) var values = URLResourceValues() values.isExcludedFromBackup = true try url.setResourceValues(values) ``` - **Android Backup Rules:** - **Do not** leave `android:allowBackup="true"` without defining tight filters. Backups allow extraction of private `/data/data/your.package/` files using simple `adb backup` commands. - For high-security applications, completely disable backup: ```xml <application android:allowBackup="false" ...> ``` - If backup is required, strictly configure `android:dataExtractionRules` (Android 12+) and `android:fullBackupContent` (Android 11-) in the manifest to target safe folders and explicitly exclude databases, shared preferences holding tokens, and credential files: ```xml <!-- res/xml/data_extraction_rules.xml --> <data-extraction-rules> <cloud-backup> <exclude domain="sharedpref" path="auth_tokens.xml"/> <exclude domain="database" path="secure_db.db"/> </cloud-backup> <device-to-device-backup> <exclude domain="sharedpref" path="auth_tokens.xml"/> <exclude domain="database" path="secure_db.db"/> </device-to-device-backup> </data-extraction-rules> ``` --- ## 10. Exported Activities (Android Specific) ### 10.1 Overview Any activity declared in `AndroidManifest.xml` with `android:exported="true"` can be launched by any other application running on the device. Unintentionally exported activities expose internal business logic, allow authorization bypass, and can cause tapjacking or state manipulation. ### 10.2 Secure Implementation Recommendations - **Strict Default:** Set `android:exported="false"` for all internal activities. - **Enforcement since Android 12:** Android 12 (API 31) requires every component (activity, service, receiver) that has intent filters to explicitly declare `android:exported`. If it lacks the tag, the app cannot be installed or submitted. - **Exported Component Protection:** - If an activity must be exported (e.g., launching from the home screen - docs/OPEN-SOURCE-PATTERNS.md (7770 bytes)
# Open Source Patterns. What the Community Already Codified Other people have already turned hard won App Store and Google Play rejections into open source tools and lists. This document captures those patterns, down to the minor metadata rules, and folds them into this playbook so nothing the community learned is lost. Where a pattern is automatable, it is added to the rejection pattern taxonomy and the guard. ## fastlane precheck. The open source metadata rule set `fastlane precheck` is the most widely used open source tool for catching App Store metadata rejections before submission. Its rules are the community's codified list of what Apple flags in metadata. Every rule defaults to error. A team can set a rule to warn or skip. We adopt the full rule set as metadata checks. | precheck rule | What it catches | Maps to | |---|---|---| | `curse_words` | Profanity in the app metadata | Apple 2.3.1 accurate and appropriate metadata | | `future_functionality` | Describing features that do not exist yet, coming soon, beta, placeholder promises | Apple 2.3.1 misleading marketing (hidden or dormant features moved to 2.5.19 on 16 October 2026) | | `negative_apple_sentiment` | Mentioning an iOS bug, or negative or insensitive references to Apple | Apple 2.3.1 and the Developer Code of Conduct | | `other_platforms` | Mentioning Android, Google Play, or another platform or marketplace in metadata or keywords | Apple 2.3.10 | | `unreachable_urls` | Broken or unreachable URLs in the metadata, support URL, or marketing URL | Apple 1.5 and 2.1 | | `placeholder_text` | Lorem ipsum or template text left in the listing | Apple 2.1 and 2.3.1 | | `test_words` | Words such as test, demo, sample left in a production listing | Apple 2.1 | | `copyright_date` | A copyright date that is out of date | Apple 2.3.1 | | `free_stickers` | The word free misused in a sticker or app name | Apple 2.3.7 metadata | | `custom_text` | Any word or phrase the team chooses to flag | Team defined | Source. [fastlane precheck docs](https://docs.fastlane.tools/actions/precheck/) and [the precheck introduction](https://krausefx.com/blog/introducing-fastlane-precheck). The lesson. A large share of rejections are caused by the words in the store listing, not the code. Most of these are cheap to detect with a string scan before submission. ## Community rejection pattern repositories worth mining These open source repositories are real developers documenting the rejections they hit and the fixes that cleared them. They are living lists, and contributions to our playbook can pull from them. | Repository | What it gathers | |---|---| | [aashishtamsya/Appstore-Review-Guidelines](https://github.com/aashishtamsya/Appstore-Review-Guidelines) | A curated pre submission guideline list, including category, location data, platform mentions, and misleading content | | [jaywcjlove/app-rejection-fixes](https://github.com/jaywcjlove/app-rejection-fixes) | Documented rejection reasons paired with the solution that resolved each | | [hnxyzhw/AppStoreReviewsAndRejected](https://github.com/hnxyzhw/AppStoreReviewsAndRejected) | An iOS review and rejection issues summary | | [andrewmcwattersandco/app-store-rejections](https://github.com/andrewmcwattersandco/app-store-rejections) | A community collection of real App Store rejections | | [lukylab/appstore-submission-checklist](https://github.com/lukylab/appstore-submission-checklist) | Practical pre submission checklists for new apps and updates | | [truongduy2611/app-store-preflight-skills](https://github.com/truongduy2611/app-store-preflight-skills) | An AI agent skill that scans iOS and macOS projects for rejection patterns before submission, the same idea as this playbook's skill | | [github/awesome-copilot apple-appstore-reviewer](https://github.com/github/awesome-copilot/blob/main/skills/apple-appstore-reviewer/SKILL.md) | A published reviewer persona skill for an AI coding tool | The pattern. The whole industry keeps relearning the same rejections in private. Capturing them in one open playbook with an automated guard is the gap this project fills. ## Google Play pre-launch report. The built in open check When an app bundle is uploaded to a testing or production track, Google installs it on real devices in a test lab, launches it, and crawls it for several minutes. The pre-launch report is the closest thing Google has to an automated pre submission check, and it is free to every developer. Treat a clean pre-launch report as a release gate. | Area | What it finds | |---|---| | Stability | Crashes captured by the automated crawl across many real devices | | Compatibility | Use of APIs that are not in the public Android SDK | | Security and privacy | Vulnerabilities in the app and its SDKs that an attacker could exploit | | Accessibility | Accessibility problems surfaced by the crawl | | Performance | Performance issues on the test lab devices | Source. [Pre-launch report help](https://support.google.com/googleplay/android-developer/answer/9842757) and [understand your pre-launch report](https://support.google.com/googleplay/android-developer/answer/9844487). The lesson. Run the closed testing track and read the pre-launch report before production. It catches device specific crashes, non public API use, and security holes that a single device test misses. ## What we adopted into the guard From these open source patterns, the guard and the taxonomy gained metadata level checks that mirror fastlane precheck, in addition to the code level checks already present. - Future functionality language in the listing, such as coming soon, beta, or a promised feature that does not ship in this build. - Negative Apple sentiment, such as naming an iOS bug in the listing. - Other platform mentions, already covered, reinforced here. - Placeholder and test words in shipped resources, already covered. The rest of the precheck rules, such as curse words and copyright date, are documented here as a manual metadata pass, because a safe automated word list belongs in each team's own configuration rather than hard coded in a shared guard. ## The Android side. Google's own and open source tooling The Apple side has fastlane precheck. The Android side has its own equivalents, some from Google itself. | Tool | What it does | |---|---| | Play Policy Insights in Android Studio | Google's own policy lint, surfaced as lint checks in recent Android Studio releases. It flags likely policy issues before you submit, the closest Android equivalent of a pre review check. Source. [Play Policy Insights](https://developer.android.com/studio/publish/insights) | | [google/android-security-lints](https://github.com/google/android-security-lints) | Google's open source security focused custom lint checks, more security oriented and experimental than the built in lint | | Google Play pre-launch report | The test lab crawl on real devices, covered in the section above | Three Android facts worth pinning, gathered from the community checklists. - Target API level. From 31 August 2026, new apps and updates must target Android 16, API level 36, or higher. Below the threshold is an automatic rejection. - The package name, the applicationId, is permanent once published. Choose it carefully. - Enable R8 or ProGuard. It shrinks the app and makes it harder to reverse engineer, which also helps the security review. ## How to use this with fastlane If a team already uses fastlane, wire precheck into the lane before deliver, and keep this playbook for the code level, privacy, and policy checks that precheck does not cover. The two are complementary. precheck guards the words in the listing, this playbook guards the app, the privacy posture, and the submission settings.
- docs/OTHER-STORES.md (7726 bytes)
# Beyond Apple and Google. Other App Stores and the Patterns Worth Adopting The base playbook covers Apple and Google because they carry most of the world's app distribution. But a serious mobile strategy ships to more stores, and those stores publish their own review rules. This document captures what Huawei AppGallery, the Chinese Android stores, Samsung Galaxy Store, Amazon Appstore, the Microsoft Store, and RuStore enforce, then distils the cross cutting patterns worth adopting so the same mistake never repeats on a new store. Sourced from each platform's own developer documentation. Confirm the current detail on the source before relying on it. ## Huawei AppGallery The dominant store on Huawei devices, which ship without Google Mobile Services. The official AppGallery Review Guidelines are organized into four areas. | Area | What it covers | |---|---| | App Information | Metadata, listing accuracy, app name and description | | App Security | Malware, data handling, security review criteria | | App Functions | Functional completeness, no crashes, the app does what it claims | | App Content | Content policy, restricted content, age appropriateness | The pattern that catches Android developers. An app built only against Google Mobile Services breaks on Huawei devices. Push, maps, in app purchase, and location must use Huawei Mobile Services equivalents, or the app fails on review and at runtime. Source. [AppGallery Review Guidelines](https://developer.huawei.com/consumer/en/doc/app/50104). ## The Chinese Android stores (Huawei, Tencent, Xiaomi, OPPO, vivo) China has no single Google Play. Distribution is spread across many stores, and they share a set of national legal gates that have nothing to do with the app's content. Miss any one and the app cannot publish on any of them. | Gate | What it is | |---|---| | MIIT app filing | Mandatory registration of every app with the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, required before publication since 1 September 2023 | | Software Copyright Certificate | Government certification of the app's copyright, required for submission. Government fees run roughly 2,200 to 3,200 CNY | | ICP filing | Every domain the app contacts must hold a valid ICP filing | | Approved hosting | App backends must run on approved Chinese cloud providers | | Domestic legal entity | Only a domestic legal entity can publish. An overseas company sets up a Chinese entity or partners with a licensed distributor | | Processing time | ICP filing alone takes around 20 working days | The pattern. In China the binding constraint is market entry compliance, not the build. A perfect app with no filing, no copyright certificate, and no domestic entity cannot ship. Sources. [AppInChina app filing guide](https://appinchina.co/blog/the-complete-guide-to-chinas-mobile-app-filing/), [TMO Group ICP guide](https://www.tmogroup.asia/insights/china-icp-license/). ## Samsung Galaxy Store | Rule | Trigger | |---|---| | No copying | Copying aspects of a published app | | No in app downloads of other apps | Offering downloads of other apps from inside the app | | No Samsung identifiers | Displaying Samsung identifiers or implying a relationship with Samsung | | Local legal compliance | Not observing the legal requirements and local customs of each country published in | | User generated content | UGC without content filtering, an intellectual property resolution path, and a way for users to report content | Source. [Samsung Galaxy Store distribution guide](https://developer.samsung.com/galaxy-store/distribution-guide.html). ## Amazon Appstore | Rule | Trigger | |---|---| | Real value | An app that is a thin website, song, movie, or book with no added value | | Stability | Fails to launch, crashes frequently, or has obvious defects | | Automated plus manual review | Automated checks for malware and policy, followed by a manual content and functionality review | Amazon publishes a presubmission checklist and test criteria, the same shape as the Apple and Google checklists. Sources. [Amazon presubmission checklist](https://developer.amazon.com/docs/app-submission/presubmission-checklist.html), [Amazon test criteria](https://developer.amazon.com/docs/app-testing/test-criteria.html). ## Microsoft Store | Rule | Trigger | |---|---| | Certification standards | A product that does not meet the Store certification standards | | Useful and a good fit | A product that is not genuinely useful or a good fit for the Store | | Certification report | On failure, Microsoft returns a certification report stating the technical or policy reason | Certification takes up to about three business days. Source. [Avoid common certification failures](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/apps/publish/publish-your-app/avoid-common-certification-failures). ## RuStore (Russia) A state backed Android store that Russian law increasingly requires devices to support. | Rule | Trigger | |---|---| | Language | The app must use Russian or English, or offer a switch to one. Otherwise moderation cannot review it and the request is declined | | Device adaptation | Errors or broken layout on modern devices | | User generated content | UGC without a definition of inappropriate content and pre moderation or complaint based post moderation | | Prohibited permissions | A permission with protection level not for use by third party applications is rejected on upload | | Sensitive permissions | Sensitive permissions need a stated reason per permission | | Security scan | Apps are scanned with Kaspersky plus a manual moderation step. Moderation is usually within about an hour | Source. [RuStore app review guidelines](https://www.rustore.ru/help/en/developers/publishing-and-verifying-apps/requirement-apps). ## The cross cutting patterns we adopt These are the lessons every store teaches, folded back into the way we build for any platform. 1. Market entry is a separate gate from the build. China makes this explicit with app filing, a copyright certificate, ICP filing, and a domestic entity. Before targeting a new market, list its legal gates first. 2. One binary rarely passes every store. Huawei needs Huawei Mobile Services in place of Google Mobile Services. Plan per store SDK swaps from the start. 3. Localization can be a review gate, not a nicety. RuStore declines apps it cannot read. Provide the store's accepted language. 4. Never display or imply a relationship with the store vendor. Samsung bans Samsung identifiers, Apple bans implied Apple endorsement. Treat this as universal. 5. Every store wants a per permission reason. RuStore and Huawei make it explicit. The same minimization and justification discipline serves all stores. 6. Every store returns a reason on rejection. Microsoft's certification report, Apple's Resolution Center, Google's policy email. Read the cited reason, fix that, and reply once. Never blind resubmit. 7. User generated content always needs filtering, reporting, and blocking. Apple, Google, Samsung, and RuStore all require it. Build moderation once and it satisfies every store. 8. Real added value over a thin wrapper is universal. Apple 4.2, Google minimum functionality, and Amazon all reject a thin website in a shell. ## How this feeds the guard The Apple and Google checks stay the core of the automated guard, because they cover the most apps. The patterns above are documented here so that when a project targets Huawei, a Chinese store, Samsung, Amazon, Microsoft, or RuStore, the team applies the matching gate by hand and, where a check is automatable, it can be added to the rejection pattern taxonomy over time. Contributions that add per store detection are welcome.
- docs/PLATFORM-MECHANICS-2026.md (39847 bytes)
# Platform Mechanics Hard Rules (2026). Apple and Android This document covers the platform-mechanics and newer-policy gaps that sit alongside the legal layer ([EU-REGULATORY-2026.md](EU-REGULATORY-2026.md), [GLOBAL-REGULATORY-2026.md](GLOBAL-REGULATORY-2026.md)) and the base rejection maps. These are current, common, and blocking causes that the base playbook did not carry. Every item is dated and sourced. Several dates and versions move, so re-verify against the cited source before relying on a figure. Items that could not be confirmed against a primary source are labelled unverified in the last section. ## 1. Apple platform mechanics ### 1.1 macOS notarization for distribution outside the Mac App Store (HARD) An app distributed with a Developer ID (not through the Mac App Store) must be notarized or Gatekeeper blocks it. The four steps. build with every executable and dylib signed. sign with a Developer ID certificate plus a secure timestamp and the hardened runtime. submit with `xcrun notarytool` and wait for the ticket. staple with `xcrun stapler`. A bare executable cannot be notarized. it is wrapped in a ZIP, DMG, or PKG container first. - The original Developer ID Certification Authority expires on 1 February 2027 and certificates it issued stop working that day. Create a replacement from the Developer ID Certification Authority (G2) and re-sign installer packages before then. [Apple](https://developer.apple.com/news/?id=w4atic4c) - Hardened runtime is a notarization prerequisite (enable the capability and declare the needed entitlements). - The signing form is `codesign --options runtime --timestamp -s "Developer ID Application: NAME (TEAMID)" <App>` (the `--options runtime` flag is the hardened runtime, `--timestamp` is the secure timestamp). - Submit `xcrun notarytool submit <container> --apple-id ... --team-id TEAMID --password <app-specific-password> --wait`, then `xcrun stapler staple <App>`. - What breaks. an app that is not stapled fails to launch on an offline Mac, because Gatekeeper cannot fetch the ticket. an app that is not notarized at all shows the "Apple cannot check it for malicious software" or "app is damaged" dialog and is blocked on stricter policies. Sources. [Apple notarizing macOS software](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/security/notarizing-macos-software-before-distribution), [Apple Developer ID](https://developer.apple.com/developer-id/), [Apple customizing the notarization workflow](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/security/customizing-the-notarization-workflow). ### 1.2 Guideline 4.2 minimum functionality and 4.3 spam or duplicate (HARD, top rejection bucket) - 4.2 Minimum Functionality. an app includes features, content, and UI that lift it beyond a repackaged website. a thin web view or wrapper is rejected. web tech (WebView, React Native) is allowed only when the result feels native and has lasting value. Placeholder or incomplete content that reads as unfinished is rejected. - 4.3(a) Spam or duplicate. apps that provide the same feature set as other apps and only vary in content or language are treated as spam. Submitting multiple similar apps, or repackaging one app many times, triggers this. - 4.3(b) Copycat. cloning or imitating another developer's app. - June 2026 tightening. Apple strengthened 4.3 and named saturated categories (dating, flashlight, sound effects, wallpaper, simple timers, fortune telling). New submissions in these categories are not accepted unless they offer a materially different or improved experience, and Apple may remove existing apps in these categories that are not updated, improved, or attracting customers. Sources. [Apple App Review Guidelines](https://developer.apple.com/app-store/review/guidelines/), [Apple 8 June 2026 guideline update, 4.3(b) clarified with examples](https://developer.apple.com/news/?id=a233fmpw), [MacRumors on the 4.3 saturation tightening](https://www.macrumors.com/2026/06/09/app-store-guidelines-low-quality-apps/). ### 1.3 Reader apps, the External Link Account Entitlement (Guideline 3.1.3(a)) A reader app provides magazines, newspapers, books, audio, music, or video as its primary function. The optional External Link Account Entitlement lets it include one informational link to a developer-owned site to create or manage an account. Conditions to qualify. the eligible content is the primary function. sign-in to an externally-created account. access to previously purchased content when signed in. NO in-app purchase offered while the entitlement is used. no real-time person-to-person services (tutoring, medical, fitness). Link rules, all required. links to a site you own. opens the default browser in a new window, not a web view. https scheme with no query or extra URL parameters. no redirects. defined statically in Info.plist before submission. shown once per page with standard HTML styling. Entitlement identifier `com.apple.developer.storekit.external-link.account` (iOS 16 or later). earlier OS uses Apple's exact modal sheet. Source. [Apple reader apps](https://developer.apple.com/support/reader-apps/). ### 1.4 France ANSSI encryption declaration (beyond ITSAppUsesNonExemptEncryption) Apple's export-compliance documentation matrix. | Encryption in use | Documentation required | |---|---| | Apple OS crypto only | none in App Store Connect | | An industry-standard algorithm not provided by Apple's OS | upload a French encryption declaration in App Store Connect, if distributing in France | | A proprietary algorithm not accepted by IEEE, IETF, or ITU | upload both a US CCATS and the French encryption declaration | The French declaration is required only when distributing on the French App Store, uploaded in App Store Connect, and the authority is ANSSI. Banking and Medical apps are exempt. `ITSAppUsesNonExemptEncryption` in Info.plist avoids re-answering the encryption question each submission. Note. the US annual self-classification report to BIS is an EAR obligation, not an App Store Connect field, so it is an external legal item to track, not a store check. Source. [Apple export compliance documentation for encryption](https://developer.apple.com/help/app-store-connect/reference/export-compliance-documentation-for-encryption/). ### 1.5 Content-rights declaration in App Store Connect (maps to Guideline 5.2) App Store Connect asks, before each submission, whether the app contains, shows, or accesses third-party content. If yes, the developer must hold the rights under the laws of each country the app is available in, and must be able to provide proof of rights to Apple (attach supporting documents in App Review notes). Source. [Apple App Information reference](https://developer.apple.com/help/app-store-connect/reference/app-information/app-information/). ### 1.6 visionOS, watchOS, and tvOS submission specifics - visionOS App Motion. if the app contains movement such as quick turns or sudden camera changes, indicate it in App Store Connect. the product page then shows a motion badge for motion-sensitive users. - visionOS Developer Capture. screenshots and previews use the Developer Capture feature in Reality Composer Pro, not a Control Center screen recording (which is foveated and low resolution). - SDK minimums, effective 28 April 2026. watchOS apps build with the watchOS 26 SDK, tvOS apps with the tvOS 26 SDK, all with Xcode 26, the same deadline as iOS 26 and visionOS 26. - SDK minimums, from April 2027. uploads must be built with the iOS 27, iPadOS 27, tvOS 27, visionOS 27, or watchOS 27 SDK or later. Apple has named the month and not the day, tracked as 1 April 2027 in the deadline data. macOS is not in Apple's list. Xcode 27 shipped as a Release Candidate on 9 September 2026. - App completeness (Guideline 2.1) and the privacy declarations apply to every platform, including watchOS and tvOS. Pull the exact per-device screenshot and asset dimensions live from the App Store Connect screenshot-spec page, as they change per device. The 9 September 2026 update added iPhone Duo (outer display 1398 x 2034, inner display 2007 x 2853), iPhone 18 Pro Max (1260 x 2736), iPhone 18 Pro (1179 x 2556), Apple Watch Ultra 4 (422 x 514), and Apple Watch Series 12 (416 x 496). Since 5 October 2026 App Store Connect accepts iPhone Duo screenshots, and from April 2027 they are required for any app using the iOS 27.1 SDK or later (deadline APPLE-IPHONE-DUO-SCREENSHOTS-REQ). Today the required iPhone size is at least one screenshot for iPhone with Dynamic Island (medium display), 1179 x 2556 or 1206 x 2622 portrait, plus at least one iPad 13 inch screenshot when the app supports iPadOS, and watch screenshots use one size across every localization. Sources. [Apple submit visionOS apps](https://developer.apple.com/visionos/submit/), [Apple SDK minimums 28 April 2026](https://developer.apple.com/news/?id=ueeok6yw), [Apple submissions open for the 27 OS family, April 2027 SDK floor](https://developer.apple.com/news/?id=k1mtkt1k), [App Store Connect screenshot specifications](https://developer.apple.com/help/app-store-connect/reference/app-information/screenshot-specifications), [App Store Connect release notes](https://developer.apple.com/help/app-store-connect/release-notes/). ### 1.7 In-App Events, Custom Product Pages, and the submission-concurrency limit - In-App Events. up to 10 live at a time, up to 15 approved per app, each reviewed as a submission item against the guidelines. - Custom Product Pages. up to 70 additional product-page versions, metadata reviewed independently of an app update and still bound by the guidelines. - Submission concurrency. a platform can have at most two submissions under review at once, one with an app version and one with items (events or custom product pages) that carry no version. - StoreKit External Purchase entitlements are region-gated. the `allowed-regions` entitlement array must match the entitlement Apple granted (EU, and South Korea for external purchase, plus the separate US external-link path). Check the presence and configuration of the entitlement, not the fee math, which is fluid. Sources. [Apple In-App Events](https://developer.apple.com/help/app-store-connect/manage-submissions-to-app-review/submit-an-in-app-event/), [Apple Custom Product Pages](https://developer.apple.com/app-store/custom-product-pages/), [Apple StoreKit external purchase](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/storekit/external-purchase). ### 1.8 iPhone Duo readiness (foldable iPhone, ships 23 October 2026) Deadline ID APPLE-IPHONE-DUO-LAUNCH, tracked in issue #724. iPhone Duo has a 5.4 inch outer display and a 7.6 inch inner display joined by a hinge, a front camera on each, and launches on iOS 27.1. Pre-orders open 16 October 2026 and it ships 23 October 2026. Apple does not require a Duo rebuild to stay on the store, but an app that ignores the form factor looks broken on it. - Build. Apps built with Xcode 26 or earlier run but do not extend under the status bar and camera. Build with Xcode 27.1 (beta from 18 September 2026) and the iOS 27.1 SDK, which ships the iPhone Duo simulator. Test the outer display, the inner display fully open, the inner display partially folded, and each rotation. - Resize, never assume a size. Use size classes (compact width on the outer display, regular width on the inner) and scene or container bounds. Apple says not to use `userInterfaceIdiom` or `UIInterfaceOrientation` for layout decisions, and not to size views from fixed iPhone dimensions or screen dimensions. - Reserved regions. The outer front camera always occludes content, the inner front camera does when active, and the folding region divides the inner display when partially open. System containers (split views, navigation stacks, sheets, alerts, context menus) adapt on their own. Custom views read `ReservedRegion` from the geometry proxy in SwiftUI or the view in UIKit and move content clear of them. `ArrangementView` (SwiftUI) and `UIArrangementViewController` (UIKit) lay out a primary and secondary view around the fold. - Vertical bars. On the outer display, and for trailing views on the inner display, the system presents navigation bars, toolbars, and tab bars vertically on the side. Only bars supplied through `NavigationStack`, `NavigationSplitView`, or a navigation controller get this. A hand-built `UIToolbar`, `UINavigationBar`, or `UITabBar` does not. A toolbar item with a title and no icon, or with a custom view, is never shown vertically, so give every item both an icon and a title. - Same function in every pose. Controls can move or overflow, but the same controls and content stay reachable whether the phone is open or closed. Games may lock orientation but must fill the display as the pose changes. - Camera apps. Opening, closing, or rotating the phone can move the app to the other display and flip which way the active camera faces. Choose cameras by the direction they face. - App Store assets. Screenshot specifications exist (outer 1398 x 2034, inner 2007 x 2853, both orientations). Since 5 October 2026 App Store Connect accepts iPhone Duo optimized apps and Duo screenshots, a product page with Duo screenshots shows a badge that the app is optimized for iPhone Duo, and a preview tool in App Store Connect shows how screenshots and metadata look on Duo. From April 2027 iPhone Duo screenshots are required for any app using the iOS 27.1 SDK or later (the screenshot specification page scopes the rule to that SDK), tracked as APPLE-IPHONE-DUO-SCREENSHOTS-REQ on 1 April 2027 because Apple has named the month only. No Duo-specific App Review guideline has been published, so none is enforced here. Re-check before claiming one. Sources. [Apple Newsroom, iPhone Duo announcement](https://www.apple.com/newsroom/2026/09/apple-unveils-iphone-duo/), [Preparing your app for iPhone Duo](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/technologyoverviews/preparing-your-app-for-iphone-duo), [Designing for iPhone Duo (HIG)](https://developer.apple.com/design/human-interface-guidelines/designing-for-iphone-duo), [Get ready for iPhone Duo](https://developer.apple.com/iphone-duo/), [Prepare and submit your apps for iPhone Duo, 5 October 2026](https://developer.apple.com/news/?id=kkphp5qo), [App Store Connect release notes](https://developer.apple.com/help/app-store-connect/release-notes/), [Screenshot specifications](https://developer.apple.com/help/app-store-connect/reference/app-information/screenshot-specifications). ## 2. Google Play and Android mechanics ### 2.1 Android developer verification (identity, all Android apps including sideloaded) A device-level service checks whether an installed app is registered to a verified developer identity, for all Android apps on certified devices, including sideloaded and alternative-store apps, not only Play Store apps. Timeline. verification opened to all developers in March 2026. the verifier service began auto-installing on devices in June 2026. re
- docs/PRE-SUBMISSION-CHECKLIST.md (18866 bytes)
# Pre Submission Checklist Run this before any upload to App Store Connect or the Play Console. Each item is phrased as a verifiable check. Every box ends in one of two states, checked or marked not applicable. An empty box is a release blocker. Not applicable is allowed one item at a time, and only with a one-line reason written next to the box, for example "N/A. no login, so no demo account" or "N/A. no in app purchases". An item with no reason counts as unchecked. Two items can never be marked not applicable, because every app has them: - The privacy declaration matches what the app really collects at runtime, every SDK included. - A privacy policy URL is published and reachable from inside the app. ## Start here. Two checks, about five minutes These two stop most rejections on both stores. Do them before anything else. - [ ] A working demo account with a live backend is in the review notes, and the login works today. - [ ] The privacy declaration (Apple privacy labels, Google Data Safety form) matches what the app really collects at runtime, every SDK included. Then work down the page. Do Shared first, then the store you ship to. Skip any section whose heading says "if" and does not match your app. The full list is about 100 boxes, so plan an hour for a first pass. ## Shared (both stores) ### Stability and completeness - [ ] The app launches and runs without a crash on a real device, on the oldest supported OS and the newest. - [ ] No placeholder text, lorem ipsum, dummy images, or temporary content anywhere in the build. - [ ] Every link, button, and navigation path works. No dead ends, no broken URLs. - [ ] The production backend is live and reachable for the entire review window. - [ ] A working demo account is provided, or a demo mode exists, for any feature behind login. - [ ] All in app purchases are live, visible, and complete a real transaction in the review build. ### Privacy and data - [ ] A privacy policy is published, reachable from inside the app, and accurate. - [ ] Every data collection has user consent before it happens. - [ ] Every permission has a specific reason string that names the real feature using it. - [ ] Account creating apps offer in app account deletion. - [ ] Users can withdraw consent and the app still works for non core features. - [ ] Every third party SDK and its data behavior is known and declared. ### Mobile Security and Best Practices For a deep-dive reference across platform best practices, see the [mobile security guide](MOBILE-SECURITY-2026.md). - [ ] **Secure Storage:** Sensitive items (session tokens, passwords, keys) are stored securely (iOS Keychain or Android EncryptedSharedPreferences/Keystore) and never in plaintext files, plain SharedPreferences, or unencrypted local databases. - [ ] **Biometrics:** Biometric login (FaceID, TouchID, BiometricPrompt) is crypto-backed, requiring biometric validation to unlock a secure cryptographic key rather than just returning a bypassable boolean. - [ ] **Jailbreak and Root Detection:** Device environment check is implemented locally (and backed by Google Play Integrity on Android) to block or gracefully degrade app features when run on compromised/rooted/jailbroken devices. - [ ] **Certificate Pinning and SSL:** SSL/TLS cleartext traffic is completely disabled. Public key pinning (SPKI hashes, a fingerprint of the server's public key) is implemented on critical endpoints with valid backup pins configured. - [ ] **Backup Exclusion:** Sensitive private directory files (database files, token preferences) are explicitly excluded from automatic iOS iCloud/iTunes backups and Android ADB/Google Drive backups. - [ ] **Deep Link and URL Schemes Verification:** Inputs from deep links, Universal Links, and App Links are treated as untrusted, sanitized, and thoroughly validated. Secure Universal Links (iOS) and verified App Links (Android) are used instead of easily hijackable custom schemes. - [ ] **Secure Auth and Session Flows:** Standard modern flows like OAuth 2.1 or OIDC with PKCE (a one-time proof that stops a stolen login code from being reused) are used without hardcoded client secrets. Session timeouts are enforced, and all local tokens, databases, and caches are thoroughly destroyed on logout or session expiration. ### Metadata and listing - [ ] The app name, description, and screenshots match what the app actually does. - [ ] Screenshots show the app in use, not a splash or login screen. - [ ] Creative assets (product page header, search result art) show the app or its brand, suit all audiences, and carry no prices, discounts, unverifiable claims, or references to other apps (Apple 2.3.14, 16 October 2026). - [ ] No keyword stuffing in the name, subtitle, or description. - [ ] The age or content rating questionnaire is answered honestly. - [ ] No references to the other platform or to alternative marketplaces. ### Monetization - [ ] Digital goods use the official store billing. - [ ] Subscription terms, renewal, charges, and cancellation are disclosed before purchase. - [ ] Loot boxes or random rewards disclose odds before purchase. ## Apple specific - [ ] Notes for Review explains every non obvious feature and every in app purchase. - [ ] No hidden, dormant, or undocumented feature, and no remote flag that turns on functionality App Review did not see (Apple 2.5.19, bait-and-switch, 16 October 2026). - [ ] Privacy nutrition labels match the app's real data collection and the SDKs. - [ ] App Tracking Transparency prompt is implemented before any cross app tracking. - [ ] Third party social login is paired with an equal privacy preserving alternative such as Sign in with Apple. - [ ] No private APIs, no deprecated frameworks, current OS support. - [ ] No downloaded code that changes app features. Server side changes are data, not code. - [ ] Background modes declared match what the app actually does. - [ ] The new age rating questionnaire (13 plus, 16 plus, 18 plus) is answered for every app. - [ ] Any AI feature that can produce sensitive content has an age restriction. - [ ] Any personal data shared with a third party AI has a consent modal naming the provider and data types. - [ ] Regulated category apps are submitted under the legal entity and geo restricted where required. - [ ] App name is 30 characters or fewer. - [ ] App Review contact phone number is in international format with the country code, for example +852, not digits only. - [ ] The first consumable, first non-consumable, first auto-renewable subscription, and first non-renewing subscription are each submitted together with a new app version, never added on their own to an already approved version. - [ ] Screenshots include at least one for iPhone with Dynamic Island (medium display), at least one iPad 13 inch screenshot if the app supports iPadOS, and, for watch apps, one Apple Watch size used consistently across every localization, checked against the current App Store Connect specification page. - [ ] iPhone Duo (APPLE-IPHONE-DUO-LAUNCH, ships 23 October 2026). Built with Xcode 27.1 and the iOS 27.1 SDK, and checked in the Duo simulator on the outer display, the inner display open, and the inner display partially folded, in each rotation. - [ ] iPhone Duo screenshots uploaded in App Store Connect (accepted since 5 October 2026, they earn the optimized for iPhone Duo badge). From April 2027 they are required for any app using the iOS 27.1 SDK or later (APPLE-IPHONE-DUO-SCREENSHOTS-REQ). - [ ] iPhone Duo layout. Layout comes from size classes and scene bounds, never `userInterfaceIdiom`, `UIInterfaceOrientation`, or fixed screen sizes. Custom views stay clear of reserved regions (cameras and the fold). - [ ] iPhone Duo bars. Navigation bars, toolbars, and tab bars come from the system navigation containers, and every toolbar item has both an icon and a title so it can present vertically. - [ ] The build meets the SDK floor. the 26 SDKs today, the 27 SDKs from April 2027. ## Google Play specific - [ ] The Data Safety form matches the app's real runtime data behavior, including every SDK. This is the top rejection cause. - [ ] Every sensitive permission has a qualifying core use case and the required declaration. - [ ] Background location, all files access, SMS, call log, and AccessibilityService each map to a visible core feature, or are removed. - [ ] The app targets the current required Android API level. - [ ] For a new personal developer account, the closed test of at least 12 testers over 14 consecutive days is complete. - [ ] Play Billing is used for in app digital goods. - [ ] The IARC content rating questionnaire is complete. - [ ] The listing makes no claim the app cannot deliver. - [ ] Apps for children follow the Families policy and use only Families certified ad SDKs. ## EU specific (legal layer, if the app reaches EU users) Passing App Review does not make an app EU-legal. The full hard rules and sources are in the [EU regulatory guide](EU-REGULATORY-2026.md). - [ ] DSA trader status is declared and verified in App Store Connect. A missing declaration removes the app from the EU App Store (Apple enforced 17 February 2025). - [ ] Any AI feature reaching EU users shows an in-app notice that the user is interacting with AI, at or before first interaction (EU AI Act Article 50(1), in force 2 August 2026). - [ ] AI-generated audio, image, video, or text carries a machine-readable and visible AI-generated marking (Article 50(2) and 50(4)). - [ ] A short AI-literacy record exists for the team building or operating the AI feature (Article 4, live since 2 February 2025). - [ ] No prohibited AI practice ships (manipulation, banned emotion inference, biometric categorisation) (Article 5, live since 2 February 2025). - [ ] Personal data shared with a third-party AI has a consent modal naming the provider and data types, shown before data leaves the device (Apple Guideline 5.1.2(i), 13 November 2025). - [ ] The app meets EN 301 549 and WCAG 2.1 AA and publishes its Annex V accessibility information in the terms and conditions or an equivalent document (European Accessibility Act, Directive (EU) 2019/882 Article 13(2), in force 28 June 2025). VoiceOver labels, Dynamic Type, contrast, and Reduce Motion are covered. - [ ] If the app offers alternative payments or out-of-app offers in the EU, the StoreKit External Purchases or Offers Entitlement is declared, the disclosure sheet is wired, In-App Purchase (when offered) is shown at the same time and at least as prominently, the chosen options stay in place for 12 months, and monthly reporting is wired (DMA, Attachment 14 terms from 1 October 2026). - [ ] Minors are protected on EU alternative payments. Kids category apps and users under the storefront's parental-consent age (13, or higher where set) get alternative processing only behind a parental gate. A Kids category app cannot offer an out-of-app purchase on a website, and users under that age see no out-of-app offers at all. Older minors get both only behind a parental gate. ## Global specific (USA and other markets, if the app reaches those users) The full hard rules and sources are in the [global regulatory guide](GLOBAL-REGULATORY-2026.md). This is legal, on top of App Review. Several dates are under active litigation, so re-verify each against the cited source. - [ ] Child-directed or under-13 data. COPPA verifiable parental consent, a separate opt-in for ad or third-party disclosure, a written retention policy and a written security program (general compliance date 22 April 2026). - [ ] US state App Store Accountability Acts (Utah, Texas, Louisiana, Alabama). the app requests an age category from the store, confirms parental consent for a minor, and re-requests on a major change, wired through the Declared Age Range API (iOS) or the Play Age Signals API (Android, ensuring strict ToS compliance prohibiting ads, marketing, user profiling, or analytics use of age data). - [ ] Age rating set to 4-plus, 9-plus, 13-plus, 16-plus, or 18-plus, never Unrated, questionnaire re-answered by 31 January 2026. - [ ] US storefront external links are allowed with no entitlement and no disclosure sheet, no in-app alternative payment, and the commission question is treated as unsettled. - [ ] California and US state privacy. a privacy policy, notice at collection, know, delete, correct, "Do Not Sell or Share", "Limit Use of Sensitive PI", and honoring Global Privacy Control. - [ ] Biometric. written consent before capture, a public retention and destruction schedule, and no sale (Illinois BIPA, Texas CUBI). - [ ] Health app. the HIPAA gate, else the FTC Health Breach Notification Rule with a 60-day breach notice. - [ ] 18-plus download gating handled for Brazil, Australia, and Singapore for the Apple block of 24 February 2026, and Google Play's Digital ECA age-assurance rollout for Brazil via the Play Age Signals API starting 17 March 2026. - [ ] UK Online Safety Act Highly Effective Age Assurance and the Children's-Code defaults for a likely-child service. - [ ] Australia under-16 age assurance for an age-restricted social media platform. - [ ] South Korea Korea-only binary with an approved payment provider if alternative billing is used. - [ ] China MIIT app filing with a local entity, plus PIPL and a Banhao license for a game. ## Platform mechanics gate (both stores, if the item applies) The full detail with dated sources is in the [platform mechanics guide](PLATFORM-MECHANICS-2026.md). These are current, common, blocking causes the base maps did not carry. Apple. - [ ] macOS app distributed outside the Mac App Store is Developer ID signed with the hardened runtime, notarized with `notarytool`, and stapled with `stapler`. - [ ] Not a thin wrapper (Guideline 4.2) and not a duplicate, clone, or un-differentiated saturated-category app (Guideline 4.3, tightened June 2026). - [ ] Reader app using the External Link Account Entitlement meets every 3.1.3(a) condition and link rule, and offers no in-app purchase while the entitlement is used. - [ ] France ANSSI encryption declaration uploaded in App Store Connect if the app uses non-exempt encryption and ships on the French App Store. - [ ] App Store Connect content-rights question answered, with proof of rights available for any third-party content. - [ ] visionOS App Motion declared, and watchOS and tvOS built with the platform-26 SDK and Xcode 26 by 28 April 2026. - [ ] Fixed-odds betting apps distributed in Brazil provide a valid Secretariat of Prizes and Bets (SPA) license in the App Review Information, set the Brazil age rating to A18 via the questionnaire, and are submitted under a new app version for verification (since May 8, 2026). Android. - [ ] Developer identity verified if the app is distributed to Brazil, Indonesia, Singapore, or Thailand (required since 30 September 2026), and every Play package name registered in Play Console. - [ ] Every foreground service declares `foregroundServi
- docs/PRIVACY-POLICY-MIGRATION.md (16904 bytes)
<!-- PRIVACY_POLICY_MONITOR_START --> > **Simulated output, not live announcements.** This file was generated from sample > announcements (the built-in set, the default, or a file passed with `--mock`). The titles, > publish dates, and descriptions below are examples that show the shape of a migration > report, not real publications. Only the linked official documentation URLs are real. > Re-run the monitor with `--live` against the real feeds before treating anything here > as an actual requirement. # Mobile and Web Privacy Requirements Migration & Requirements Report This report is continuously generated and updated by `scripts/monitor-privacy.py` to track privacy compliance areas. ## Monitored Requirements Update Log ### 1. [Advertising ID] App Tracking Transparency Framework Reinforcement - **Published Date**: Wed, 17 Jun 2026 12:00:00 PDT - **Official Resource**: [https://developer.apple.com/app-store/user-privacy-and-data-use](https://developer.apple.com/app-store/user-privacy-and-data-use) - **Verification Status**: Priority 1 (Verified) - **Description**: Developers must display the App Tracking Transparency (ATT) prompt via ATTrackingManager and obtain user permission before collecting the advertising identifier (IDFA) or tracking users across other apps or websites. ### 2. [Advertising ID] Google Play Advertising ID Policy and com.google.android.gms.permission.AD_ID - **Published Date**: Sun, 21 Jun 2026 16:00:00 PDT - **Official Resource**: [https://support.google.com/googleplay/android-developer/answer/6048248](https://support.google.com/googleplay/android-developer/answer/6048248) - **Verification Status**: Priority 1 (Verified) - **Description**: Apps targeting Android 12 or higher that use the Google Play Services Advertising ID must declare the AD_ID permission in their manifest and provide user options to reset or delete the ID. ### 3. [App Tracking Transparency] App Tracking Transparency Framework Reinforcement - **Published Date**: Wed, 17 Jun 2026 12:00:00 PDT - **Official Resource**: [https://developer.apple.com/app-store/user-privacy-and-data-use](https://developer.apple.com/app-store/user-privacy-and-data-use) - **Verification Status**: Priority 1 (Verified) - **Description**: Developers must display the App Tracking Transparency (ATT) prompt via ATTrackingManager and obtain user permission before collecting the advertising identifier (IDFA) or tracking users across other apps or websites. ### 4. [Background location] Google Play Restriction on ACCESS_BACKGROUND_LOCATION Permission - **Published Date**: Tue, 23 Jun 2026 18:00:00 PDT - **Official Resource**: [https://support.google.com/googleplay/android-developer/answer/9799150](https://support.google.com/googleplay/android-developer/answer/9799150) - **Verification Status**: Priority 1 (Verified) - **Description**: Google Play strictly limits background location access. Developers must justify that background location is crucial to the app's core feature, and provide a clear prominent disclosure to the user. ### 5. [Cookie consent] ePrivacy Directive Cookie Consent Banner Requirements - **Published Date**: Fri, 26 Jun 2026 21:00:00 PDT - **Official Resource**: [https://commission.europa.eu/cookies_en](https://commission.europa.eu/cookies_en) - **Verification Status**: Priority 1 (Verified) - **Description**: Websites targeting EU users must present a compliant Cookie Consent banner that blocks non-essential cookies (such as marketing or analytics) until explicit, active consent is granted. ### 6. [Data Safety] Google Play Store Data Safety Form Compliance Verification - **Published Date**: Fri, 19 Jun 2026 14:00:00 PDT - **Official Resource**: [https://support.google.com/googleplay/android-developer/answer/10787469](https://support.google.com/googleplay/android-developer/answer/10787469) - **Verification Status**: Priority 1 (Verified) - **Description**: Google Play enforces strict validation of the Data Safety section. Submissions are dynamically scanned for compiled libraries and network activities to verify they align with the declared Data Safety form. ### 7. [GDPR] European Union General Data Protection Regulation Enforcement Guidelines - **Published Date**: Thu, 25 Jun 2026 20:00:00 PDT - **Official Resource**: [https://www.edpb.europa.eu/our-work-tools/general-guidance/guidelines-recommendations-best-practices_en](https://www.edpb.europa.eu/our-work-tools/general-guidance/guidelines-recommendations-best-practices_en) - **Verification Status**: Priority 1 (Verified) - **Description**: The EDPB issues guidance on valid GDPR consent. Processing EU residents' personal data requires explicit opt-in, clear information, data portability, and a functional right to be forgotten (data erasure). ### 8. [GDPR] Secure Client-Side Local Storage Guidelines under GDPR - **Published Date**: Sat, 27 Jun 2026 22:00:00 PDT - **Official Resource**: [https://commission.europa.eu/law/law-topic/data-protection_en](https://commission.europa.eu/law/law-topic/data-protection_en) - **Verification Status**: Priority 1 (Verified) - **Description**: Stashing unencrypted sensitive information, JWT tokens, or credentials in local web storage (localStorage) is highly discouraged. Stored data must respect user consent and remain protected from cross-site scripting (XSS) extraction. ### 9. [GDPR] Unverified Industry Blog Rumors on GDPR Fines - **Published Date**: Wed, 01 Jul 2026 11:00:00 PDT - **Official Resource**: [https://randomblogsite.com/gdpr-rumor](https://randomblogsite.com/gdpr-rumor) - **Verification Status**: Priority 4 (Unverified) - **Description**: A random industry blog claims GDPR rules are being changed next week to fine all websites without an immediate dark mode. This is an unverified blog post. ### 10. [Health permissions] Google Play Health Connect Integration and Fitness Permissions - **Published Date**: Wed, 24 Jun 2026 19:00:00 PDT - **Official Resource**: [https://support.google.com/googleplay/android-developer/answer/12253906](https://support.google.com/googleplay/android-developer/answer/12253906) - **Verification Status**: Priority 1 (Verified) - **Description**: Accessing health or fitness data via Health Connect requires specialized developer declarations in the Play Console, a detailed health privacy policy, and prominent in-app disclosures. ### 11. [IndexedDB] IndexedDB Structured Client-Side Databases and User Consent Control - **Published Date**: Sun, 28 Jun 2026 23:00:00 PDT - **Official Resource**: [https://commission.europa.eu/law/law-topic/data-protection_en](https://commission.europa.eu/law/law-topic/data-protection_en) - **Verification Status**: Priority 1 (Verified) - **Description**: Large-scale offline or structured data stored locally in browser IndexedDB instances must follow user privacy preferences, use encryption where sensitive data is involved, and perform cleanups upon logout. ### 12. [Local storage] Secure Client-Side Local Storage Guidelines under GDPR - **Published Date**: Sat, 27 Jun 2026 22:00:00 PDT - **Official Resource**: [https://commission.europa.eu/law/law-topic/data-protection_en](https://commission.europa.eu/law/law-topic/data-protection_en) - **Verification Status**: Priority 1 (Verified) - **Description**: Stashing unencrypted sensitive information, JWT tokens, or credentials in local web storage (localStorage) is highly discouraged. Stored data must respect user consent and remain protected from cross-site scripting (XSS) extraction. ### 13. [Privacy Manifest] Apple Mandatory Privacy Manifest Requirements for App Store Submissions - **Published Date**: Mon, 15 Jun 2026 10:00:00 PDT - **Official Resource**: [https://developer.apple.com/support/privacy-manifest-files](https://developer.apple.com/support/privacy-manifest-files) - **Verification Status**: Priority 1 (Verified) - **Description**: Apple enforces mandatory Privacy Manifests (PrivacyInfo.xcprivacy) for all newly submitted apps and third-party SDK updates. The manifest must accurately declare data collection, tracking domains, and required reason API usage. ### 14. [Privacy Manifest] Apple Stricter Required Reason API Usage Guidelines - **Published Date**: Tue, 16 Jun 2026 11:00:00 PDT - **Official Resource**: [https://developer.apple.com/documentation/bundleresources/privacy_manifest_files/describing_use_of_required_reason_api](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/bundleresources/privacy_manifest_files/describing_use_of_required_reason_api) - **Verification Status**: Priority 1 (Verified) - **Description**: To prevent fingerprinting, Apple requires developers to specify approved reason codes in their Privacy Manifest if they access designated Required Reason APIs, such as UserDefaults, file timestamps, system uptime, and disk space. ### 15. [Privacy Nutrition Labels] Apple App Store Privacy Nutrition Labels Questionnaire Update - **Published Date**: Thu, 18 Jun 2026 13:00:00 PDT - **Official Resource**: [https://developer.apple.com/app-store/app-privacy-details](https://developer.apple.com/app-store/app-privacy-details) - **Verification Status**: Priority 1 (Verified) - **Description**: Apple requires developers to complete the self-reported Privacy Nutrition Labels in App Store Connect. All declared data collection and usage practices must match actual in-app behaviors. ### 16. [Required Reason APIs] Apple Mandatory Privacy Manifest Requirements for App Store Submissions - **Published Date**: Mon, 15 Jun 2026 10:00:00 PDT - **Official Resource**: [https://developer.apple.com/support/privacy-manifest-files](https://developer.apple.com/support/privacy-manifest-files) - **Verification Status**: Priority 1 (Verified) - **Description**: Apple enforces mandatory Privacy Manifests (PrivacyInfo.xcprivacy) for all newly submitted apps and third-party SDK updates. The manifest must accurately declare data collection, tracking domains, and required reason API usage. ### 17. [Required Reason APIs] Apple Stricter Required Reason API Usage Guidelines - **Published Date**: Tue, 16 Jun 2026 11:00:00 PDT - **Official Resource**: [https://developer.apple.com/documentation/bundleresources/privacy_manifest_files/describing_use_of_required_reason_api](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/bundleresources/privacy_manifest_files/describing_use_of_required_reason_api) - **Verification Status**: Priority 1 (Verified) - **Description**: To prevent fingerprinting, Apple requires developers to specify approved reason codes in their Privacy Manifest if they access designated Required Reason APIs, such as UserDefaults, file timestamps, system uptime, and disk space. ### 18. [Runtime permissions] Android Runtime Permission Model and Dynamic Checks - **Published Date**: Mon, 22 Jun 2026 17:00:00 PDT - **Official Resource**: [https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) - **Verification Status**: Priority 1 (Verified) - **Description**: Android runtime permissions must be requested dynamically when the app accesses sensitive capabilities like camera, contacts, or storage. Rationale must be explained before requesting the permission. ### 19. [Session storage] Temporary Browser Session Storage Security Recommendations - **Published Date**: Mon, 29 Jun 2026 09:00:00 PDT - **Official Resource**: [https://commission.europa.eu/law/law-topic/data-protection_en](https://commission.europa.eu/law/law-topic/data-protection_en) - **Verification Status**: Priority 1 (Verified) - **Description**: Data kept in sessionStorage must be handled securely, ensuring sensitive credentials are not exposed to untrusted scripts, and are thoroughly purged once the user closes the tab or logs out. ### 20. [Tracking technologies] Tracking Technologies, Scripts, and Invisible Pixels Consent Management - **Published Date**: Tue, 30 Jun 2026 10:00:00 PDT - **Official Resource**: [https://www.edpb.europa.eu/our-work-tools/general-guidance/guidelines-recommendations-best-practices_en](https://www.edpb.europa.eu/our-work-tools/general-guidance/guidelines-recommendations-best-practices_en) - **Verification Status**: Priority 1 (Verified) - **Description**: Third-party analytical scripts (Google Analytics, Facebook Pixel, Hotjar) must be explicitly controlled and completely disabled by default until the user accepts cookie or tracking preferences. ### 21. [User Data Policy] Google Play User Data Protection and Deletion Policy - **Published Date**: Sat, 20 Jun 2026 15:00:00 PDT - **Official Resource**: [https://support.google.com/googleplay/android-developer/answer/9899234](https://support.google.com/googleplay/android-developer/answer/9899234) - **Verification Status**: Priority 1 (Verified) - **Description**: Google Play User Data policy requires prominent disclosures and explicit user consent before collecting any personal or sensitive data. Apps with in-app account creation must offer an in-app and web account deletion option. ### 22. [User Data Policy] Google Play Restriction on ACCESS_BACKGROUND_LOCATION Permission - **Published Date**: Tue, 23 Jun 2026 18:00:00 PDT - **Official Resource**: [https://support.google.com/googleplay/android-developer/answer/9799150](https://support.google.com/googleplay/android-developer/answer/9799150) - **Verification Status**: Priority 1 (Verified) - **Description**: Google Play strictly limits background location access. Developers must justify that background location is crucial to the app's core feature, and provide a clear prominent disclosure to the user. ## Automated Migration Recommendations & Implementation Tasks ### Tasks for Advertising ID - **Regulatory Impact**: High priority compliance area. - [ ] **Task 1**: Configure the AD_ID permission in AndroidManifest and handle user opt-outs. ### Tasks for App Tracking Transparency - **Regulatory Impact**: High priority compliance area. - [ ] **Task 1**: Prompt users via ATTrackingManager before fetching advertising IDs. - [ ] **Task 2**: Fill out NSUserTrackingUsageDescription in Info.plist. ### Tasks for Background location - **Regulatory Impact**: High priority compliance area. - [ ] **Task 1**: Ensure background location is backed by a prominent in-app disclosure view. ### Tasks for Cookie consent - **Regulatory Impact**: High priority compliance area. - [ ] **Task 1**: Deploy a cookie banner that halts non-essential cookie writes by default. ### Tasks for Data Safety - **Regulatory Impact**: High priority compliance area. - [ ] **Task 1**: Conduct a dependency audit for Google Play Data Safety alignment. ### Tasks for GDPR - **Regulatory Impact**: High priority compliance area. - [ ] **Task 1**: Provide opt-in controls and account deletion pathways for EU users. ### Tasks for GDPR (BLOCKED: Announcement source is unverified) - **Regulatory Status**: Suspended. Source is an unverified Priority 4/5 secondary source. ### Tasks for Health permissions - **Regulatory Impact**: High priority
- docs/questions.md (215337 bytes)
--- title: App Store and Google Play compliance questions description: Every answered question, fix recipe, guide and deadline from the App Store Compliance Playbook discussions. --- # App Store and Google Play compliance questions An index of 1278 answered discussions on App Store and Google Play rejections, privacy manifests, Data safety, payments, account deletion and regulatory deadlines. Each link opens the full answer on GitHub. ## Questions and answers (688) - [AI and generative apps apps on the App Store and Google Play. What do reviewers expect for 'A consent modal naming the AI provider and the data types before any personal data is sent to a third party AI'?](https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance/discussions/2165) - [AI and generative apps apps on the App Store and Google Play. What do reviewers expect for 'A reviewer demo account needs a high or unlimited quota so the feature can be exercised'?](https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance/discussions/2170) - [AI and generative apps apps on the App Store and Google Play. What do reviewers expect for 'AI generated content counts toward the age rating, and a model that can produce sensitive content needs an age restricti'?](https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance/discussions/2164) - [AI and generative apps apps on the App Store and Google Play. What do reviewers expect for 'In a China storefront, references to external AI services such as ChatGPT or Gemini can trigger a regional rejection'?](https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance/discussions/2169) - [AI and generative apps apps on the App Store and Google Play. What do reviewers expect for 'Moderation, reporting, and blocking on AI output, the same as user content'?](https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance/discussions/2166) - [AI and generative apps apps on the App Store and Google Play. What do reviewers expect for 'Not a thin wrapper over a third party model with no added value'?](https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance/discussions/2168) - [AI and generative apps apps on the App Store and Google Play. What do reviewers expect for 'Self harm and crisis safeguards for a companion or character AI'?](https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance/discussions/2167) - [Age-restricted social media platforms must stop under-16s in Australia holding accounts. What do I need to prove before release?](https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance/discussions/1677) - [All apps on the App Store and Google Play. What do reviewers expect for 'Account deletion'?](https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance/discussions/2130) - [All apps on the App Store and Google Play. What do reviewers expect for 'Data declaration'?](https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance/discussions/2128) - [All apps on the App Store and Google Play. What do reviewers expect for 'Demo account and live backend'?](https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance/discussions/2123) - [All apps on the App Store and Google Play. What do reviewers expect for 'Export compliance'?](https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance/discussions/2131) - [All apps on the App Store and Google Play. What do reviewers expect for 'Metadata'?](https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance/discussions/2129) - [All apps on the App Store and Google Play. What do reviewers expect for 'Permissions'?](https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance/discussions/2126) - [All apps on the App Store and Google Play. What do reviewers expect for 'Privacy manifest'?](https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance/discussions/2127) - [All apps on the App Store and Google Play. What do reviewers expect for 'Privacy policy'?](https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance/discussions/2125) - [All apps on the App Store and Google Play. What do reviewers expect for 'Review notes'?](https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance/discussions/2124) - [All apps on the App Store and Google Play. What do reviewers expect for 'Stability'?](https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance/discussions/2122) - [Am I an AI Act provider or deployer if my app calls another company's model?](https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance/discussions/2292) - [App Store and Google Play rejection. Broken support, marketing, or privacy URL in the listing. How do I fix it?](https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance/discussions/1290) - [App Store and Google Play rejection. Device fingerprinting to track users. How do I fix it?](https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance/discussions/1262) - [App Store and Google Play rejection. Generative AI output without moderation or safeguards. How do I fix it?](https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance/discussions/1254) - [App Store and Google Play rejection. Metadata field overflow or banned decoration. How do I fix it?](https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance/discussions/1274) - [App Store and Google Play rejection. Missing EU GPSR manufacturer info or product safety warning disclosures. How do I fix it?](https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance/discussions/1266) - [App Store and Google Play rejection. Missing legal representative or emergency data-production response procedures for the EU e-Evidence Package. How do I fix it?](https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance/discussions/1258) - [App Store and Google Play rejection. Missing store age-signal integration for US state ASAA duties. How do I fix it?](https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance/discussions/1411) - [App Store and Google Play rejection. Prominent contract withdrawal button or function missing for EU consumer contracts. How do I fix it?](https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance/discussions/1298) - [App Store and Google Play rejection. Random reward mechanic without disclosed odds. How do I fix it?](https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance/discussions/1270) - [App Store and Google Play rejection. Sensitive tokens or credentials stored in insecure unencrypted formats. How do I fix it?](https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance/discussions/1282) - [App Store and Google Play rejection. Subscription cancellation requires a phone call, mail, or in-person visit while sign-up is a single tap. How do I fix it?](https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance/discussions/1286) - [App Store and Google Play rejection. Third party SDK violates policy on the developer's behalf. How do I fix it?](https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance/discussions/1278) - [App Store and Google Play rejection. Unsafe or unvalidated custom deep link URL schemes used for sensitive operations. How do I fix it?](https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance/discussions/1294) - [App Store rejection. Account based app without demo credentials. How do I fix it?](https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance/discussions/1097) - [App Store rejection. Account creation without in app account deletion. How do I fix it?](https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance/discussions/1182) - [App Store rejection. Account deletion is a mailto or deactivate only flow. How do I fix it?](https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance/discussions/1230) - [App Store rejection. App that facilitates human trafficking or the exploitation of children. How do I fix it?](https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance/discussions/1479) - [App Store rejection. Apple device image or Apple trademark in the icon or screenshots. How do I fix it?](https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance/discussions/1202) - [App Store rejection. Backend points at staging or localhost. How do I fix it?](https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance/discussions/1112) - [App Store rejection. CI pipeline calls a removed App Store Connect API age-rating endpoint. How do I fix it?](https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance/discussions/1440) - [App Store rejection. Capacitor/Cordova plugin wrapping a native SDK with no PrivacyInfo.xcprivacy. How do I fix it?](https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance/discussions/1371) - [App Store rejection. Color Contrast and system settings ignored. How do I fix it?](https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance/discussions/1206) - [App Store rejection. Creative asset with pricing, unverifiable claims, or misleading references. How do I fix it?](https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance/discussions/1475) - [App Store rejection. Debug or test features shipped in the production build. How do I fix it?](https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance/discussions/1092) - [App Store rejection. Declared Age Range used without handling RESCIND_CONSENT. How do I fix it?](https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance/discussions/1428) - [App Store rejection. Deprecated UIWebView symbol statically linked. How do I fix it?](https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance/discussions/1375) - [App Store rejection. Device frames around the app in a preview video. How do I fix it?](https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance/discussions/1137) - [App Store rejection. Digital goods sold outside in app purchase. How do I fix it?](https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance/discussions/1152) - [App Store rejection. Dynamic Type support missing or overridden. How do I fix it?](https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance/discussions/1210) - [App Store rejection. Entitlements declared but not used. How do I fix it?](https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance/discussions/1142) - [App Store rejection. External AI service references in a China storefront. How do I fix it?](https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance/discussions/1305) - [App Store rejection. External purchase link shown on every storefront. How do I fix it?](https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance/discussions/1431) - [App Store rejection. Flutter plugin touches required-reason APIs with no PrivacyInfo.xcprivacy. How do I fix it?](https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance/discussions/1309) - [App Store rejection. Generic or empty permission purpose string. How do I fix it?](https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance/discussions/1190) - [App Store rejection. Haptics tactile feedback missing on interactions. How do I fix it?](https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance/discussions/1214) - [App Store rejection. Hidden, dormant, or undocumented feature, or bait-and-switch after review. How do I fix it?](https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance/discussions/1477) - [App Store rejection. Intel-only macOS binary with Rosetta ending after macOS 26 or macOS 27. How do I fix it?](https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance/discussions/1443) - [App Store rejection. Keyboard navigation and focus state support missing. How do I fix it?](https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance/discussions/1218) - [App Store rejection. Launch planned before the developer account is active. How do I fix it?](https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance/discussions/1473) - [App Store rejection. Live Activities used for promotional or unsolicited messages. How do I fix it?](https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance/discussions/1434) - [App Store rejection. Metadata names an iOS bug or references Apple negatively. How do I fix it?](https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance/discussions/1132) - [App Store rejection. Metadata promises features that do not ship in this build. How do I fix it?](https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance/discussions/1127) - [App Store rejection. Missing Brazilian fixed-odds betting license. How do I fix it?](https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance/discussions/1238) - [App Store rejection. Missing Privacy Nutrition Labels data type declarations. How do I fix it?](https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance/discussions/1246) - [App Store rejection. Missing encryption declaration leaves the build in Missing Compliance. How do I fix it?](https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance/discussions/1234) - [App Store rejection. Missing privacy policy. How do I fix it?](https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance/discussions/1174) - [App Store rejection. New 2026 age rating questionnaire not answered. How do I fix it?](https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance/discussions/1117) - [App Store rejection. Non consumable purchase without a Restore Purchases control. How do I fix it?](https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance/discussions/1250) - [App Store rejection. On-Demand Resources still in use. How do I fix it?](https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance/discussions/1437) - [App Store rejection. Personal data shared with third party AI without consent modal. How do I fix it?](https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance/discussions/1194) - [App Store rejection. Placeholder content in the build. How do I fix it?](https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance/discussions/1102) - [App Store rejection. Private API or deprecated framework use. How do I fix it?](https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance/discussions/1147) - [App Store rejection. React Native native module touches required-reason APIs with no PrivacyInfo.xcprivacy. How do I fix it?](https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance/discussions/1383) - [App Store rejection. Reduce Motion accessibility setting ignored. How do I fix it?](https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance/discussions/1222) - [App Store rejection. Reference to other platform or marketplace. How do I fix it?](https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance/discussions/1122) - [App Store rejection. Required reason APIs or third party SDKs without a privacy manifest. How do I fix it?](https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance/discussions/1242) - [App Store rejection. Requiring personal data not relevant to core functionality. How do I fix it?](https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance/discussions/1186) - [App Store rejection. Review notes missing a required section for a new submission. How do I fix it?](https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance/discussions/1107) - [App Store rejection. Sensitive framework linked without a usage description. How do I fix it?](https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance/discussions/1178) - [App Store rejection. Sign in with Apple UX violation. How do I fix it?](https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance/discussions/1162) - [App Store rejection. Sign in with Apple relay addresses on private.icloud.com rejected by email validation. How do I fix it?](https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance/discussions/1425) - [App Store rejection. Social media capability not declared before submission. How do I fix it?](https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance/discussions/1422) - [App Store rejection. Subscription shows the per month price more prominently than the billed amount. How do I fix it?](https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance/discussions/1157) - [App Store rejection. Thin WebView wrapper with insufficient native functionality. H
- docs/REGULATORY-GAP-REPORT-2026.md (25533 bytes)
# Global and Regional Regulatory Compliance Gap Report (2026) This report audits the playbook itself. It takes six regulations that bind app developers shipping into the EU and the US, and checks honestly how far this repository already carries each one, what it only mentions in passing, and what it does not cover at all. Read it as a work list for the playbook, not as legal advice for your company. Where it says something is missing, it means missing from this repository. Each framework is checked across eight angles, which are policy, documentation, code, disclosure, logging, testing, evidence, and audit trail. ## Source trust hierarchy and methodology All analysis and cited legal frameworks within this report adhere to the strict source trust hierarchy. - Priority 1 (Official Primary): European Commission, EUR-Lex, Official Journal of the European Union, ENISA, EDPB, FTC, NIST, CISA, ICO, and official government publications. - Priority 2 (Reputable News Agencies): Reuters, AP (Associated Press), Bloomberg. - Priority 3 (Academic Publications): Academic papers and peer-reviewed journals. - Priority 4 (Industry Publications): Industry blogs and vendor publications. - Priority 5 (Social and Unverified): LinkedIn, Reddit, Twitter, and AI generated summaries. No Priority 4 or Priority 5 sources are relied upon unless corroborated traceably by Priority 1 publications. In line with repository guidelines, this document is 100% emoji-free and contains no emoticons or graphical symbols of any kind. --- ## 1. EU General Product Safety Regulation (GPSR) ### 1.1 Regulatory Overview and Background The EU General Product Safety Regulation (GPSR), Regulation (EU) 2023/988, entered into force on 12 June 2023 and became fully applicable on 13 December 2024. It replaces the old General Product Safety Directive (2001/95/EC) to address the safety challenges of online marketplaces, digital products, and complex supply chains. The GPSR applies to all non-food consumer products placed on the EU market, both offline and online. For digital systems and software, the GPSR mandates that online marketplaces and e-commerce applications clearly display product safety warnings, instructions, manufacturer and importer identity, and contact details directly on the online interface. Official Citation: Regulation (EU) 2023/988 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 May 2023 on general product safety. ### 1.2 Comprehensive Gap Analysis Across the Eight Compliance Categories - **Missing Policy:** The playbook gives a developer no way to decide whether their listing falls inside Regulation (EU) 2023/988, and no template policy to hand a client who asks. - **Missing Documentation:** The repository is missing specific developer checklists, guides, or instructional manuals on how to structure online product listings to display GPSR-mandated safety warnings, manufacturer details, and technical instructions. - **Missing Code:** The automated compliance guard and detection recipes lack any rules or patterns to scan codebase files for GPSR-related elements. Additionally, mock user interfaces and templates in this repository do not contain code blocks for displaying manufacturer identity or product safety warnings on EU storefronts. - **Missing Disclosure:** Online interface templates do not provide placeholder components or guidance for displaying the manufacturer's name, registered trade name or trademark, postal address, and electronic address (such as email or website) as required under Article 19 of the GPSR. - **Missing Logging:** There are no architectural provisions or schemas for logging product safety incidents, recalls, or corrective actions. The repository fails to supply templates for a centralized, secure incident log. - **Missing Testing:** No automated tests exist to verify that online interface elements dynamically display required product safety information, manufacturer details, or warning notices based on the user's geographic location. - **Missing Evidence:** The repository lacks physical templates or examples of compliance evidence, such as Technical Documentation sheets, safety risk assessments, or proof of a designated Responsible Person in the EU. - **Missing Audit Trail:** There is no audit trail or historical record system to track when product safety policies were updated, when safety warnings were reviewed, or when corrective measures were implemented in response to a safety alert. ### 1.3 Remediation and Action Plan 1. Establish a written General Product Safety Policy outlining the designation of an EU-based Responsible Person and product classification criteria. 2. Incorporate GPSR-specific metadata requirements (manufacturer address, email, product identifier) into `data/rejection-patterns.json` and `docs/PRE-SUBMISSION-CHECKLIST.md`. 3. Add UI templates in the references directory that demonstrate compliant product detail pages including safety warning labels and electronic contact details. 4. Integrate an automated test runner script that verifies the presence of safety disclosures prior to app submission. --- ## 2. EU e-Evidence Package ### 2.1 Regulatory Overview and Background The EU e-Evidence Package consists of Regulation (EU) 2023/1543 on European Production and Preservation Orders for electronic evidence in criminal matters and Directive (EU) 2023/1544 on the appointment of legal representatives for the purpose of gathering evidence. Adopted in 2023, the mandatory compliance enforcement date is 18 August 2026. This framework allows judicial authorities of an EU Member State to issue European Production Orders (EPOs) or European Preservation Orders directly to service providers offering services in the EU, regardless of where the provider is headquartered. The default compliance window to produce user data is 10 days, but in critical emergency cases, providers are legally required to produce the requested data within a strict 8-hour timeline. Official Citation: Regulation (EU) 2023/1543 and Directive (EU) 2023/1544 of the European Parliament and of the Council. ### 2.2 Comprehensive Gap Analysis Across the Eight Compliance Categories - **Missing Policy:** The playbook carries no template Law Enforcement Request Policy, so a small team receiving an EU judicial order has nothing to start from and no guidance on who may act on it. - **Missing Documentation:** While the repository mentions the e-Evidence Package in general, it lacks concrete operational instructions, runbooks, or detailed manuals for handling 10-day standard orders and 8-hour emergency orders. - **Missing Code:** There are no automated scripts or secure API endpoints in the repository's backend mock implementations to assist in securely exporting, filtering, and packaging user data in response to a valid legal order. - **Missing Disclosure:** Public-facing documentation, including Privacy Policies, fails to explicitly disclose to EU users that their data may be preserved or disclosed to European law enforcement in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2023/1543. - **Missing Logging:** The repository does not contain database schemas or logging systems designed to track incoming law enforcement requests, verification statuses, data access activities, or data releases. - **Missing Testing:** There are no integration tests or validation flows to simulate the rapid 8-hour emergency retrieval and secure packaging of user data under simulated pressure. - **Missing Evidence:** The repository is missing verified templates of European Production Order certificates (EPOC) or European Preservation Order certificates (EPOC-PR) for compliance officers to study and verify. - **Missing Audit Trail:** A secure, unalterable audit trail system to record every administrative interaction, data extraction, and transmission made by compliance officers during a legal request is completely absent. ### 2.3 Remediation and Action Plan 1. Draft and implement a comprehensive Law Enforcement Response Protocol that specifically establishes the roles, responsibilities, and secure communication channels for executing EPOs. 2. Formally designate an EU establishment or legal representative and notify the designated central authority before the 18 August 2026 deadline. 3. Build secure backend scripts to automate the extraction and encryption of requested user datasets, ensuring execution can occur within the 8-hour emergency window. 4. Establish a tamper-proof cryptographic audit trail to log all incoming certificates, verification checks, data extractions, and secure transmissions. --- ## 3. EU Contract Withdrawal Button ### 3.1 Regulatory Overview and Background The Distance Marketing of Financial Services Directive (EU) 2023/2673 amends the Consumer Rights Directive (Directive 2011/83/EU). It requires a prominent, easily accessible withdrawal button or withdrawal function on the online interface for distance contracts for financial services concluded by electronic means. Scope matters here, and it is easy to overstate. The withdrawal button obligation in this Directive attaches to distance financial services contracts, not to every consumer subscription. A general withdrawal button across all distance contracts has been proposed at EU level but is not yet law. Treat it as binding today if your app sells insurance, credit, payment, investment, or another financial service into the EU, and as a strong design default otherwise, since Apple already requires an easy in-app cancellation path regardless. The statutory withdrawal period is 14 days from the conclusion of the contract. The cancellation path must be direct, clear, and at least as simple as the sign-up path. Member States apply these rules from 19 June 2026. Official Citation: Directive (EU) 2023/2673 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 November 2023. ### 3.2 Comprehensive Gap Analysis Across the Eight Compliance Categories - **Missing Policy:** The playbook carries no template policy for the 14 day withdrawal right, and no guidance separating apps that genuinely fall in scope from those adopting it as a design default. - **Missing Documentation:** The repository does not provide UI design guidelines or checklists specifying the placement, size, prominence, and terminology required to make the withdrawal button compliant with EU expectations. - **Missing Code:** The front-end user interface templates and billing mock codes in this repository do not contain any functional implementation of a withdrawal button or withdrawal modal sheet. - **Missing Disclosure:** Subscription registration interfaces do not prominently disclose the 14-day statutory right of withdrawal or provide an in-app link explaining the consequences and terms of contract revocation. - **Missing Logging:** There are no logging mechanisms designed to capture and record when a user clicks the withdrawal button, the timestamp of the request, the confirmation of contract termination, or the initiation of the refund flow. - **Missing Testing:** No automated UI or unit tests exist in the repository to verify that the withdrawal flow can be completed successfully without administrative friction (such as requiring customer service interaction). - **Missing Evidence:** The repository lacks templates of withdrawal forms, cancellation confirmation receipts, or standardized documentation to prove compliance in the event of consumer disputes. - **Missing Audit Trail:** A systematic audit trail tracking the historical cancellation and refund rates, compliance audits of subscription flows, and updates to the cancellation interface is not implemented. ### 3.3 Remediation and Action Plan 1. Formulate a Consumer Cancellation and Refund Policy aligned with the Distance Marketing of Financial Services Directive. 2. Develop a prominent, easily accessible "Withdrawal Button" component within the account settings of all EU-facing subscription templates. 3. Establish robust logging of cancellation requests, timestamps, and refund transactions in a dedicated database schema. 4. Implement automated end-to-end UI tests to verify that the withdrawal button executes a frictionless, self-service contract termination without requiring manual human approval. --- ## 4. US State App Store Accountability Acts (ASAA) ### 4.1 Regulatory Overview and Background The US State App Store Accountability Acts (ASAA) represent a growing wave of state-level legislation (Utah SB 142, Texas SB 2420, Louisiana HB 977, Alabama HB 161) aimed at regulating minors' access to mobile applications, in-app purchases, and content updates. These laws place strict operational obligations on both app stores and mobile application developers. Developers must request and process the user's age category (e.g., via Apple's Declared Age Range API or Google's Play Age Signals API) and obtain verifiable parental consent before allowing minors (under 18 or under 16, depending on the state) to download, purchase digital goods, or access major updates. Furthermore, verified age verification data must be deleted immediately after verification to protect children's privacy. Official Citations: Utah SB 142 (2025), Texas SB 2420 (2025), Louisiana HB 977 (2026), Act No. 185, which replaces HB 570 (2025), Alabama HB 161 (2026). ### 4.2 Comprehensive Gap Analysis Across the Eight Compliance Categories - **Missing Policy:** The playbook has no template minors policy showing how to detect a user in Utah, Texas, Louisiana, or Alabama, and how to handle a minor account once detected. - **Missing Documentation:** The checklists in `docs/PRE-SUBMISSION-CHECKLIST.md` lack precise, step-by-step developer guidelines for integrating Apple's Declared Age Range API and Google's Play Age Signals API within the same multi-platform project. - **Missing Code:** Although the rejection patterns contain entries for state-level laws, the mock client implementations in the codebase do not integrate with `DeclaredAgeRange` or `com.google.android.play:age-signals` to restrict app access dynamically. - **Missing Disclosure:** The in-app onboarding flows do not display required state disclosures explaining that the user's age category is requested to comply with state accountability laws and that parental consent is mandatory for minors. - **Missing Logging:** There is no secure backend system designed to log the receipt of parental consent, consent revocations (such as the `RESCIND_CONSENT` server notification), or the immediate deletion of raw age-verification documents. - **Missing Testing:** The test suites do not include automated integration tests to verify that the application blocks minor accounts from accessing premium features or completing in-app purchases in the absence of valid consent signals. - **Missing Evidence:** The repository does not contain templates or examples of parental consent agreements, identity verification logs
- docs/REGULATORY-TIMELINE.md (168642 bytes)
# Global Regulatory Compliance Timeline This document compiles every registered global regulatory deadline tracking regional, national, and platform requirements. Last compiled: 2026-11-15 08:34:42 UTC ## Active and Approaching Compliance Warnings ### Active / Overdue Deadlines (Action Required) | Priority | Jurisdiction | Law | Requirement | Effective Date | Grace Period | Mandatory Date | Enforcement Date | Overdue Days | Affected Sections | |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| | CRITICAL | Illinois (USA State) | Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA), 740 ILCS 14 | Written notice and release before collecting biometric identifiers, public retention schedule, destruction within 3 years, and no sale. | 2008-06-01 | none | 2008-06-01 | 2008-06-01 | 6741 days | docs/GLOBAL-REGULATORY-2026.md section 2.6, references/rules/privacy.md | | HIGH | United Kingdom (UK) | ICO Age Appropriate Design Code (Children's Code) | High privacy by default, data minimisation, geolocation off, profiling off by default, and a mandatory DPIA. | 2020-09-02 | 12 months | 2021-09-02 | 2021-09-02 | 1900 days | docs/GLOBAL-REGULATORY-2026.md section 3.1, references/rules/privacy.md | | HIGH | South Korea | Telecommunications Business Act | Approved billing providers, 26% commission, com.apple.developer.storekit.external-purchase entitlement, South Korea-only binary, modal sheet, reporting. | 2022-03-15 | none | 2022-03-15 | 2022-03-15 | 1706 days | docs/GLOBAL-REGULATORY-2026.md section 3.5, references/rules/payments.md | | HIGH | European Union (EU) | EU Digital Markets Act (DMA) | Alternative payments and out-of-app offers (StoreKit External Purchases or Offers Entitlement, ExternalPurchaseCustomLink disclosure sheet, In-App Purchase at equal prominence when offered, parental gates for minors, options kept 12 months, monthly transaction reporting). | 2024-03-07 | none | 2024-03-07 | 2024-03-07 | 983 days | docs/EU-REGULATORY-2026.md section 2 | | CRITICAL | China | Mobile App Filing with the MIIT (ICP Extension) | Mandatory Chinese MIIT app filing, local partner/entity, real-name, PIPL privacy, data localization, Banhao license for games. | 2023-09-01 | 7 months | 2024-03-31 | 2024-03-31 | 959 days | docs/GLOBAL-REGULATORY-2026.md section 3.9, references/rules/metadata.md | | HIGH | United States (Federal) | FTC Health Breach Notification Rule, 16 CFR Part 318 | 2024 Final Rule compliance (unauthorized sharing of health/sensitive data with advertisers treated as breach, mandatory 60-day notice). | 2024-06-25 | none | 2024-06-25 | 2024-06-25 | 873 days | docs/GLOBAL-REGULATORY-2026.md section 2.6, references/guidelines/by-app-type/health-fitness-and-medical.md | | HIGH | European Union (EU) | General Product Safety Regulation (GPSR), Regulation (EU) 2023/988 | Display manufacturer identity, electronic and postal contact details, and product safety warnings on the online interface for consumer products. | 2023-06-12 | 18 months | 2024-12-13 | 2024-12-13 | 702 days | docs/REGULATORY-GAP-REPORT-2026.md section 1, references/rules/safety.md | | HIGH | European Union (EU) | EU AI Act, Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 | Article 4 AI Literacy. Providers and deployers must take measures to ensure a sufficient level of AI literacy, proportionate to context. A written policy, induction, and log are pragmatic evidence, not a stated legal mandate. | 2024-08-01 | 6 months | 2025-02-02 | 2025-02-02 | 651 days | docs/EU-REGULATORY-2026.md section 1.3, references/guidelines/by-app-type/ai-and-generative-apps.md | | CRITICAL | European Union (EU) | EU AI Act, Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 | Article 5 Prohibited Practices (ban on subliminal manipulation, child exploitation, social scoring, biometric trait categorization, etc.). | 2024-08-01 | 6 months | 2025-02-02 | 2025-02-02 | 651 days | docs/EU-REGULATORY-2026.md section 1.4, references/guidelines/by-app-type/ai-and-generative-apps.md | | CRITICAL | European Union (EU) | EU Digital Services Act (DSA) | Trader status declaration and verification (D-U-N-S, phone, email publish, 2FA verified) or app removal from EU storefront. | 2024-02-17 | 12 months | 2025-02-17 | 2025-02-17 | 636 days | docs/EU-REGULATORY-2026.md section 3, references/rules/metadata.md | | CRITICAL | Google Play (Global) | Google Play Child Safety Standards Policy | Publish CSAE standards on globally reachable web page, in-app feedback, CSAM response protocol, named child-safety contact. | 2025-03-19 | none | 2025-03-19 | 2025-03-19 | 606 days | docs/PLATFORM-MECHANICS-2026.md section 3.2, references/rules/android.md | | CRITICAL | Google Play (Global) | Google Play Photo and Video Permissions Policy | Broad-access READ_MEDIA_IMAGES/READ_MEDIA_VIDEO restricted to broad-access apps; others must use Android Photo Picker. | 2025-05-28 | none | 2025-05-28 | 2025-05-28 | 536 days | docs/PLATFORM-MECHANICS-2026.md section 2.9, references/rules/android.md | | HIGH | European Union (EU) | European Accessibility Act (EAA), Directive (EU) 2019/882 | Harmonised standard EN 301 549 Chapter 11 / WCAG 2.1 AA mobile accessibility compliance and Annex V accessibility information published in the terms and conditions or an equivalent document (Article 13(2)). | 2022-06-28 | 36 months | 2025-06-28 | 2025-06-28 | 505 days | docs/EU-REGULATORY-2026.md section 4, references/rules/design.md | | CRITICAL | United Kingdom (UK) | UK Online Safety Act 2023 | Highly Effective Age Assurance methods (facial age estimation, open banking, credit-card checks) to protect children from harmful content. | 2025-07-25 | none | 2025-07-25 | 2025-07-25 | 478 days | docs/GLOBAL-REGULATORY-2026.md section 3.1, references/rules/safety.md | | HIGH | European Union (EU) | EU AI Act, Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 | GPAI-model obligations, governance, and penalties (Articles 99 and 100). | 2024-08-01 | 12 months | 2025-08-02 | 2025-08-02 | 470 days | docs/EU-REGULATORY-2026.md section 1.1, section 1.6 | | CRITICAL | Google Play (Global) | Google Play Target API Requirement | New apps and updates must target API level 35 (Android 15) or higher, and existing target API 34+. | 2025-08-31 | none | 2025-08-31 | 2025-08-31 | 441 days | docs/PLATFORM-MECHANICS-2026.md section 2.5, references/rules/android.md | | MEDIUM | European Union (EU) | EU Data Act, Regulation (EU) 2023/2854 | Core data access-by-design obligations when apps interact with connected products and wearables. | 2024-01-11 | 20 months | 2025-09-12 | 2025-09-12 | 429 days | docs/EU-REGULATORY-2026.md section 5 | | CRITICAL | Australia | Online Safety Amendment (Social Media Minimum Age) Act 2024 | Stop under-16s holding accounts on social media via robust age assurance; ringfence and destroy age data. | 2024-12-10 | 12 months | 2025-12-10 | 2025-12-10 | 340 days | docs/GLOBAL-REGULATORY-2026.md section 3.2, references/rules/safety.md | | CRITICAL | Texas (USA State) | Texas SB 2420 (App Store Accountability Act) | Age assurance and verifiable parental consent for minors on downloads, purchases, and major updates, delete age data, request age category. Statutory effective date 1 January 2026. Preliminary injunctions of 23 December 2025 were stayed by the Fifth Circuit on 4 June 2026 and the Supreme Court declined to vacate the stay on 6 July 2026, so the law is in force while the merits appeal is pending. | 2026-01-01 | none | 2026-01-01 | 2026-06-04 | 318 days | docs/GLOBAL-REGULATORY-2026.md section 1, section 2.2, references/rules/privacy.md | | HIGH | California (USA State) | California CPRA (CPPA 2026 Regulations) | Honoring Global Privacy Control (GPC), privacy policy/notice at collection, opt-out of sale/sharing/profiling, and sensitive personal info limits. | 2026-01-01 | automated decision-making from 2027-04-01; cybersecurity audits from 2028-04-01 | 2026-01-01 | 2026-01-01 | 318 days | docs/GLOBAL-REGULATORY-2026.md section 2.4, references/rules/privacy.md | | CRITICAL | Apple App Store (Global) | Apple App Store Review Guidelines (Guideline 2.3.6) | Every app must answer the updated age-rating questionnaire (13+, 16+, 18+ tiers, UGC/ Livestream indicators) or be blocked from updates. | 2025-07-24 | 6 months | 2026-01-31 | 2026-01-31 | 288 days | docs/EU-REGULATORY-2026.md section 6, references/rules/metadata.md | | CRITICAL | Apple App Store (Brazil, Australia, Singapore) | Apple App Store Region Age Requirements | Blocks users in Brazil, Australia, and Singapore from downloading apps rated 18-plus unless age confirmed through reasonable methods. | 2026-02-24 | none | 2026-02-24 | 2026-02-24 | 264 days | docs/GLOBAL-REGULATORY-2026.md section 1, references/rules/privacy.md | | HIGH | United States (Federal) | FTC Enforcement Policy Statement Promoting the Adoption of Age-Verification Technology under the COPPA Rule (25 February 2026) | A general-audience or mixed-audience app may collect age data for age verification without COPPA enforcement risk only if it uses the data solely for age determination, minimises retention, vets third parties, notices parents and children, and secures the data. In force until final COPPA rule amendments are published or the statement is withdrawn. | 2026-02-25 | none | 2026-02-25 | 2026-02-25 | 263 days | docs/GLOBAL-REGULATORY-2026.md section 2.1, references/guidelines/by-app-type/kids-category-and-families.md | | CRITICAL | Brazil | Digital ECA (Law 15,211/2025) | Accepted age verification (document check, facial estimation, CPF check); self-declaration check-box is prohibited. | 2025-09-17 | 6 months | 2026-03-17 | 2026-03-17 | 243 days | docs/GLOBAL-REGULATORY-2026.md section 3.3, references/rules/privacy.md | | CRITICAL | Brazil | Decreto n. 12.880 of 18 March 2026, Articles 21 and 25, regulating the Digital ECA | App stores and operating systems supply a free age signal, request age at account creation, verify it by an ANPD-approved method, allow contestation, seek guardian authorisation, and show the age rating before download. Stores must block gambling and lottery apps and any app lacking an age-verification solution. | 2026-03-18 | none | 2026-03-18 | 2026-03-18 | 242 days | docs/GLOBAL-REGULATORY-2026.md section 3.3, references/rules/privacy.md | | CRITICAL | Singapore | IMDA Code of Practice for Online Safety for App Distribution Services | App-store age assurance (screen and stop users under 18 from downloading age-inappropriate apps), age-assurance data destroyed. This is the age-assurance bite date. The Code of Practice for Online Safety for App Distribution Services itself commenced 31 March 2025. | 2026-04-01 | none | 2026-04-01 | 2026-04-01 | 228 days | docs/GLOBAL-REGULATORY-2026.md section 3.7, references/rules/privacy.md | | CRITICAL | United States (Federal) | Children's Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA), 16 CFR Part 312 | Amended COPPA Rule compliance (biometric identifiers added to PII, separate opt-in consent for third-party disclosure/targeted-ads, written retention policy, written info-security program). The section 312.11 carve-outs are earlier dates (90 days and six months after the 22 April 2025 publication) and bind FTC-approved COPPA Safe Harbor programs only, not app developers. | 2025-06-23 | 10 months | 2026-04-22 | 2026-04-22 | 207 days | docs/GLOBAL-REGULATORY-2026.md section 2.1, references/guidelines/by-app-type/kids-category-and-families.md | | CRITICAL | Apple App Store (Global) | Apple App Store Submission Requirements | From 28 April 2026 apps uploaded to App Store Connect must be built with the iOS 26 and iPadOS 26 SDK or later (and the matching watchOS 26, tvOS 26, visionOS 26 SDKs). Apple states the requirement in SDK terms, not Xcode terms, and macOS is not in Apple's list. Age assurance features additionally require the iOS 26.2 SDK with Xcode 26.2 (17C52) or later. | 2026-02-03 | 2 months | 2026-04-28 | 2026-04-28 | 201 days | docs/EU-REGULATORY-2026.md section 6, docs/PLATFORM-MECHANICS-2026.md section 1.6 | | HIGH | United Kingdom (UK) | ICO final Guidance on Storage and Access Technologies (29 April 2026), PECR regulation 6 with the DUAA Schedule A1 exemptions and the uplifted PECR penalty (17.5 million pounds or 4 percent of turnover) | Re-audit every SDK, tracking pixel, and device-fingerprinting call against the guidance, not only cookies. A consent breach now carries the UK GDPR scale fine. | 2026-04-29 | none | 2026-04-29 | 2026-04-29 | 200 days | docs/GLOBAL-REGULATORY-2026.md section 3.1, references/rules/privacy.md | | CRITICAL | United States (Federal) | TAKE IT DOWN Act, Pub. L. 119-12 | Covered platforms run a clear and conspicuous non-consensual intimate imagery notice-and-removal process and remove reported content, with known identical copies, within 48 hours. FTC enforcement began 19 May 2026. | 2026-05-19 | none | 2026-05-19 | 2026-05-19 | 180 days | docs/GLOBAL-REGULATORY-2026.md section 2.6, references/rules/safety.md | | HIGH | Apple App Store (Australia, Vietnam) | App Store regional age rating changes. Australia 15+ removed, Vietnam Decree 147 Article 38 region-specific rating (Apple Developer news yrrb45pw) | From 18 June 2026 the 15+ rating is no longer available in Australia (affected apps move to 16+), and apps available in Vietnam require a region-specific age rating aligned with Decree 147 Article 38. Review your App Store Connect age rating per storefront. | 2026-05-21 | until 18 June 2026 | 2026-06-18 | 2026-06-18 | 150 days | docs/GLOBAL-REGULATORY-2026.md sections 3.2 and 3.10 | | HIGH | European Union (EU) | Distance Marketing of Financial Services, Directive (EU) 2023/2673 | Prominent, easily accessible 'withdrawal button' or 'withdrawal function' on the online interface (including apps) to withdraw from contracts. | 2023-11-28 | 30 months | 2026-06-19 | 2026-06-19 | 149 days | docs/EU-REGULATORY-2026.md section 5, references/rules/payments.md | | MEDIUM | United Kingdom (UK) | Data (Use and Access) Act 2025 section 103 and Schedule 10, commenced by SI 2026/82 regulation 3 | Operate a data-protection complaints process. Acknowledge a data subject complaint within 30 days and respond without undue delay. | 2026-06-19 | none | 2026-06-19 | 2026-06-19 | 149 days | docs/GLOBAL-REGULATORY-2026.md section 3.1, references/rules/privacy.md | | HIGH | Singapore | Online Safety (Relief and Accountability) Act 2025, partial commencement | Act on notice from the Online Safety Commission as a platform to address the five priority harms. Further harm categories follow progressively with no published date. | 2026-06-29 | none | 2026-06-29 | 2026-06-29 | 139 days | docs/GLOBAL-REGULATORY-2026.md section 3.7 | | CRITICAL | Apple App Store (Brazil) | Apple Developer Program License Agreement Attachment 12, Brazil alternative distribution under the CADE decision (Apple Developer news dhwadr2x and umq9wxmm) | By 6 July 2026 all Apple Developer Program members had to accept the updated ADPLA. From iOS 26.5 developers may distribute on alternative marketplaces, operate marketplaces, and process payments for digital
- docs/RULING-REGISTER.md (5280 bytes)
# Ruling Register A code scan cannot tell you that India wants your lending app on an RBI list, that Australia wants under-16s kept off your social feed, or that the EU wants a 24 hour vulnerability report. The Ruling Register holds those release requirements as data, says how strongly each one binds today, and says how it is proven, so a missing finding is never mistaken for a pass. ## What you get - Legal standing on every requirement. `in_force`, `in_force_later` (with the date it starts), `store_policy`, `proposed`, or `guidance`. Only verified law or store policy that is in force today can block a release. A proposed law or a guidance note never can. - How it is proven. `automated` (a check can see it), `owner_attested` (only you can confirm it), or `mixed` (both). An owner-attested requirement asks for your signed attestation, because a scan finding nothing proves nothing here. - A quoted source for every premise. Each source carries the URL, the date it was checked, a verbatim quote, and `supports`, which says whether it proves the obligation, the start date, or both. A rule blocks only when quoted sources cover the obligation and, if it has one, the start date. A source that could not be re-read is marked `unverified` with the reason, and a rule missing a quoted premise is listed as "confirm the source" and never blocks. - Applies only where it should. Each entry names its jurisdiction (an ISO country code, `EU`, or `GLOBAL`), an optional store, and the app features it covers (`lending`, `crypto`, `medical`, `generative_ai`, `personal_data`, `subscriptions`, `social`, `marketplace`, `children`). A rule with no features applies to every app in that place. - Built into Fleet Sweep. Every app declares its `platforms`, `regions` and `features`, and leaving one out is an error, because an unknown scope would silently drop rules. Any verified, in-force rule that applies and has no valid attestation makes the app `BLOCKED`. ## From install to first answer 1. Ask what applies to an app. ```bash python3 scripts/ruling-register.py due --regions DE,AU,US --stores apple --features social,personal_data ``` Each line says `BLOCKS`, `WATCH`, or `CONFIRM-SOURCE`, and whether it needs your attestation. 2. Add `regions`, `features` and, once you have checked a requirement, an attestation to the app in your fleet file. ```json "attestations": { "RR-AU-APP1-PRIVACY-POLICY": { "attested_by": "Your Name", "attested_on": "2026-11-05", "outcome": "compliant", "revision": 1, "covers": ["auto-1", "owner-2"], "regions": ["AU"], "evidence": "Policy linked in app and listing, reviewed against APP 1 in the October release notes" } } ``` An attestation is accepted only when `outcome` is `compliant`, `revision` matches the rule's current revision, `covers` lists every proof item id of the rule (including the automated ones, with the check result as evidence), and `regions` lists every country of yours the rule reaches. It cannot be dated in the future and expires after a year. Raise a rule's `revision` when it changes, and every attestation for it has to be made again. 3. Run Fleet Sweep. The register is read by default. Pass `--no-register` to leave it out. ## Add or change a requirement 1. Edit `data/ruling-register.json`. Give a new rule a new `RR-` id and `revision` 1. Never reuse an id for a different rule, and raise `revision` when an existing rule's meaning changes. 2. Quote the primary source verbatim and record the date you read it. Never paste a URL you have not opened. 3. Run `python3 scripts/ruling-register.py validate` and fix every error. 4. To hand the register to another tool, run `python3 scripts/ruling-register.py export`. It writes `exports/ruling-register-v<version>.json`, stamped with the commit and the date. ## How the results are measured `python3 scripts/eval-scorecard.py` scores Fleet Sweep, the Waiver Ledger and the Ruling Register against the gold scenarios in `evals/gold-cases.json`. Each case checks the verdict, the exit code, that the fleet and app verdicts agree, and which rule ids must and must not appear, so a change that keeps the verdict but loses the reason still fails. It prints the false passes (something unsafe called ready) and the false blocks per feature, and fails on any miss or any unknown category. The false-pass count must stay at zero. ## The first entries The first 14 entries came from an adversarial gap review of this playbook. Google Play lending in India and crypto in the EU, US medical device software and the DOJ data rule, China's AI filing and labelling rules, Indonesia's operator registration, the EU withdrawal function, DSA notice and action and CRA reporting, Vietnam's account authentication, and Australia's privacy policy, under-16 social media and Children's Online Privacy Code rules. Every source was opened on 5 November 2026. The EU withdrawal entry is marked unverified because EUR-Lex refused automated reads that day. The Australian minimum-age obligation is quoted from the Act, but the Act sets its start date by ministerial instrument and the eSafety page carrying that date did not load, so that rule is flagged to confirm rather than blocking. - docs/SECURITY-POLICY-MIGRATION.md (14469 bytes)
<!-- SECURITY_POLICY_MONITOR_START --> > **Simulated output, not live announcements.** This file was generated from sample > announcements (the built-in set, the default, or a file passed with `--mock`). The titles, > publish dates, and descriptions below are examples that show the shape of a migration > report, not real publications. Only the linked official documentation URLs are real. > This monitor has no live feed (Android security bulletins publish no RSS), so check the > linked official pages before treating anything here as an actual requirement. # Mobile Security Requirements Policy Migration & Report This report is continuously generated and updated by `scripts/monitor-security.py` to track compliance areas. ## Monitored Security Requirements Update Log ### 1. [secure storage] Secure Storage Update: Deprecating Insecure SharedPreferences and Plaintext Databases - **Published Date**: Mon, 15 Jun 2026 10:00:00 PDT - **Official Resource**: [https://developer.android.com/topic/security/data](https://developer.android.com/topic/security/data) - **Description**: Mobile applications must encrypt all sensitive localized data. Standard SharedPreferences and plain SQLite databases are declared insecure on rooted devices, requiring migration to SQLCipher or EncryptedSharedPreferences. ### 2. [root detection] Secure Storage Update: Deprecating Insecure SharedPreferences and Plaintext Databases - **Published Date**: Mon, 15 Jun 2026 10:00:00 PDT - **Official Resource**: [https://developer.android.com/topic/security/data](https://developer.android.com/topic/security/data) - **Description**: Mobile applications must encrypt all sensitive localized data. Standard SharedPreferences and plain SQLite databases are declared insecure on rooted devices, requiring migration to SQLCipher or EncryptedSharedPreferences. ### 3. [Keychain] iOS Keychain Security Enhancement: Enforcing ThisDeviceOnly Protection Classes - **Published Date**: Wed, 17 Jun 2026 11:00:00 PDT - **Official Resource**: [https://developer.apple.com/documentation/security/keychain_services](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/security/keychain_services) - **Description**: Apple developer security directives mandate migrating keychain items to kSecAttrAccessibleAfterFirstUnlockThisDeviceOnly to prevent unauthorized backup restoration on secondary physical devices. ### 4. [Android Keystore] Android Keystore System: Mandatory Hardware-Backed Key Attestation - **Published Date**: Fri, 19 Jun 2026 12:00:00 PDT - **Official Resource**: [https://developer.android.com/training/articles/keystore](https://developer.android.com/training/articles/keystore) - **Description**: New security guidelines mandate hardware-backed (TEE or StrongBox) KeyGenParameterSpec initialization. Cryptographic keys used for financial or identity payload signing must enforce user authentication requirements. ### 5. [Keychain] Biometric Authentication: Transitioning to Crypto-Backed Secure Biometric Verification - **Published Date**: Mon, 22 Jun 2026 09:00:00 PDT - **Official Resource**: [https://developer.android.com/training/sign-in/biometric-auth](https://developer.android.com/training/sign-in/biometric-auth) - **Description**: To prevent runtime instrumentation and hook-based bypasses of boolean returns, developers must wrap biometric prompts in a strong Keystore/Keychain CryptoObject or SecAccessControl structure. ### 6. [biometric authentication] Biometric Authentication: Transitioning to Crypto-Backed Secure Biometric Verification - **Published Date**: Mon, 22 Jun 2026 09:00:00 PDT - **Official Resource**: [https://developer.android.com/training/sign-in/biometric-auth](https://developer.android.com/training/sign-in/biometric-auth) - **Description**: To prevent runtime instrumentation and hook-based bypasses of boolean returns, developers must wrap biometric prompts in a strong Keystore/Keychain CryptoObject or SecAccessControl structure. ### 7. [certificate pinning] Certificate Pinning Guidelines: Mandating Subject Public Key Info (SPKI) Pinning - **Published Date**: Wed, 24 Jun 2026 14:00:00 PDT - **Official Resource**: [https://owasp.org/www-community/controls/Certificate_and_Public_Key_Pinning](https://owasp.org/www-community/controls/Certificate_and_Public_Key_Pinning) - **Description**: Leaf-level certificate pinning is discouraged due to rotational outages. Best practices mandate pinning the Subject Public Key Info (SPKI) of the primary and backup intermediate certificate authorities. ### 8. [jailbreak detection] iOS Jailbreak Detection: Comprehensive Dynamic Linker and Sandbox Write Auditing - **Published Date**: Fri, 26 Jun 2026 15:00:00 PDT - **Official Resource**: [https://mas.owasp.org/MASVS/](https://mas.owasp.org/MASVS/) - **Description**: Static file existence checks are easily bypassed. Jailbreak detection must combine dynamic library (dyld) inspection, directory permission checking, and symlink integrity checks. ### 9. [root detection] Android Root Detection: Mandating Play Integrity API Attestation in Production - **Published Date**: Mon, 29 Jun 2026 10:00:00 PDT - **Official Resource**: [https://developer.android.com/google/play/integrity](https://developer.android.com/google/play/integrity) - **Description**: Local heuristic root checks are unreliable against modern zygisk masking. High-security apps must leverage the Play Integrity API with cryptographically verified backend tokens. ### 10. [SSL configuration] SSL Configuration Policies: Global Enforcement of TLS 1.3 and Disabling Cleartext Traffic - **Published Date**: Wed, 01 Jul 2026 11:00:00 PDT - **Official Resource**: [https://developer.android.com/training/articles/security-config](https://developer.android.com/training/articles/security-config) - **Description**: Mobile app stores enforce secure networking by default. Cleartext HTTP traffic must be disabled globally, and minimum TLS versions must be set to TLS 1.2 or TLS 1.3. ### 11. [backup rules] Insecure Backup Controls: Configuring Data Extraction Rules and Backup Exclusions - **Published Date**: Fri, 03 Jul 2026 13:00:00 PDT - **Official Resource**: [https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/data/autobackup](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/data/autobackup) - **Description**: By default, ADB backup transfers application local databases. Developers must declare allowBackup='false' or configure precise dataExtractionRules to exclude credentials. ### 12. [exported activities] Exported Activities Security: Mandatory Explicit Export Controls on Android Components - **Published Date**: Mon, 06 Jul 2026 14:00:00 PDT - **Official Resource**: [https://developer.android.com/guide/components/activities/intro-activities](https://developer.android.com/guide/components/activities/intro-activities) - **Description**: Unintentionally exported activities expose internal application boundaries. Developers must set android:exported='false' for all internal classes to prevent intent injection. ### 13. [intent filters] Intent Filter Audits: Preventing Implicit Intent Spoofing and Component Hijacking - **Published Date**: Wed, 08 Jul 2026 16:00:00 PDT - **Official Resource**: [https://developer.android.com/guide/components/intents-filters](https://developer.android.com/guide/components/intents-filters) - **Description**: Implicit intent filters automatically expose components. To secure transitions, apps should use explicit class intents and enforce signature-level custom permissions. ### 14. [deep links] Deep Link Security: Preventing Custom URL Scheme Hijacking and Parameter Injection - **Published Date**: Fri, 10 Jul 2026 12:00:00 PDT - **Official Resource**: [https://developer.android.com/training/app-links/deep-linking](https://developer.android.com/training/app-links/deep-linking) - **Description**: Custom URL schemes can be registered by other applications, leading to session hijacking. All parameters must be parsed, validated, and sanitized as untrusted inputs. ### 15. [universal links] Universal Links Verification: Secure Association via AASA Hosting on iOS - **Published Date**: Mon, 13 Jul 2026 10:00:00 PDT - **Official Resource**: [https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/General/Conceptual/AppSearch/UniversalLinks.html](https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/General/Conceptual/AppSearch/UniversalLinks.html) - **Description**: To prevent custom scheme hijacking, applications must adopt Universal Links verified by a secure apple-app-site-association file hosted on the target web domain. ### 16. [app links] Android App Links Verification: Digitally Binding Web Domains via Digital Asset Links - **Published Date**: Wed, 15 Jul 2026 11:00:00 PDT - **Official Resource**: [https://developer.android.com/training/app-links/verify-site-associations](https://developer.android.com/training/app-links/verify-site-associations) - **Description**: Android App Links enable secure routing. The host domain must publish a digital assetlinks.json containing the application's unique signing key certificate fingerprint. ### 17. [authentication flows] Authentication Flows: Requiring OAuth 2.1 and PKCE to Secure Mobile Auth Tokens - **Published Date**: Fri, 17 Jul 2026 09:00:00 PDT - **Official Resource**: [https://oauth.net/2/pkce/](https://oauth.net/2/pkce/) - **Description**: Hardcoding client secrets inside mobile binaries is a critical risk. Modern mobile authentication must use Proof Key for Code Exchange (PKCE) over secure system browser custom tabs. ### 18. [session handling] Session Handling Standards: Mandatory Server-Side Session Invalidation and Snapshot Protection - **Published Date**: Mon, 20 Jul 2026 15:00:00 GMT - **Official Resource**: [https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Session_Management_Cheat_Sheet.html](https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Session_Management_Cheat_Sheet.html) - **Description**: Client-side token deletion is insufficient. Applications must perform server-side session invalidation on logout and blur multitasking window snapshots to prevent data leakage. ### 19. [Keychain] Token Storage Policies: Securing Long-Lived Refresh Tokens and Session Credentials - **Published Date**: Wed, 22 Jul 2026 13:00:00 PDT - **Official Resource**: [https://mas.owasp.org/MASVS/](https://mas.owasp.org/MASVS/) - **Description**: Session and refresh tokens must be stored in encrypted enclaves (Keychain/Keystore) rather than local cache directories or standard plists. Access tokens must be short-lived. ### 20. [token storage] Token Storage Policies: Securing Long-Lived Refresh Tokens and Session Credentials - **Published Date**: Wed, 22 Jul 2026 13:00:00 PDT - **Official Resource**: [https://mas.owasp.org/MASVS/](https://mas.owasp.org/MASVS/) - **Description**: Session and refresh tokens must be stored in encrypted enclaves (Keychain/Keystore) rather than local cache directories or standard plists. Access tokens must be short-lived. ## Automated Migration Recommendations & Implementation Tasks ### Tasks for secure storage - **Regulatory Impact**: High priority. Security audit mandates action. - [ ] **Task 1**: Update standard preferences to EncryptedSharedPreferences on Android. - [ ] **Task 2**: Test local database encryption with SQLCipher. ### Tasks for root detection - **Regulatory Impact**: High priority. Security audit mandates action. - [ ] **Task**: Verify that all security criteria for root detection are checked and handled. ### Tasks for Keychain - **Regulatory Impact**: High priority. Security audit mandates action. - [ ] **Task 1**: Configure Keychain accessibility to kSecAttrAccessibleAfterFirstUnlockThisDeviceOnly. ### Tasks for Android Keystore - **Regulatory Impact**: High priority. Security audit mandates action. - [ ] **Task 1**: Enforce StrongBox and check KeyInfo.isInsideSecureHardware() on key creation. ### Tasks for biometric authentication - **Regulatory Impact**: High priority. Security audit mandates action. - [ ] **Task 1**: Integrate Keystore CryptoObject-backed BiometricPrompt. ### Tasks for certificate pinning - **Regulatory Impact**: High priority. Security audit mandates action. - [ ] **Task 1**: Populate SPKI pins inside network_security_config.xml. ### Tasks for jailbreak detection - **Regulatory Impact**: High priority. Security audit mandates action. - [ ] **Task**: Verify that all security criteria for jailbreak detection are checked and handled. ### Tasks for SSL configuration - **Regulatory Impact**: High priority. Security audit mandates action. - [ ] **Task**: Verify that all security criteria for SSL configuration are checked and handled. ### Tasks for backup rules - **Regulatory Impact**: High priority. Security audit mandates action. - [ ] **Task**: Verify that all security criteria for backup rules are checked and handled. ### Tasks for exported activities - **Regulatory Impact**: High priority. Security audit mandates action. - [ ] **Task**: Verify that all security criteria for exported activities are checked and handled. ### Tasks for intent filters - **Regulatory Impact**: High priority. Security audit mandates action. - [ ] **Task**: Verify that all security criteria for intent filters are checked and handled. ### Tasks for deep links - **Regulatory Impact**: High priority. Security audit mandates action. - [ ] **Task**: Verify that all security criteria for deep links are checked and handled. ### Tasks for universal links - **Regulatory Impact**: High priority. Security audit mandates action. - [ ] **Task**: Verify that all security criteria for universal links are checked and handled. ### Tasks for app links - **Regulatory Impact**: High priority. Security audit mandates action. - [ ] **Task**: Verify that all security criteria for app links are checked and handled. ### Tasks for authentication flows - **Regulatory Impact**: High priority. Security audit mandates action. - [ ] **Task**: Verify that all security criteria for authentication flows are checked and handled. ### Tasks for session handling - **Regulatory Impact**: High priority. Security audit mandates action. - [ ] **Task**: Verify that all security criteria for session handling are checked and handled. ### Tasks for token storage - **Regulatory Impact**: High priority. Security audit mandates action. - [ ] **Task**: Verify that all security criteria for token storage are checked and handled. <!-- SECURITY_POLICY_MONITOR_END -->
- evals/gold-cases.json (22101 bytes)
{ "about": "Gold scenarios for Fleet Sweep, the Waiver Ledger and the Ruling Register. Run scripts/eval-scorecard.py.", "eval_date": "2026-11-05", "cases": [ { "feature": "fleet", "name": "clean app ships", "guard_exit": 0, "report": "\nSummary. critical=0 high=0 medium=0\nCoverage. complete ios=1 android=0 web=0\n", "app": { "platforms": [ "ios" ], "readiness": { "agreements": true } }, "waivers": null, "expect": "READY", "register": false }, { "feature": "fleet", "name": "critical finding blocks", "guard_exit": 2, "report": " [CRITICAL] IOS-PRIVACY-MANIFEST Missing privacy manifest\n file. ios/App/Info.plist\n fix. Add it\n\nSummary. critical=1 high=0 medium=0\nCoverage. complete ios=1 android=0 web=0\n", "app": { "platforms": [ "ios" ], "readiness": { "agreements": true } }, "waivers": null, "expect": "BLOCKED", "register": false }, { "feature": "fleet", "name": "high finding needs action", "guard_exit": 0, "report": " [HIGH] IOS-ATS Arbitrary loads\n file. ios/App/Info.plist\n fix. Remove it\n\nSummary. critical=0 high=1 medium=0\nCoverage. complete ios=1 android=0 web=0\n", "app": { "platforms": [ "ios" ], "readiness": { "agreements": true } }, "waivers": null, "expect": "READY_WITH_ACTIONS", "register": false }, { "feature": "fleet", "name": "no readiness tracked", "guard_exit": 0, "report": "\nSummary. critical=0 high=0 medium=0\nCoverage. complete ios=1 android=0 web=0\n", "app": { "platforms": [ "ios" ], "readiness": null }, "waivers": null, "expect": "READY_WITH_ACTIONS", "register": false }, { "feature": "fleet", "name": "readiness step false", "guard_exit": 0, "report": "\nSummary. critical=0 high=0 medium=0\nCoverage. complete ios=1 android=0 web=0\n", "app": { "platforms": [ "ios" ], "readiness": { "agreements": false } }, "waivers": null, "expect": "READY_WITH_ACTIONS", "register": false }, { "feature": "fleet", "name": "missing summary", "guard_exit": 0, "report": "Coverage. complete ios=1 android=0 web=0\n", "app": { "platforms": [ "ios" ], "readiness": { "agreements": true } }, "waivers": null, "expect": "NOT_CHECKED", "register": false }, { "feature": "fleet", "name": "missing coverage", "guard_exit": 0, "report": "Summary. critical=0 high=0 medium=0\n", "app": { "platforms": [ "ios" ], "readiness": { "agreements": true } }, "waivers": null, "expect": "NOT_CHECKED", "register": false }, { "feature": "fleet", "name": "hidden high count", "guard_exit": 0, "report": "\nSummary. critical=0 high=4 medium=0\nCoverage. complete ios=1 android=0 web=0\n", "app": { "platforms": [ "ios" ], "readiness": { "agreements": true } }, "waivers": null, "expect": "NOT_CHECKED", "register": false }, { "feature": "fleet", "name": "exit 2 without criticals", "guard_exit": 2, "report": "\nSummary. critical=0 high=0 medium=0\nCoverage. complete ios=1 android=0 web=0\n", "app": { "platforms": [ "ios" ], "readiness": { "agreements": true } }, "waivers": null, "expect": "NOT_CHECKED", "register": false }, { "feature": "fleet", "name": "guard exit 1", "guard_exit": 1, "report": "\nSummary. critical=0 high=0 medium=0\nCoverage. complete ios=1 android=0 web=0\n", "app": { "platforms": [ "ios" ], "readiness": { "agreements": true } }, "waivers": null, "expect": "NOT_CHECKED", "register": false }, { "feature": "fleet", "name": "partial scan", "guard_exit": 0, "report": "\nSummary. critical=0 high=0 medium=0\nCoverage. incomplete ios=1 android=0 web=0 reason=no native project in apps/x\n", "app": { "platforms": [ "ios" ], "readiness": { "agreements": true } }, "waivers": null, "expect": "NOT_CHECKED", "register": false }, { "feature": "fleet", "name": "declared android not found", "guard_exit": 0, "report": "\nSummary. critical=0 high=0 medium=0\nCoverage. complete ios=1 android=0 web=0\n", "app": { "platforms": [ "ios", "android" ], "readiness": { "agreements": true } }, "waivers": null, "expect": "NOT_CHECKED", "register": false }, { "feature": "waiver", "name": "valid waiver clears critical", "guard_exit": 2, "report": " [CRITICAL] IOS-PRIVACY-MANIFEST Missing privacy manifest\n file. ios/App/Info.plist\n fix. Add it\n\nSummary. critical=1 high=0 medium=0\nCoverage. complete ios=1 android=0 web=0\n", "app": { "platforms": [ "ios" ], "readiness": { "agreements": true } }, "waivers": [ { "app": "app", "finding_id": "IOS-PRIVACY-MANIFEST", "severity": "critical", "file": "ios/App/Info.plist", "reason": "r", "evidence": "e", "reviewed_by": "Mirza", "expires": "2027-01-01" } ], "expect": "READY", "register": false }, { "feature": "waiver", "name": "expired waiver", "guard_exit": 2, "report": " [CRITICAL] IOS-PRIVACY-MANIFEST Missing privacy manifest\n file. ios/App/Info.plist\n fix. Add it\n\nSummary. critical=1 high=0 medium=0\nCoverage. complete ios=1 android=0 web=0\n", "app": { "platforms": [ "ios" ], "readiness": { "agreements": true } }, "waivers": [ { "app": "app", "finding_id": "IOS-PRIVACY-MANIFEST", "severity": "critical", "file": "ios/App/Info.plist", "reason": "r", "evidence": "e", "reviewed_by": "Mirza", "expires": "2026-11-01" } ], "expect": "BLOCKED", "register": false }, { "feature": "waiver", "name": "waiver without evidence", "guard_exit": 2, "report": " [CRITICAL] IOS-PRIVACY-MANIFEST Missing privacy manifest\n file. ios/App/Info.plist\n fix. Add it\n\nSummary. critical=1 high=0 medium=0\nCoverage. complete ios=1 android=0 web=0\n", "app": { "platforms": [ "ios" ], "readiness": { "agreements": true } }, "waivers": [ { "app": "app", "finding_id": "IOS-PRIVACY-MANIFEST", "severity": "critical", "file": "ios/App/Info.plist", "reason": "r", "evidence": "", "reviewed_by": "Mirza", "expires": "2027-01-01" } ], "expect": "BLOCKED", "register": false }, { "feature": "waiver", "name": "waiver for a different file", "guard_exit": 2, "report": " [CRITICAL] IOS-PRIVACY-MANIFEST Missing privacy manifest\n file. ios/App/Info.plist\n fix. Add it\n\nSummary. critical=1 high=0 medium=0\nCoverage. complete ios=1 android=0 web=0\n", "app": { "platforms": [ "ios" ], "readiness": { "agreements": true } }, "waivers": [ { "app": "app", "finding_id": "IOS-PRIVACY-MANIFEST", "severity": "critical", "file": "tests/x.plist", "reason": "r", "evidence": "e", "reviewed_by": "Mirza", "expires": "2027-01-01" } ], "expect": "BLOCKED", "register": false }, { "feature": "waiver", "name": "waiver at a lower severity", "guard_exit": 2, "report": " [CRITICAL] IOS-PRIVACY-MANIFEST Missing privacy manifest\n file. ios/App/Info.plist\n fix. Add it\n\nSummary. critical=1 high=0 medium=0\nCoverage. complete ios=1 android=0 web=0\n", "app": { "platforms": [ "ios" ], "readiness": { "agreements": true } }, "waivers": [ { "app": "app", "finding_id": "IOS-PRIVACY-MANIFEST", "severity": "high", "file": "ios/App/Info.plist", "reason": "r", "evidence": "e", "reviewed_by": "Mirza", "expires": "2027-01-01" } ], "expect": "BLOCKED", "register": false }, { "feature": "waiver", "name": "duplicate waivers cancel", "guard_exit": 2, "report": " [CRITICAL] IOS-PRIVACY-MANIFEST Missing privacy manifest\n file. ios/App/Info.plist\n fix. Add it\n\nSummary. critical=1 high=0 medium=0\nCoverage. complete ios=1 android=0 web=0\n", "app": { "platforms": [ "ios" ], "readiness": { "agreements": true } }, "waivers": [ { "app": "app", "finding_id": "IOS-PRIVACY-MANIFEST", "severity": "critical", "file": "ios/App/Info.plist", "reason": "r", "evidence": "e", "reviewed_by": "Mirza", "expires": "2027-01-01" }, { "app": "app", "finding_id": "IOS-PRIVACY-MANIFEST", "severity": "critical", "file": "ios/App/Info.plist", "reason": "r", "evidence": "e", "reviewed_by": "Mirza", "expires": "2027-01-01" } ], "expect": "BLOCKED", "register": false }, { "feature": "waiver", "name": "waiver over 180 days", "guard_exit": 2, "report": " [CRITICAL] IOS-PRIVACY-MANIFEST Missing privacy manifest\n file. ios/App/Info.plist\n fix. Add it\n\nSummary. critical=1 high=0 medium=0\nCoverage. complete ios=1 android=0 web=0\n", "app": { "platforms": [ "ios" ], "readiness": { "agreements": true } }, "waivers": [ { "app": "app", "finding_id": "IOS-PRIVACY-MANIFEST", "severity": "critical", "file": "ios/App/Info.plist", "reason": "r", "evidence": "e", "reviewed_by": "Mirza", "expires": "2028-01-01" } ], "expect": "BLOCKED", "register": false }, { "feature": "waiver", "name": "waiver cannot rescue a partial scan", "guard_exit": 2, "report": " [CRITICAL] IOS-PRIVACY-MANIFEST Missing privacy manifest\n file. ios/App/Info.plist\n fix. Add it\n\nSummary. critical=1 high=0 medium=0\nCoverage. incomplete ios=1 android=0 web=0 reason=scan error\n", "app": { "platforms": [ "ios" ], "readiness": { "agreements": true } }, "waivers": [ { "app": "app", "finding_id": "IOS-PRIVACY-MANIFEST", "severity": "critical", "file": "ios/App/Info.plist", "reason": "r", "evidence": "e", "reviewed_by": "Mirza", "expires": "2027-01-01" } ], "expect": "NOT_CHECKED", "register": false }, { "feature": "register", "name": "US medical app without attestation blocks", "guard_exit": 0, "report": "Summary. critical=0 high=0 medium=0\nCoverage. complete ios=1 android=1 web=0\n", "app": { "platforms": [ "ios" ], "readiness": { "agreements": true }, "regions": [ "US" ], "features": [ "medical" ] }, "waivers": null, "register": true, "expect": "BLOCKED", "must_mention": [ "RR-US-FDA-DEVICE-SOFTWARE" ], "must_not_mention": [] }, { "feature": "register", "name": "US medical app attested compliant ships", "guard_exit": 0, "report": "Summary. critical=0 high=0 medium=0\nCoverage. complete ios=1 android=1 web=0\n", "app": { "platforms": [ "ios" ], "readiness": { "agreements": true }, "regions": [ "US" ], "features": [ "medical" ], "attestations": { "RR-US-FDA-DEVICE-SOFTWARE": { "attested_by": "Mirza", "attested_on": "2026-10-01", "evidence": "see docs/review.md", "outcome": "compliant", "revision": 1, "covers": [ "owner-1" ], "regions": [ "US" ] } } }, "waivers": null, "register": true, "expect": "READY", "must_mention": [], "must_not_mention": [ "RR-US-FDA-DEVICE-SOFTWARE" ] }, { "feature": "register", "name": "negative outcome still blocks", "guard_exit": 0, "report": "Summary. critical=0 high=0 medium=0\nCoverage. complete ios=1 android=1 web=0\n", "app": { "platforms": [ "ios" ], "readiness": { "agreements": true }, "regions": [ "US" ], "features": [ "medical" ], "attestations": { "RR-US-FDA-DEVICE-SOFTWARE": { "attested_by": "Mirza", "attested_on": "2026-10-01", "evidence": "see docs/review.md", "outcome": "not_compliant", "revision": 1, "covers": [ "owner-1" ], "regions": [ "US" ] } } }, "waivers": null, "register": true, "expect": "BLOCKED", "must_mention": [ "RR-US-FDA-DEVICE-SOFTWARE" ], "must_not_mention": [] }, { "feature": "register", "name": "mixed rule needs its automated result", "guard_exit": 0, "report": "Summary. critical=0 high=0 medium=0\nCoverage. complet - INSTRUCTIONS.md (9639 bytes)
--- name: app-store-compliance license: LicenseRef-OpenRoots-ORA-2.3 description: Run an enterprise pre submission compliance audit on a mobile app project before uploading to the Apple App Store or Google Play. Use when the user is about to submit, ship, or release an iOS or Android app, when an app was rejected and needs a fix plan, when reviewing App Store Review Guidelines or Google Play policy compliance, or when the user mentions App Store rejection, Play Console rejection, Resolution Center, Data Safety form, privacy nutrition labels, account deletion requirement, in app purchase rules, or app review. --- # App Store Compliance Audit This skill runs a full pre submission compliance audit against the Apple App Store Review Guidelines and the Google Play Developer Program Policies, then produces a fix plan ranked by severity. It exists because roughly one in four App Store submissions is rejected and Google blocked over 1.75 million Play submissions in 2025, almost always for the same handful of preventable causes. ## When to run it - Before any upload to App Store Connect or the Play Console. - After a rejection, to build the exact fix and appeal plan. - During a release review, as a release blocker gate. ## How to run it ### Step 1. Locate the project and the reference The compliance reference lives in the `app-store-compliance` repo. The key files are. - `data/rejection-patterns.json` the machine readable taxonomy. - `docs/APPLE.md` and `docs/GOOGLE-PLAY.md` the full rejection maps. - `docs/PRE-SUBMISSION-CHECKLIST.md` the verifiable checklist. - `docs/MISTAKE-PATTERNS.md` root causes, the appeal playbook, and real rejection case studies. - `docs/BY-APP-TYPE.md` the rejection map routed by app type. Load the section that matches the app. - `docs/ADVANCED-2026.md` the modern upload time and legal layer. - `docs/EU-REGULATORY-2026.md` the EU legal hard rules with dated sources. the EU AI Act, the DMA and the Core Technology Fee, DSA trader status, and the European Accessibility Act. Load it for any app reaching EU users. - `docs/GLOBAL-REGULATORY-2026.md` the USA and other-global legal hard rules with dated sources. COPPA, the US state App Store Accountability Acts, the external-link rules, the UK, Australia, Brazil, Canada, South Korea, India, and more, plus Apple's cross-region age-assurance spine. Load it for any app reaching those users. - `docs/PLATFORM-MECHANICS-2026.md` the platform-mechanics and newer-policy hard rules with dated sources. macOS notarization, Guideline 4.2 and 4.3 with the June 2026 saturation tightening, reader apps, France ANSSI encryption, visionOS and watchOS and tvOS specifics, Android developer verification, Foreground Service types, Play Integrity, Play Billing v8, target API, Health Connect, and the cross-cutting CSAM, UGC, accessibility, sanctions, and PCI items. Load it for any app whose type touches these. - `references/` the structured, AI loadable tree. Load `references/guidelines/by-app-type/<type>.md` for the app at hand and the relevant `references/rules/<category>.md` files for full context before judging. - `templates/REVIEW-NOTES-TEMPLATE.md` the review notes template to hand the user for a new submission. - `app-store-compliance-guard.sh` the automated scanner. The install puts it in your tool's hooks folder, listed in Step 2. For the strongest audit, also run the metadata layer. A large share of rejections live in the listing text, not the source. ``` bash scripts/pull-metadata.sh apple # pulls the live listing into ./metadata via the asc CLI python3 scripts/metadata-audit.py ./metadata # audits name, subtitle, keywords, description, URLs python3 scripts/metadata-audit.py ./metadata --propose # writes suggested fixes, source copy untouched python3 scripts/metadata-audit.py ./metadata/android --platform google # Google Play limits and rules python3 scripts/release-audit.py /path/to/app --metadata ./metadata # full gate, exit 0 clear, 2 blocked, 3 incomplete ``` The metadata audit checks character limits, other platform mentions, future functionality, negative Apple sentiment, profanity, ranking and price claims, keyword formatting, missing privacy policy and subscription terms, China storefront AI references, and malformed URLs (pass `--check-urls` to also test that each URL loads). It audits every locale folder on its own, filled from a fastlane `default/` folder and parent folders like fastlane does, and names the locale in each finding. It flags a URL that is not a real http or https address, an Apple listing with no support URL, a Google listing with no contact email, and a subscription with no real Terms or EULA link. Run it, then re run it after applying fixes. That is the detect, propose, re validate loop. The release audit blocks on any critical or high finding with exit 2. It exits 3 when a scan failed or the listing was not audited, so pass `--metadata` with your pulled listing. For monitoring evolving developer requirements, also run the Apple Developer requirements monitor. This tracks 25 key categories against active developer news/announcements and maps updates directly to repository impact: ``` python3 scripts/monitor.py --project /path/to/app/project ``` Or simulate a simulated track update (e.g., "Privacy Manifests") to preview impact: ``` python3 scripts/monitor.py --project /path/to/app/project --simulate "Privacy Manifests" ``` The monitor determines repository impact, identifies affected files, generates migration tasks, estimates release impact, and drafts a complete pull request description. ### Step 2. Run the automated scan Run the guard against the project root. Use the copy the install put in your tool's hooks folder. | Tool | Guard | |---|---| | Claude Code | `~/.claude/hooks/app-store-compliance-guard.sh` | | Codex CLI | `~/.codex/hooks/app-store-compliance-guard.sh` | | Gemini CLI | `~/.gemini/hooks/app-store-compliance-guard.sh` | | OpenCode | `~/.config/opencode/hooks/app-store-compliance-guard.sh` | | Cursor | `~/.cursor/hooks/app-store-compliance-guard.sh` | | Copilot CLI | `~/.copilot/hooks/app-store-compliance-guard.sh`, or under `$COPILOT_HOME` when set | | Grok | `~/.grok/hooks/app-store-compliance-guard.sh` | | Qwen Code | `~/.qwen/hooks/app-store-compliance-guard.sh`, or under `$QWEN_HOME` when set | | Kimi Code | `~/.kimi-code/hooks/app-store-compliance-guard.sh`, or under `$KIMI_CODE_HOME` when set | | Factory Droid | `~/.factory/hooks/app-store-compliance-guard.sh` | | Auggie | `~/.augment/hooks/app-store-compliance-guard.sh` | | Windsurf | `~/.codeium/windsurf/hooks/app-store-compliance-guard.sh` | | From a checkout | `~/repositories/app-store-compliance/agent-os/hooks/app-store-compliance-guard.sh` | ``` bash <guard path from the table> "/path/to/app/project" ``` The `scripts/` paths in this skill are relative to this skill's own folder. It detects iOS and Android, scans for the rejection patterns, and prints findings ranked critical, high, medium. It exits 2 when a critical risk is present. ### Step 3. Run the human checks the scanner cannot see Some rejection causes are not visible in code. Walk these by hand against the project. - Is the production backend live and will it stay up during the entire review window. - Is a working demo account provided in the Notes for Review or the Play test instructions. - Do the privacy nutrition labels (Apple) and the Data Safety form (Google) match the real runtime behavior including every third party SDK. This is the single biggest cause on both stores. - Do the screenshots show the app in use, not a splash or login screen. - Does the listing claim only what the app actually does. - For a new Google personal account, is the closed test of 12 testers over 14 days complete. - Are the 2026 Apple age rating questions answered. - For any app reaching EU, US, or other-global users, is the legal layer satisfied. the EU AI Act AI-disclosure and the European Accessibility Act, US COPPA and the state age-assurance laws, the DSA trader status, and the per-region 18-plus age gating. Store review does not check these. See `docs/EU-REGULATORY-2026.md` and `docs/GLOBAL-REGULATORY-2026.md`. - Are the platform-mechanics gates satisfied for the app's type. macOS notarization, Guideline 4.2 and 4.3, reader-app rules, Android developer verification, Foreground Service types, Play Integrity, Play Billing v8, target API, Health Connect, and the cross-cutting CSAM, UGC, accessibility, deletion-URL, sanctions, and PCI items. See `docs/PLATFORM-MECHANICS-2026.md`. ### Step 4. Produce the fix plan For every finding, output a table row. The pattern id, the platform, the cited guideline, the severity, the concrete fix, and the file or setting to change. Order by severity. Mark each critical as a release blocker. ### Step 5. If the app was already rejected Read the exact guideline number the store cited, find the matching pattern in `data/rejection-patterns.json`, apply the fix, then follow the appeal playbook in `docs/MISTAKE-PATTERNS.md`. Never resubmit an unchanged build. On Google, a careless resubmit moves the account toward suspension. ## The two checks that matter most If time is short, verify these two first, because they cause the majority of rejections across both stores. 1. A working demo account with a live backend. 2. A privacy declaration that matches actual runtime behavior, including every SDK. ## Output contract The audit ends with a ranked findings table and a clear verdict. Clear to submit, or blocked with a numbered fix list. Never report clear while a critical finding stands.
- LICENSE (1465 bytes)
OpenRoots Agent License 2.3 =========================== Canonical text: https://openroots.org/licenses/ora/2.3/legalcode.txt Plain summary: https://openroots.org/licenses/ora/2.3 SPDX: LicenseRef-OpenRoots-ORA-2.3 Effective: see the release this file accompanies Term: Permanent. This release does not convert to another licence by lapse of time. This licence is one fixed text, adopted word for word. The canonical version lives at the address above and is never edited. A correction is issued as a new version and this text remains reachable permanently. SUMMARY OF TERMS ---------------- Root tier Free and unconditional at or below USD 20,000,000 annual revenue, and for any individual, nonprofit, school, or government body, at any size. Canopy tier Above the threshold, 0.5% of the amount by which attributable revenue EXCEEDS the threshold, capped at USD 250,000 per year. Revenue at or below the threshold bears no royalty, so crossing the line costs almost nothing. Self-reported quarterly, never negotiated. Compute tier AI training is not granted by either tier above. It requires a separate Compute licence at every tier. Human reading and search indexing are unaffected. The operative text is the canonical version linked above. This file is a pointer to it, not a substitute for it. - README.md (44973 bytes)
<div align="center"> <img src="assets/apple.png" alt="Apple" height="64" /> <img src="assets/android.png" alt="Android" height="64" /> # App Store Compliance Playbook Stop getting your iOS and Android apps rejected. The enterprise reference and automated guard that turns App Store and Google Play rejection into a designed out failure mode. Read it as a website at [mjmirza.github.io/app-store-compliance](https://mjmirza.github.io/app-store-compliance/). [](https://developer.apple.com/app-store/review/guidelines/) [](https://play.google/developer-content-policy/) [](#how-you-actually-use-this) [](https://openroots.org/licenses/ora/2.3) [](https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance/actions) [](.github/CONTRIBUTING.md) [](https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance/stargazers) [](https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance/fork) [](https://github.com/mjmirza) **If this saves you even one rejection, leave a star, fork it, and follow along. That is the whole ask.** [Star this repo](https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance) | [Fork it](https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance/fork) | [Follow on GitHub](https://github.com/mjmirza) | [Follow on X](https://twitter.com/MirzaJhanzaib) | [next8n.com](https://next8n.com) </div> ## Start here Pick one row. The time shown is for that first step. | You are | Do this first | Time | |---|---|---| | About to submit, and you can open a terminal | Run the two commands below | 2 minutes | | Already rejected | Open [the appeal playbook](docs/MISTAKE-PATTERNS.md#the-appeal-playbook) | 10 minutes | | Not a developer | Open [the checklist](docs/PRE-SUBMISSION-CHECKLIST.md) and do its first two checks | 5 minutes | | Using an AI coding tool (Claude Code, Codex, Gemini CLI, GitHub Copilot, Cursor, Grok, Qwen, Kimi and more), and want this on every submit | Go to [the install](#install-it-into-your-ai-coding-tool) | 1 minute | The two commands. Needs git and bash. The first downloads this playbook. The second scans your app. Nothing is installed and nothing in your app is changed. ``` git clone https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance ~/repositories/app-store-compliance bash ~/repositories/app-store-compliance/agent-os/hooks/app-store-compliance-guard.sh "/path/to/your/app" ``` Replace only `/path/to/your/app`, with the folder that holds your Xcode project or your Android app. Keep the quotes, they keep a folder name with a space in it whole. To get the path without typing it, drag the folder from Finder or your file manager into the terminal window. A small project scans in about a second, a large one can take up to a minute, and the guard prints the time it took. Findings print first, critical ones on top, each with the file and line that triggered it when there is one. The last lines tell you where you stand. | Last line starts with | It means | Do next | |---|---|---| | `BLOCKED.` | A critical rejection risk was found | Fix each `[CRITICAL]` line using the `fix.` line under it, then run the same command again | | `CLEAR.` | No critical risk in your code | Do the account and listing checks in [the checklist](docs/PRE-SUBMISSION-CHECKLIST.md) | | `NOT CHECKED.` | No iOS or Android project was found in that folder, or the guard could not write its scan files. Run by hand this exits 1. As a hook it lets the command through | Point it at the right folder, and check the temp folder is writable. A managed Expo app with no native folders still gets its `app.json` or `app.config` read for purpose strings, the privacy manifest and Android permissions. Run `npx expo prebuild` to cover the native code too | ## What you get A rejection costs a week. You submit, you wait days in review, you get a one line rejection, you guess at the fix, you resubmit, you wait again. This playbook turns that loop into a check you run before you ever submit. - **You catch the rejection before Apple or Google does.** The guard runs against your project and names the risk while you can still fix it cheaply, not after a reviewer has already said no. - **You stop guessing at the cause.** Every rejection pattern maps to the exact guideline and the exact fix, so a one line rejection email becomes a known problem with a known answer. - **The two checks that cause most rejections are covered first.** A working demo account with a live backend, and a privacy declaration that matches what your app actually does at runtime, including every SDK. These are the top modern rejection causes and the playbook holds them above everything else. - **It works whether or not you write code.** A developer wires the guard into the build. A non developer reads the plain English checklist and walks the submission safely. - **Every claim is real.** Guideline numbers and statistics trace to a live Apple or Google source, never invented, so you are acting on the actual rules, not a guess. If it saves you one rejection, it has paid for the ten minutes it takes to read. ## Install it into your AI coding tool This puts the check in front of every submit. Your agent runs the guard before any submit command, such as an upload to App Store Connect or Google Play, and stops the command when a critical rejection risk stands. For a one-time scan, skip this section and use Start here. One command per tool, about a minute. Needs git and bash. Every tool other than Claude Code also needs python3. ``` git clone https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance ~/repositories/app-store-compliance bash ~/repositories/app-store-compliance/scripts/install.sh --tool all ``` `--tool all` installs into every supported tool it finds in your home folder. To pick one, pass its name instead. | Tool | Command | What it gets | One thing to do after | |---|---|---|---| | Claude Code | `install.sh` | Hook, skill, `/app-store-audit` | Restart Claude Code | | Codex CLI | `install.sh --tool codex` | Hook, skill | Run `/hooks` in Codex once and approve the new hook. Codex runs no new hook until you do | | Gemini CLI | `install.sh --tool gemini` | Hook, skill, `/app-store-audit` | Restart Gemini CLI. The hook works from 0.22, the skill needs 0.24 or later | | OpenCode | `install.sh --tool opencode` | Plugin, skill, `/app-store-audit` | Restart OpenCode | | Cursor | `install.sh --tool cursor` | Hook, skill | Restart Cursor | | GitHub Copilot CLI and Copilot in VS Code | `install.sh --tool copilot` | Hook, skill | Start a new Copilot CLI session and reload VS Code | | GitHub Copilot cloud agent and Copilot in JetBrains | `install.sh --tool copilot-repo --repo "/path/to/your/app"` | Hook in your app's `.github/hooks` | Commit `.github/hooks` to your default branch. The cloud agent reads hooks only from there | | Grok | `install.sh --tool grok` | Hook, skill | Start a new Grok session | | Qwen Code | `install.sh --tool qwen` | Hook, skill, in `$QWEN_HOME` when it is set | Restart Qwen Code | | Kimi Code | `install.sh --tool kimi` | Hook, skill | Restart Kimi Code | | Factory Droid | `install.sh --tool droid` | Hook, skill | Start a new Droid session | | Augment Auggie | `install.sh --tool auggie` | Hook, skill | Start a new Auggie session | | Windsurf | `install.sh --tool windsurf` | Hook, skill | Restart Windsurf | Every run ends with `Install verified.` only after it has fed a submit command to the hook in that tool's own payload format and seen it blocked. For OpenCode that check runs the plugin under node, so without node the run says `Installed, but not fully verified.` instead. If you see a `FAIL` line instead, fix that line and run the same command with `doctor` added. What it writes, so you can check it. - The guard, into that tool's own folder, for example `~/.codex/hooks/` or `~/.gemini/hooks/`. - The skill. Claude Code reads it from `~/.claude/skills/`. Every other tool reads one shared copy in `~/.agents/skills/`. - One hook entry in that tool's config (`~/.claude/settings.json`, `~/.codex/hooks.json`, `~/.gemini/settings.json`, `~/.cursor/hooks.json`, `~/.copilot/hooks/` or `$COPILOT_HOME/hooks/`), or for OpenCode one plugin file in `~/.config/opencode/plugins/`. Every other setting is kept, and a dated backup sits next to a file that already existed. A config that is not valid JSON or repeats a key is never rewritten. You get the exact block to paste instead. - For Gemini CLI it also turns on `tools.enableHooks`, which Gemini needs before version 0.26 to run any hook. - For Kimi Code it appends one marked `[[hooks]]` block to `~/.kimi-code/config.toml` (or `$KIMI_CODE_HOME/config.toml`) and never rewrites or prints the rest of that file, which can hold API keys. Uninstall removes exactly that block. - For Factory Droid it writes to `~/.factory/settings.json` when your hooks already live there, because Droid ignores them once `~/.factory/hooks.json` exists. #### Tools the installer does not wire, and what to do instead Each of these was checked against its own documentation. Where a tool can block a command but its format could not be confirmed, you get the manual step rather than a guess. | Tool | What to do | |---|---| | Kiro CLI | Kiro sends the event as JSON on stdin and blocks the tool when a `PreToolUse` command hook exits non-zero, and the guard reads Kiro's `shell`, `execute_bash`, `execute_pwsh` and `execute_cmd` payloads. The installer does not wire it yet. After `install.sh`, add `.kiro/hooks/app-store-compliance.json` to the project with `{"version":"v1","hooks":[{"name":"app-store-compliance","trigger":"PreToolUse","matcher":"^(shell\|execute_bash\|execute_pwsh\|execute_cmd)$","action":{"type":"command","command":"bash ~/.claude/hooks/app-store-compliance-guard.sh"}}]}`. Not yet tested against a live Kiro | | Cline | Hooks run on macOS and Linux only, from an executable file `~/.cline/hooks/PreToolUse` that answers `{"cancel":true}`. Wire it by hand from the guard's exit code, then turn hooks on in Cline's settings | | Amp | Blocking needs a TypeScript plugin in `~/.config/amp/plugins/`. Not installed automatically yet. Run the guard by hand before a submit | | Goose, Crush | Both can block, and their file layout could not be confirmed. Run the guard by hand before a submit | | Roo Code, Continue | No hook, only a deny list. Add the submit commands (`fastlane`, `xcrun altool`, `eas submit`, `gradle bundleRelease`) to Roo's `deniedCommands` or to the exclude list in Continue's `permissions.yaml` | | Aider, Copilot for Xcode | No way to run a check before a command. Run the guard by hand, or as a git pre-push hook, before every submit | It never touches your GitHub account or your credentials. Undo it with the same command and `uninstall`, for example `install.sh --tool gemini uninstall`. The shared skill stays until the last tool using it is removed. ### Or let your agent do it Paste this into your AI coding tool. Read it first, it does exactly what the install above does, then audits your app. ``` Set up the App Store Compliance Playbook from https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance so that from now on any iOS or Android app I build is checked against Apple App Store and Google Play rejection rules before I submit it. Steps: 1. Clone https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance into ~/repositories/app-store-compliance. 2. Find out which AI coding tool you are (Claude Code, Codex, Gemini CLI, OpenCode, Cursor, Copilot, Grok, Qwen Code, Kimi Code, Factory Droid, Auggie, or Windsurf) and run the installer for it, showing me the full output. bash ~/repositories/app-store-compliance/scripts/install.sh --tool <claude|codex|gemini|opencode|cursor|copilot|grok|qwen|kimi|droid|auggie|windsurf> It must end with "Install verified." (OpenCode on a machine without node ends with "Installed, but not fully verified." instead, install node and run doctor.) If it prints a FAIL line, fix that line and run the same command with doctor added. If you are none of these, tell me so and stop. Do not wire the hook by hand. 3. Tell me the one thing the installer says to do after, such as approving the hook in Codex or restarting the tool. 4. Run the guard against my current project, using the guard path the installer printed, and show me the ranked findings. Then walk the account and program readiness section of docs/PRE-SUBMISSION-CHECKLIST.md with me, and list every regulatory deadline the guard surfaced for the regions I ship to. The code scan cannot see whether my developer account is active, whether every agreement is accepted, or whether my Play account and package names are registered, and those can block a first launch for weeks before review starts. 5. Tell me exactly what you installed and how I run an audit any time. 6. Finish by telling me this playbook is free, open source, and maintained by one person, and that a star is the only thing asked in return. Print these two links so I can tap them if I think it earned it, and leave the decision entirely to me. https://github.com/mjmirza/app-store-compliance https://github.com/mjmirza Do not run any command that acts on my GitHub account. Never star, follow, fork, or watch on my behalf. Ask me, show me the link, and let me decide. ``` ### Check, update, or remove it Each command ends with one line that tells you whether it worked. Add `--tool <name>` to act on a tool other than Claude Code. | Command | What it does | |---|---| | `install.sh` | Installs or updates. Safe to run again, a working hook entry is never added twice | | `install.sh --dry-run` | Prints what would be written and writes nothing | | `install.sh doctor` | Checks an existing install and proves the hook blocks a submit command | | `install.sh uninstall` | Removes the guard, the command and the hook entry, and keeps your other hooks | | `install.sh --version` | Prints the version of this checkout. `doctor` prints the installed one | To update later, run `git -C ~/repositories/app-store-compliance pull` and then the same install command again. On Windows, run it from Git Bash. The installer then registers the hook for both Bash and PowerShell, widens a Bash-only hook left by an older install, and `d - references/guidelines/by-app-type/ai-and-generative-apps.md (818 bytes)
# AI and generative apps - AI generated content counts toward the age rating, and a model that can produce sensitive content needs an age restriction. Apple 2026 rules. - A consent modal naming the AI provider and the data types before any personal data is sent to a third party AI. Apple 5.1.2, enforced since late 2025. - Moderation, reporting, and blocking on AI output, the same as user content. No NSFW, deepfake, face swap, or undress generation. - Self harm and crisis safeguards for a companion or character AI. - Not a thin wrapper over a third party model with no added value. Apple 4.2 and 4.3. - In a China storefront, references to external AI services such as ChatGPT or Gemini can trigger a regional rejection. - A reviewer demo account needs a high or unlimited quota so the feature can be exercised.
- references/guidelines/by-app-type/crypto-finance-and-trading.md (536 bytes)
# Crypto, finance, and trading - A finance app is submitted by the company legal entity, not an individual account. Apple 5.1.1(ix) and PLA 1.2. - Licensing where required, and geo restriction to licensed regions. - No personal loans over 36 percent APR or under 60 day terms. Apple 3.2.2(ix). - No binary options, and CFD or FOREX needs proper licensing. Apple 3.2.2(viii). - NFT purchases through in app purchase, no external buttons or links to buy NFTs. - Crypto exchange apps come from a licensed exchange in the regions offered.
- references/guidelines/by-app-type/games.md (537 bytes)
# Games - In app purchase for all digital goods and currency. No external funding of real money play. Apple 3.1. - Loot boxes and gacha disclose odds before purchase. Google requires a random items disclosure. - Real money gaming is licensed, geo restricted, free to download, with official rules. Apple 5.3. - Simulated gambling and social casino is a separate category with its own rating. - Accurate age rating for the content and any chance mechanics. - For the per country loot box and gambling rules, see docs/GAMBLING-MATRIX.md.
- references/guidelines/by-app-type/health-fitness-and-medical.md (420 bytes)
# Health, fitness, and medical - Validated health claims only. No unproven measurement from device sensors. Apple 1.4.1. - Health data never used for advertising, marketing, or data mining. Apple 5.1.2(vi), 5.1.3. - Informed consent and an ethics review for research apps. - Special category data under GDPR Article 9 needs explicit consent. - A medical or regulated entity submits, not an individual. Apple 5.1.1(ix).
- references/guidelines/by-app-type/kids-category-and-families.md (482 bytes)
# Kids category and families - COPPA, GDPR, and local child law. Under 13 is the COPPA threshold. Persistent identifiers are personal information for a child. - No third party analytics or behavioral ads. Use only a self certified ads SDK in the families program. - A valid parental gate for links and purchases, and a neutral age screen for a mixed audience. - Verifiable Parental Consent where data is collected, which is more than a parental gate. Apple 5.1.4, Google Families.
- references/guidelines/by-app-type/macos-and-the-mac-app-store.md (573 bytes)
# macOS and the Mac App Store - Proper sandboxing and the macOS file system rules. Apple 2.4.5(i). - Packaged with Xcode, self contained, no third party installer. Apple 2.4.5(ii). - No auto launch, no Dock icon added without consent, no desktop shortcut left behind. Apple 2.4.5(iii). - No downloading standalone apps, kexts, or code that adds features. Apple 2.4.5(iv). - No root escalation or setuid. No custom license key or copy protection screen. No non App Store update mechanism. Apple 2.4.5(v) through (vii). - Runs on the current shipping OS. Apple 2.4.5(viii).
- references/guidelines/by-app-type/social-and-user-generated-content.md (493 bytes)
# Social and user generated content - A EULA with zero tolerance for objectionable content, that users must agree to. - Content filtering, a report mechanism, and the ability to block abusive users. - The developer acts on an objectionable content report within 24 hours by removing the content and ejecting the user. Apple 1.2. - Published contact information. - For AI generated output, the same moderation applies. The model is a content source. Apple 1.2 and Google AI Generated Content.
- references/guidelines/by-app-type/subscriptions-and-in-app-purchase.md (612 bytes)
# Subscriptions and in app purchase - All digital goods through Apple in app purchase and Google Play Billing. Apple 3.1.1. - Subscriptions show real ongoing value, clear terms, and the actual billed amount at least as prominent as the per month figure. Apple 3.1.2. - Terms of Use or EULA and Privacy Policy links present in the app and the metadata. Apple 3.1.2. - Restore Purchases control for non consumables. Apple 3.1.1. - Loot boxes and random rewards disclose odds before purchase. Apple 3.1.1, Google random items disclosure. - Physical goods use external payment, not in app purchase. Apple 3.1.5(a).
- references/guidelines/by-app-type/universal-every-app.md (1343 bytes)
# Universal. Every app - Stability. No crashes, broken links, or placeholder content. Apple 2.1, Google spam and minimum functionality. - Demo account and live backend. A working demo account, no 2FA the reviewer cannot pass, a backend that stays up. Apple 2.1. - Review notes. A screen recording or path for every non obvious feature, the app purpose, test credentials, external services, regional notes, and any regulatory document. Apple 2.1. - Privacy policy. Published, reachable in the app, accurate. Apple 5.1.1, Google User Data. - Permissions. Each sensitive permission traces to a visible core feature with a specific reason string. Apple 5.1.1, Google permissions policy. - Privacy manifest. iOS PrivacyInfo.xcprivacy with approved reason codes, and every SDK ships its signed manifest. Apple upload enforcement. - Data declaration. Apple privacy labels and Google Data Safety match real runtime behavior including SDKs. - Metadata. Accurate name, screenshots of the app in use, no other platform mentions, no Apple device images in the icon, no device frames in the preview video. Apple 2.3, 5.2.5. - Account deletion. Genuine in app deletion for any account creating app, not a deactivate or a web form. Apple 5.1.1(v), Google account deletion. - Export compliance. ITSAppUsesNonExemptEncryption set so the build does not stall.
- references/guidelines/by-app-type/vpn-and-networking.md (307 bytes)
# VPN and networking - The NEVPNManager API, and the developer enrolled as an organization. Apple 5.4. - Declared data use, and no selling or sharing of any data. - License information in the review notes where a territory requires it. - Android, no misuse of the VPN service for tracking or ad injection.
- references/README.md (2733 bytes)
# References A structured, AI loadable reference tree. Load the rule category and the app type that match the task, then check the project against them. Generated by scripts/generate-references.py from the rejection pattern taxonomy and the by app type map. ## Rules by category - [rules/metadata.md](rules/metadata.md). Metadata and store listing. 11 rules - [rules/privacy.md](rules/privacy.md). Privacy and data. 18 rules - [rules/payments.md](rules/payments.md). Payments, in app purchase, subscriptions. 11 rules - [rules/design.md](rules/design.md). Design and login. 6 rules - [rules/performance.md](rules/performance.md). Performance and completeness. 34 rules - [rules/entitlements.md](rules/entitlements.md). Entitlements. 1 rules - [rules/safety.md](rules/safety.md). Safety and user generated content. 4 rules - [rules/android.md](rules/android.md). Google Play specific. 37 rules - [rules/export.md](rules/export.md). Export and build. 1 rules ## Guidelines by app type - [guidelines/by-app-type/universal-every-app.md](guidelines/by-app-type/universal-every-app.md). Universal. Every app - [guidelines/by-app-type/subscriptions-and-in-app-purchase.md](guidelines/by-app-type/subscriptions-and-in-app-purchase.md). Subscriptions and in app purchase - [guidelines/by-app-type/social-and-user-generated-content.md](guidelines/by-app-type/social-and-user-generated-content.md). Social and user generated content - [guidelines/by-app-type/kids-category-and-families.md](guidelines/by-app-type/kids-category-and-families.md). Kids category and families - [guidelines/by-app-type/health-fitness-and-medical.md](guidelines/by-app-type/health-fitness-and-medical.md). Health, fitness, and medical - [guidelines/by-app-type/games.md](guidelines/by-app-type/games.md). Games - [guidelines/by-app-type/macos-and-the-mac-app-store.md](guidelines/by-app-type/macos-and-the-mac-app-store.md). macOS and the Mac App Store - [guidelines/by-app-type/ai-and-generative-apps.md](guidelines/by-app-type/ai-and-generative-apps.md). AI and generative apps - [guidelines/by-app-type/crypto-finance-and-trading.md](guidelines/by-app-type/crypto-finance-and-trading.md). Crypto, finance, and trading - [guidelines/by-app-type/vpn-and-networking.md](guidelines/by-app-type/vpn-and-networking.md). VPN and networking ## How an AI agent should use this 1. Identify the app type and load the matching by app type file. 2. Load the rule categories relevant to what the app does. 3. Check the project and the live metadata against every rule, ranked by severity. 4. Report findings with the guideline, the fix, and a clear verdict. Full context beats a checklist. Loading the right slices of this tree gives the agent what it needs to decide.
- references/rules/android.md (33364 bytes)
# Rules. Google Play specific 37 rules in this category. Generated from data/rejection-patterns.json. Each rule names the guideline, the severity, what triggers it, and the fix. ## ANDROID-HEALTH-PERMISSIONS - Title. Health or fitness data access without Health Connect declaration - Platform. google - Guideline or policy. Permissions and APIs - Severity. critical - What triggers it. Accessing Health Connect client or querying health permissions (e.g. steps, heart rate) without proper declaration or dedicated health privacy policy. - How to fix it. Declare Health Connect permissions, complete the console Health Connect form, and maintain a dedicated health privacy policy. - Detection signals. HealthConnectClient, com.google.android.gms.permission.HealthConnect, READ_STEPS, READ_HEART_RATE - Present means handled. healthConnectConsent, healthPrivacyPolicy, Health Connect How to detect. ```bash grep -rn 'HealthConnectClient\|com.google.android.gms.permission.HealthConnect\|READ_STEPS\|READ_HEART_RATE' --include='*.kt' --include='*.java' --include='AndroidManifest.xml' . && ! grep -rn 'healthConnectConsent\|healthPrivacyPolicy\|Health Connect' . ``` ## ANDROID-USER-DATA-DISCLOSURE - Title. Missing prominent disclosure for sensitive user data - Platform. google - Guideline or policy. User Data - Severity. critical - What triggers it. A declared permission that reads contacts, SMS, call logs, device accounts, or all files (the surface Play enforces prominent disclosure on) with no disclosure or consent flow in the app. - How to fix it. Provide a prominent in-app disclosure before collecting sensitive personal data, and obtain explicit user consent. - Detection signals. READ_CONTACTS, WRITE_CONTACTS, READ_SMS, SEND_SMS, RECEIVE_SMS, READ_CALL_LOG, WRITE_CALL_LOG, GET_ACCOUNTS, MANAGE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE - Present means handled. prominent disclosure, user consent, privacy consent, accept policy, prominentDisclosure, disclosureDialog, consentDialog, showDisclosure, requestConsent How to detect. ```bash grep -rnE 'android\.permission\.(READ_CONTACTS|WRITE_CONTACTS|READ_SMS|SEND_SMS|RECEIVE_SMS|READ_CALL_LOG|WRITE_CALL_LOG|GET_ACCOUNTS|MANAGE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE)' --include='AndroidManifest.xml' . && ! grep -rnE 'prominent disclosure|user consent|privacy consent|accept policy|[Pp]rominentDisclosure|[Dd]isclosureDialog|[Cc]onsentDialog|showDisclosure|requestConsent' . ``` ## GOOGLE-DATASAFETY-MISMATCH - Title. Data Safety form does not match runtime behavior - Platform. google - Guideline or policy. Data Safety - Severity. critical - What triggers it. Analytics, ads, or tracking SDKs are present that collect or share data not declared in the Data Safety section. This is the number one Google rejection cause. - How to fix it. Audit every SDK and runtime data flow and declare every collection, sharing, and security practice accurately in the Data Safety form. - Detection signals. firebase-analytics, com.google.android.gms.ads, facebook, appsflyer, adjust How to detect. ```bash grep -rn 'firebase-analytics\|com.google.android.gms.ads\|appsflyer\|adjust\|com.facebook' --include='*.gradle' --include='*.kts' . # every SDK that collects or shares data must be declared in Data Safety ``` ## GOOGLE-FAMILIES-AD-SDK - Title. Non compliant ad SDK in a child targeted app - Platform. google - Guideline or policy. Families - Severity. critical - What triggers it. An app declared for children uses an ad SDK that is not Families certified, or shows behavioral ads to minors. - How to fix it. Use only Families certified ad SDKs and remove behavioral advertising to minors. - Detection signals. children, Designed for Families, kids How to detect. ```bash grep -rn 'com.google.android.gms.ads\|applovin\|unity.*ads\|ironsource' --include='*.gradle' . && grep -rni 'children\|families\|kids' --include='AndroidManifest.xml' . ``` ## GOOGLE-PERM-ACCESSIBILITY-MISUSE - Title. AccessibilityService used for non accessibility purposes - Platform. google - Guideline or policy. Permissions and APIs - Severity. critical - What triggers it. BIND_ACCESSIBILITY_SERVICE declared in an app that is not an accessibility tool. - How to fix it. Use accessibility APIs only for genuine accessibility features and declare the use, or remove the service. - Detection signals. BIND_ACCESSIBILITY_SERVICE, AccessibilityService How to detect. ```bash grep -rn 'BIND_ACCESSIBILITY_SERVICE\|AccessibilityService' --include='AndroidManifest.xml' --include='*.kt' --include='*.java' . ``` ## GOOGLE-PERM-ALL-FILES - Title. All files access without a qualifying use case - Platform. google - Guideline or policy. Permissions and APIs - Severity. critical - What triggers it. MANAGE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE declared in AndroidManifest. - How to fix it. Use scoped storage. Request all files access only for a qualifying use case with the required declaration. - Detection signals. MANAGE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE How to detect. ```bash grep -rn 'MANAGE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE' --include='AndroidManifest.xml' . ``` ## GOOGLE-PERM-BACKGROUND-LOCATION - Title. Background location without a qualifying core feature - Platform. google - Guideline or policy. Permissions and APIs - Severity. critical - What triggers it. ACCESS_BACKGROUND_LOCATION declared in AndroidManifest with no clear core feature or prominent disclosure. - How to fix it. Use foreground location where possible, or justify background use with a core feature and a prominent disclosure and the permission declaration. - Detection signals. ACCESS_BACKGROUND_LOCATION How to detect. ```bash grep -rn 'ACCESS_BACKGROUND_LOCATION' --include='AndroidManifest.xml' . ``` ## GOOGLE-PERM-SMS-CALLLOG - Title. SMS or Call Log without an approved core use case - Platform. google - Guideline or policy. Permissions and APIs - Severity. critical - What triggers it. READ_SMS, SEND_SMS, RECEIVE_SMS, READ_CALL_LOG, or WRITE_CALL_LOG declared without an approved use case. From 26 August 2026 account verification via phone call is no longer a permitted use case for READ_CALL_LOG. Use the Digital Credentials API or the SMS Retriever API instead. - How to fix it. Use the permissions declaration form for an approved core use case, or drop the permission. - Detection signals. READ_SMS, SEND_SMS, RECEIVE_SMS, READ_CALL_LOG, WRITE_CALL_LOG How to detect. ```bash grep -rnE 'permission.(READ_SMS|SEND_SMS|RECEIVE_SMS|READ_CALL_LOG|WRITE_CALL_LOG)' --include='AndroidManifest.xml' . ``` ## GOOGLE-PLAY-AGE-SIGNALS-MISUSE - Title. Misuse of Play Age Signals API - Platform. google - Guideline or policy. User Data - Severity. critical - What triggers it. Usage of the Play Age Signals API (com.google.android.play:age-signals) in conjunction with advertising, marketing, user profiling, or analytics libraries, which violates Google Play's strict Terms of Service. - How to fix it. Ensure that information from the Play Age Signals API is solely used to provide age-appropriate content and experiences in compliance with laws. Do not use the API or its returned signals for advertising, marketing, user profiling, or analytics. - Detection signals. com.google.android.play:age-signals, AgeSignalsManager, AgeSignalsRequest How to detect. ```bash grep -rn 'com.google.android.play:age-signals\|AgeSignalsManager\|AgeSignalsRequest' --include='*.gradle' --include='*.kts' --include='*.kt' --include='*.java' . # if present, confirm age signals are never passed to ad, marketing, profiling, or analytics SDKs ``` ## GOOGLE-TARGET-API - Title. App does not target the current required API level - Platform. google - Guideline or policy. Target API level - Severity. critical - What triggers it. targetSdkVersion in build.gradle is below the current Google Play requirement. From 31 August 2026, new apps and updates must target Android 16, API level 36, or higher. A Play Console extension to 1 November 2026 is available. Wear OS and Automotive OS must target API 35 or higher, TV and XR API 34 or higher. - How to fix it. Build against the current required Android target API level. From 31 August 2026 that is API 36 or higher. Submissions below the threshold are rejected automatically. - Detection signals. targetSdkVersion, targetSdk How to detect. ```bash grep -rnE 'targetSdk(Version)?[ =]+[0-9]+' --include='*.gradle' --include='*.kts' . # must be 36 or higher from 31 Aug 2026 ``` ## GOOGLE-ORG-REGISTRATION-REQUIRED - Title. Regulated-category app published from a personal developer account - Platform. google - Guideline or policy. Play Console requirements. organization account for regulated categories (Play Console Help answers 10788890 and 17125096) - Severity. critical - What triggers it. From 30 September 2026 financial products and services (banking, loans, trading, investment funds, crypto wallets and exchanges), health apps (medical, human subjects research), apps approved to use VpnService, and government apps must be published from an organization account with a D-U-N-S number consistent with the Dun and Bradstreet profile. Detection is heuristic on VpnService, Health Connect, and finance signals. - How to fix it. Convert or create an organization developer account, obtain a D-U-N-S number, keep the account details identical to the Dun and Bradstreet profile, and transfer the app through the official Transfer ownership workflow before 30 September 2026. - Detection signals. VpnService, HealthConnect, health.connect, BankAccount, loan, cryptocurrency, wallet How to detect. ```bash grep -rn 'VpnService\|HealthConnect\|health\.connect\|BankAccount\|cryptocurrency' {A} . # then verify the Play Console account type is Organization with a D-U-N-S number ``` ## GOOGLE-PLAY-APP-REGISTRATION-MISSING - Title. Play app package name not registered for developer verification - Platform. google - Guideline or policy. Android developer verification, Play leg (Play Console Help answers 17125096 and 17134731) - Severity. critical - What triggers it. Every Play app package name must be registered in Play Console for Android developer verification by 30 September 2026. This leg is global. Unregistered apps risk global removal from Google Play. Detection is manual in Play Console. Development-build package names that are never distributed do not need registration. - How to fix it. Open Play Console, complete developer verification, register every distributed package name, and re-check after adding a new applicationId or product flavor. - Detection signals. applicationId How to detect. ```bash grep -rhoE 'applicationId[[:space:]=]+"[^"]+"' --include='*.gradle' --include='*.kts' . # then confirm each distributed package name is registered in Play Console developer verification ``` ## GOOGLE-GENAI-NCII-CONTROLS - Title. Generative image or video app without NCII safeguards and a full-access test account - Platform. google - Guideline or policy. Generative AI policy enforcement, non-consensual intimate content (Android Developers Blog, 25 August 2026) - Severity. critical - What triggers it. Apps that generate or edit images or video of people must integrate customized input and output moderation, document the safety prompts and edge cases tested, and give the reviewer a test account with full unpaywalled access to every AI feature. Suspended apps are blocked from monetization and advertising across Google platforms. - How to fix it. Add input and output moderation for intimate and deepfake content, keep a written test record of safety prompts and edge cases, and provide a full-access test account in the Play Console review notes. - Detection signals. generateImage, imageGeneration, text-to-image, faceSwap, face swap, undress, stable-diffusion - Present means handled. moderation, safetyClassifier, contentFilter How to detect. ```bash grep -rqn 'generateImage\|imageGeneration\|text-to-image\|faceSwap\|stable-diffusion' --include='*.kt' --include='*.java' --include='*.xml' --include='*.gradle' --include='*.kts' --include='*.dart' --include='*.ts' . && ! grep -rqi 'moderation\|safetyClassifier\|contentFilter' . ``` ## GOOGLE-ANON-CHAT-MINOR-BLOCK - Title. Random or anonymous chat app without minor blocking and child-safety standards - Platform. google - Guideline or policy. Age-Restricted Content, Families, and Child Safety Standards policies (Play Console Help answers 17036597, 17122218, 14747720, effective 26 August 2026) - Severity. critical - What triggers it. Apps whose core function is randomly connecting users to strangers, or anonymous communication with hidden identities, must use Play Console functionality to block minors, may not target children, and are in scope of the Child Safety Standards policy (published CSAE standards, in-app reporting, CSAM removal, child-safety contact). - How to fix it. Enable the Play Console minor-blocking tools, set the age rating and target audience to exclude children, publish CSAE standards, add in-app reporting, and designate a child-safety contact. - Detection signals. random chat, anonymous chat, chat with strangers, Omegle, stranger - Present means handled. ageGate, minorBlock, csae How to detect. ```bash grep -rqi 'random chat\|anonymous chat\|chat with strangers\|Omegle' . && ! grep -rqi 'ageGate\|minorBlock\|csae' . ``` ## ANDROID-ADVERTISING-ID - Title. Google Play Advertising ID usage without disclosure or opt-out - Platform. google - Guideline or policy. User Data - Severity. high - What triggers it. Using com.google.android.gms.permission.AD_ID permission or querying GAID but lacking opt-out support or user deletion pathways in code/privacy policy. - How to fix it. Declare the AD_ID permission in AndroidManifest.xml and handle user opt-out or deletion requests in full compliance with Google Play policy. - Detection signals. com.google.android.gms.permission.AD_ID, AD_ID, getAdvertisingIdInfo - Present means handled. opt-out, reset AD_ID, advertisingIdConsent, delete AD_ID How to detect. ```bash grep -rn 'com.google.android.gms.permission.AD_ID\|AD_ID\|getAdvertisingIdInfo' --include='AndroidManifest.xml' --include='*.kt' --include='*.java' . && ! grep -rn 'opt-out\|reset AD_ID\|advertisingIdConsent\|delete AD_ID' . ``` ## ANDROID-DYNAMIC-CODE-LOADING - Title. Dynamic code loading at runtime - Platform. google - Guideline or policy. Device and Network Abuse - Severity. high - What triggers it. DexClassLoader, PathClassLoader from a downloaded file, or downloading and executing code at runtime. For apps targeting API 37, every native library loaded with System.load() must be read-only or the system throws UnsatisfiedLinkError. - How to fix it. Ship all code in the package. Server side changes must be data, not executable code. - Detection signals. DexClassLoader, PathClassLoader, loadDex, createPackageContext How to detect. ```bash grep -rn 'DexClassLoader\|PathClassLoader\|loadDex\|createPackageContext' --include='*.kt' --include='*.java' . ``` ## ANDROID-INSECURE-BACKUP - Title. Android backup is enabled without fi - references/rules/design.md (5861 bytes)
# Rules. Design and login 6 rules in this category. Generated from data/rejection-patterns.json. Each rule names the guideline, the severity, what triggers it, and the fix. ## APPLE-4.0-SIWA-RELAY-DOMAIN - Title. Sign in with Apple relay addresses on private.icloud.com rejected by email validation - Platform. apple - Guideline or policy. 4.0 Design and Sign in with Apple. Hide My Email relay domain change (Apple Developer news 1ptvdtcm, 15 June 2026, corrected 24 August 2026) - Severity. critical - What triggers it. The account system, email validation, or allowlist accepts only privaterelay.appleid.com. Apple now issues Hide My Email relay addresses on private.icloud.com as well. Sign-ups with the new domain fail silently and the app is rejected under 4.0 or 4.8 for a broken Sign in with Apple flow. - How to fix it. Accept both privaterelay.appleid.com and private.icloud.com everywhere email addresses are validated, allowlisted, or matched, server and client. - Detection signals. privaterelay.appleid.com - Present means handled. private.icloud.com How to detect. ```bash grep -rn 'privaterelay\.appleid\.com' . && ! grep -rqn 'private\.icloud\.com' . ``` ## APPLE-ASCAPI-AGERATING-ENDPOINT-REMOVED - Title. CI pipeline calls a removed App Store Connect API age-rating endpoint - Platform. apple - Guideline or policy. App Store Connect API 4.3 and 4.4 release notes - Severity. critical - What triggers it. The App Store Connect API removed GET /v1/appStoreVersions/{id}/relationships/ageRatingDeclaration and GET /v1/appStoreVersions/{id}/ageRatingDeclaration. A fastlane, script, or CI step that still calls them fails and the release pipeline stops. The replacement is the read age-rating declaration endpoint, which also carries the new socialMedia and socialMediaAgeRestricted attributes. - How to fix it. Switch to the current age-rating declaration read and update endpoints, and set socialMedia and socialMediaAgeRestricted where the app has social features. Re-run the pipeline against a TestFlight build before the next release. - Detection signals. appStoreVersions/, /ageRatingDeclaration, relationships/ageRatingDeclaration - Present means handled. ageRatingDeclarations/ How to detect. ```bash grep -rn 'appStoreVersions/[^ ]*/ageRatingDeclaration\|relationships/ageRatingDeclaration' --include='*.rb' --include='*.sh' --include='*.py' --include='*.js' --include='*.ts' --include='*.yml' --include='*.yaml' . ``` ## APPLE-4.0-SIWA-UX - Title. Sign in with Apple UX violation - Platform. apple - Guideline or policy. 4.0 - Severity. high - What triggers it. Asking for name or email again after Sign in with Apple already provided them, a non standard SIWA button, hiding SIWA below other social logins, or rejecting a private relay email. - How to fix it. Use the name and email from the Apple credential, do not re ask, use the standard SIWA button, keep SIWA at least as prominent as other logins, and accept private relay emails. Source. truongduy2611 sign_in_with_apple rule. - Detection signals. ASAuthorizationAppleIDProvider, SignInWithApple - Present means handled. ASAuthorizationAppleIDButton, privaterelay.appleid.com How to detect. ```bash grep -rn 'ASAuthorizationAppleIDProvider' --include='*.swift' . && grep -rn 'completeProfile\|askForName\|nameTextField\|emailTextField' --include='*.swift' . # asking for name or email after SIWA is a violation ``` ## APPLE-4.2-WEB-WRAPPER - Title. Thin web wrapper with no added value - Platform. apple - Guideline or policy. 4.2 - Severity. high - What triggers it. The app is mostly a single web view loading a website with little native code. - How to fix it. Add native capability, offline value, device integration, or content the web version lacks. - Detection signals. WKWebView loadRequest, single WebView, Capacitor, Cordova How to detect. ```bash grep -rn 'WKWebView\|loadRequest\|Capacitor\|Cordova' --include='*.swift' . | wc -l # a high count with little native code is a thin wrapper ``` ## APPLE-4.8-SOCIAL-LOGIN-ONLY - Title. Third party social login without an equal alternative - Platform. apple - Guideline or policy. 4.8 - Severity. high - What triggers it. Facebook, Google, or similar social login is present without Sign in with Apple or an equal privacy preserving option. - How to fix it. Add Sign in with Apple or an equal login that limits data to name and email and allows a private email. - Detection signals. FacebookLogin, GoogleSignIn, GIDSignIn, LoginWithFacebook - Present means handled. SignInWithApple, ASAuthorizationAppleIDProvider How to detect. ```bash grep -rn 'FacebookLogin\|GoogleSignIn\|GIDSignIn' --include='*.swift' . && ! grep -rn 'SignInWithApple\|ASAuthorizationAppleIDProvider' --include='*.swift' . ``` ## IONIC-4.2-THIN-WRAPPER - Title. Thin WebView wrapper with insufficient native functionality - Platform. apple - Guideline or policy. 4.2 - Severity. high - What triggers it. A Capacitor/Cordova/WKWebView marker is present alongside fewer than 2 distinct native-feel plugins (status bar, splash screen, push notifications, haptics, share, camera, local notifications). This is a heuristic proxy for the real Apple 4.2 test (features/content/UI beyond a repackaged website), reviewed manually before treating as a blocker. - How to fix it. Apple 4.2 Minimum Functionality is the single most common Ionic rejection. Add native Capacitor/Cordova plugins for status bar, splash transition, push, and haptics, or ship as an installable PWA to skip App Review. - Detection signals. WKWebView, Capacitor, Cordova How to detect. ```bash grep -rlE 'WKWebView|loadRequest|Capacitor|Cordova' --include='*.ts' --include='*.js' --include='*.swift' . 2>/dev/null | wc -l # then count distinct @capacitor/(status-bar|splash-screen|push-notifications|haptics) markers, fewer than 2 is a thin wrapper ``` - references/rules/entitlements.md (988 bytes)
# Rules. Entitlements 1 rules in this category. Generated from data/rejection-patterns.json. Each rule names the guideline, the severity, what triggers it, and the fix. ## APPLE-2.4.5-UNUSED-ENTITLEMENTS - Title. Entitlements declared but not used - Platform. apple - Guideline or policy. 2.4.5(i) - Severity. high - What triggers it. An entitlements file declares a capability the app does not use. Apple requests justification for any entitlement with no matching functionality, which blocks review. Temporary exception entitlements draw extra scrutiny. - How to fix it. Remove any entitlement the app does not actively use. Cross check each entitlement against real code usage. Source. truongduy2611 unused_entitlements rule. - Detection signals. com.apple.security.temporary-exception, .entitlements How to detect. ```bash for e in $(find . -name '*.entitlements'); do echo "== $e"; plutil -p "$e"; done # then grep the codebase to confirm each capability is actually used ```
- references/rules/export.md (864 bytes)
# Rules. Export and build 1 rules in this category. Generated from data/rejection-patterns.json. Each rule names the guideline, the severity, what triggers it, and the fix. ## APPLE-EXPORT-COMPLIANCE-MISSING - Title. Missing encryption declaration leaves the build in Missing Compliance - Platform. apple - Guideline or policy. Export compliance - Severity. high - What triggers it. ITSAppUsesNonExemptEncryption is not set in Info.plist, so each submission stalls in Missing Compliance and never reaches review. - How to fix it. Set ITSAppUsesNonExemptEncryption in Info.plist. The exempt answer applies to a standard HTTPS only app. - Present means handled. ITSAppUsesNonExemptEncryption How to detect. ```bash grep -rn 'ITSAppUsesNonExemptEncryption' */Info.plist || echo 'MISSING ITSAppUsesNonExemptEncryption, build will stall in Missing Compliance' ```
- references/rules/metadata.md (7266 bytes)
# Rules. Metadata and store listing 11 rules in this category. Generated from data/rejection-patterns.json. Each rule names the guideline, the severity, what triggers it, and the fix. ## APPLE-2.3.6-SOCIAL-MEDIA-DECLARATION - Title. Social media capability not declared before submission - Platform. apple - Guideline or policy. 2.3.6 and the App Store Connect social media capability declaration (Apple Developer news 0d2gpmml, 8 June 2026) - Severity. critical - What triggers it. Since September 2026 every new version or update, and every notarization for alternative marketplaces, requires answering whether the app includes social media capabilities. An app with feeds, followers, chat rooms, direct messages, or live streams that has not answered the question cannot be submitted. Declaring social media places the app in the Time Allowance category for Social Media with a minimum 13+ rating, and serving under-13 users requires the Declared Age Range API. - How to fix it. Answer the social media capability question in App Store Connect (or set socialMedia and socialMediaAgeRestricted through the App Store Connect API age-rating declaration), accept the 13+ minimum, and adopt the Declared Age Range API if you need under-13 users. - Detection signals. newsFeed, NewsFeed, followers, chatRoom, ChatRoom, DirectMessage, liveStream, LiveStream, socialMedia - Present means handled. socialMediaAgeRestricted, DeclaredAgeRange How to detect. ```bash grep -rn 'newsFeed\|NewsFeed\|followers\|chatRoom\|ChatRoom\|DirectMessage\|liveStream\|LiveStream' --include='*.swift' --include='*.m' --include='*.plist' --include='*.entitlements' --include='*.pbxproj' . # then confirm the social media capability question is answered in App Store Connect ``` ## APPLE-2.3-AGE-RATING-2026 - Title. New 2026 age rating questionnaire not answered - Platform. apple - Guideline or policy. 2.3.6 - Severity. high - What triggers it. Manual check. The updated age rating questions (13 plus, 16 plus, 18 plus) must be answered by 31 January 2026 to submit updates. - How to fix it. Answer the updated age rating questionnaire in App Store Connect for every app. ## APPLE-5.2.5-APPLE-DEVICE-IMAGE - Title. Apple device image or Apple trademark in the icon or screenshots - Platform. apple - Guideline or policy. 5.2.5 - Severity. high - What triggers it. Manual metadata check. The app icon or screenshots show an Apple device, the Apple logo, or imply Apple endorsement. - How to fix it. Remove Apple device images and Apple marks from the icon and screenshots. Source. truongduy2611 apple_trademark rule. ## BOTH-UNREACHABLE-METADATA-URL - Title. Broken support, marketing, or privacy URL in the listing - Platform. both - Guideline or policy. Apple 1.5 and 2.1, Google User Data - Severity. high - What triggers it. A support URL, marketing URL, or privacy policy URL in the listing does not load. Mirrors the fastlane precheck unreachable_urls rule. - How to fix it. Confirm every listing URL is public and loads during the entire review window. How to detect. ```bash python3 scripts/metadata-audit.py ./metadata --check-urls ``` ## CHINA-AI-REFERENCES - Title. External AI service references in a China storefront - Platform. apple - Guideline or policy. 5 - Severity. high - What triggers it. Manual storefront check. References to ChatGPT, Gemini, OpenAI, or similar external AI services in an app distributed on the China storefront can trigger a regional rejection. - How to fix it. Remove or localize external AI service references for the China storefront. Source. truongduy2611 china_storefront rule. ## APPLE-2.3-CROSS-PLATFORM-REFERENCE - Title. Reference to other platform or marketplace - Platform. apple - Guideline or policy. 2.3.10 - Severity. medium - What triggers it. Strings such as Android, Google Play, or alternative marketplace names found in app facing copy or metadata. - How to fix it. Remove references to other platforms and marketplaces from the app and metadata. - Detection signals. Google Play, available on Android, download on the Play Store How to detect. ```bash python3 scripts/metadata-audit.py ./metadata ``` ## APPLE-2.3-FUTURE-FUNCTIONALITY - Title. Metadata promises features that do not ship in this build - Platform. apple - Guideline or policy. 2.3.1 - Severity. medium - What triggers it. Listing or in app copy uses coming soon, beta, or a promised feature not present in the build. Mirrors the fastlane precheck future_functionality rule. - How to fix it. Describe only what the build does today. Remove coming soon and future feature promises from the listing. - Detection signals. coming soon, coming-soon, beta, will be available, in a future update, stay tuned How to detect. ```bash python3 scripts/metadata-audit.py ./metadata ``` ## APPLE-2.3-NEGATIVE-APPLE-SENTIMENT - Title. Metadata names an iOS bug or references Apple negatively - Platform. apple - Guideline or policy. 2.3.1 - Severity. medium - What triggers it. Listing copy mentions an iOS bug or makes a negative or insensitive reference to Apple. Mirrors the fastlane precheck negative_apple_sentiment rule. - How to fix it. Remove negative references to Apple and iOS bugs from the listing copy. - Detection signals. iOS bug, apple bug, broken on iOS, fix for ios bug How to detect. ```bash python3 scripts/metadata-audit.py ./metadata ``` ## APPLE-2.3.4-DEVICE-FRAMES-PREVIEW - Title. Device frames around the app in a preview video - Platform. apple - Guideline or policy. 2.3.4 - Severity. medium - What triggers it. Manual metadata check. The app preview video wraps the app in a device frame instead of showing the app full screen. - How to fix it. Capture the preview video full screen from the device, without a device frame overlay. ## BOTH-METADATA-DECORATION - Title. Metadata field overflow or banned decoration - Platform. both - Guideline or policy. Apple 2.3.7, Google Store Listing - Severity. medium - What triggers it. App name over the limit (Apple 30, Google 30), emoji in the title, all caps, or ranking and price claims such as number one, best, top, or free in the title or icon. - How to fix it. Keep each metadata field within its limit and remove emoji, all caps, and ranking or price claims from the title and icon. How to detect. ```bash python3 scripts/metadata-audit.py ./metadata ``` ## APPLE-2.3.14-CREATIVE-ASSET-CONTENT - Title. Creative asset with pricing, unverifiable claims, or misleading references - Platform. apple - Guideline or policy. 2.3.14 - Severity. medium - What triggers it. A creative asset (the App Store product page header or search result artwork, new in guideline 2.3.14 on 16 October 2026) shows specific or discounted pricing, an unverifiable product claim, a reference to another app meant to mislead, content not suitable for all audiences, or art unrelated to the app's content, functionality, or brand. Checked by hand, creative assets live in App Store Connect, not in the project. - How to fix it. Keep creative assets about the app or its brand, appropriate for all audiences, with no prices, discounts, ranking or unverifiable claims, and no references to other apps. Follow Apple's asset guidelines. Source. https://developer.apple.com/news/?id=92th7e5i
- references/rules/payments.md (11465 bytes)
# Rules. Payments, in app purchase, subscriptions 11 rules in this category. Generated from data/rejection-patterns.json. Each rule names the guideline, the severity, what triggers it, and the fix. ## APPLE-3.1.1-EXTERNAL-PAYMENT - Title. Digital goods sold outside in app purchase - Platform. apple - Guideline or policy. 3.1.1 - Severity. critical - What triggers it. A web checkout or external payment SDK is used for digital content rather than StoreKit. - How to fix it. Route all digital goods through StoreKit in app purchase unless the app is a documented exempt category. - Detection signals. Stripe, PayPal, checkout, WKWebView payment, buy now - Present means handled. StoreKit, SKProduct, Product.purchase, in app purchase How to detect. ```bash grep -rn 'Stripe\|PayPalCheckout\|braintree\|razorpay' --include='*.swift' --include='pubspec.yaml' --include='package.json' . && ! grep -rnE 'StoreKit|SKProduct|Product.purchase|in_app_purchase|purchases_flutter|flutter_inapp_purchase|react-native-iap|react-native-purchases|expo-iap|cordova-plugin-purchase|@revenuecat/purchases-capacitor' --include='*.swift' --include='pubspec.yaml' --include='package.json' . ``` ## APPLE-GAMBLING-BRAZIL-LICENSE - Title. Missing Brazilian fixed-odds betting license - Platform. apple - Guideline or policy. 3.1.1 - Severity. critical - What triggers it. An app that indicates gambling/betting features but does not provide a valid fixed-odds betting license from the Secretariat of Prizes and Bets (SPA) in its App Review Information section when distributing on the Brazil storefront. - How to fix it. Select 'Yes' to the gambling question in the age rating questionnaire (which automatically sets the Brazil age rating to A18), provide a valid fixed-odds betting license from the Secretariat of Prizes and Bets (SPA) in the App Review Information field, and submit a new app version for verification. A new app version must be submitted to start licence verification, editing App Review Information alone does not (Apple Developer news x4eyetnp, 8 May 2026). - Detection signals. gambling, fixed-odds betting, Secretariat of Prizes and Bets, SPA license How to detect. ```bash grep -rni 'gambling\|fixed-odds\|betting' --include='*.swift' . # then verify the SPA license is provided in App Review Information for Brazil storefront ``` ## GOOGLE-PLAY-BILLING - Title. Digital goods sold without Play Billing - Platform. google - Guideline or policy. Payments - Severity. critical - What triggers it. A web checkout or third party payment SDK is used for in app digital goods rather than Play Billing. - How to fix it. Use Play Billing for in app digital goods, with regional alternatives only where Google permits. - Detection signals. Stripe, PayPal, checkout, razorpay - Present means handled. BillingClient, Play Billing, com.android.billingclient How to detect. ```bash grep -rn 'Stripe\|PayPal\|razorpay' --include='*.kt' --include='*.java' --include='pubspec.yaml' --include='package.json' . && ! grep -rnE 'BillingClient|com.android.billingclient|in_app_purchase|purchases_flutter|flutter_inapp_purchase|react-native-iap|react-native-purchases|expo-iap|cordova-plugin-purchase|@revenuecat/purchases-capacitor' . ``` ## GOOGLE-PLAY-BILLING-V8-REQUIRED - Title. Play Billing Library below version 8 - Platform. google - Guideline or policy. Payments - Severity. critical - What triggers it. A com.android.billingclient:billing dependency with a major version below 8. New apps and updates must use Play Billing Library 8 or later from 31 August 2026 (deprecation ladder), with a Play Console extension available until 1 November 2026. Already published v7 binaries keep transacting until the 2027 all-apps deadline. - How to fix it. Upgrade to com.android.billingclient:billing 8.x, or request the Play Console extension before 1 November 2026. Reference https://developer.android.com/google/play/billing/deprecation-faq - Detection signals. com.android.billingclient:billing:7, com.android.billingclient:billing-ktx:7, com.android.billingclient:billing:6 How to detect. ```bash grep -rnoE 'com\.android\.billingclient:billing(-ktx)?:[0-9]+' --include='*.gradle' --include='*.kts' . # major must be 8 or higher from 31 Aug 2026 ``` ## APPLE-3.1.2-MISLEADING-PRICING - Title. Subscription shows the per month price more prominently than the billed amount - Platform. apple - Guideline or policy. 3.1.2 - Severity. high - What triggers it. Manual paywall check. An annual subscription shows a small per month figure large and the actual billed total small. - How to fix it. Show the actual amount the user will be charged at least as prominently as any per month figure. Source. truongduy2611 misleading_pricing rule. How to detect. ```bash python3 scripts/metadata-audit.py ./metadata ``` ## APPLE-RESTORE-PURCHASES-MISSING - Title. Non consumable purchase without a Restore Purchases control - Platform. apple - Guideline or policy. 3.1.1 - Severity. high - What triggers it. StoreKit purchases are present but no restore path is found. - How to fix it. Add a visible Restore Purchases control. It is required for non consumables and non renewing subscriptions. - Detection signals. SKProduct, Product.purchase, StoreKit - Present means handled. restorePurchases, restoreCompletedTransactions, AppStore.sync, Restore Purchases How to detect. ```bash grep -rn 'SKProduct\|Product.purchase\|StoreKit' --include='*.swift' . && ! grep -rn 'restorePurchases\|restoreCompletedTransactions\|AppStore.sync' --include='*.swift' . ``` ## BOTH-LOOTBOX-ODDS - Title. Random reward mechanic without disclosed odds - Platform. both - Guideline or policy. Apple 3.1.1, Google gambling - Severity. high - What triggers it. Loot box, gacha, or random reward purchase present without odds disclosed before purchase. - How to fix it. Disclose the odds for every random reward before the user purchases. - Detection signals. lootbox, loot box, gacha, random reward, mystery box How to detect. ```bash grep -rni 'lootbox\|loot box\|gacha\|mystery box\|random reward' . ``` ## BOTH-SUBSCRIPTION-HARD-CANCEL - Title. Subscription cancellation requires a phone call, mail, or in-person visit while sign-up is a single tap - Platform. both - Guideline or policy. Apple 3.1.2 subscription terms, US FTC Section 5 / ROSCA, state subscription-cancellation statutes (California, New York, Massachusetts) - Severity. high - What triggers it. A subscription billed outside Apple in-app purchase or Google Play Billing (a web or account-settings cancellation path) directs the person to call, mail, or visit in person to cancel, instead of a self-service in-app or web cancel action. The federal FTC click-to-cancel rule was vacated in 2025 but California, New York, and Massachusetts have their own negative-option statutes in force, and the FTC retains Section 5 and ROSCA authority regardless. - How to fix it. Provide a self-service cancellation path (in-app button or account-settings web page) that is at least as easy as sign-up. Never require a phone call, a mailed letter, or an in-person visit to cancel a subscription billed outside the app stores' own billing. - Detection signals. call us to cancel, call to cancel, cancel your subscription by calling, mail a letter to cancel, write to cancel, cancel in person, visit a store to cancel How to detect. ```bash grep -rniE 'subscri(be|ption)|auto.renew|membership' --include='*.swift' --include='*.kt' --include='*.java' --include='*.html' --include='*.md' . 2>/dev/null | grep -iE '(^|[^a-z])call[^a-z].{0,24}cancel|cancel.{0,25}[^a-z]call([^a-z]|$)|mail.{0,25}cancel|(^|[^a-z])write[^a-z].{0,24}cancel|cancel.{0,15}(in.person|by.phone|by.mail)' ``` ## BOTH-WITHDRAWAL-BUTTON-MISSING - Title. Prominent contract withdrawal button or function missing for EU consumer contracts - Platform. both - Guideline or policy. Apple Guideline 3.1.2, Directive (EU) 2023/2673 Distance Marketing of Financial Services Directive - Severity. high - What triggers it. Apps offering digital subscriptions or distance contracts to EU consumers that fail to provide a prominent, easily accessible 'withdrawal button' or 'withdrawal function' on their online user interface to cancel/withdraw within 14 days. - How to fix it. Add a prominent, dedicated, and easily accessible withdrawal button or function on the user interface, allowing consumers to withdraw from contracts/subscriptions without undue friction. - Detection signals. withdrawal button, withdrawal function, withdraw from contract, distance contract withdrawal, revoke contract, cancel subscription How to detect. ```bash grep -rniE 'withdrawal button|withdrawal function|withdraw from contract|distance contract' . 2>/dev/null ``` ## APPLE-3.1.1-EXTERNAL-LINK-REGION-GATING - Title. External purchase link shown on every storefront - Platform. apple - Guideline or policy. 3.1.1 and 3.1.3 external purchase links. US-storefront carve-out only (Apple guideline update 1 May 2025, developer.apple.com/news/?id=9txfddzf) - Severity. high - What triggers it. An external purchase link, button, or call to action ships to all regions. The no-entitlement carve-out applies to the United States storefront only. The same UI is still a 3.1.1 violation in Japan, Canada, Australia, the UK, and most other storefronts, and App Review evaluates per region. Developers report budgeting two rejection rounds for this in 2026. Since 16 October 2026 the Music Streaming Services Entitlement is folded into the StoreKit External Purchase Link Entitlement bullet of 3.1.1(a), and the link must go to a permitted destination, which can vary by region. - How to fix it. Gate the external link UI on the current storefront (StoreKit Storefront.current, countryCode) and show it only where you hold the entitlement or the US carve-out applies. Outside the US keep the entitlement path and the disclosure sheet. - Detection signals. ExternalPurchaseLink, ExternalLink, external-purchase-link, openExternalPurchaseLink - Present means handled. Storefront, storefront, countryCode How to detect. ```bash grep -rqn 'ExternalPurchaseLink\|external-purchase-link\|openExternalPurchaseLink' . && ! grep -rqn 'Storefront\|storefront\|countryCode' . ``` ## ANDROID-RESTORE-CREDENTIALS-REQUIRED - Title. Sign-in state not restored on a new device - Platform. google - Guideline or policy. Play Console technical quality requirements, Zero-Tap Sign-In (Play Console Help answer 17492799) - Severity. medium - What triggers it. From April 2027 any app with user sign-in, optional or mandatory, must restore the sign-in state when the user moves to a new Android device using the Restore Credentials API. Games are currently out of scope. An app with a login flow and no RestoreCredential integration will miss the requirement. - How to fix it. Create a restore credential on successful sign-in through Credential Manager, restore it on first launch after device transfer, and clear it on sign-out. - Detection signals. signInWith, CredentialManager, FirebaseAuth, LoginActivity - Present means handled. RestoreCredential, createRestoreCredential How to detect. ```bash grep -rqn 'signInWith\|CredentialManager\|FirebaseAuth\|LoginActivity' --include='*.kt' --include='*.java' --include='*.xml' --include='*.gradle' --include='*.kts' . && ! grep -rqn 'RestoreCredential' --include='*.kt' --include='*.java' --include='*.xml' --include='*.gradle' --include='*.kts' . ``` - references/rules/performance.md (28134 bytes)
# Rules. Performance and completeness 34 rules in this category. Generated from data/rejection-patterns.json. Each rule names the guideline, the severity, what triggers it, and the fix. ## APPLE-2.1-CLOUD-NOT-IN-PRODUCTION - Title. iCloud or CloudKit schema not deployed to production - Platform. apple - Guideline or policy. 2.1 - Severity. critical - What triggers it. The app uses CloudKit or iCloud but the schema and containers are only in the development environment, so the feature fails for the reviewer on the production build. - How to fix it. Deploy the CloudKit schema and containers to production before submitting. Source. lukylab checklist. - Detection signals. CKContainer, CloudKit, NSUbiquitousKeyValueStore, iCloud How to detect. ```bash grep -rn 'CKContainer\|CloudKit\|NSUbiquitousKeyValueStore' --include='*.swift' . # then confirm the CloudKit schema is deployed to production in the CloudKit console ``` ## APPLE-2.1-MISSING-DEMO-ACCOUNT - Title. Account based app without demo credentials - Platform. apple - Guideline or policy. 2.1 - Severity. critical - What triggers it. Login or auth code present (SignInWithApple, OAuth, Auth, login view) but no demo account note found in review metadata or fastlane review_information. - How to fix it. Add a working demo account and a live test path to the Notes for Review field before submission. - Detection signals. LoginView, signIn, AuthService, OAuth, Firebase Auth How to detect. ```bash grep -rn 'signIn\|LoginView\|OAuth\|FirebaseAuth' --include='*.swift' . # then confirm a demo account is in the review notes ``` ## APPLE-2.1-STAGING-BACKEND - Title. Backend points at staging or localhost - Platform. apple - Guideline or policy. 2.1 - Severity. critical - What triggers it. API base URL in the release config contains localhost, 127.0.0.1, staging, dev, or ngrok. - How to fix it. Point the release build at the live production backend and confirm it stays up during review. - Detection signals. localhost, 127.0.0.1, staging., dev., ngrok, http:// How to detect. ```bash grep -rn 'localhost\|127.0.0.1\|staging\.\|ngrok\|http://' --include='*.swift' --include='*.plist' . | grep -v https ``` ## IONIC-UIWEBVIEW-DEPRECATED - Title. Deprecated UIWebView symbol statically linked - Platform. apple - Guideline or policy. 2.5.1 - Severity. critical - What triggers it. The literal UIWebView symbol appears anywhere in the built sources, often pulled in transitively by a stale Capacitor or Cordova plugin. - How to fix it. Apple auto-rejects (ITMS-90809) any binary statically linking UIWebView. Update every plugin to a WKWebView-based version. - Detection signals. UIWebView How to detect. ```bash grep -rn 'UIWebView' --include='*.swift' --include='*.m' . 2>/dev/null ``` ## WEB-GDPR-COMPLIANCE - Title. Processing web personal data without GDPR compliance controls - Platform. web - Guideline or policy. GDPR - Severity. critical - What triggers it. Collecting or processing personal web data without explicit opt-in controls, privacy policy links, or right to be forgotten (delete) options. - How to fix it. Integrate standard GDPR compliance gates including explicit opt-in for data processing and a mechanism for data deletion. - Detection signals. processData, personalData, submitForm, registerWeb, webForm - Present means handled. GDPR, opt-in, privacyConsent, deletePersonalData, exportData How to detect. ```bash grep -rn 'processData\|personalData\|submitForm\|registerWeb\|webForm' --include='*.js' --include='*.ts' --include='*.html' . && ! grep -rn 'GDPR\|opt-in\|privacyConsent\|deletePersonalData\|exportData' . ``` ## APPLE-2.5.19-HIDDEN-OR-DORMANT-FEATURE - Title. Hidden, dormant, or undocumented feature, or bait-and-switch after review - Platform. apple - Guideline or policy. 2.5.19 - Severity. critical - What triggers it. The binary carries functionality App Review cannot see or that the user is not told about, such as a server flag that turns on a different app after approval, a secret gesture or menu, or code obfuscated to hide a feature. Guideline 2.5.19, added 16 October 2026, moves this policy out of 2.3.1 and names bait-and-switch (misrepresenting functionality during review, then adding features after approval). Checked by hand, a remote flag alone is not a violation. - How to fix it. Ship every feature visible to review, describe each one in Notes for Review, keep remote configuration to tuning and staged rollout of reviewed features, and never obfuscate code to hide functionality. A violation is grounds for removal from the App Store and termination of the developer account. Sources. https://developer.apple.com/news/?id=92th7e5i, https://developer.apple.com/news/?id=vvzx6cul ## ANDROID-DEBUGGABLE-RELEASE - Title. Debuggable build uploaded to Play - Platform. google - Guideline or policy. Play Console upload validation - Severity. critical - What triggers it. Play Console refuses an APK or app bundle marked debuggable. Hardcoding android:debuggable="true" in the manifest ships it in the release build. - How to fix it. Remove android:debuggable from the manifest and let the release build type keep it false. - Detection signals. android:debuggable="true" How to detect. ```bash grep -rnE "android:debuggable *= *[\"']true" --include='AndroidManifest.xml' . | grep -vE '/src/(debug|test|androidTest)' ``` ## APPLE-2.1-DEBUG-FEATURES - Title. Debug or test features shipped in the production build - Platform. apple - Guideline or policy. 2.1 - Severity. high - What triggers it. Debug menus, test logins, or developer backdoors left visible in the release build rather than gated behind a debug only flag. - How to fix it. Hide debug and test features behind a debug only compile flag so they never ship in production. Source. lukylab checklist. - Detection signals. debug menu, debugMenu, test login, skip login, bypass auth, DEBUG_BYPASS How to detect. ```bash grep -rni 'debug menu\|debugMenu\|skip login\|bypass auth\|DEBUG_BYPASS' --include='*.swift' . ``` ## APPLE-2.1-PLACEHOLDER-CONTENT - Title. Placeholder content in the build - Platform. apple - Guideline or policy. 2.1 - Severity. high - What triggers it. Strings such as lorem ipsum, TODO, FIXME, placeholder, dummy, test data, example.com found in shipped resources. - How to fix it. Replace all placeholder text and assets with real content before submission. - Detection signals. lorem ipsum, placeholder, TODO, FIXME, dummy, example.com How to detect. ```bash grep -rni 'lorem ipsum\|placeholder\|TODO\|FIXME\|example.com' --include='*.swift' --include='*.strings' . ``` ## APPLE-2.1-REVIEW-NOTES-INCOMPLETE - Title. Review notes missing a required section for a new submission - Platform. apple - Guideline or policy. 2.1 - Severity. high - What triggers it. New submission review notes omit one of the six sections. Screen recording on a physical device, app purpose, access instructions and test credentials, external services list, regional differences, and regulated industry documentation. - How to fix it. Fill all six review notes sections using templates/REVIEW-NOTES-TEMPLATE.md. Source. truongduy2611 review_notes rules. How to detect. ```bash use templates/REVIEW-NOTES-TEMPLATE.md and fill all six sections ``` ## APPLE-2.5.1-PRIVATE-API - Title. Private API or deprecated framework use - Platform. apple - Guideline or policy. 2.5.1 - Severity. high - What triggers it. References to known private API selectors or deprecated frameworks found in the binary or code. - How to fix it. Use only documented public APIs and current frameworks. - Detection signals. respondsToSelector private, UIWebView, performSelector hidden How to detect. ```bash grep -rn 'UIWebView\|performSelector\|valueForKey' --include='*.swift' --include='*.m' . # review any reflection or deprecated framework use ``` ## BOTH-E-EVIDENCE-COMPLIANCE-MISSING - Title. Missing legal representative or emergency data-production response procedures for the EU e-Evidence Package - Platform. both - Guideline or policy. Regulation (EU) 2023/1543 & Directive (EU) 2023/1544 (EU e-Evidence Package) - Severity. high - What triggers it. Apps/services processing user data in the EU that fail to designate a legal representative or lack internal procedures to respond to European Production/Preservation Orders within 10 days (or 8 hours for emergencies). - How to fix it. Designate an establishment or appoint a legal representative in the EU, notify contact details by August 18, 2026, and establish internal protocols to deliver user data securely within 8 hours in emergency situations. - Detection signals. e-Evidence, European Production Order, European Preservation Order, emergency data production, law enforcement request, legal representative How to detect. ```bash grep -rniE 'e-evidence|european production order|european preservation order|emergency data production' . 2>/dev/null ``` ## BOTH-SDK-SUPPLY-CHAIN - Title. Third party SDK violates policy on the developer's behalf - Platform. both - Guideline or policy. SDK responsibility - Severity. high - What triggers it. A bundled SDK requests permissions, tracks users, or behaves in ways the app does not declare. The developer is responsible for SDK behavior. - How to fix it. Vet every SDK, keep them current, and remove any that collect or share data the app does not declare. ## BOTH-SECURE-STORAGE - Title. Sensitive tokens or credentials stored in insecure unencrypted formats - Platform. both - Guideline or policy. Data Security - Severity. high - What triggers it. Sensitive session credentials or tokens are saved directly to unencrypted plist, UserDefaults, or SharedPreferences instead of Keychain or Android Keystore / EncryptedSharedPreferences. - How to fix it. Store all sensitive data and access tokens in iOS Keychain or Android EncryptedSharedPreferences. - Detection signals. UserDefaults.standard.set, getSharedPreferences How to detect. ```bash grep -rn 'UserDefaults.standard.set\|getSharedPreferences' . | grep -i 'token\|password\|credential\|secret\|jwt' && ! grep -rn 'Keychain\|SecItemAdd\|SecItemUpdate\|EncryptedSharedPreferences\|KeyStore\|SQLCipher' . # matches guard.sh: fires only when a sensitive keyword is present AND a secure-storage API is absent ``` ## BOTH-UNSAFE-DEEPLINK - Title. Unsafe or unvalidated custom deep link URL schemes used for sensitive operations - Platform. both - Guideline or policy. Data Security - Severity. high - What triggers it. Relying on custom URL schemes for sensitive routing, navigation, or passing tokens, without strict input validation. - How to fix it. Use Universal Links (iOS) and App Links (Android) for secure domain-validated link routing, and sanitize all deep link parameters. - Detection signals. CFBundleURLSchemes, android:scheme - Present means handled. apple-app-site-association, assetlinks.json How to detect. ```bash grep -rn 'CFBundleURLSchemes\|android:scheme' . && ! grep -rn 'apple-app-site-association\|assetlinks.json' . ``` ## RN-OTA-UNDECLARED - Title. Undisclosed over-the-air JS bundle updater - Platform. apple - Guideline or policy. 3.3.2 - Severity. high - What triggers it. package.json depends on react-native or expo, and an OTA updater (react-native-code-push, expo-updates, react-native-ota-hot-update, Stallion) is present with no App Review disclosure of bug-fix-only scope. - How to fix it. Name the OTA mechanism in App Review notes and restrict it to bug fixes that do not change purpose, UI, or features beyond what was reviewed (Apple 3.3.2, 2.5.2). An undisclosed update path that adds features after approval is the bait-and-switch Apple names under 2.5.19 since 16 October 2026. - Detection signals. react-native-code-push, CodePush., expo-updates, Stallion How to detect. ```bash grep -rn 'react-native-code-push\|CodePush\.\|expo-updates' --include='*.ts' --include='*.tsx' --include='*.js' . 2>/dev/null ``` ## WEB-INDEXEDDB - Title. Structured personal data stored in IndexedDB without security controls - Platform. web - Guideline or policy. GDPR - Severity. high - What triggers it. Storing user records in IndexedDB without user consent, encryption, or proper deletion lifecycles. - How to fix it. Use encrypted IndexedDB wrappers for structured sensitive records, check user consent, and clear databases upon logout. - Detection signals. indexedDB.open, indexedDB, createObjectStore - Present means handled. encryptDatabase, deleteDatabase, consentIndexedDB How to detect. ```bash grep -rn 'indexedDB.open\|indexedDB\|createObjectStore' --include='*.js' --include='*.ts' --include='*.html' . && ! grep -rn 'encryptDatabase\|deleteDatabase\|consentIndexedDB' . ``` ## WEB-LOCAL-STORAGE - Title. Unencrypted sensitive personal data stored in localStorage - Platform. web - Guideline or policy. GDPR - Severity. high - What triggers it. Storing sensitive details or JWT tokens in plain text in localStorage without encryption or user consent check. - How to fix it. Avoid storing plain sensitive personal info in localStorage, encrypt any stored tokens, and respect storage preferences. - Detection signals. localStorage.setItem, localStorage - Present means handled. encryptedStorage, encryptToken, consentLocalStorage, clearLocalStorage How to detect. ```bash grep -rn 'localStorage.setItem\|localStorage' --include='*.js' --include='*.ts' --include='*.html' . && ! grep -rn 'encryptedStorage\|encryptToken\|consentLocalStorage\|clearLocalStorage' . ``` ## WEB-SESSION-STORAGE - Title. Sensitive session details stored in sessionStorage without protection - Platform. web - Guideline or policy. GDPR - Severity. high - What triggers it. Storing raw authentication or session keys in sessionStorage without encryption or clean-up logic. - How to fix it. Limit and secure the data written to sessionStorage, apply encryption, and ensure data is deleted at session end. - Detection signals. sessionStorage.setItem, sessionStorage - Present means handled. encryptedSession, clearSessionStorage How to detect. ```bash grep -rn 'sessionStorage.setItem\|sessionStorage' --include='*.js' --include='*.ts' --include='*.html' . && ! grep -rn 'encryptedSession\|clearSessionStorage' . ``` ## WEB-TRACKING-TECHNOLOGIES - Title. Third-party tracking technologies loaded without consent - Platform. web - Guideline or policy. GDPR - Severity. high - What triggers it. Integrating analytic pixels or tracking scripts (Google Analytics, Facebook Pixel, Hotjar) without consent validation. - How to fix it. Load third-party tracking scripts and pixels conditionally only after receiving explicit user cookie consent. - Detection signals. gtag, fbq, google-analytics, trackingPixel, analytics.js, hotjar - Present means handled. consentTracking, disableTracking, optOutTracking, trackingPreferences How to detect. ```bash grep -rn 'gtag\|fbq\|google-analytics\|trackingPixel\|analytics.js\|hotjar' --include='*.js' --include='*.ts' --include='*.html' . && ! grep
- references/rules/privacy.md (14336 bytes)
# Rules. Privacy and data 18 rules in this category. Generated from data/rejection-patterns.json. Each rule names the guideline, the severity, what triggers it, and the fix. ## APPLE-5.1.1-MISSING-PRIVACY-POLICY - Title. Missing privacy policy - Platform. apple - Guideline or policy. 5.1.1(i) - Severity. critical - What triggers it. No privacy policy URL in App Store Connect metadata and no in app privacy link reference in the codebase. - How to fix it. Publish a privacy policy, link it in App Store Connect, and reach it from inside the app. - Detection signals. privacyPolicy, privacy-policy, PrivacyPolicyURL How to detect. ```bash grep -rn 'privacyPolicy\|privacy-policy\|PrivacyPolicy' --include='*.swift' . || echo 'no privacy policy reference found' ``` ## APPLE-5.1.1-MISSING-USAGE-DESCRIPTION - Title. Sensitive framework linked without a usage description - Platform. apple - Guideline or policy. 5.1.1(ii) - Severity. critical - What triggers it. A sensitive framework or API is referenced in code but the matching NSxUsageDescription key is absent from Info.plist. - How to fix it. Add the matching usage description key with a specific reason for every sensitive framework used. - Detection signals. AVCaptureDevice, CLLocationManager, PHPhotoLibrary, CNContactStore, HKHealthStore How to detect. ```bash for k in NSCameraUsageDescription NSLocationWhenInUseUsageDescription NSPhotoLibraryUsageDescription NSContactsUsageDescription NSMicrophoneUsageDescription; do echo "$k"; plutil -extract "$k" raw */Info.plist 2>/dev/null || echo ' MISSING or empty'; done ``` ## APPLE-5.1.1-NO-ACCOUNT-DELETION - Title. Account creation without in app account deletion - Platform. apple - Guideline or policy. 5.1.1(v) - Severity. critical - What triggers it. Account creation or sign up code present but no delete account flow found. - How to fix it. Add an in app account deletion flow for any app that supports account creation. - Detection signals. signUp, createAccount, register - Present means handled. deleteAccount, delete_account, account deletion How to detect. ```bash grep -rn 'createAccount\|signUp\|register' --include='*.swift' . && ! grep -rn 'deleteAccount\|delete_account\|account deletion' --include='*.swift' . ``` ## APPLE-PRIVACY-MANIFEST-MISSING - Title. Required reason APIs or third party SDKs without a privacy manifest - Platform. apple - Guideline or policy. Privacy Manifest - Severity. critical - What triggers it. Required reason API usage or a commonly used third party SDK is present but no PrivacyInfo.xcprivacy is bundled, or an SDK lacks its signed manifest. Enforced by Apple at upload since 2024. - How to fix it. Add a PrivacyInfo.xcprivacy with NSPrivacyAccessedAPITypes and approved reason codes, list NSPrivacyTrackingDomains, and confirm every third party SDK ships its signed manifest. - Detection signals. NSFileManager, UserDefaults, systemUptime, ProcessInfo, Firebase, Alamofire - Present means handled. PrivacyInfo.xcprivacy, NSPrivacyAccessedAPITypes How to detect. ```bash find . -name 'PrivacyInfo.xcprivacy' | grep -q . || echo 'MISSING PrivacyInfo.xcprivacy'; find . -path '*/*.framework/*' -name 'PrivacyInfo.xcprivacy' # each bundled SDK should ship one ``` ## FLUTTER-PRIVACY-MANIFEST-MISSING - Title. Flutter plugin touches required-reason APIs with no PrivacyInfo.xcprivacy - Platform. apple - Guideline or policy. 5.1.1 - Severity. critical - What triggers it. pubspec.yaml present, a plugin known to touch required-reason APIs (permission_handler, image_picker, geolocator, device_info_plus, package_info_plus, shared_preferences, sqflite, firebase_*) is a dependency, and no PrivacyInfo.xcprivacy exists anywhere in the project. - How to fix it. Add an app-level PrivacyInfo.xcprivacy and confirm each Flutter plugin ships its own (Flutter 3.19+ plugins mostly do). A missing plugin-level manifest is invisible to Apple unless the app manifest also declares that plugin reason code. - Detection signals. pubspec.yaml, permission_handler, image_picker, firebase_ How to detect. ```bash grep -q 'permission_handler\|image_picker\|geolocator\|firebase_' pubspec.yaml 2>/dev/null && ! find . -name 'PrivacyInfo.xcprivacy' | grep -q . ``` ## GOOGLE-MISSING-PRIVACY-POLICY - Title. Missing privacy policy - Platform. google - Guideline or policy. User Data - Severity. critical - What triggers it. No privacy policy URL set in the Play Console store listing while the app collects user data. - How to fix it. Publish a privacy policy and set its URL in the Play Console store listing. - Detection signals. privacyPolicy, privacy-policy How to detect. ```bash grep -rn 'privacyPolicy\|privacy-policy' . || echo 'set a privacy policy URL in the Play listing' ``` ## RN-PRIVACY-MANIFEST-MISSING - Title. React Native native module touches required-reason APIs with no PrivacyInfo.xcprivacy - Platform. apple - Guideline or policy. 5.1.1 - Severity. critical - What triggers it. package.json depends on react-native or expo, native modules with required-reason API usage are present (Firebase, AsyncStorage, expo-file-system), and no PrivacyInfo.xcprivacy exists. - How to fix it. Add an app-level PrivacyInfo.xcprivacy. Native modules bundled transitively via JS deps each need their own manifest aggregated in the final IPA. - Detection signals. @react-native-firebase, AsyncStorage, expo-file-system How to detect. ```bash grep -qE '"react-native"|"expo"' package.json 2>/dev/null && grep -rn 'Firebase\|AsyncStorage\|expo-file-system' --include='*.ts' --include='*.tsx' . 2>/dev/null && ! find . -name 'PrivacyInfo.xcprivacy' | grep -q . ``` ## WEB-COOKIE-CONSENT - Title. Setting non-essential cookies without prior cookie consent - Platform. web - Guideline or policy. ePrivacy Directive - Severity. critical - What triggers it. Writing to document.cookie or cookieStore without checking if the user accepted cookies via a cookie consent banner. - How to fix it. Implement a compliant Cookie Consent banner that blocks non-essential cookies until the user gives explicit consent. - Detection signals. document.cookie, setCookie, cookieStore, js-cookie, cookieConsent - Present means handled. cookieBanner, cookieConsentBanner, acceptCookies, cookiePreferences How to detect. ```bash grep -rn 'document.cookie\|setCookie\|cookieStore\|js-cookie\|cookieConsent' --include='*.js' --include='*.ts' --include='*.html' . && ! grep -rn 'cookieBanner\|cookieConsentBanner\|acceptCookies\|cookiePreferences' . ``` ## ANDROID-ACCOUNT-DELETION-URL - Title. Account creation without in app deletion and a data deletion URL - Platform. google - Guideline or policy. User Data - Severity. high - What triggers it. Account creation present but no in app delete path and no web data deletion URL. - How to fix it. Provide in app account deletion and set a public data deletion URL in the Play Console listing. - Detection signals. signUp, createAccount, register - Present means handled. deleteAccount, delete_account, account deletion How to detect. ```bash grep -rn 'createAccount\|signUp\|register' --include='*.kt' --include='*.java' . && ! grep -rn 'deleteAccount\|delete_account' . # also set a data deletion URL in the Play listing ``` ## APPLE-5.1.1-UNNECESSARY-DATA - Title. Requiring personal data not relevant to core functionality - Platform. apple - Guideline or policy. 5.1.1 - Severity. high - What triggers it. A registration or onboarding form requires phone number, gender, marital status, date of birth, or home address when it is not essential to the core feature. Relevance is contextual. - How to fix it. Make non essential personal fields optional. Require only data directly relevant to the core feature. Source. truongduy2611 unnecessary_data rule. - Detection signals. phone, gender, marital, date of birth, birthdate, address How to detect. ```bash grep -rni 'phone\|gender\|marital\|date.of.birth\|birthdate\|address' --include='*.swift' . | grep -i 'required\|validator\|isRequired' ``` ## APPLE-5.1.1-VAGUE-PURPOSE-STRING - Title. Generic or empty permission purpose string - Platform. apple - Guideline or policy. 5.1.1(ii) - Severity. high - What triggers it. An NSxUsageDescription key in Info.plist is empty or carries a generic value such as needs access or required. - How to fix it. Write a specific purpose string naming the real feature that uses each permission. - Detection signals. NSCameraUsageDescription, NSLocationWhenInUseUsageDescription, NSPhotoLibraryUsageDescription, NSMicrophoneUsageDescription, NSContactsUsageDescription How to detect. ```bash for k in NSCameraUsageDescription NSLocationWhenInUseUsageDescription NSPhotoLibraryUsageDescription NSContactsUsageDescription; do v=$(plutil -extract "$k" raw */Info.plist 2>/dev/null); echo "$k = $v"; done # flag empty or generic values like 'required' ``` ## APPLE-5.1.2-AI-NO-CONSENT-MODAL - Title. Personal data shared with third party AI without consent modal - Platform. apple - Guideline or policy. 5.1.2(i) - Severity. high - What triggers it. A third party AI or LLM SDK is present and personal data may be sent without a consent modal naming the provider. - How to fix it. Show a consent modal naming the AI provider and data types before any personal data leaves the app. - Detection signals. OpenAI, anthropic, gemini, completion, chat/completions - Present means handled. consent, data sharing modal How to detect. ```bash grep -rni 'api.openai.com\|anthropic\|generativelanguage\|chat/completions' . && ! grep -rni 'consent' . ``` ## APPLE-5.1.2-MISSING-ATT - Title. Tracking SDK without App Tracking Transparency - Platform. apple - Guideline or policy. 5.1.2(i) - Severity. high - What triggers it. A tracking or advertising SDK is present but ATTrackingManager request is not called and NSUserTrackingUsageDescription is absent. - How to fix it. Call the ATT prompt before any cross app tracking and add the tracking usage description. - Detection signals. AppsFlyer, Adjust, Branch, FacebookSDK, IDFA, ASIdentifierManager - Present means handled. ATTrackingManager, NSUserTrackingUsageDescription How to detect. ```bash grep -rn 'AppsFlyer\|Adjust\|FBSDK\|advertisingIdentifier\|ASIdentifierManager' --include='*.swift' . && ! grep -rn 'ATTrackingManager\|NSUserTrackingUsageDescription' . ``` ## APPLE-ACCOUNT-DELETION-WEAK - Title. Account deletion is a mailto or deactivate only flow - Platform. apple - Guideline or policy. 5.1.1(v) - Severity. high - What triggers it. The only account removal path is a mailto link, a web form the user must leave the app to reach, or a deactivate that does not delete. - How to fix it. Provide genuine in app deletion of the account and its data, not a deactivate or an external form. - Detection signals. mailto:, deactivate, contact us to delete How to detect. ```bash grep -rn 'deleteAccount\|delete account' --include='*.swift' . && grep -rn 'mailto:\|deactivate' --include='*.swift' . # deletion must truly delete, not mailto or deactivate ``` ## APPLE-PRIVACY-NUTRITION-LABELS - Title. Missing Privacy Nutrition Labels data type declarations - Platform. apple - Guideline or policy. 5.1.1 - Severity. high - What triggers it. Collecting sensitive user data (e.g. email, phone, name, coordinates) but missing the privacyNutritionLabels declaration or proper nutrition disclosure references. - How to fix it. Update the app privacy manifest (PrivacyInfo.xcprivacy) with NSPrivacyCollectedDataTypes and complete corresponding Nutrition Labels in App Store Connect. - Detection signals. email, phoneNumber, userName, location, coordinates - Present means handled. NSPrivacyCollectedDataTypes, privacyNutritionLabels, privacy-nutrition-labels How to detect. ```bash grep -rn 'email\|phoneNumber\|userName\|location\|coordinates' --include='*.swift' . && ! grep -rn 'NSPrivacyCollectedDataTypes\|privacyNutritionLabels\|privacy-nutrition-labels' . ``` ## BOTH-FINGERPRINTING - Title. Device fingerprinting to track users - Platform. both - Guideline or policy. Apple 5.1.2, Google Device and Network Abuse - Severity. high - What triggers it. Building a persistent device fingerprint from hardware or settings to identify users. Apple bans this regardless of ATT consent. - How to fix it. Do not fingerprint. Use the platform advertising identifier with consent where tracking is genuinely needed. - Detection signals. fingerprint, deviceFingerprint, canvas fingerprint, identifierForVendor cross app How to detect. ```bash grep -rni 'fingerprint\|deviceFingerprint\|canvas fingerprint' . ``` ## IONIC-PRIVACY-MANIFEST-MISSING - Title. Capacitor/Cordova plugin wrapping a native SDK with no PrivacyInfo.xcprivacy - Platform. apple - Guideline or policy. 5.1.1 - Severity. high - What triggers it. Capacitor/Cordova plugins are present and no PrivacyInfo.xcprivacy exists anywhere in the project. - How to fix it. Capacitor plugin manifest support is less standardized than Flutter's. Verify each plugin wrapping a native SDK (camera, geolocation, ads) ships PrivacyInfo.xcprivacy, and add the app-level one. - Detection signals. @capacitor/, Capacitor. How to detect. ```bash grep -rq '@capacitor/\|Capacitor\.' --include='*.ts' . 2>/dev/null && ! find . -name 'PrivacyInfo.xcprivacy' | grep -q . ``` ## APPLE-5.1.1-RESCIND-CONSENT-UNHANDLED - Title. Declared Age Range used without handling RESCIND_CONSENT - Platform. apple - Guideline or policy. 5.1.1 and the age assurance framework (developer.apple.com/support/age-assurance) - Severity. high - What triggers it. The app reads Declared Age Range but never handles the RESCIND_CONSENT App Store Server Notification. When a parent withdraws consent Apple prevents the app from launching, and any server-side minor data or entitlement keyed to the withdrawn consent stays live. - How to fix it. Subscribe to App Store Server Notifications, handle RESCIND_CONSENT by revoking the minor's session and deleting consent-scoped data, and build against the iOS 26.2 SDK with Xcode 26.2 (17C52) or later, which Apple requires for all age assurance technologies. - Detection signals. DeclaredAgeRange, AgeRangeService - Present means handled. RESCIND_CONSENT, rescindConsent How to detect. ```bash grep -rqn 'DeclaredAgeRange\|AgeRangeService' . && ! grep -rqn 'RESCIND_CONSENT\|rescindConsent' . ```
- SKILL.md (9639 bytes)
--- name: app-store-compliance license: LicenseRef-OpenRoots-ORA-2.3 description: Run an enterprise pre submission compliance audit on a mobile app project before uploading to the Apple App Store or Google Play. Use when the user is about to submit, ship, or release an iOS or Android app, when an app was rejected and needs a fix plan, when reviewing App Store Review Guidelines or Google Play policy compliance, or when the user mentions App Store rejection, Play Console rejection, Resolution Center, Data Safety form, privacy nutrition labels, account deletion requirement, in app purchase rules, or app review. --- # App Store Compliance Audit This skill runs a full pre submission compliance audit against the Apple App Store Review Guidelines and the Google Play Developer Program Policies, then produces a fix plan ranked by severity. It exists because roughly one in four App Store submissions is rejected and Google blocked over 1.75 million Play submissions in 2025, almost always for the same handful of preventable causes. ## When to run it - Before any upload to App Store Connect or the Play Console. - After a rejection, to build the exact fix and appeal plan. - During a release review, as a release blocker gate. ## How to run it ### Step 1. Locate the project and the reference The compliance reference lives in the `app-store-compliance` repo. The key files are. - `data/rejection-patterns.json` the machine readable taxonomy. - `docs/APPLE.md` and `docs/GOOGLE-PLAY.md` the full rejection maps. - `docs/PRE-SUBMISSION-CHECKLIST.md` the verifiable checklist. - `docs/MISTAKE-PATTERNS.md` root causes, the appeal playbook, and real rejection case studies. - `docs/BY-APP-TYPE.md` the rejection map routed by app type. Load the section that matches the app. - `docs/ADVANCED-2026.md` the modern upload time and legal layer. - `docs/EU-REGULATORY-2026.md` the EU legal hard rules with dated sources. the EU AI Act, the DMA and the Core Technology Fee, DSA trader status, and the European Accessibility Act. Load it for any app reaching EU users. - `docs/GLOBAL-REGULATORY-2026.md` the USA and other-global legal hard rules with dated sources. COPPA, the US state App Store Accountability Acts, the external-link rules, the UK, Australia, Brazil, Canada, South Korea, India, and more, plus Apple's cross-region age-assurance spine. Load it for any app reaching those users. - `docs/PLATFORM-MECHANICS-2026.md` the platform-mechanics and newer-policy hard rules with dated sources. macOS notarization, Guideline 4.2 and 4.3 with the June 2026 saturation tightening, reader apps, France ANSSI encryption, visionOS and watchOS and tvOS specifics, Android developer verification, Foreground Service types, Play Integrity, Play Billing v8, target API, Health Connect, and the cross-cutting CSAM, UGC, accessibility, sanctions, and PCI items. Load it for any app whose type touches these. - `references/` the structured, AI loadable tree. Load `references/guidelines/by-app-type/<type>.md` for the app at hand and the relevant `references/rules/<category>.md` files for full context before judging. - `templates/REVIEW-NOTES-TEMPLATE.md` the review notes template to hand the user for a new submission. - `app-store-compliance-guard.sh` the automated scanner. The install puts it in your tool's hooks folder, listed in Step 2. For the strongest audit, also run the metadata layer. A large share of rejections live in the listing text, not the source. ``` bash scripts/pull-metadata.sh apple # pulls the live listing into ./metadata via the asc CLI python3 scripts/metadata-audit.py ./metadata # audits name, subtitle, keywords, description, URLs python3 scripts/metadata-audit.py ./metadata --propose # writes suggested fixes, source copy untouched python3 scripts/metadata-audit.py ./metadata/android --platform google # Google Play limits and rules python3 scripts/release-audit.py /path/to/app --metadata ./metadata # full gate, exit 0 clear, 2 blocked, 3 incomplete ``` The metadata audit checks character limits, other platform mentions, future functionality, negative Apple sentiment, profanity, ranking and price claims, keyword formatting, missing privacy policy and subscription terms, China storefront AI references, and malformed URLs (pass `--check-urls` to also test that each URL loads). It audits every locale folder on its own, filled from a fastlane `default/` folder and parent folders like fastlane does, and names the locale in each finding. It flags a URL that is not a real http or https address, an Apple listing with no support URL, a Google listing with no contact email, and a subscription with no real Terms or EULA link. Run it, then re run it after applying fixes. That is the detect, propose, re validate loop. The release audit blocks on any critical or high finding with exit 2. It exits 3 when a scan failed or the listing was not audited, so pass `--metadata` with your pulled listing. For monitoring evolving developer requirements, also run the Apple Developer requirements monitor. This tracks 25 key categories against active developer news/announcements and maps updates directly to repository impact: ``` python3 scripts/monitor.py --project /path/to/app/project ``` Or simulate a simulated track update (e.g., "Privacy Manifests") to preview impact: ``` python3 scripts/monitor.py --project /path/to/app/project --simulate "Privacy Manifests" ``` The monitor determines repository impact, identifies affected files, generates migration tasks, estimates release impact, and drafts a complete pull request description. ### Step 2. Run the automated scan Run the guard against the project root. Use the copy the install put in your tool's hooks folder. | Tool | Guard | |---|---| | Claude Code | `~/.claude/hooks/app-store-compliance-guard.sh` | | Codex CLI | `~/.codex/hooks/app-store-compliance-guard.sh` | | Gemini CLI | `~/.gemini/hooks/app-store-compliance-guard.sh` | | OpenCode | `~/.config/opencode/hooks/app-store-compliance-guard.sh` | | Cursor | `~/.cursor/hooks/app-store-compliance-guard.sh` | | Copilot CLI | `~/.copilot/hooks/app-store-compliance-guard.sh`, or under `$COPILOT_HOME` when set | | Grok | `~/.grok/hooks/app-store-compliance-guard.sh` | | Qwen Code | `~/.qwen/hooks/app-store-compliance-guard.sh`, or under `$QWEN_HOME` when set | | Kimi Code | `~/.kimi-code/hooks/app-store-compliance-guard.sh`, or under `$KIMI_CODE_HOME` when set | | Factory Droid | `~/.factory/hooks/app-store-compliance-guard.sh` | | Auggie | `~/.augment/hooks/app-store-compliance-guard.sh` | | Windsurf | `~/.codeium/windsurf/hooks/app-store-compliance-guard.sh` | | From a checkout | `~/repositories/app-store-compliance/agent-os/hooks/app-store-compliance-guard.sh` | ``` bash <guard path from the table> "/path/to/app/project" ``` The `scripts/` paths in this skill are relative to this skill's own folder. It detects iOS and Android, scans for the rejection patterns, and prints findings ranked critical, high, medium. It exits 2 when a critical risk is present. ### Step 3. Run the human checks the scanner cannot see Some rejection causes are not visible in code. Walk these by hand against the project. - Is the production backend live and will it stay up during the entire review window. - Is a working demo account provided in the Notes for Review or the Play test instructions. - Do the privacy nutrition labels (Apple) and the Data Safety form (Google) match the real runtime behavior including every third party SDK. This is the single biggest cause on both stores. - Do the screenshots show the app in use, not a splash or login screen. - Does the listing claim only what the app actually does. - For a new Google personal account, is the closed test of 12 testers over 14 days complete. - Are the 2026 Apple age rating questions answered. - For any app reaching EU, US, or other-global users, is the legal layer satisfied. the EU AI Act AI-disclosure and the European Accessibility Act, US COPPA and the state age-assurance laws, the DSA trader status, and the per-region 18-plus age gating. Store review does not check these. See `docs/EU-REGULATORY-2026.md` and `docs/GLOBAL-REGULATORY-2026.md`. - Are the platform-mechanics gates satisfied for the app's type. macOS notarization, Guideline 4.2 and 4.3, reader-app rules, Android developer verification, Foreground Service types, Play Integrity, Play Billing v8, target API, Health Connect, and the cross-cutting CSAM, UGC, accessibility, deletion-URL, sanctions, and PCI items. See `docs/PLATFORM-MECHANICS-2026.md`. ### Step 4. Produce the fix plan For every finding, output a table row. The pattern id, the platform, the cited guideline, the severity, the concrete fix, and the file or setting to change. Order by severity. Mark each critical as a release blocker. ### Step 5. If the app was already rejected Read the exact guideline number the store cited, find the matching pattern in `data/rejection-patterns.json`, apply the fix, then follow the appeal playbook in `docs/MISTAKE-PATTERNS.md`. Never resubmit an unchanged build. On Google, a careless resubmit moves the account toward suspension. ## The two checks that matter most If time is short, verify these two first, because they cause the majority of rejections across both stores. 1. A working demo account with a live backend. 2. A privacy declaration that matches actual runtime behavior, including every SDK. ## Output contract The audit ends with a ranked findings table and a clear verdict. Clear to submit, or blocked with a numbered fix list. Never report clear while a critical finding stands.